War and Peace,Freeze and Thaw: Regional Narratives of North Korea and the 2018 Winter Olympics

Abstract

The marching of North and South Korea under one flag at the opening ceremony of the 2018 Winter Olympics opening ceremony was celebrated as a step towards greater harmony in the region. North Korea’s attendance and widespread goodwill during the “Peace Games” even led to talk of a joint Korea bid for the 2032 Summer Olympics. While the 2018 Games were successful in bringing the nations together, the opportunities for long-lasting peace – and a memorable Games legacy – were not achieved. Utilising thematic analysis across 551 articles from four online news publications from North Korea, South Korea, China and Japan, this study examines regional narratives of North Korea’s participation in PyeongChang 2018. The results highlight portrayals in the media towards North Korea and the broader key themes of war, conflict, peace and reconciliation. Overall, it is evident that the hope generated by the nation’s participation in 2018 was a false dawn for long-term aspirations of unification, and reflective of the freeze and thaw approach to engagement by North Korea with its neighbour.

The 2018 Winter Olympics in South Korea was staged to the background of peace and reunification following North Korea’s late decision to send athletes, officials and cheerleaders to PyeongChang. It was a move broadly welcomed around the world and the marching of the North and South Korean athletes under one flag at the opening ceremony was celebrated as a step towards greater harmony, with the two nations officially at war since 1950. The 2018 Winter Olympics also signalled the beginning of the East-Asian Era (see Horne & Whannel, 2016) in these mega-sport events, with Tokyo hosting the 2021 Summer Olympics and Beijing the 2022 Winter Olympics, creating an intense sporting and political focus on the region. North Korea’s attendance and widespread goodwill during the “Peace Games” even led to talk of a joint Korea bid for the 2032 Summer Olympics. While PyeongChang 2018 was successful in bringing the nations together and creating a “thaw” in relations and a “victory” for sports diplomacy (Hammond, 2018; The Korea Times, 2018a), the opportunities for long-lasting peace – and a memorable Games legacy – were not achieved. By 2021, the Olympic motto had added “together” to “faster, higher, stronger”, but North Korea did not participate in the following Summer Olympics, citing concerns over travelling during the Covid-19 pandemic. As a result, the nation was banned by the International Olympic Committee from the Beijing Winter Games. The sporting truce that had been so hard fought for in 2018 had ended.

The East-Asian Era of the Olympics has now concluded, with the next cycle to be hosted by cities in Europe and North America. As the focus shifts from East Asia, it is timely to reflect on the opening stage of this phase when mega sport, geo-politics and sports diplomacy intersected due to North Korea’s involvement (see English & Murray, 2022). In the relatively short time since PyeongChang 2018, there has been detailed scholarship on the Winter Olympics and themes of peace and sports diplomacy in the media (see Lee, 2020, 2021a, 2021b, 2022; Rowe, 2019, 2022). Rowe (2019) notes how these Games were the “centre of global media news discourse” while Lee (2021a) described reconciliation as a key factor in the coverage, and a development which may have changed geopolitics in Northeast Asia. While elements of global and regional news have been previously examined, including in relation to war, peace, reunification and diplomacy, this paper analyses these aspects specifically through regional narratives of North Korea’s participation in 2018.

The approach is in contrast to previous work that contained more general international coverage, and included North Korea as only one of the players in the broader sporting and geo-political environment (see Lee, 2021a, 2021b; Rowe, 2019, 2022), rather than the sole nation of focus. Examining publications from four East Asian nations provides greater context of issues of sports diplomacy, peace, and war in relation to North Korea’s involvement in the Games, due to the events, debates and conflict occurring within the nations’ own region. Gaining an understanding of the narratives portrayed in East Asia is therefore important, especially as previous scholarship has criticised Western coverage of the Koreas (see Murray, 2020; Seo, 2009; Seo, 2018). This finding highlights the need for media analysis from within the region to complement some of the ‘outside-in’ approaches of previous scholarship. A thematic analysis is utilised across 551 articles from four online news publications from North Korea, South Korea, China and Japan. The paper concludes with a summary of what has occurred to North Korea since those Peace Games. According to the media coverage, a legacy of PyeongChang 2018 was that while it did bring two nations together, the cohesion and harmony was only in the short term. However, the tone and content of reporting varied between the publications on peace and reunification, conflict and war, and North Korea’s plans for the future.

