This article discusses the heterogeneity and power asymmetry within Agricultural Value Systems (AVS). The power asymmetry arises due to the peculiar nature of cultivation and noncultivation sections of the AVS and also because of different factor endowments within the farming community. The power asymmetry in AVS siphons off surplus from cultivation to noncultivation segments of the AVS. The theoretical discussion in this article is followed by an example of paddy value systems in India. The article suggests that merely connecting farmers with the markets will not be sufficient because of the systemic existence of power asymmetry.
AbrolD. (2021). Concentration in global seed and agro-chemical industry: Implications for Indian agriculture. Corporate Concentration in Agriculture and Food, 14–28. https://focusweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/CorpConAg_Dossier_FocusJuly2020-1.pdf
2.
AdityaK. S., SubashS. P., PraveenK. V., NithyashreeM. L., BhuvanaN., & SharmaA. (2017). Awareness about minimum support price and its impact on diversification decision of farmers in India. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies, 4(3), 514–526.
3.
AminS. (1978). The law of worldwide value. Monthly Review Press.
4.
BaldwinD. A. (1978). Power and social exchange. The American Political Science Review, 72(4), 1229–1242.
5.
BhaduriA. (1973). A study in agricultural backwardness under semi feudalism. The Economic Journal, 83(329), 120–137.
6.
BharadwajK. (1974). Production condition in Indian agriculture. Cambridge University Press.
7.
BharadwajK. (1997). Agricultural price policy for growth: The emerging contradictions. In ByresT. J. (Ed.), The state, development planning and liberalisation in India. Oxford University Press.
8.
BlauP. M. (1964). Exchange and power in social life. Wiley.
9.
ChakravartyS. (1984). Power structure and agricultural productivity. In DesaiM.., RudolphS. H., & RudraA. (Eds.), Agrarian power and agricultural productivity in South Asia (pp. 345–374). Oxford University Press.
10.
ChandR. (2009). The wheat market: Distortions caused by government interventions. Economic and Political Weekly, 44(12), 41–46.
11.
DahlR. A. (1968). Power. International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 12, 405–415. Free Press.
12.
DevS. M., & RaoN. C. (2005). Food processing and contract farming in Andhra Pradesh: A small farmer perspective. Economic and Political Weekly, 40(26), 2705–2713.
13.
DevS. M., & RaoN. C. (2010). Agricultural price policy, farm profitability and food security. Economic and Political Weekly, 45(26/27), 174–182.
14.
DoES. (2018). Agricultural statistics at a glance 2017. Directorate of Economics and Statistics (DoES).
15.
FosterJ. B., McChesneyR. W., & JonnaR. J. (2011). Monopoly and competition in twenty-first-century capitalism. Monthly Review, 66(11), https://monthlyreview.org/category/2011/volume-62-issue-11-april/
16.
GillA. (2004). Interlinked agrarian credit markets: Case study of Punjab. Economic and Political Weekly, 39(33), 3741–3751.
17.
HarrissJ. (2006). Power matters: Essays on institutions, politics and society in India. Oxford University Press.
18.
HomansG. C. (1961). Social behavior: Its elementary forms. Revised edition. Harcourt, Brace & World Inc.
19.
JhaP. (1988). Review: Agrarian power and agricultural productivity. Social Scientist, 16(11), 51–72.
20.
KaleckiM. (1971). Selected essays on the dynamics of the capitalist economy, 1933–1970. Cambridge University Press.
21.
KaurR., & SharmaM. (2012). Agricultural subsidies in India boon or curse. IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 2(4), 40–46.
22.
KumarM. (2019). India’s rice export: What is in it for farmers?Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy, 8(1–2), 136–171.
23.
MarxK. (1867). Capital: A critique of political economy, Volume I. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Capital-Volume-I.pdf
24.
MarxK. (1968). Theories of the surplus value, Volume–II. Progress Publishers.
25.
MilibandR. (1984). Class power and state power. Verso Book. https://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/Soc924-2011/Miliband%20-%201983%20State%20Power%20and%20CLass%20nterests%20NLR13404.pdf
26.
MuthiahC. (1961). Marketable surplus of foodgrains: Policy for third plan. Economic and Political Weekly, 13(3), 87–89.
27.
NSSO. (2014). Key indicators of situation of agricultural households in India-70th round. National Sample Survey Office.
28.
PatnaikU. (1999). EMS on the agrarian question: Ground rent and its implications. Social Scientist, 27(9/10), 51–64.
29.
SarkarA. (2011). Socio-economic implications of depleting groundwater resource in Punjab: A comparative analysis of different irrigation systems. Economic and Political Weekly, 46(7), 59–66.
30.
SaxenaN. C. (2013). Tenancy reforms vs open market leasing – what would serve the poor better?Planning Commission, Government of India.
31.
ScherrerC. (2021). The “nested” power of TNCs: Smallholders’ biggest challenge. Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy, 10(2), 391–403.
32.
SweezyP. M. (1946). The theory of capitalist development. Monthly Review Press.
33.
ThakurJ., BoseM. L., HossainM., & JanaiahA. (2001). Rural income distribution and poverty in Bihar: Insights from village studies. Economic and Political Weekly, 35(52/53), 4657–4663.
34.
ThingalayaN. K. (1965). Has the farmer benefited from high prices? A comparison of trends in harvest and annual prices. Economic and Political Weekly, 17(23), 923–925.
35.
WeberM. (1957; first published 1922). The theory of social and economic organization (Trans HendersonA. M. & ParsonsT.). Free Press.
36.
YaffeD. (1974). Value and price in Marx’s capital. Revolutionary communist.
