Old Borders,New Techniques and Technologies in Hakkâri: How Locals Cope with the Border Wall?

Abstract

The European Union (EU) enforces external border policies through formal agreements with third countries and joint measures to deter and manage migration outside the EU territory. Following the 2016 EU–Türkiye deal, Türkiye’s borders became an EU externalised border zone. The eastern frontier of Türkiye, known as the Kurdish borderlands, is pivotal for implementing these policies. In 2017, this strategy materialised in the construction of a border wall. This article examines the Hakkâri (Colemêrg) province, bordering Iran and Iraq, to show how broad policies affect local communities and the regional environment. Findings show the border wall fails to stop migration; rather, increased surveillance causes economic hardship and pushes residents to migrate. This research analyses changes on both sides of the Türkiye–Iran border through interviews and contributes to border policy scholarship by examining their impacts on daily life and the ecology.

Keywords

Border wall ecology externalisation Kurdish borderlands surveillance

Introduction

Border regions function as zones where state power operates without limits, serving as sites of exceptional policy implementation (Mbembe, 2019) and, at times, zones of conflict (Jones, 2016). The United States and the European Union (EU) increasingly secure borders through externalisation (Bobić & Šantić, 2019; Casas-Cortes et al., 2015; Lemberg-Pedersen, 2019; Muftuler-Bac, 2021), involving third countries and advanced surveillance technologies (Pallister-Wilkins, 2022). Neighbouring countries, such as Türkiye, negotiate their participation and interests in this process (Casas-Cortes et al., 2015; FitzGerald, 2019; Lemberg-Pedersen, 2015). Türkiye, bordering Syria, Iran and Iraq, exemplifies the impact of externalisation policies (Lemberg-Pedersen, 2015).

Historically, the Türkiye–Iran border has been a critical entry point for migrants and refugees from Afghanistan, Pakistan and other countries, many of whom go to Europe. The 2016 Türkiye–EU deal continues to impact refugees seeking to cross the borders, as pushbacks have risen along the Iran–Türkiye border, preventing them from seeking asylum (Augustová, 2021a). Therefore, the construction of a 170-kilometre border wall has been underway in southeastern Türkiye since 2017 (İçişleri Bakanlığı, 2023). The Türkiye–Syria wall, whose construction began on the Syrian border in 2018, was completed in 2021, covering 837 kilometres. The Syria–Türkiye border wall is considered the third-largest in the world, after the Great Wall of China and the United States–Mexico border (Maltaş, 2016). At the time, Süleyman Soylu, the Turkish interior minister, stated that the border wall was made possible thanks to the EU’s financial support of 110 million Euros and that EU funds also enabled the clearing of mines along the border before construction (Augustová, 2021a). The Turkish state explains that the purpose of building these border walls is to prevent illegal crossings, smuggling and terrorist infiltration. Module blocks are used to construct the border wall. These blocks are 3 metres high and 2.8 metres wide. The border is not limited to the wall alone. Various security measures and surveillance mechanisms have been put in place around the wall. Trenches 4 metres deep and 4 metres wide were dug along the border line (İçişleri Bakanlığı, 2023). Three rows of razor wire were drawn on the concrete wall. A total of 92 towers were built: 75 Lego and 17 monoblock. The border is constantly monitored by 103 electro-optic towers, thermal cameras, night-vision binoculars and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Security measures have been increased using motion sensors and thermal cameras along the border (Daily Sabah, 2024; Deniz & Nargül, 2025). Interestingly, this wall was constructed by TOKİ, the Housing Development Administration (Coskun & Butler, 2016). TOKİ is a state-supported public institution established to meet the housing needs of low- and middle-income citizens in Türkiye. It operates under the Ministry of Environment, Urbanisation and Climate Change.