The Peace Games

The PyeongChang Olympics were 2 months from opening when North Korea leader Kim Jong-un, speaking during his New Year address, said the Games would “serve as a good occasion for demonstrating our nation’s prestige and we earnestly wish the Olympic Games a success” (The National Committee on North Korea, 2018). Kim also outlined how he was “willing to dispatch our delegation and adopt other necessary measures”, and to improve “the frozen inter-Korean relations”. Two days later, the border hotline between the Koreas opened for the first time in almost 2 years, and plans were quickly developed for 22 athletes to compete in ice-hockey, speed skating, and skiing. The selection of a joint Korea ice-hockey team heightened the feeling of unification between nations that remained officially at war. At the opening ceremony, a North Korea delegation, which included Kim’s sister, Kim Yo-jong, watched both nations walk under the same flag for the first time since the 2006 Winter Olympics.

The inclusion of North Korea – and the broader geopolitical environment – often over-shadowed the sport of the Winter Olympics (English & Murray, 2022; Lee 2020, 2022; Rowe, 2019). Tensions in the region in the years leading up to the Games included threats of war, North Korea’s previous ballistic missile and nuclear tests, human rights issues, and United Nations sanctions. During 2017, barbs traded by Kim and the US President, Donald Trump, were also in the background, along with the death of Otto Warmbier, a US student who was imprisoned in North Korea, and died after being flown home. The importance of these events, in comparison with the sport on display, were viewed differently around the world (English & Murray, 2022), but North Korea’s inclusion created a greater focus on Northeast Asia. With the Games being based in this region, it is important to consider the narratives present in coverage from some of the media outlets in these nations, to examine perceptions of North Korea’s participation in the Games.

Sport, politics and sports diplomacy in North Korea

Briefly, as North Korea’s history has been covered in detail in recent scholarship (see English & Murray, 2022; Lee, 2021a, 2021b, Rowe, 2019), sport has often been employed as a tool for nation building, political propaganda, and gaining recognition for its teams (see Jung, 2001; Lee, 2022; Lee & Bairner, 2009, 2017; Merkel, 2014; Min & Choi, 2019). A decade after the Korean War from 1950–53, North Korea was approved as a separate entity for Olympic purposes and participated in the 1964 Winter Games (Lee, 2022). At the time, other sports, including football, were being utilised to attract international attention, with the politicisation of sport continuing under the leadership of Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un (Lee & Bairner, 2009; Merkel, 2014; Min & Choi 2019). This approach includes athletes being praised, including in the media, as an official government policy developed in the 1980s (Merkel, 2014). In PyeongChang, as Lee (2022) notes, the North Korea athletes had not qualified through their performances, and were accepted as part of the diplomatic effort to participate in the Games. Lee (2022, p. 72) states this agreement resulted in a “diplomatic advantage” for North Korea’s national-interest goals. While the unified hockey team did not win any matches, the side – and its supporting cheerleaders – received praise in the North Korea publication Rodong Sinmun (13 February). The players were a “unified team skillfully driving the puck” and their appearance with “the cheering groups once again made the spectators feel keenly that the Korean nation is a homogeneous nation which can’t live separated from each other”. The story did not mention that Switzerland beat Korea 8–0. North Korea’s most successful result at the Games was 13^th, in the pairs figure skating, another detail not included in Rodong Sinmun’s reporting (English & Murray, 2022).

The 2018 Games have also been examined in relation to sports diplomacy (see English & Murray, 2022; Lee, 2020, 2021a, 2021b, 2022; Rowe, 2019, 2022). Briefly, sports diplomacy, including at Olympic events, can be used to achieve government foreign policy aims, and create favourable images of key figures, including politicians, athletes, or even cheerleaders (Beacom, 2018; Li, 2011; Murray, 2012; Murray & Pigman, 2014; Rofe, 2018). Crucially, it can be a key element in reducing conflict and opening dialogue and negotiations between nations and their leaders (Abdi et al., 2019; Deos, 2014; Lee, 2021a; Murray, 2018; Murray & Pigman, 2014). In North Korea’s case, sports diplomacy and the 2018 Winter Olympics was implemented to soften its image due to its nuclear weapons program, and concerns over human rights violations (English & Murray, 2022). Rowe (2022, p. 55) notes how sports diplomacy and the media is not a simple relationship, but states that “real time symbolic unification” at a mega event such as the Winter Olympics, or the Sydney Olympics of 2000 when the Koreas also marched together, can encourage negotiations between key figures. Lee (2021a) examined elements of sports diplomacy in British, North and South Korean publications, including Rodong Sinmun, but only through the lens of the Winter Olympics opening and closing ceremonies. Lee noted the international media’s messages of peace and unity and recognised the cultural, sport and inter-state diplomacy through these ceremonies. Rowe (2019, p. 5) undertook what he describes as a “discursive” analysis of the Games in predominantly Australian and United Kingdom publications, focusing primarily on the lead-up to the event and the competitive period of the Olympics. In terms of the media’s analysis, Rowe (2019, p. 15) proposed that the Winter Olympics were “widely credited in the media in various regions, including Western Europe and Australasia, with being the catalyst or ‘icebreaker’ in relation” to geopolitical developments, and easing of tension on the Korean peninsula (see also Rowe, 2022). However, he states that while “a mediated consensus is likely to be established in various national contexts” around the Games, there will not be a uniform pattern, with “differential positions in relation to the Korean peninsula” and the broader region (Rowe, 2019, p. 15). This conclusion is one of the reasons why this study explores regional narratives specifically in East Asian publications. It is also important to note that previous research has been critical of Western coverage of the Koreas, with its shallow reporting and lack of understanding of the nations (Murray, 2020; Seo, 2009, 2018). As a result, this study aims to contribute greater depth in outlining events focusing on North Korea at the Winter Olympics from regional media perspectives in East Asia.

