We analyze a Bertrand-Edgeworth game in a homogeneous product industry, under efficient rationing and constant (and identical across firms) marginal cost until full capacity utilization. We solve for the unique equilibrium in a subset of the no pure strategy equilibrium region of the capacity space in which differences in individual capacities are sufficiently small.
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