Although important studies have explored the Kurdish borderlands of Türkiye (Aras, 2020; Augustová, 2021a, 2021b; Augustová et al., 2023; Augustová & Suber, 2023), few studies have focused on ecology, underscoring the significance of this research. The main research question of the study is: How do EU externalised border policies affect the local population and the ecology of Hakkâri? While many studies have addressed ecological destruction in the Kurdish region (Akin, 2022; Dinc, 2022; Wiktor-Mach et al., 2024), few examine the impact of such border policies. Drawing on narratives from local people, this research explores the effects of EU border externalisation in a region already subject to intense surveillance and environmental damage. Unlike most studies on EU border externalisation that focus on migrants (Frelick et al., 2016; Lemberg-Pedersen, 2015; Tyszler, 2019), this study also builds on previous work on externalisation (İçduygu & Karadağ, 2018; Kaytaz, 2016). It examines how Türkiye’s eastern border wall shapes the daily lives of local people and the environment, particularly in Hakkâri province, which shares a 113 kilometre border with Iran. Ongoing militarisation resulting from the protracted conflict between the Turkish state and the PKK has made Hakkâri a focal point. The EU–Türkiye deal has intensified and diversified securitisation, prompting the use of new technologies. Migrants view Hakkâri as a place to cross quickly, while locals continually experience changes in their environment and new forms of securitisation in daily life. This research draws on extensive participant observation in Hakkâri and interviews with locals.

To structure this exploration, the article is organised around two major conceptual axes. First, it examines how border policies reshape residents’ everyday lives, including their interactions and communication with relatives on the other side of the border. Second, it investigates the ecological consequences for local fauna and flora resulting from these policies. Through these lenses, the article demonstrates how local people cope with the realities introduced by the border wall.

EU Border Externalisation and Surveillance

Türkiye has been operating as a transit country for the last 40 years. Most migrants from countries such as Afghanistan, Iran and Syria reach other parts of the world via Türkiye, mainly to continue onward to EU countries (İçduygu & Karadağ, 2018; Kaytaz, 2016). The EU’s securitisation of migration (Huysmans, 2006) and its adoption of policies aimed at preventing migration have led to cooperation on ‘combating’ migration at the borders of neighbouring countries, such as Türkiye. Türkiye has become an important actor in the EU’s externalised border policies (Üstübici, 2019). The border wall built in the Kurdish borderland is a part and even a concrete example of these externalised border policies. The EU has provided significant financial resources for constructing the wall, technological devices and other regional border security measures. With the EU borders becoming ‘transportable and deployable’ (Weizman, 2007) to third countries, new technical and surveillance mechanisms have also been exported to these countries (Karadağ, 2019). Border practices are based on a ‘visibility regime’, and surveillance mechanisms (e.g., watchtowers and drones) are used to ensure this visibility. This visibility regime of the border is a technique used to control the mobility of unwanted groups and has continued from ancient times to the present day (Khosravi, 2019).

While the border wall and the surveillance mechanisms deployed around it aim to ensure border security, they also increase insecurity in the border regions—both for locals and for migrants (Arslan et al., 2020). Because of these difficult living conditions, locals turn to ‘illegal’ cross-border trade. Moreover, ethnic and family ties among Kurds in Türkiye and Iran facilitate the establishment of robust informal economic networks (Augustová et al., 2023). This trade is passed down from generation to generation; however, the state also imposes serious penalties against these people. Therefore, individuals involved in this ‘illegal’ trade may sometimes pay the price with their lives. Furthermore, they can be accused of political crimes (e.g., connections with the PKK) during border checks and can be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment (Augustová et al., 2023). Despite all the militarised, high-tech border controls, ‘smuggling’ cannot be stopped (Augustová, 2021b). Nevertheless, local people continue this difficult trade at the expense of their lives to cope with poverty. As Aras (2020, p. 152) states, while the border region is a state of exception (Agamben, 2005), dying due to ‘illegal’ trade creates the ‘banality of fear and death’ on the border.

On the other hand, EU-securitised border policies have intersected with Türkiye’s national security strategies. The wall on the Kurdish borderland not only serves the EU’s externalised border efforts but also overlaps with Türkiye’s counter-terrorism policies against the PKK (Augustová et al., 2023). Since the late 1980s, the Kurdish region in Türkiye has witnessed intense militarisation due to policies against the PKK. As a result, Hakkâri and its surroundings have become one of the most militarised border regions in the Middle East (Ozcan, 2021). Furthermore, militarisation and surveillance increased further with the EU’s externalisation of border policies and the construction of the border wall as a result. This situation deeply affects the daily lives of the people there. Moreover, the border wall and surveillance mechanisms affect not only local people but also the ecology.

