Growing Restiveness of the Peasantry in Contemporary India: Context and Challenges

Abstract

The global rise of neoliberalism has drastically altered the economic landscape of the peasantry and deepened the agrarian crisis of the countries of the Global South, including India. The roots of India’s agrarian crisis can be traced to a very significant transition from dirigiste to a neoliberal macroeconomic policy regime, in 1991, which has continued till date. Its most gruesome manifestation has been high and ever-rising farmers’ suicides. Factors such as substantial compression of rural development expenditures, increasing input prices, vulnerability to world market price fluctuations due to greater openness, inadequate crop insurance and substantial weakening of the provisioning for credit, along with the governments’ apathy to the demand for remunerative prices for farm produce, are among the obvious causal correlates of the contemporary agrarian crisis in the country. An important consequence has been a steady building up of peasant resistance, particularly over the last decade, leading up to the recent mass protests. Given their scale, intensity, and tenacity, they have been widely hailed as among the most significant resistance movements within the country and across the world against the machinations of corporate power and the interests of big business. This article addresses some of the primary features of the farmers’ movement in India, and the contradictions and challenges with which it has been contending.

Introduction

For a country like India, as for a very large number of countries in the Global South, the importance of agriculture in facilitating decent livelihood continues to be critical, given that close to half of the country’s population still depends primarily on it. ¹ The obvious symptoms of the agrarian crisis in the country have been a significant deceleration in the trend of agricultural growth, along with major structural shifts, within and beyond the agricultural economy, during much of the so-called reform era, and a marked increase in income disparity between the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors (secondary and tertiary sectors). In the 1980s, the farm income per cultivator was 34% of a nonagricultural worker’s income, declining further to 25% around the mid-1990s (Chand, 2017); in 2016, a farmer earned only 20% of the national per capita income (Birthal et al., 2017). In accordance with data provided by the National Statistical Office, the most recent investigation, undertaken in 2021, revealed that the inflation-adjusted rate of income expansion for agricultural households over the preceding decade amounted to 2.5% (Nair, 2023). Furthermore, the rate of growth of the average annual total farm income decelerated from 20.38% in the decade between 2002–2003 and 2012–2013 to 11.90% between 2012–2013 and 2018–2019, leading to a significant squeeze in the rate of growth of total income among the farmers (Narayanamoorthy, 2021).

The rate of the growth of per capita production of food grains also witnessed an unprecedented compression from the 1990s compared to the preceding decades, contributing to greater food vulnerability. This obviously had an adverse impact on farmers, not to mention that a larger section of the population got further exposed to food vulnerability reflected in hunger and malnutrition, the latest National Family Health Survey-5 indicates that the number of malnourished children is one of the highest in the world. ² India’s position in the Global Hunger Index has worsened, with the country being placed at 111 out of 125 countries in 2023. Furthermore, India is performing atrociously with respect to the provision of a basic healthy diet. Seventy-four percent of Indians were not able to afford adequate nutrition, which places the country among the worst performers in the so-called developing world, as well as in comparison, India’s neighbors (UNICEF, 2023). In short, the distress in India’s agricultural economy has been multidimensional and palpable for over three decades now.

The correlates of the aforementioned agrarian distress must be visualized within the broader political economy context, both in the longue durée sense and with respect to the recent policy architecture. The gradual rise to the hegemony of neoliberalism globally since the 1970s has drastically altered the landscape of the peasant economy in a vast majority of countries, particularly in the Global South; India is no exception. However, it is important to note that in a longue durée perspective riding on the back of the mainstream ideas of economic or structural transformation, couched in “modernisation paradigms,” even within strands of political economy, driven primarily by the discourses in the Global North, the “classical” agrarian question (AQ) has largely been deemed to be resolved, such that agriculture and the peasantry have been effectively marginalized in the perspectives wedded to “growth fundamentalism.” The underlying assumption has been that industrialization is the core objective of economic transformation, and the disappearance of the peasantry is its ultimate destiny. Sure enough, substantial strands of Marxian political economy recognize the critical agency of the peasantry in overall socioeconomic transformation, which is irreducible to industrialization per se.

A detailed treatment of these issues is not possible here and, in any case, there is substantial literature pertaining to the relevant arguments. We will only flag here what needs to be noted as a critical backdrop. With respect to the debates on the resolution of the AQ, there has been considerable contestation within the Marxist tradition itself, and we have engaged with these issues in considerable detail in several of our earlier contributions (Jha & Yeros, 2021; Moyo et al., 2013, 2016). The key message which we have tried to flesh out in some detail in our earlier writings is AQ must not be reduced to the trap of backwardness/industrialization binary; in our considered opinion, the resolution of the AQ necessarily requires addressing the pertinent issues organically connected with national liberation/sovereignty. A neglect of the same, sooner or later, results in the crisis of the countryside.