Method

To analyse regional narratives of North Korea’s participation in PyeongChang 2018, articles were collected from four online newspapers. The articles were then collated for thematic analysis to allow interpretation of the major patterns in the qualitative data (Clarke & Braun, 2017), with an inductive approach applied (Boyatzis, 1998). Unsurprisingly, given the tense environment over the previous years with nuclear tests and missile launches, themes of war, conflict, peace and reunification were central to the coverage, and are therefore the focus of this paper. These themes are consistent with previous research on these Winter Olympics (English & Murray, 2022; Lee, 2020, 2021a, 2021b, 2022; Rowe, 2019, 2022). However, this paper applies a systematic approach to analysing the qualitative data from a sample drawn from four East-Asian publications, and deals specifically with the research question of how regional narratives portrayed North Korea’s participation in the Games? These factors contribute to this study being more targeted towards North Korea’s involvement than previous research that has predominantly looked at the Games more broadly, both in regional and international contexts, and utilised a more global approach in selecting media to examine.

The four publications – North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun, China Daily, The Korea Times and The Japan Times – were chosen due to their outward facing, international focus (see English & Murray, 2022; Murray, 2020). While there are substantial differences between the types of publications, their focus on content, and political leanings, they provide a valuable platform for a regional overview of North Korea’s participation in the 2018 Winter Olympics. Rodong Sinmun and China Daily are controlled by the state while The Korea Times and The Japan Times are privately owned. The Japan Times’ parent company since 2017 is News2u Holdings, a public relations firm, while The Korea Times has been owned by the wood manufacturers, the Donghwa Group, since 2014. Both conservative publications outline their independence from government. The Japan Times (2023) states it wants to build a well-informed public and promotes “freedom and democracy, and international cooperation and world peace”. The Korea Times (2023) notes how it has contributed “to the democratization of the country, by defending itself from dictatorship and military regimes”. The four publications are printed in English, so it is important to recognise that the narratives and coverage may have differed across local-language titles.

Articles were collected through internal website searches of the publications’ websites from January 3, 2018, the day of the border hotline reopening, until March 3, 2018, 2 weeks after the conclusion of the Winter Olympics. The search terms “North Korea” and “Winter Olympics” were utilised across each publication, with “DPRK” and “Winter Olympics” also being searched to reflect the way North Korea is sometimes described. There was a total of 551 articles for analysis, with 299 from The Korea Times, 102 from China Daily, 89 from The Japan Times, and 61 from Rodong Sinmun.

Pushing for Peace

The pursuit of peace was a major theme throughout media coverage in the region, from the first discussions about North Korea fielding athletes in early January 2018, until after the Games concluded. In the regional media examined, both North and South Korea were enthusiastic to outline the benefits of reunification, seeing short- and long-term benefits for their nation – and both nations. Official talks dominated the opening weeks of the year, with both Koreas hopeful there would be an agreement over athletes competing, amid broader aims for more lasting peace. North Korea was quick to claim credit for the initial contact. In the week after the opening of the border hotline, a Rodong Sinmun (10 January) commentary noted the “happy environment for the north-south reconciliation, created by the great magnanimity and initiative measures taken by the DPRK”. It also said the nation had “made all efforts for the high-level talks” and had a “sincere willingness to improve the north-south ties”.