The Politics of Border Securitisation: Ecological and Social Costs

Recent policies implemented across governments treat border management primarily as a security issue, leading to the large-scale deployment of both armed and unarmed drones and advanced surveillance technologies (Correa-Cabrera et al., 2014). Cyber surveillance technologies built along borders, while justified by the claim of preventing irregular migration, in practice push migrants onto more deadly and arduous routes rather than stopping the flow of migration (Pickering & Cochrane, 2012). This technological siege is irreversibly damaging not only human mobility but also border ecology. Furthermore, border regions function as tech experimentation where these new generation surveillance tools are tested (Molnar, 2024); the mechanisms developed there eventually infiltrate the country and become a tool of repression against dissident groups. Ultimately, border technologies constitute a multidimensional securitisation problem that harms not only local people’s daily lives but also the ecological balance. Despite the documented adverse effects of border technologies, states persistently prioritise securitisation over human and environmental safety.

Considering political borders as lines of ownership and control relegates ecology to a secondary role. This seriously disrupts the global ecological balance (Pouya & Erdem Kaya, 2019). Human rights advocates and environmental activists argue that the border is not a dividing line but a living membrane. The border wall and the surveillance technologies surrounding it are cutting through wildlife conservation areas, causing ‘irreversible ecological damage’ (Wright, 2020).

Border walls have a devastating effect on regional ecology and local communities. They not only disrupt animal movement more than human movement (Ogden, 2017) but also undermine locals’ deep historical ties to the land. This is because people and ecology are deeply interconnected (Owens, 2021). Furthermore, border walls and surveillance mechanisms restrict the ‘rights of access to natural resources’ (Lavorel, 2016, p. 160) for those living near the border. Locals’ rights to water, food, an adequate standard of living, property and land are increasingly violated (Lavorel, 2016). Heavy construction techniques involved in these projects eliminate thousands of plant species and degrade air quality, while dust suppression consumes significant amounts of water (Wolf, 2022). Additionally, border walls block animal passage and reduce species diversity on both sides. Although some believe certain animals, like birds, are unaffected, research shows even birds are impeded by walls and surveillance alone (Wolf, 2022).

The daily routines of local people living in the border region of Hakkâri have been restricted and altered by the construction of the border wall and the expansion of surveillance mechanisms. In addition, the local population’s relationship with the land and nature has been damaged by changes in the region’s ecology and the designation of agricultural areas as security zones. The animal diversity on both sides of the border has also changed. This situation shows that border walls and surveillance mechanisms built in different parts of the world are destroying nature and the livelihoods of local people in similar ways and are generally disrupting the balance of the natural world.

Methodology

This research comprises two main components: ethnographic observations and interviews. Ethnographic observation and 12 semi-structured interviews were conducted at 2-year intervals between 2023 and 2025 by the first author. The first author’s background facilitated participant observation, even amid the challenges inherent in a securitised context (Nordstrom & Robben, 1995). The first author is from Hakkâri, speaks Kurdish and is well acquainted with the region. He carried out the fieldwork. Participant observation served as a key data source, enriching interview data and providing immediate insights into quotidian practices and spatial interactions with the border regime. The highly militarised, constantly surveilled conditions in the border villages made it difficult for outsiders to enter as researchers. The first author’s insider status helped him build trust and gain access to the community. In contrast, the second author was an outsider to the region and brought a different perspective to data analysis and collaborative writing. The insider role of the first author facilitated fieldwork and rapport. The outsider position of the second author enabled critical reflection. Although the research is not free of bias, combining insider and outsider perspectives enhanced the critical approach to writing and analysis (Dwyer & Buckle, 2009). This prompted self-reflection by both authors.

Twelve interviews were conducted in border areas affected by the wall and securitisation policies. Ten interviewees were from Türkiye, and two were from Iran. Iranian interviewees participated by phone, ensuring both border sides were covered. These semi-structured interviews revealed the border’s social and ecological impacts. The research also captured the wall’s environmental impacts through interviewee narratives to understand how people adapted, negotiated and resisted.

During the interviews, no audio recording was made to ensure the interviewees felt comfortable, but brief notes were taken, except for one online interview, in which the interviewee stated they had no objection to being recorded. Afterwards, the first author recorded an audio of the interviewee’s account based on the notes. The authors later transcribed the audio recordings of the notes. Manual coding was conducted. Manual coding centred on the principal interview themes— surveillance, ecology, daily life and resistance—which was facilitated by the limited number of interviewees.

