This research utilizes the 2010 Environmental Performance Index to examine how electoral rules affect environmental performance in 20 Latin American democracies. Using supporting time-series analysis with dependent variables for habitat protection, particulate matter, and carbon dioxide emissions from 2000 to 2008, our study finds that proportionality and party systems influence environmental performance in the region. Results show that representation impacts ecosystem vitality more so than public health. We account for this gap by arguing that levels of political representation influence the allocation of public and private goods which, in turn, help determine environmental outcomes. Our findings do not always paint a consistent picture, which may be attributed to the difficulties of operationalizing complex concepts such as environmental performance within and across countries and examining how these relationships change over time. Additional research is warranted to tease out these relationships.
AmesB (1995) Electoral rules, constituency pressures, and pork barrel: Bases of voting in the Brazilian Congress. Journal of Politics57(2): 324–343.
2.
AmesB (2001) The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
3.
Austen-SmithD (2000) Redistributing income under proportional representation. Journal of Political Economy108(6): 1235–1269.
4.
BarrettSGaddyK (2000) Freedom, growth and the environment. Environment and Development Economics5(4): 433–456.
5.
BawnKRosenbluthF (2006) Coalition parties versus coalition of parties: How electoral agency shapes the political logic of costs and benefits. American Journal of Political Science50(2): 251–265.
6.
BhattaraiMHammingM (2001) Institutions and the environmental Kuznets curve for deforestation: A cross-country analysis for Latin America, Africa, and Asia. World Development29(6): 995–1010.
7.
BlaisABodetA (2006) Does proportional representation foster closer congruence between citizens and policymakers?Comparative Political Studies39: 1243–1262.
8.
Bueno de MesquitaBSmithASiversonRM, et al. (2003) The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
9.
BuitenzorgyMMolAPJ (2011) Does democracy lead to a better environment? Deforestation and the democratic transition peak. Environmental and Resource Economics48(1): 59–70.
10.
CainBEFerejohnJFiorinaM (1987) The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
11.
CareyJShugartMS (1995) Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formula. Electoral Studies14(4): 417–439.
12.
Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania (2011) Penn World Table Version 7.0.
13.
ChangE (2005) Electoral incentives for political corruption under open-list proportional representation. Journal of Politics67(3): 716–730.
14.
ChangEGoldenM (2007) Electoral systems, district magnitude, and corruption. British Journal of Political Science37(1): 115–137.
15.
CheibubJAPrzeworskiASaieghS (2004) Government coalitions under parliamentarism and presidentialism. British Journal of Political Science34(4): 565–587.
16.
CongletonR (1992) Political institutions and political control. The Review of Economics and Statistics74(3): 412–421.
17.
CoxGWMcCubbinsMD (1993) Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Berkeley: University of California Press.
18.
CoxGWMcCubbinsMD (2001) The institutional determinants of economic policy outcomes. In: HaggardSMcCubbinsM (ed.) Structure and Policy in Presidential Democracies. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp.21–63.
19.
CoxGWMorgensternS (2002) Epilogue: Latin American reactive assemblies and pro-active presidents. In: MorgensternSNacifB (eds) Legislative Politics in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp.1–22.
20.
CoxGWThiesM (1998) The cost of intraparty competition: SNTV and money politics in Japan. Comparative Political Studies31(3): 267–291.
21.
CrepazM (1998) Inclusion versus exclusion: Political institutions and welfare expenditures. Comparative Politics31(1): 61–80.
22.
DahlR (1971) Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press.
23.
DaltonRFarrellDMcAllisterI (2011) Political Parties and Democratic Linkage: How Parties Organize Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
24.
DaltonRFarrellDMcAllisterI (2012) Political Parties and Democratic Linkage. In: How Parties Organize Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
25.
DeaconR (1999) Dictatorship, democracy, and the provision of public goods. UC Santa Barbara Economics Working Papers, 11–99.
26.
DuvergerM (1959) Political Parties. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
27.
EpsteinDO’HalloranS (1999) Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
28.