The Korea Times reported in detail on the talks in the border village of Panmunjom, including the Games and wider reunification elements, with one example describing “a possible sign of a thaw in inter-Korean relations” (7 January). In the China Daily, articles reported on Kim’s New Year speech, saying he was open to sending a delegation to South Korea, with another report noting Kim’s “olive branch” for “a quick end to the frozen relations with Seoul” (9 January). The Japan Times also covered the talks in depth, including mentioning how South Korea said it could lift sanctions to allow an Olympic delegation from the North. It also reported on “the rival Koreas” sitting for formal talks “to find ways to cooperate on the Winter Olympics”, and “to improve their abysmal ties” (5 January). However, this report also noted potential difficulties and that “after last year’s threats of nuclear war, the Koreas have a long history of failing to move past their deep animosity”. Despite the hope of reunification in the short and longer terms, concerns remained in the region, fitting the “freeze and thaw” narrative of North Korea’s historic diplomatic engagement patterns with South Korea (Hammond, 2018; The Korea Times, 2018a).

While each article in the sample mentioned sport, the issue of peace was clearly more important, both in regional and geopolitical contexts, than the Winter Olympics (see English & Murray, 2022). Denuclearisation was seen as a major component of achieving reconciliation, in The Japan Times and The Korea Times, which reflected both organisations’ goals to promote peace (The Japan Times, 2023), or defend against military regimes (The Korea Times, 2023). The Korea Times reported that during the nations’ first meeting in more than 2 years “Seoul then adroitly touched on issues over the Kim regime’s nuclear program” (9 January). An editorial from the same paper (8 January) argued the two nations needed to discuss how to reduce military tensions, and reuniting families separated during the 1950–53 war. “But ultimately, they also need to discuss how to resolve the nuclear crisis”. China Daily reported that China welcomed “the positive changes of the Korean Peninsula situation” (16 January), while President Xi Jinping said he hoped the Winter Olympics would allow dialogue to improve the relationship between the Koreas (15 January). The mood in the coverage was predominantly about using this “thaw” as a way to achieve harmony and unification. As South Korea’s President Moon Jae-in said in The Korea Times (10 January), there needed to be “efforts to hold a peace Olympics … We need to peacefully resolve the North Korean nuclear issue”.

“Sports Can Help Countries”

After North Korea’s agreement with South Korea to send athletes to the Games, the International Olympic Committee approved the nation’s participation, which again contributed elements of the narrative of peace and unification. Sports diplomacy was a key theme in the coverage based around the sporting aspects of the Winter Olympics. After “a year of mounting tension”, diplomacy that focused on sport resulted in North Korean athletes being sent to the Winter Olympics” (China Daily, 23 January). The Korea Times (5 February) reported President Moon’s address to the 132nd IOC session in the week before the Games when he said: “We will send a message of peace and reconciliation to the world during the Olympics”. Moon also said “the North’s participation alone will send a clear message to the rest of the world that sports can help countries and people overcome their political and ideological differences” (6 February). China Daily (8 February) noted the talks between Seoul and Pyongyang were for different reasons, with North Korea “seeking to deflect the extreme pressure created by the sanctions imposed by the United Nations and the United States”, and that “it realized that improving ties with Seoul might do the job”.

The importance of sports diplomacy was highlighted by the joint Korea women’s ice-hockey team, although this was a source of praise and criticism. For example, The Korea Times (18 January) said it was “time for all Koreans to get behind President Moon Jae-in’s drive for a ‘Peace Olympics’”, while another report stated the hockey decision was part of “efforts to improve inter-Korean relations by taking full advantage of sports diplomacy” (The Korea Times, 21 January). However, this story also noted how the move had created a “growing sense of hostility toward North Korea”. That view was recognised in The Japan Times (16 January), which reported South Korean skaters being “furious” at the idea to combine teams, “highlighting a broader lack of enthusiasm for some of the government’s peace-making plans”.

Let the Peace Games Begin

As the Olympic events started, there was constant focus on reunification, including through the opening ceremony, where the teams marched together, and dignitaries from around the world attended, including Kim’s sister, and the United States vice-president, Mike Pence. Rodong Sinmun (10 February) noted it was “the DPRK’s proactive proposal and steps” that meant “a breakthrough was made toward detente, peace and improvement of the relations”. The report stated the enthusiasm for a successful Winter Olympics was “sweeping the whole Korean Peninsula”. However, China Daily (8 February) reported that as the Olympics started both Japan and the United States were continuing “the ‘maximum’ pressure on” North Korea over nuclear weapon and missile development. In the East-Asian region, Japan and South Korea were pushing for reductions while China was supportive of continuing talks (The Japan Times, 9 February).

In the first week of the Games, Rodong Sinmun (14 February) reported there were “only a handful” of people who were “displeased with the atmosphere of improved north-south relations and challenging the aspiration of the nation”. There were warnings in this article of the potential for the situation to change:

But if the outrages of such conservative gangsters trying to turn the Winter Olympics into a theater of confrontation, far from appreciating the sincere efforts of the fellow countrymen who share the joy for national event, are allowed, the trend toward improved north-south relations which has just started will be stemmed again and national reconciliation and unity can never be achieved.