The focus of this article is primarily on the recent phase of agrarian distress in India, for which, in a approximate sense, the ascendancy of neoliberalism has been critical. It is generally recognized that the roots of India’s agrarian crisis can be traced to the transition from dirigiste to a neoliberal macroeconomic policy regime, which almost came with a bang in July 1991, although some elements of such a shift were already evident during the late 1980s. Furthermore, with the country formally joining the World Trade Organization and, in particular, becoming a signatory to the Agreement on Agriculture in the mid-1990s, the agricultural sector came under the sway of neoliberalism in profound ways; on the whole, the balance sheet for this sector has been utterly disastrous during the last three decades, as is clearly evident from the large and burgeoning literature on this subject. The most gruesome and chilling manifestation of the resultant agrarian crisis has been farmers’ suicides, with close to 400,000 farmers killing themselves since the late 1990s, many of them from prosperous states such as Punjab, Kerala, and Maharashtra. ³ Factors such as substantial compression of rural development expenditures, increasing input prices, vulnerability to world market price fluctuations due to greater openness, inadequate crop insurance and substantial weakening of the provisioning for credit, along with the apathy of government to the demand for remunerative prices for farm produce, are among the obvious causal correlates of the contemporary agrarian crisis in the country.

An important consequence has been a steady building up of the peasant resistance to the onslaught of neoliberal capitalism, particularly during the last decade. Recently, the scale, intensity, and tenacity of the protests by India’s peasantry have attracted considerable attention, locally and globally, and are widely hailed as among the most significant resistance movements in recent years to the machinations of corporate power and interests of big business, not only within the country but also across the world. Against this backdrop, the core concern of this article is to provide a glimpse of some primary issues in the most recent phase of movements among the peasantry that offer a determined resistance, with clearly a progressive and political thrust, to relentless and unprecedented assaults on working people at large. This movement, took a very important form in 2020, when the movement consolidated itself at the national level against the three newly legislated farm laws. We argue that the current neoliberal regime has been forced to acknowledge a powerful contestation to its agenda, although it still remains confident of having its way; however, it seems that the battle, as of now, is in an uncertain stretch, but the least that the movement has already achieved is to put the question of the peasantry and the overall trajectory of agricultural development at the center stage.

This article seeks to flag issues that are central to the farmers’ movement, the contradictions and challenges with which it has been contending, and the standoff with essentially a belligerent Federal/National/Union (as they are used interchangeably) government, intoxicated by its brute majority and wedded to aggressive neoliberalism. The next section focuses on the core features of neoliberal architecture to situate the context of contemporary resistance. The subsequent section gives an overview of the recent struggles, focusing on the 2020–21 protests and the more recent agitations coordinated by the Samyukt Kisan Morcha (SKM). The article closes with some brief concluding remarks.

India’s Neoliberal Turn and the Peasantry

It hardly needs any reiteration that the rise of neoliberalism adversely impacted the peasantry everywhere. Compelling evidence underscores that the global ascendancy of neoliberalism has heightened the hardships faced by farmers universally and has raised grave concerns for food security, along with worsening environmental and health challenges. A recent report by the Food and Agriculture Organization (2023) estimated that the global hidden costs of agri-food systems were approximately 12.7 trillion estimated in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, dollars, in 2020. This includes hidden environmental costs such as greenhouse gas and nitrogen emissions, water use, and land-use change; hidden health costs such as losses in productivity due to unhealthy dietary patterns; and hidden social costs from poverty and productivity losses associated with undernourishment. In fact, hidden expenses seem to pose a more substantial economic challenge in nations with lower income levels, reaching an approximate average of 27% of the gross domestic product (GDP). This stands in contrast to middle-income countries, where such costs are estimated at 11%, and high-income countries where they are comparatively lower at 8%. Unsurprisingly, prioritizing the alleviation of poverty and addressing undernourishment stands as a primary concern in low-income nations, given that these factors contribute to approximately half of the overall concealed expenses quantified within these regions.

Two critical issues specific to be peasantry need to be flagged here. First, while diverse trajectories of transition unfold across the Global North and South, and within these blocs, owing to myriad factors such as neocolonialism imperialism, the role of nation-states, class dynamics etc., the overarching tendency remains universal in the context of unfettered capitalism, where the economy is left to the mercy of the unbridled dictates of the market. In essence, farmers across societal strata globally find themselves increasingly susceptible to the manipulations and impunity of agribusinesses and corporate entities. In fact, contemporary neoliberalism, coupled with the concurrent forces of imperialism, has facilitated international capital, predominantly headquartered in the Global North, to exploit multiple channels, resorting to heightened predatory measures to annex land and natural resources in the South. In succinct terms, the unfettered thrust of neoliberalism, manifested in the concept of “accumulation through encroachment,” as coined by Patnaik (2012), detrimentally impacts agriculture and farmers in the South with far greater intensity than in the North, substantiated by extensive evidence spanning nearly five decades.