FacettiJ (2009) Is Latin America condemned by corruption? In MillettRLHolmesJSPerezOJ (eds) Latin American Democracy: Emerging Reality or Endangered Species. New York: Routledge, pp.301–324.
29.
FiorinoDJ (2006) The New Environmental Regulation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
30.
FranzeseRNooruddinILong-JuskoK (2004) Geographic versus partisan bases of representation: Party unity and the effective constituency in US distributive politics. Presentation, Midwest Political Science Association, 15–18 April 2004, Chicago, IL.
31.
FredrikssonPGWollscheidJR (2010) Party discipline and environmental policy: The role of “smoke-filled back rooms”. Scandinavian Journal of Economics112(3): 489–513.
32.
GoldenM (2003) Electoral connections: The effects of the personal vote on political patronage, bureaucracy, and legislation in postwar Italy. British Journal of Political Science33(2): 189–212.
33.
GoldenMChangE (2001) Competitive corruption: Factional conflict and political malfeasance in postwar Italian Christian democracy. World Politics53(4): 588–622.
34.
GoldenMStramskiJ (2010) Ideological congruence and electoral institutions. American Journal of Political Science54: 90–106.
35.
GourevitchP (2003) The politics of corporate governance regulation. Yale Law Journal112(7): 1829–1880.
36.
GourevitchPShinnJ (2005) Political Power and Corporate Control: The New Global Politics of Corporate Governance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
37.
GrossmanGMKruegerAB (1995) Economic growth and the environment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics110(2): 353–377.
38.
GrossmanGMHelpmanE (2005) A protectionist bias in majoritarian politics. Quarterly Journal of Economics120(4): 1239–1282.
39.
HestonASummersRAtenB (2011) Penn World Table Version 7.0. Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania.
40.
HickenA (2006) How do rules and institutions encourage vote buying? In ShafferF. C. (ed.), Democracy for Sale: The Causes, Consequences, and Reform of Vote Buying (47–60) Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
41.
HickenASimmonsJ (2008) The personal vote and the efficacy of education spending. American Journal of Political Science52(1): 109–124.
42.
HukkinenJ (1995) Corporatism as an impediment to ecological sustenance: The case of Finnish waste management. Ecological Economics15(1): 59–75.
43.
IversenTSoskiceD (2006) Electoral systems and the politics of coalitions: Why some democracies redistribute more than others. American Political Science Review100(2): 165–181.
44.
JonesMP (1995) Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracy. South Bend: Notre Dame University Press.
45.
JonesBBaumgartnerFBreunigC, et al. (2009) A general empirical law of public budgets: A comparative analysis. American Journal of Political Science53: 855–873.
46.
KaempferWHLowenbergA (1992) International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective. Boulder: Westview.
47.
KatzR (1980) A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
48.
KeeferP (2010) Database on political institutions (DPI2010). Development Research Group. Washington: The World Bank.
49.
KingstoneP (2011) The Political Economy of Latin America: Reflections on Neoliberalism and Development. New York: Routledge.
50.
LakeDABaumM (2001) The invisible hand of democracy: Political control and the provision of public services. Comparative Political Studies34(6): 587–621.
51.
LijphartA (1984) Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press.
52.
LijphartA (1994) Democracies: Form, performance, and constitutional engineering. European Journal of Political Research41: 107–113.
53.
LijphartA (1999) Patterns of Democracy: Government and Performance in Thirty-Six Democracies. New Haven: Yale University Press.
54.
LinzJ (1994) Presidential and parliamentary democracy: Does it make a difference? In: LinzJValenzuelaA (eds) The Failure of Presidential Democracy (2nd ed.). Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, pp.3–87.
55.
LizzeriAPersicoN (2001) The provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives. American Economic Review91(1): 225–245.
56.
MainwaringS (1993) Presidentialism, multipartism, and democracy: The difficult combination. Comparative Political Studies26(2): 198–228.
57.