The uncertainty was also outlined by The Korea Times (9 February) in a report saying “the key question now is whether this conciliatory mood will continue”. When the Olympics were finishing after 2 weeks of competition, there was cautious hope for lasting peace across the region’s publications. In The Korea Times (20 February), there was a call for more impact from sustained sports diplomacy, saying it:

should not be a one-time event for South and North Korea. Rather it should help the two Koreas make stable peace on the long-divided peninsula. Boosted by the ongoing PyeongChang Winter Olympics, Seoul’s sports diplomacy with Pyongyang has to serve as an opportunity to tackle the North’s nuclear weapons and missile development programs.

China Daily (26 February) reported that the “close of the Winter Olympics in PyeongChang could herald the beginning of a breakthrough on the Korean Peninsula issue, as Pyongyang said it had ‘enough willingness’ to hold talks with the United States”. As a result, the international community would be “closely watching developments” in the future. Again, the coverage reiterated the desire to reduce North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, and was consistent among the three publications outside North Korea. In The Korea Times (25 February) a report said “Seoul should pave the way for denuclearization talks”, noting how the Games “have carried significant implications due to North Korea’s participation. The North’s presence contributed not only to promoting the Winter Games, but also to turning the event into a Peace Olympics. However, in another story on the same day, the newspaper stated that the “diplomacy ended without finding a possible solution to the North Korean nuclear issue”. There were also reports in The Korea Times of future talks between the US and North Korea.

After the Games, The Korea Times (28 February) said the Olympics “proved yet again that the power of sports can transcend politics. North Korea’s participation, most of all, demonstrated the true Olympic values of peace and harmony”. The Japan Times (4 March) noted the Games “gave a boost to recent engagement between the two Koreas”, with the newspaper also including experts saying “the North’s outreach over the Olympics shows its ambition to break out of diplomatic isolation” (2 March). While there was considerable discussion and reporting on peace and reunification narratives in the regional media, particularly in South Korea, Japan and China, the prospect of escalating tensions was also a feature of the coverage.

Confrontation, Conflict and War

Another major media focus was the narrative of war and conflict in the region – and beyond. While this was unsurprising, given the potential for short-term threats and the long-term nature of the broader contestations across the Korean Peninsula, there were different elements around the topics, events and perspectives of the media in the four nations. In the coverage across the region, the narrative of the prospect of war or future conflict was a constant presence, even in stories focusing predominantly on peace. This was evident in the decision of South Korea and the United States to postpone military drills that were initially planned to occur during the Olympics, but were seen by North Korea as a provocation. Was this a sign of peace and goodwill, or an indicator of further conflict? It depended on the media reporting or viewpoint.

A key difference in this theme was the more emotive and threatening language in Rodong Sinmun, which often attributed blame to other nations. For example, a commentary on 15 February about the military exercises, in the week the Games began, said: “The saber-rattling of warmongers at home and abroad, quite contrary to the Winter Olympics, clearly shows who is the harasser of peace on the Korean Peninsula”. Other articles mentioning the exercises in the same publication said if the drills resume the situation will “turn back to the catastrophic phase again” (9 February), while describing “a deliberate provocation to turn the trend of the present situation back to confrontation and war” (14 February). After the Games, when the exercises were being rescheduled, a Rodong Sinmun (28 February) commentary piece said the plans were “a vicious challenge to the entire Korean nation hoping for détente and durable peace” and that North Korea was “making all possible efforts for the improvement of the north-south relations”. As a state-controlled publication, the articles reflected the views of the North Korea government.

China Daily reported sympathetically towards some elements of coverage about North Korea, including quoting sources from within the nation, in examples of links between the two communist nations that have been traditional allies. An article the day after North Korea’s Olympic inclusion was confirmed by the IOC said the country had warned South Korea over rhetoric from media and politicians “that chills the atmosphere of reconciliation” (21 January). Another report described, from the view of a North Korean spokesman, how the US was “running amok to bring another dark cloud of confrontation and war over the Korean peninsula by announcing enormous sanctions against the DPRK” (25 February). Alternatively, The Japan Times (3 February) noted that while tensions had eased in the lead-up to the Olympics, sources said “speculation is growing in the Japanese government that North Korea could take action once the United States and South Korea resume joint military drills after the Paralympics conclude on March 18”. The prospect of North Korea engaging with other nations, particularly South Korea but also the United States, was a feature of some parts of the coverage. In 2017, North Korea released intercontinental ballistic missiles and conducted its sixth test of nuclear weapons, which resulted in sanctions from South Korea and the United Nations (The Japan Times, 4 March). Even though the United States is not part of the region, it was hard to ignore the presence it had in regional media narratives, especially with the planned military drills with South Korea, and the attendance at the opening ceremony of vice-president Pence.

