The ROK-U.S. Combined Command and Control System and Crisis Management Procedures

Abstract

This article seeks to examine the development of the ROK-U.S. combined command and control system and crisis management procedures in South Korea. In particular, it explores the four crises which occurred between 1968 and 1999 in order to identify its implications for the ROK-U.S. combined crisis management. During a crisis, command and control over the armed forces are critical issues, in order to co-ordinate military movements and alert operations in the context of overall crisis objectives. Within the ROK-U.S. alliance, the ROK command and control chain of armed forces was highly integrated with the command and control chains of the UNC until 1978 and with the CFC from 1978. This CFC combined command structure has enabled the ROK to participate in the chain of operational control of its own forces and to strengthen its position in the ROK-U.S. combined crisis management procedures.

Although both co-operated closely to cope with Korean crises in the past, there were some tensions in the use of military force and in the co-ordination of the detailed operational dimension of military operations. However, it can be argued that as long as the ROK crisis objectives and strategy were achieved through a consensus of alliance crisis options, these arrangements provided an effective crisis management system for ROK to resolve Korean crises. To some extent, the combined crisis management system enabled ROK to use America's massive military and intelligence capabilities to deter North Korea and to manage crises effectively. In the face of an era of transition and transformation in the ROK-U.S. alliance relationships following the September 11 2001, the ROK and U.S. need to minimise potential negative effects on combined crisis management system and maintain coherent deterrence capability and alliance stability on the Korean peninsula.