The first author secured verbal informed consent from participants and explicitly outlined the research’s purpose, scope and intended uses of the interviews. Written consent was omitted to mitigate security risks and enhance participant comfort (Fujii, 2012). Participants were informed of their right to withdraw at any point. Given the sensitive nature of the border region, all data were critically evaluated, and identifying details were redacted as necessary. Names and contextual descriptions of locations, events and individuals were carefully anonymised to ensure participant safety. Pseudonyms were not used to avoid potential security issues for non-interviewees in the area. In response to pervasive surveillance, the researchers maintained rigorous caution. Ethical approval was granted by the Research Ethics Board at Wilfrid Laurier University (REB File #9275).

This research has one limitation. This study included only 12 interviewees, limiting the generalisability of the findings. This was due to intensive surveillance, a focus on those directly affected by the border wall in one city, and the limited number of interviewees from Iran, where access constraints restricted participation to only two individuals reached by phone. Detailed information about the interviewees is provided in Table 1.

Table 1.

Demographic and Interview Characteristics of the Interviewees.

Participant ID	Gender	Age	Occupation	Interview Language	Interview Duration
Interviewee 1	Man	25	Student	Turkish and Kurdish	2 hours
Interviewee 2	Man	36	Trader	Turkish and Kurdish	1.5 hours
Interviewee 3	Man	22	Engineer	Turkish	2.5 hours
Interviewee 4	Woman	43	Homemaker	Kurdish	2 hours
Interviewee 5	Woman	27	Lawyer	Kurdish	1 hour
Interviewee 6	Man	47	Cross-border porter	Kurdish	2.5 hours
Interviewee 7	Woman	34	Activist and academic	Turkish	2 hours
Interviewee 8	Man	35	Politician	Turkish and Kurdish	3 hours
Interviewee 9	Woman	57	Beet picker	Kurdish	1.5 hours
Interviewee 10	Man	37	Migrant guide	Turkish and Kurdish	2 hours
Interviewee 11	Woman	57	Homemaker	Kurdish	1.5 hours
Interviewee 12	Man	33	Political asylum seeker	Turkish and Kurdish	1 hour

Findings

Impact of the Border Wall on Local Daily Life

The construction of the border wall has had a multi-layered impact on local people’s social life and daily routine. The border wall has changed and transformed local people’s communication with their relatives and tribe members on the other side of the wall, their use of open green spaces and their trade across the border.

According to the interviewees, the border wall divides Kurdish families. Interviewees repeatedly stress that, although the wall splits them, locals on both sides still see themselves as one community, connected by kinship, ethnicity, language and religion. Thus, rather than regarding it solely as a tool of the EU’s external border policy against migrants, locals see the wall as a barrier and a symbol of defiance among Kurds in different countries. The interviewee, a 35-year-old politician, explained his thoughts on this issue.

I think that this (border wall) was built not particularly in terms of daily life, but in the longer term to divide the Kurds between the two borders, and also to prevent the Kurds in the local area from doing business and to make them needy. I think its real purpose is to prevent and slow down the trade of people in the Kurdish regions. Many family members and tribespeople are on the other side of the border. Of course, our communication with them has completely changed. It has started to be limited to social media in particular. (Interviewee 8)

The relationships and trade between people living on both sides of the border, who belong to the same family and tribe, are older than the history of nation-states. These relationships, which have been maintained despite all the difficulties and security-oriented policies, have become much more restricted with the construction of the EU-funded border wall. As the interviewee mentioned, the border wall separates families and tribe members living on both sides and disrupts long-standing border trade. This hindrance to economic relations is seen as making the Kurdish people destitute. Local residents say the wall is an attempt to discipline them.

Another interviewee stated that the wall barred families from gathering, even on significant days. A 25-year-old student recounted his own experience and insights.