Coverage in Rodong Sinmun painted North Korea, separately, as peace maker and potential aggressor. After the games, Rodong Sinmun (1 March) reported it was the enthusiasm of North Korea for reunification that allowed it to mend relations:

which had been in the phase of freeze and provided a climate of reconciliation and dialogue. Now no one can fault or disregard the peace-loving sincere efforts and measures made by the DPRK to provide a peaceful climate on the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK has so far made every possible effort with maximum of restraint in order to defuse the acute tension between the north and the south and create a peaceful climate.

What Will North Korea Do Next?

There were constant reports and commentary pieces in the South Korea, Japan and China publications on what North Korea might do, both in the lead-up to the Games and after its conclusion. The Japan Times (25 January) reported that while its government was welcoming North Korea in PyeongChang in a “celebration of peace”, it was “making contingency plans for possible conflict on the Korean Peninsula”. The Japan Times (30 January) also highlighted that the “US and Japan are skeptical that North Korea’s participation in the Olympics will lead to a lasting peace”, due to Kim not being willing to discuss denuclearization. In The Korea Times, coverage early in the year discussed whether North Korea would test more ballistic missiles, however these concerns were eased as the nation’s Winter Olympics participation became more advanced. One report described the “Olympic breathing space amid the tensions roiling the peninsula” created by the decision to attend, which meant the temporary evaporation of “spiraling tensions” (The Korea Times, 15 January). North Korea was also considering whether it would be under threat.

As the Winter Olympics began, Rodong Sinmun (13 February) reported the US and South Korea were deploying military around the peninsula, estimating that “conflict may break out on the Korean peninsula in late March or early April”. The previous month it had reported that the US planned to “dispatch soon another nuclear-powered aircraft carrier strike group … under the pretext of countering a possible ‘provocation’ of the DPRK during the Winter Olympics” (25 January). North Korea’s nuclear involvement was often an undercurrent of the coverage. After the Games, China Daily (2 March) noted contradictory messages from Trump and how “belligerent rhetoric is especially troubling now” following the rapprochement between the Koreas, which included the possibility of future talks with the US. The report recognised that “the current reconciliation does not necessarily mean Pyongyang will abandon its missile and nuclear programs, but it seems this is a good time for all parties involved to pursue dialogue to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula”.

There were concerns in the reporting from the Japanese and South Korean publications of the foreign media coverage being swept up by the charm of North Korea, which was “hijacking” the Games, “stealing the spotlight”, and sometimes being called the “Pyongyang Olympics” after North Korea’s capital (The Korea Times, 26 January). The Korea Times was most vocal about the attention being paid to North Korea. One report noted how:

North Korea, shunned by much of the world for its hell-bent push to build its nuclear weapons arsenal, a country that has repeatedly vowed to annihilate Seoul in a “sea of fire”, now wants the world to think it embraces Olympic comity and fair play. Forgive us if we don't drink that sugary drink (The Korea Times, 26 January).

The author explained how:

this sudden expression of unity beats the usual brinkmanship and fiery bluster we get from the Kim regime. But North Korea is adept at the game of freeze and thaw. This isn’t the first time that the North has clasped hands with the South at an Olympiad ― it did so at the Summer Games in Sydney in 2000.

Another report described how “North Korea’s slow-motion hijacking of the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics wasn’t the usual North Korean hijacking of airplanes and abductions of people. Dictatorship 2.0 was a puppet show of cheerleaders, musicians, dancers, and athletes as part of North Korea’s so-called ‘charm offensive’” (The Korea Times, 26 February).

This theme had emerged in the lead-up to the Games. The Korea Times (19 January) noted the “familiar North Korean playbook” of Kim switching to “conciliatory tactics” and that “South Korea has jumped at the chance to achieve anything close to a more stable form of lasting peace”. The Japan Times (3 January) also recognised North Korea’s approach of “intense provocations followed by conciliatory phases aimed at exposing rifts”. As the Games approached, the newspaper said North Korea’s participation:

has been a strategic victory for the Kim regime. The temporary detente to allow for its participation has provided the North valuable political space to further consolidate its strategic nuclear deterrent – a deterrent designed to dissuade the United States from a pre-emptive strike to either remove North Korea’s nuclear capabilities or destroy the regime itself (The Japan Times 30 January).