The second salient issue demanding attention pertains to a pervasive myth regarding plausible and desirable trajectories of economic and occupational transformations as hinted in the previous section. We argued that contrary to conventional wisdom, a more robust perspective, as articulated by numerous progressive scholars, posits that agriculture and farmers should not be subjected to the unmitigated forces of spontaneous capitalism. In the Indian context, official sources indicate a discernible decline in real income and consumption across all rural classes in recent years. Additionally, numerous studies reveal that farm-gate prices globally have faced substantial downward pressure in real terms since the mid-1980s. Contrasting this with the substantial financial support extended by countries in the Global North to their agricultural sectors—such as the United States, Japan, and the European Union, which inject billions of dollars in direct income support and various subsidies—it becomes evident that the stress on farmers is exacerbated by the absence of similar support mechanisms in the South. Unlike almost any country in the South, China emerges as a major exception, as the foremost provider of subsidies to its agriculture, reaching a staggering USD 212 billion in 2016, very much in the same league as the leading countries in the Global North with respect to such support.

Before delving into the specifics of the peasant movements in contemporary India, it is imperative to sketch some core elements of the broader structural economic context which may facilitate a better understanding of the underlying causes and correlates of what many observers of Indian agriculture, for almost three decades now, have often described as a period of deep and pervasive agrarian distress. It must be noted, inadequacies notwithstanding, that a regulated regime and public policies vis-à-vis agriculture played an absolutely critical role in ensuring a degree of food sufficiency and security in the country. Those familiar with the late 1960s and 1970s will recall that India’s food economy at that time presented quite a difficult picture and many well-known experts had written it off as a “basket case and Malthusian nightmare.” And it was precisely a regulated regime, that included state-led policies to support the so-called Green Revolution (GR) strategy, with priority sector lending, subsidized inputs, extension services, etc., coupled with procurement operations and minimum support prices (MSP), public distribution system (PDS) at subsidized prices, and so on, that resulted in significant improvements in the overall agricultural and food situation. Although the distribution of gains with respect to incomes for cultivators was quite uneven across regions, classes, and crops, the country as a whole certainly took a large stride toward at least cereal security.

Punjab, Haryana, and Western Uttar Pradesh outshone others as success stories of the regulated regime for much of the period since the early 1970s and became leaders as granary for the nation. Even if we look at the recent estimates, around 70% of procurement of wheat and rice in the country are from Punjab and Haryana, and seven states accounted for 90% of all public procurement of paddy. As it happens, the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices announces MSP for 23 crops currently, but implementation beyond rice and wheat is quite limited, in fact negligible. Furthermore, for these two crops, between 75% and 95% of even small and marginal farmers in Punjab and Haryana are able to avail of MSP, and these numbers are dramatically higher than the all-India averages (Pandey, 2019). In short, coherence between different components of the regulated regime created particularly conducive systems in Northwestern India for realization of not only trajectories of decent output growth but also that of assured income growth that had a wide reach. The obvious reason underlying the huge anger within this region among the peasantry at large, and all those connected with agriculture, including hired farm labor, is the widespread perception that the new laws may be massive body blows to assured returns from cultivation. We must also emphasize right away that even though procurement and MSP were of limited significance in large parts of the country, farmers everywhere had benefited, of course in varying degrees, from different components of public policy since the late 1960s.

Moreover, as the regulated regime paved way for increased involvement of big businesses in this sector, the adverse impact on the peasantry mounted. For instance, as already noted, unregulated procurement through private operators (including through electronic channels) has been a widespread feature, and corporates have increasingly become active players in this market in recent years. Similarly, contract farming of various hues, with the increased presence of corporate houses, especially since the early 1990s, has been well documented across several states; these include, for example, tomato and potato in Punjab, cotton and onion in Maharashtra, and high-end exotic foods and vegetables from these and other states. Relevant research clearly establishes seriously questionable outcomes for farmers through increasing contract farming and points to the peasantry being left at the mercy of big business; clearly, based on their experiences, farmers can hardly consider “more of the same” as a panacea!