The place we call Sero is one you can see out of the corner of your eye. In the past, when there was a wedding or a condolence ceremony on the other side of the border, families would definitely go. They would go in groups, even in convoys. With the construction of this wall, everything is now more tightly controlled, so those without passports or those whose passports have expired cannot enter or exit. For this reason, although cultural rituals are still significant, they are no longer performed as widely as before; they are now performed with fewer people. Because the number of passport holders is low. More importantly, the price paid for entry and exit is very high. (Interviewee 1)

As the interviewee stated, the border wall primarily affects communication with relatives on the other side, making it difficult for Kurdish people to come together on important days such as weddings, holidays and funerals, which are traditionally and culturally significant. Only those with passports can cross, which can result in lost contact, so communication is often limited to social media and the telephone. Also, the issue is not only obtaining a passport but also entry and exit fees, which are key obstacles to people meeting their relatives.

The construction of the border wall has caused major disruptions to the area’s economic and social life. Many families and individuals depended on border trade, and its interruption has created complex economic hardships, making it difficult for residents to maintain their livelihoods. As a direct result, many have been compelled to relocate to other regions or countries. Although officials intend to prevent migration with this wall, the experience of Interviewee 12, a 33-year-old political refugee in Switzerland, demonstrates an opposite outcome. The wall’s construction directly harmed his family’s border trade activities, making it harder for them to support themselves and disrupting his education. As a consequence, he encountered several groups from Iran who had come to the local village with plans to reach Europe. He joined one of these groups and emigrated. This example illustrates how, rather than reducing migration, the wall indirectly prompted more people from the area to migrate to Europe—highlighting a failure by the EU and Türkiye to consider local dynamics.

In addition, the border wall made life in villages near the border unsustainable. As a result, people were forced not only to migrate out of the country but also to move from these villages to city centres in search of viable livelihoods.

A 27-year-old lawyer from Iran shared her thoughts on how the border wall has affected her life:

Our daily life has been affected … Because trade has come to a standstill. Families have moved further inland, towards Urmia, towards urban life. There is a significant migration in our village, instead of migrating to the interior. Our communication with our relatives on the other side of the border has decreased significantly. (Interviewee 5)

As the interviewee’s statements above show, this border wall makes life difficult for both the villages on the Turkish side and those on the Iranian border. However, while the border wall changes and transforms the villages and lives there, local people refuse to remain passive; they choose to resist the policies it drives and to shape the area. For example, a 37-year-old male interviewee works as a migrant guide. He lost a close relative after a fire at the police station. He describes how this loss changed his life and motivates him to help migrants cross borders as a reaction to the concept of borders:

Exactly 2 years ago, my uncle’s son lost his life in our village, right next to the border wall, when he was fired from the police station. Therefore, from that day on, I promised myself I would help everyone who wanted to cross here. I thought I would somehow facilitate them, whether they had money. (Interviewee 10)

The interviewee viewed his actions at the border as efforts to increase its permeability. He identifies as a migrant guide, not a smuggler. He distinguishes himself by adjusting prices based on migrants’ gender, age and financial status, and by helping those unable to pay. His narrative shows that the border wall and its policies deeply affected local people, prompting them to develop opposing practices.

The construction of the border wall intensified surveillance in the already heavily monitored border villages, reducing communication with relatives on the other side. The EU’s external border policies primarily focus on preventing migrants from reaching EU borders, affecting the daily lives of local populations. This situation has made daily life more challenging and has influenced migration within and outside the country. Additionally, it has contributed to the development of resistance practices among the local population in these border villages.

Surveillance

Hakkâri has been under surveillance for many years due to securitisation and militarisation policies. It is observed that technological surveillance practices have become widespread within the scope of the state’s security policies with the construction of the border wall. According to the Human Rights Association (IHD, 2024) report, entrances and exits in villages near the border wall are strictly controlled. X-ray devices have been placed at the entrances of these villages. In addition, people who do not reside in those villages must obtain permission from the military in the region to enter them. Such security policies also show that the border does not start with that wall but at the entrances of neighbouring villages. The local people are under surveillance with cameras everywhere, UAVs constantly flying overhead and police stations in the villages.

A 33-year-old interviewee, who did his military service in the same region, described the level of surveillance there as follows.

Since the technology in the military region is very advanced, everything is monitored 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. We would go to sleep to the sound of UAVs and wake up to the sound of UAVs. (Interviewee 3)

Similarly, another perspective comes from a 25-year-old university student, who highlighted the impact of the border wall on the village.