After the Games, the mood of uncertainty over North Korea’s next steps continued. The Japan Times (24 February) concluded “South Korea’s self-styled ‘Peace Games’ have been a sporting success, but public reaction suggests Seoul may have failed its bigger test – to generate the support the president needs to make bold moves to improve ties with the old enemy”. In The Korea Times (22 February), commentator Donald Kirk wrote at the end of the Olympics, reflecting broader sentiment across the region – and the world – that:

Now the real games begin; the interplay between North and South Korea and between the U.S. and both Koreas. The players may have shifted some of the pieces around the chessboard during these most political of Winter Olympics, but it’s much too early to know what happens next, much less the final moves … What matters most, however, will be whatever Kim Jong-un decides.

Thaw, Then Freeze

Although the sport of the Winter Olympics was able to help foster discussions of unification, it was unable to provide the spark for lasting healing of the decades-old rift between North and South Korea. Sports diplomacy, in itself, could only do so much, despite President Moon’s hope for sport to “help countries and people overcome their political and ideological differences” (The Korea Times, 6 February). Relying on a sporting event to diffuse long-standing tensions was a lot to wish for. As Lee (2021a) has argued, it was an exaggerated claim that sport could resolve disputes between nations, although he later noted that the PyeongChang mega-event functioned “as a catalyst for a degree of reconciliation in Northeast Asian geopolitics” (Lee, 2021b, p. 1503).

Looking back, when the unified team walked out together at the opening ceremony there was so much hope – across the East-Asia region, and the world – that peace and unification would be the legacy of these Games. This was reflected across the publications, especially in the conservative titles of The Korea Times (2023) and The Japan Times (2023), with their respective company aims to defend their nation against dictators and military regimes, or promote peace. As China Daily (12 February) reported, “it felt like the entire stadium was wrapped in a warm glow of unity ... which made the freezing winter night less unbearable”. After the Games, there were relatively fast advancements in North Korea’s involvement in sport, regional politics, and international relations. The dialogue continued between the Koreas, and IOC President Thomas Bach visited North Korea to discuss the nation’s Olympic future, with peace and reconciliation viewed as major political legacies of the Games (Lee, 2020, 2021b, 2022). The nations also marched under the same flag in the 2018 Asian Games in Indonesia.

Within the region, the leaders of the Koreas, Moon and Kim, met three times at summits in 2018, and Trump attended talks with Kim in Singapore. Later that year Trump travelled to see Kim at the Demilitarised Zone on the border between North and South Korea. These meetings are an example of sports diplomacy’s influence, including Rowe’s (2022) description of mega-sports events such as the Winter Olympics encouraging key negotiations, leading to high-level face-to-face talks. Further, as Lee (2021b, p. 233) states, 2018 was “arguably one of the most peaceful periods in the Korean peninsula since its division, and it was the Winter Olympics that brought this warm air to the region”. A year after the opening ceremony, the sports diplomacy and reunification aims of both nations led them to consider a joint Olympic bid for the 2032 Summer Games. A proposal was submitted to the International Olympic Committee in 2021, but Brisbane, Australia, was appointed as the preferred bidder and confirmed as host. At the time, as Lee (2021b, p. 1503) wrote, “[s]port kept connecting the two Koreas”.

Now, just one Winter Olympic cycle later, the problems that were so prevalent before PyeongChang have re-emerged. Late in 2022, North Korea was firing ballistic missiles amid speculation of another round of nuclear weapons tests. Despite the hope and harmony generated in 2018, the temperature had returned to the level of “freeze”, a chill which had not been felt since 2017. In noting the uncertainties around what might happen in the future, Rowe (2019, p. 15) stated PyeongChang would be remembered for its involvement in regional and world peace and the intervention between North Korea and other parts of the world. Presciently, he warned the event’s historical reputation depended on geopolitical shifts that might see “its role in politics and diplomacy recast as futile, misguided, naive, or even deluded”. In 2022, North Korea was diplomatically and sportingly isolated within the region again and major international sport no longer provided a distraction, opportunity or excuse for broader discussions around disarmament or human rights. North Korea was reported to have resumed development of its nuclear program in 2020, following its suspension during talks with the US, and the hopes of denuclearisation remained low (The Japan Times, 2020a, 2020b). Regional media narratives over this period no longer reflected the “warm glow” of hope and unity and, with the East-Asian Era of the Olympics retreating into history, mega sporting events were no longer able to act as a starting point for the key nations’ leaders to enter the same stadium – or meeting room. Once again, in a North Korean context, the Olympics were about “faster, higher, stronger”, but not “together”.

