The purposes of this study are to examine the nature of air pollution control and available policy instruments in the United States. Focusing on command-and-control (CAC), emission tax, bubble policy and emission offset policy, this study analyzes their theoretical frameworks and limitations. The analysis of this study suggests that the U.S. air pollution control policies have been evolved to deal with economic inefficiencies from the CAC approach. Reforming the pollution policy to market incentive systems could achieve the efficiency of pollution control. Possible policy implications are also discussed.
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