While farmer movements have garnered significant media attention lately, particularly against the introduction and subsequent repealing of three farm laws (discussed later), it must be noted that the resentment had been building for decades with small pockets of continuous resistance. This, indeed, has a lot to do with a range of issues intrinsic to the GR strategy itself, such as increased chemicalization, choice of cropping patterns, depletion of water resources, and other ecological challenges, which have contributed to falling productivity and incomes from cultivation over time and raised serious questions regarding the sustainability of various aspects pertaining to the GR. However, it needs to be stressed here that the overall macroeconomic policy regime, since the early 1990s, that ushered in a neoliberal regime, has contributed to further worsening and aggravating of already serious threats confronting Indian agriculture. Public investments in agriculture declined substantially by around 4% between the 1990s and 2000s, and expenditure on the agricultural sector has remained at an abysmal 0.3%–0.5% of the GDP in the last decade or so. Successive governments have tried to introduce policies that encourage corporate investments in agricultural infrastructure, and the three farm laws aimed to provide a qualitative push in this direction. Relevant issues have been analyzed in great detail by several scholars working on this subject, and there is a near consensus that the transition to a neoliberal regime in India since the 1990s unleashed several forces leading to growing distress in the countryside (Jha & Acharya, 2011; Patnaik, 2010).

As noted earlier, the most tragic manifestation of adversities confronting Indian agriculture has been mounting suicides by farmers, the official count of which during the last 25 years is close to 400,000 (and this number is likely to be an underestimate). As per the National Crime Records Bureau, in 2022, 11,290 deaths by suicide of those involved in farming (cultivators/agricultural laborers) were reported, showing an increase of 5.7% relative to 2020 (Shagun, 2023). Among the many correlates of neoliberalism, it is absolutely critical to mention two factors which are central to the theology of neoliberalism and the consequent withdrawal of the State from agriculture.

First, the period since the early 1990s has been one of a serious squeeze on fiscal space, with significant adverse impacts on a whole range of variables in agriculture (Jha, 2006; Jha & Acharya, 2011). Particularly since the early 1990s, a noteworthy contributor to the diminished momentum of technological innovation and infrastructural advancement in Indian agriculture has been the deficiency in capital formation, resulting in adverse repercussions for agricultural productivity and overall output. Notably, in the fiscal year 1980–1981, the proportion of capital formation in agriculture within the gross fixed capital formation of the country stood at 15.05%, dwindling to 10.04% in 1990–1991, and further diminishing to 6.91% in 2000–2001. Similarly, diverse states in India have observed varying degrees of contraction in public sector capital expenditure directed toward agricultural development. The data spanning from the fiscal year 2011–2012 to 2018–2019 revealed a decrease in government expenditure on agriculture from 11% to 9.5% as a proportion of total expenditure, while over the same period, its share in gross value added declined marginally from 18.2% to 17.8% (Shagun, 2022). This indicated a sharper decline in public spending in agriculture in terms of compound annual growth rate (CAGR, -1.65%) relative to its importance in the economy (CAGR of -0.27%) (FAS, 2022). In more recent budgets, although the fiscal allocation to agriculture has increased in absolute terms, the increase has been marginal as a proportion of total Union budget expenditure (2.45%–2.92%, between 2018–2019 and 2023–2024), as well as that of the GDP (0.3%–0.4% over the same period) (Centre for Budget and Governance Accountability (CBGA), 2023).

Within specific subsectors, a conspicuous reduction in governmental expenditure has been discernible in crop cultivation, food production, and irrigation between the fiscal years 2011–2012 and 2018–2019. However, this has been juxtaposed with an upward trajectory in governmental disbursements that focus more on credit allocation and interest subsidies. In essence, the trajectory of public expenditure in the agricultural sector has shifted away from direct production support, such as quality inputs, mechanization, postharvest management, institutional support, redirecting its focus toward income support mechanisms, and credit-based interventions. In the 2018–2019 budgetary allocations, 56.6% of the Union government’s expenditure on agriculture and allied sectors was on sector-wise support. This declined to 26.6% in the most recent budget of 2023–2024. Correspondingly, the individual farmer-centric support increased from 43.4% to 73.4% (CBGA, 2023). Though there is an urgent need to provide direct financial support to the peasantry, sector-wide measures remain crucial to long-term sustained growth in agriculture and ensuring that agriculture becomes a viable occupation.

The second factor for worsening agrarian distress during the reform period has been increased exposure to unregulated markets, both domestic and international, and thus to higher volatility in the vector of prices. The net result has been that of sustained tendencies, during much of the neoliberal era, of mounting costs, falling farm-gate prices, downward pressure on income from cultivation, and growing indebtedness: in short, almost a three-decade-long period of distress which has seriously threatened very survival of the overwhelming majority of the Indian peasantry.