The situation in sport was complicated, fraught and, ultimately frozen. By not sending a team to the Tokyo 2021 Olympics, with the Covid-19 pandemic listed as the reason, North Korea was banned by the IOC from competing in the 2022 Winter Olympics in China, a nation which had been sympathetic at times to North Korea when most others had not. In a letter from North Korea’s Olympic Committee and Ministry of Physical Culture and Sports to Chinese officials, it said it “could not take part in the Olympics due to the hostile forces’ moves and the worldwide pandemic”, but offered support to “the Chinese comrades in all their work to hold splendid and wonderful Olympic festival” (The Japan Times, 2022). North Korea’s isolated sporting situation was not historically unfamiliar. Rowe (2022) also recalled how the optimism from Sydney 2000, when the Korean teams marched together, did not last. History repeated itself after PyeongChang 2018.

Previous efforts of the two nations at reconciliation through sport have included failures, such as North Korea’s boycott of the 1988 Olympics in Seoul and the bombing of a South Korean aeroplane; historic successes occurred through unified appearances at Sydney 2000, Athens 2004, Torino 2006 and Asian Games during that period (see Jung, 2013; Min & Choi, 2019). Lee (2021b, p. 1502) notes how the sporting relationship between the Koreas mirrors the political climate of the region, with both sides displaying “their unified identity through sport whenever the tensions between them were ameliorated”. In PyeongChang, South Korea’s moves to accept North Korea’s demands in order for their athletes to compete were viewed as a vital tactic in ensuring the Games went ahead harmoniously, but there was also recognition that the hosts had given up a considerable amount to ensure the rapprochement. An article in The Korea Times (22 February) argued that while President Moon agreed with North Korea’s requests to walk out under the one flag, “[n]ever before in Olympic history has any country, much less the host, agreed to march under any flag but its own”. Concessions had been made, but the rewards were not long lasting.

Conclusion

The results from this thematic analysis have highlighted similarities and differences in regional narratives portrayed by the media towards North Korea’s participation in the Winter Olympics, and the broader themes of war, conflict, peace, and reunification. In contrast with previous media publication analysis of the Games (see English & Murray, 2022; Lee, 2021a; Rowe, 2019), this study provided findings focused solely on the regional narratives of North Korea’s involvement in the Winter Olympics in four nations, developing a greater understanding from an East-Asian context of sports diplomacy, peace and war elements in the coverage. Overall, it is evident that the hope generated by the nation’s participation in 2018 was a false dawn for long-term aspirations of peace on the peninsula, and reflective of the “freeze and thaw” approach to engagement by North Korea with its neighbour (The Korea Times, 2018b). Generally, the media reporting within the region reflected similarities in the cautious early wishes for negotiating between the Koreas, to optimism during the Games for further reconciliation and nuclear disarmament. This was even evident in some of the reporting and commentary in the state-controlled Rodong Sinmum, which was often highly critical of South Korea, while vocally supporting decisions from Pyongyang.

However, the narratives across the region also highlighted differences between media reporting on the themes, supporting the prediction of Rowe (2019) that there would not be uniform views across national contexts towards the Koreas, and the broader geopolitical influence of these Games. In this context, it is important to recognise that “peace” in relation to North Korea could be interpreted differently in the four nations’ coverage. In The Korea Times it could refer to more harmonious relations with the North, including through denuclearization. Alternatively, in Rodong Sinmun’s reporting there were suggestions at times of improving ties with its neighbour, as well as reducing the power of South Korea and the US, including efforts to stop the joint military exercises. A more regional focus on peace, through international reconciliation and a reduction of nuclear capabilities, was apparent in The Japan Times and China Daily. The conservative independent titles in Korea and Japan were more likely to promote and hope for peace, reunification and denuclearization, in line with their company outlooks (The Korea Times, 2023; The Japan Times, 2023). While all of the publications pushed for peace on occasions, there was more aggression and blame in the reporting of Rodong Sinmum – which also wanted to claim credit for the Olympic rapprochement – reflecting the aims and bullish approach of the nation’s government. China Daily could show both some sympathy for North Korea in reports about their traditional communist allies, and broader hope for continuing dialogue between the Koreas.

As the Games concluded and the intense international sporting and political focus started to shift, the coverage highlighted a feeling of nervous hope around what North Korea would do next. More than 4 years later there is a reflective familiarity of disappointment as the broken-down relationship has returned to the freeze cycle. Instead, the legacy of PyeongChang was initiating talks that brought two nations together, but the cohesion and harmony was only in the short term. At the end of the East-Asian Olympic cycle, the region is left with memories of the goodwill generated by North Korea’s involvement in PyeongChang. Once the mega-sport gaze moved on, the impetus to continue negotiations and push for peace appeared to be significantly reduced.