MainwaringSShugartMS (1997) Conclusion: Presidentialism and the party system. In: MainwaringSShugartM (eds) Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.394–439.
58.
MidlarskyM (1998) Democracy and the environment: An empirical assessment. Journal of Peace Research35(3): 341–361.
59.
MorgensternS (1994) Patterns of Legislative Politics: Roll-call Voting in Latin America and the United States. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
60.
MorgensternS (2002) Towards a model of Latin American legislatures. In: MorgensternSNacifB (eds) Legislative Politics in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp.1–22.
61.
MullerWStromK (2010) Coalition agreements and cabinet governance. In: Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining. In: Strom K, Muller W and Bergman T (eds) Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 159–199.
62.
MyersonRB (1993) Incentives to cultivate favored minorities under alternative elective systems. American Political Science Review87(4): 856–869.
63.
NeedlerMC (2002) Conclusion: The legislature in a democratic Latin America. In: CloseD (ed.) Legislatures and the New Democracies in Latin America. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
64.
NetoOA (2006) The presidential calculus: Executive policy making and cabinet formations in the Americas. Comparative Political Studies39(4): 415–440.
65.
NeumayerE (2003) Are left-wing party strength and corporatism good for the environment? Evidence from panel analysis on air pollution in OECD countries. Ecological Economics45(2): 203–220.
66.
NielsonDL (2003) Supplying trade reform: Political institutions and liberalization in middle-income presidential democracies. American Journal of Political Science47(3): 470–491.
67.
OlsonM (2000) Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships. New York: Basic Books.
68.
OzymyJReyD (2013) Wild spaces or polluted places: Contentious policies, consensus institutions, and environmental performance in industrialized democracies. Global Environmental Politics 13(4): 81–100.
69.
PerssonTTabelliniG (1999) The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians. European Economic Review43(4–6): 699–735.
70.
PerssonTTabelliniG (2000) Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
71.
Poloni-StaudingerLM (2008) Are consensus democracies more environmentally effective?Environmental Politics17(3): 410–430.
72.
PowellBG (2000) Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Views. New Haven: Yale University Press.
73.
RaeDW (1971) The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven: Yale University Press.
74.
RogowskiRKayserMA (2002) Majoritarian electoral systems and consumer power price-level evidence from the OECD countries. American Journal of Political Science46(3): 526–539.
75.
RogowskiRMacRaeD (2004) Inequality and institutions? What theory, history, and (some) data tell us. Presentation. Department of Political Science, Department of Political Science, UCLA, 18.
76.
SamuelsD (1999) Incentives to cultivate a party vote in candidate-centric electoral systems: Evidence from Brazil. Comparative Political Studies32(4): 487–518.
77.
SamuelsD (2003) Ambition, Federalism and Legislative Politics in Brazil. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
78.
ScruggsL (1999) Institutions and environmental performance in seventeen Western democracies. British Journal of Political Science29(1): 1–31.
79.
ShugartMSCareyJM (1992) Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
80.
SiavelisPM (2009) Executive-legislative relations and democracy in Latin America. In: MillettRLHolmesJSPerezOJ (eds) Latin American Democracy: Emerging Reality or Endangered Species. New York: Routledge, pp.101–118.
81.
SorokaSWlezienC (2010) Degrees of Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
82.
SorokaSWlezienC (2015) The majoritarian and proportional visions and democratic responsiveness. Electoral Studies40: 539–547.
83.
StasavageD (2005) Democracy and education spending in Africa. American Journal of Political Science49(2): 343–358.
84.
WeingastBShepsleKJohnsenC (1981) The political economy of benefits and costs: A neoclassical approach to distributive politics. Journal of Political Economy89(41): 642–664.
85.
Wills-OteroL (2009) Electoral rules in Latin America: Explaining the adoption of proportional representation systems during the twentieth century. Latin American Politics and Society51(3): 33–58.
86.
WlezienCSorokaS (2012) Political institutions and the opinion-policy link. Western European Politics55: 1407–1432.
