The meaning of ‘state failure’: Public service,public servants,and the contemporary Afghan state

Abstract

In this essay I advance two arguments. First, while Afghanistan was once a state built on a social contract that demanded a balance of both modernist and traditional goals, a combination of exogenous shocks shattered that equilibrium, resulting in a territory that is no longer governed by a state, and that continues to generate what economists might call ‘negative externalities.’ It is these negative externalities that have drawn in overlapping interventions (the most salient of which remains Operation Enduring Freedom, or OEF), all of which have failed or will fail. Second, the key feature of Afghanistan’s disintegration is the flight of its public servants – the people most directly necessary for any state to work. I argue that Afghanistan does possess sufficient human capital for effective government, but that its public servants are effectively bounded by tribe, clan and valley. I conclude by showing that state-building demands public servants and public service, and that as long as Afghanistan fails to devote resources towards acquiring and maintaining a minimal critical mass of such people, it can be expected to continue to generate negative externalities that harm its people, its neighbors and the international system more broadly.