This article, from the perspective of agency and resource dependency theory, investigates the relationship between the various board characteristic measures, such as, board composition, board size, leadership structure and board activity, and accounting measures of performance in a sample of listed firms of Indian information technology (IT) sector. Panel data analysis was carried out on the sample. Our study, after controlling for firm-specific factors, found that the non-duality has a positive effect on performance only when the chairman is independent especially in the case of the larger firms. However, it failed to give evidence to the aspect of agency theory linked to board independence and firm performance. A significant and positive relationship was found between board size and firm performance. Board meeting and board attendance were not found to be associated with firm performance. Our study lends new insights specific to Indian markets as we find results contrary to the popular belief that smaller boards and boards with more independent directors lead to better firm performance.
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