Thus, a massive squeeze on the peasantry has been evident for some time contributing to its restiveness and leading to frequent protests, especially during the period of the Modi government since 2014, due to further assaults on the countryside through various acts of omission and commission. Relevant data show the disastrous impact of the agrarian crisis on the peasantry in terms of the falling income from cultivation and the growing indebtedness of farmers. Between 2013 and 2019, the share of income from cultivation in the total income of an agricultural household fell from 47.9% to 37.2%, and the share of wage labor in the total income of an agricultural household went up from 32.2% to 39.8%. Further, the average yearly debt of an agricultural household went up from approximately ₹47,000 in 2013 to approximately ₹74,121 in 2019; the proportion of indebted agricultural households remained almost stagnant at about 55%–52% in the same period. ⁴ This reflects the growing misery of the peasantry and its increasing “forced semi-proletarianisation.” It is also worth noting here that a comparison of the National Sample Surveys of 2011–2012 and 2017–2018 (the latter was never released by the current government but got leaked out) shows that per capita consumption expenditure in real terms over this period declined by almost 9%, which is unprecedented for any quinquennium since Independence; furthermore, this decline in rural consumption expenditure was reported across all deciles, including the richest.

Recent Peasant Movements in India

Given the state of agrarian distress, it is not surprising that, for almost a decade five years now, the anger of the peasants has often brought them to the streets, and both the intensity and frequency of the organized protests have been on the rise. It is within such a context that the current tide of resentment sweeping the peasantry needs to be located. As elsewhere, neoliberalism in India has subjected the peasantry and other working people to an economic squeeze through the dismantling of several components of limited protection that were put in place during the dirigiste era. However, even with the transition to the neoliberal order from the early 1990s, a few important provisions were not abandoned entirely, although weakened considerably; in agriculture, provisions of procurement of farm produce, MSP, and PDS continued to provide a degree of support both to peasant agriculture and food security. Available data on the MSP for common paddy and wheat reveal that there has hardly been any substantial increase in their real values from 2001 onward. The last significant revision for both these crops was between 2011 and 2013, under the second United Progressive Alliance government. Thereafter, a moderate increase was witnessed in 2018, in the case of common paddy; furthermore, the bonus payments offered by state governments have been recently dismantled. ⁵ Given the brazen apathy of the current regime during the last few years, and especially the new farm laws, the peasantry fears that whatever protection is left of the dirigiste regime will be snatched away and that Indian agriculture will effectively be taken over by corporate power. It is such a perception, coupled with unprecedented insensitivity of the current government compared to any other, that provides a clue to the most recent protests and the largest ever mobilization witnessed in Independent India.

In recent decades, various localized and fragmented resistance movements have been documented across different regions of the country. The current distinctive development lies in the heightened coordination observed among a comprehensive array of farmers’ organizations, culminating in the amalgamation of their collective endeavors. The persistent agrarian challenges have given rise to objective circumstances prompting farmer entities nationwide to unite under the umbrella of the All India Kisan Sangharsh Coordination Committee (AIKSCC), established in 2016, comprising 130 organizations, from the Rashtriya Kisan Mazdoor Sangathan (National Farmers’ and Workers’ Organization), to federations such as the All India Kisan Sabha, which spans at least 15 states, as per the latest tally, presently with a membership of more than 15 million spread over the country. This committee encompasses diverse types of farmers’ organizations, ranging from those with a localized presence in a single district or a couple of states. While there is a lack of precise statistics regarding the extent of the agitation, it is well acknowledged that coordinated protests transpired in a minimum of eight states since 2015 (Jha, 2017; Jha & Yeros, 2021). Notable among these are Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra (encompassing nearly all districts within the state), Odisha, Haryana, and Punjab (encompassing several districts). In select states such as Assam and Jharkhand, sporadic protests have occurred, contingent upon the nationwide call initiated by the Coordination Committee.

As already noted, one of the most recent and hugely successful peasant movements in the country was witnessed in the aftermath of the introduction of the three farm laws: The Farmers’ Produce Trade and Commerce (Promotion and Facilitation) Bill, 2020; The Farmers’ (Empowerment and Protection) Agreement of Price Assurance and Farm Services Bill, 2020; and The Essential Commodities (Amendment) Bill, 2020. ⁶ The laws were eventually repealed. It is worth noting right away that the broad intent underlying these laws is not entirely new, and the Federal/Union governments headed by different political parties during the last three decades have often been inclined to include the underlying issues in the relevant policy discourses through favorable lenses.

The official raison d’être for these three legislative changes, on the whole, was to free Indian agriculture, and thereby farmers, from an “archaic, over-regulated and inefficient” system with respect to all major aspects (investment, production, trade, etc.) pertaining to the sector. The officials of the current regime claimed that Indian agriculture has remained trapped in a suboptimal condition due to an ill-conceived regulatory regime imposed by misguided “socialist” governments for decades, robbing the sector of potentially market-driven dynamism through investments, technologies, and gains from internal and external trade, which has hurt farmers’ income, discriminated against them disproportionately vis-à-vis other economic groups, and effectively pushed them into ever-growing distress. In short, the government of India, through the above-noted legislations, attempted to give the message of an unabashed endorsement of further freedom to market forces, which effectively means corporate power and agribusiness, to determine the trajectory and outcomes pertaining to Indian agriculture.

