Abstract
This article deals with the question of dual transition by examining two Arab monarchical regimes of Morocco and Jordan. The two countries represent different paths of Middle Eastern monarchies weathering through the agony of dual transition. Each country has its own combination of economic and political liberalization. While Morocco is showing the sign of a trade-off between successful economic reform and lagging democratization, Jordan is approaching the type of economics and politics go together. This path divergence constitutes the dependent variable in this essay, whereas economic structure and political cleavages serve as two independent variables. I conclude that rentierism can be a contributing factor to democratization as well as an obstacle to economic reform. Once the decline of exogenous rents begins, the state with any intention of pushing for economic reform is obliged to choose one from two options: either forming a democratic consensus or resorting to authoritarian measures. The fiscal crisis of a “rentier state ” increases the political costs of authoritarian leadership and thereby leads incumbent rulers to opt for the distribution of economic burdens by way of democratic opening. Jordan fits the case. In contrast, a “productionist state ” does not have to make political concessions to facilitate economic reform because its economy is more inward-looking. Morocco is closer to the latter.
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