Despite being a pivotal area of research and practice, antitrust literature on platform companies lacks a policy and managerial toolkit. This gap is significant considering the need for a toolkit for thorough analysis of the ever-evolving antitrust issues. Therefore, this study has been undertaken with the intention to highlight the strategic importance of antitrust issues and to aid managerial decision-making with the support of a toolkit. To conduct the study, a deductive thematic analysis approach is adopted. The process of coding starts with analysing the US antitrust hearing. Multiple deliberations are undertaken to develop the common list of codes and subsequently to a higher-order theme. Further analysis of Google’s abuse of dominance across countries indicates that the antitrust divide continues to exist across the globe. The managerial toolkit centring on nine emerging antitrust themes provides a snapshot of antitrust regulations in a country. With platform companies becoming ubiquitous, a nuanced understanding of the factors constituting anticompetitive practices would be imperative for platform managers.
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