Arguably, the Union government must have sensed the possible discontent on account of the proposed legal changes, at least within sections of the peasantry, although it may not have anticipated its intensity and degree of resentment. Hence, using the cover of the COVID-19 pandemic, these were passed as ordinances in June 2020, taking recourse to the country’s constitutional framework to address, ostensibly, some urgent challenges; clearly, the measure was highly controversial, if not dubious. Approximately three months down the road, the government felt emboldened to get the Parliament’s approval, in what some consider a questionable procedural manner, hailing the outcome as a “watershed” moment for the prospects of Indian agriculture and farmers.

Without engaging with the laws in a detailed fashion, we highlight a few key elements. Law I aimed to remove restrictions on processes, agents, and physical procurement for trade in farmers’ produce, as mandated by the Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee Acts (APMC Acts) across a large number of states (provinces) in the country, allowing farmers and buyers to trade freely, without any requirement of licenses, commission fees, stock limits, etc., and it also permitted transactions through virtual platforms. Furthermore, it is extremely important to note that, since the mid-1960s, the country has had an MSP regime, and procurement through APMCs is required to be at the announced prices. As it happens, Law I remained silent on this, creating huge apprehensions amongst the farmers that the proposed legislation could be the end of the MSP regime, sooner or later. Law II sought to create an architecture and legal framework for “contract farming” through prior stipulated terms and conditions (including a predetermined price) between a farmer and a buyer, outside the purview of the existing APMC Acts. Law III reconstituted the list of the “Essential Commodities” by removing several important produces, such as cereals, pulses, edible oils, oilseeds, potatoes and onions, amongst others, most of these being central to food baskets across the country, and removing restrictions on their stocking and trade (including on exports).

At the most basic level, here is a contestation between two dramatically different perspectives: laissez-faire versus regulated capitalism, specifically with respect to agriculture. Beyond this basic recognition, there are further complexities in the conceptual and empirical terrain which need not be elaborated here. However, it is quite clear that the government and all its supporters, including a few “well-known economists and so-called agricultural experts,” had nothing to offer to the discourse beyond crude market fundamentalism. On the other hand, the critics engaged with considerable seriousness and nuance, exposing the official claims and their vacuity, which have simply been stonewalled by the establishment. There is already a large literature, both academic and journalistic, on these issues. ⁷

The Union government and its supporters repeatedly portrayed the protests as limited to small segments of rich farmers in pockets of Northwestern India who are hell-bent on blocking the progress of Indian agriculture and the country at large. All those supporting the agitating farmers, and the farmers themselves, were labeled by sections of the official establishment and their supporters, as “anti-nationals” of various hues. In contrast to these yarns of falsehoods being spun in large quantities by the current regime and its hyperactive acolytes, there is little doubt that the disquiet of the farmers subsequent to the above-noted agricultural ordinances, passed in early June 2020, became a mass movement in almost no time in the state of Punjab, resulted in gradual mobilization of the peasantry across several states of India, notably Haryana, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Karnataka, and Maharashtra, and had an echo in many other provinces in the country. The passing of the three laws by the Indian Parliament provided fresh impetus to widespread anger and mobilization, resulting in the decision to march to the National Capital, which began on November 25, 2020, from Punjab, led by units of the Bharatiya Kisan Union and joined by several constituents of the AIKSCC, functioning as a broad front for more than 250 farmer organizations.

This enormous mass of marching peasantry in hundreds of thousands was stopped at the borders of Delhi with the brute and repressive might of the state on full display. To the huge credit of the movement, it remained resolutely nonviolent and decided to occupy three entry points, namely, Singhu, Tikri, and Gazipur on the borders of Delhi, to continue their determined opposition to the so-called black laws. Over time, there was no significant waning of farmers’ determination, or solidarity and support from across the country for their movement; in fact, creative strategies of resistance took the protests into new territories, geographically and politically. Thus, what emerged as “summer of disquiet” in Punjab in early 2020, evolved into “winter of discontent” in large parts of Northwestern India toward the closing months of 2020, and remains a grueling pan-India battle as we go ahead.

Law I, as noted earlier, promised an easily accessible and barrier-free market for all farmers, which would ensure the best possible outcomes for all. Farmers, while endorsing the importance of “well-functioning markets,” insist that a “fair and free market” must not be held hostage by a clutch of trade cartels and agribusiness corporations, which is what they pin-pointed as their key apprehension vis-à-vis this law. The central concern articulated by the movement vis-à-vis Law II, which is often referred to in popular parlance as the “contract farming law,” was along similar lines; it was feared that this Act would limit and constrain the operation of existing APMC Acts to the physical boundaries of the existing mandis (market yards), and facilitate a free play for corporate agribusiness elsewhere. Furthermore, there was a strong apprehension that, given the huge imbalances in economic power between the corporations and the overwhelming majority of farmers, the presumed freedom of choice to enter into contracts and trade their produce, for any significant betterment in their lot, would be illusory for the bulk of the peasantry. Contrary to the official claims, it was felt that the degree of freedom would get curtailed, resulting in worsening economic prospects for farmers, such as lower incomes and loss of assets, and even leading to new forms of bondage. ⁸ With respect to Law III, the major apprehension of the movement was that it would result in dramatic strengthening of speculative forces in critical agricultural commodities, which are likely to depress farmers’ income, while hurting large segments of consumers through higher prices, and thus result in the worsening of food security.

Another widely shared concern among agitating farmers was that if the legal regime consisting of these laws came into effect, it would be a matter of time before the existing system of procurement, and MSP would be destroyed through neglect and stealth, which would also have grave implications for the PDS. Finally, a significant issue with respect to the new legal regime was that it constituted a serious violation of the federal character of the Indian Constitution and blatant attempt by the current Union government to usurp the powers of the state governments. Apart from the outright illegality, a framework imposed from above ignores multiple historic-economic complexities and diversities across states, creates administrative hurdles, and closes political spaces for farmers with respect to dealing with the governments which they generally consider appropriate for the task.

Of course, several other important issues and concerns were raised by the movement in response to the proposed law, and to the larger agrarian context in general, which cannot be taken up here for reasons of space. The foregoing highlights can be summed up into two critical apprehensions in an overarching sense: first, a huge asymmetry in economic power between agribusiness corporates and the peasantry at large, in the context of pushing Indian agriculture further into a regime of unbridled market forces, nationally and globally; second, within the domestic polity, yet another major shove toward centralization, that precludes possibilities of progressive interventions at the level of subnational governments, as envisioned and guaranteed by the country’s Constitution.

The common refrain often raised by the spokespersons and advocates of the new farm laws, that the existing administrative–legal dispensation through APMC and other instruments had implied a severe curtailment to freedom of choice and access to the market for farmers, is deeply flawed. As it happens, official estimates tell us that approximately 94% of farmers in the country sell their produce outside the APMC market yards, to whoever is a willing buyer and there is no dearth of them; the core questions have to do precisely with the nature and functioning of the “free market,” and whether they can ever address the issues of assured and “reasonable returns” to farming as an economic activity. Contrary to these claims, farmers have argued that the regulated regime, with its APMC, MSP, etc., has benefited them over decades in Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and other states; of course, in several states of the country, the network of APMC yards is woefully inadequate, with only about 27% of the total national production being procured by government agencies between 2003 and 2018. Furthermore, there are serious delays and lapses in procurement, and the existing regulatory regime is characterized by quite a few infirmities. These inadequacies of the system have led to the disproportionate distribution of gains across regions, crops, and classes; especially the marginal and small farmers, accounting for over 85% of cultivators, have gained little from the provisions of the regulated regime. All these issues have been indeed well recognized and articulated by farmers’ movements over time, and hence there has been a demand for universalizing procurement at MSP for some time now. However, these new laws passed by the current regime would have formally pushed Indian agriculture in the opposite direction and exposed it to the impunity and ravages of corporations.

On the issue of this huge national-level movement, it is important to highlight that the level of coordination among a whole spectrum of farmer unions and organizations, to put aside their differences and come together on a common platform, and to work for a critical minimum agenda, was another remarkable feature of the agitation. Spurred by the struggles in Punjab launched soon after the promulgation of the above-noted ordinances on June 5, 2020, the AIKSCC organized impressive protests across the country. The AIKSCC, which has been a major initiative of farmers’ organizations toward a national platform, came into existence in 2017, soon after five farmers were killed by police in Mandsaur, Madhya Pradesh, while protesting against some of the farm policies of the then Bharatiya Janata Party government in the state. Since its inception, the AIKSCC has emerged as a powerful voice of the peasantry and has launched major campaigns at the national level on a common agenda. Two of its key demands have been legal entitlement to remunerative prices and relief from debt. Underlying the common agenda, of course, is a clear understanding that the neoliberal policy regime is the root cause of the current agrarian crisis, and anything short of a substantive, frontal confrontation with it, will simply imply skirting the core issues, and hence cannot be a way forward.

More recently, a major step in the farmers’ movements has been the convening of the All India Joint Convention of Workers and Farmers on August 24, 2023, at Talkatora Stadium, New Delhi, initiated by the Joint Platform of Central Trade Unions/Federations/Associations and Samyukta Kisan Morcha, representing substantial segments of the working people in India, serving as an occasion to assess the disconcerting state of affairs faced by workers, farmers, and the general populace. This critical evaluation is prompted by the implementation of profoundly detrimental pro-corporate policies vigorously pursued by the central government since 2014.

In terms of the unity within the movement, as one would expect, given the diversities of social and economic bases underlying various organizations coming together to form any such broad front, palpable differences are bound to be there; indeed, some of the contradictions are deep-rooted and profound, as serious observers of peasant movements in contemporary India are well aware of. However, going by the experiences of recent years, and the recent tides of mobilization, it would appear that there has been substantive political progress in handling differences across conflicting strands, including major antagonistic ones, for instance on matters of class, caste, and gender. Of course, these have not, and will not, disappear as long as the structural-social basis of the same remains powerfully intact. It seems, however, that the almost no-holds-barred assault of neoliberal policies, concomitant crisis in the countryside, and perceptions of what looms ahead if more of the same continues have brought about relatively better critical engagement and unity of purpose between different shades of farmer organizations, to challenge policies that threaten very survival of the overwhelming majority of the peasantry, through multiple channels. The recent dramatic show of resilience by the Indian peasantry does shine through, amidst the hopelessness that has been perpetrated by the neoliberal regime in general, and the current Indian state in particular.

Furthermore, even though the 2020 movement was historic in its scale and impact, it would be erroneous to assume that the momentum of peasant movements has been lost in the aftermath of the repealing of these laws. In fact, it has lent strength to the overall struggle of the peasantry against the assault of neoliberal policies. As already noted, the most recent precipitation has been the demonstration organized in Punjab between 24 and 26 November by SKM, demanding a statutory assurance of the MSP as specified in the directives of the Swaminathan Commission report, an augmentation of MSP to encompass additional crops, the cessation of legal actions instigated against farmers in connection with both the agrarian protest and rice straw incineration, and the establishment of a monthly pension amounting to ₹10,000 for farmers aged 60 years and beyond. In fact, SKM recently came out with its charter of demands aimed at the overall well-being of the peasantry and workers. Their list of demands ranges from control of inflation, removal of GST on essential items such as food, agro-inputs and machinery, the withdrawal of PM Fasal Bima Yojna (contributory insurance scheme for farmers) and its replacement by a comprehensive Public Sector Insurance scheme for all crops, to the realization of the right to work, guaranteeing food security, and increasing the national minimum wage, to mention a few. Clearly, the struggle goes on in spite of heavy odds against it vis-à-vis the state–corporate nexus.

Concluding Remarks

In the contemporary neoliberal geopolitical landscape, the scramble for land and natural resources has gained renewed momentum, with prominent global investors becoming evermore powerful actors in the relevant domain. At the same time, any earnest social or political movement of significance contemplates the adoption of the peasant path as a contemporary resolution to the multifaceted crises of our era, encompassing economic, climatic, and energy-related challenges. Clearly, the dominant economic trajectory of appropriating land and natural resources constitutes an untenable recourse for the vast majority of humanity. In the grander temporal scheme, this approach inexorably leads to calamity for the foundations of civilization. A pressing exigency emerges, compelling a nuanced contemplation of innovative developmental alternatives.

The contemporary history of agrarian distress in neoliberal India has been accompanied by growing peasant restiveness since the 1990s that most recently reflected in the heightened protests against the three farm laws that eventually had to be repealed. The pursuit of neoliberal policies since the 1990s has resulted in the worsening of the overall economic prospects of large sections of the population in the countryside. This has tended to accentuate the contradictions between the mass of the working people and corporate capital, which is currently supported by a revanchist, retrograde, and ever more market-friendly neoliberal regime.

There is no country in the world which can be considered reasonably caring for its farmers that abandons agriculture entirely to the logic of unbridled market forces. And the ongoing farmer movement in India is acutely aware of it. It is hardly surprising that the movement has been unrelenting in its demands, even while confronting the most insensitive, autocratic government that India has seen since Independence. On the borders of Delhi, it was a most valiant and tortuous struggle for the farmers to make their voices heard in the corridors of power and get the laws repealed. It took a heavy toll as more than 750 farmers lost their lives at the Delhi borders alone during the period since the beginning of the sit-in. While the struggle against the farm laws was quite successful, the war remains far from being won. Within the present regime, it is likely to be a long and grueling one, and farmers seem determined for such a haul with ongoing protests and demonstrations across the country.