There is not much left of the village after that wall … There are watchtowers everywhere. (Interviewer 1)

These observations underscore how increased surveillance has deeply affected life in the region and altered the local people’s relationships with their villages. Almost all of the interviewees stated that they were under intense surveillance. Because surveillance technologies are visually and verbally evident, they affect local people’s daily routines and foster the perception that the region faces a constant security threat. Building on these insights, two interviewees shared their observations about surveillance.

There are drones everywhere. There are thermal cameras everywhere. They are very obvious. It was incredibly obvious. You feel like you are under observation. (Interviewee 7)

After the construction of the border wall, the number of soldiers started to increase. The soldiers, who usually do not leave their posts, started descending into the village. From the sounds of UAVs and SIHAs, we can tell they are on the move every other day. (Interviewer 9)

Further expanding on the technological landscape, the technologies used for border security differ on the Iranian and Turkish sides. A 27-year-old Iranian woman interviewee, a lawyer, shared her views on security technologies on both sides of the border.

Especially on the Iranian side, there is not as complex a structure as in Türkiye within the border wall. We see that UAVs and SIHAs are used more professionally in Türkiye. On the Iranian side, border security units operate along this border with outdated technology. (Interviewee 5)

Increased surveillance, military presence and securitisation in Hakkâri’s border villages have intensified since the construction of the border wall. These changes illustrate the impact of EU externalised border policies. Village life has diminished under years of intense surveillance, as one interviewee observed. An Iranian interviewee also noted that surveillance technologies are more common on the Turkish side. In this context, the EU’s technological and economic support under its externalised border policies plays a significant role, working in tandem with Turkey’s implementation of its own surveillance mechanisms.

Ecology

The primary sources of income for people in Hakkâri’s border villages are animal husbandry and agriculture. After the border wall’s construction, many areas became military security zones, dividing fields and reducing grazing areas, which considerably limited these activities. The wall also restricted the movement of locals and other living beings, changing the region’s ecological system. A 43-year-old homemaker shared her observations about this change as follows:

I do not see many wild animals I used to see yearly; they do not come. Especially on land, the number of turtles has decreased significantly. They probably cannot move anymore because of this wall. The number of snakes has increased a lot. I think the snakes probably stayed on this side because of the wall. (Interviewee 4)

With changes in water flow and the drying up of some sources, local people have been deeply affected. To illustrate this, a 36-year-old trader and politician explains how water sources have changed:

We had to look for new water sources; everyone was trying to extract water by digging in front of their houses. Before the wall, there was a rich water source because the stream passed through the village. It provided water to the whole village from there, but now this stream is gone because it has dried up. (Interviewee 2)

The border wall not only separated people but also disrupted the region’s ecology by dividing habitats and altering natural water flows. These ecological changes led to water resource constraints, resulting in serious problems with access to this basic necessity. Additionally, the increased security zones created by the wall have prevented local people from accessing the green spaces they once could use. The border wall and new security zones have restricted access to trees planted and inherited by local families (Figure 1). The same interviewee describes this problem.

My grandfather’s father planted trees between his two villages around the 1920s because he loved nature. After this wall, some trees remained on the Iranian side, and some were in Türkiye. Afterward, the area where these trees (fruit trees) were located was declared a special security zone, so they could not go near them. (Interviewer 2)

Figure 1.

The Mountainous Border Landscape along the Türkiye–Iran Border (Photo by the first author, [2023]).

The inaccessibility of wooded areas has prevented local people from accessing green areas and trees with material and spiritual meanings inherited from their ancestors. However, this is not the only problem. The villagers who would cut and burn dried trees to heat their homes before the border wall cannot access the wooded area and therefore cannot use those trees as fuel. People heat their homes with coal provided by the state to locals. However, the use of coal has also negatively affected the air in the region.

A 25-year-old student noted his observations as follows:

With the construction of this wall, people’s financial resources have decreased. Since forest areas are considered special security zones, local people are provided with free coal aid from the state or the government. As a result, I observed that air pollution has increased. (Interviewee 1)

The mobility of animals and people has been restricted. The fact that the border wall does not exist only as a wall, the barbed wires used on the wall and the large ditches opened near the border have also caused the deaths of people (especially migrants trying to cross the border in winter) and animals, as stated by the interviewees. Animals get stuck in the barbed wire and die when they fall into the ditches.

The region’s rich plant diversity enables locals to collect herbs and use them in meals. This practice provides income and is a family tradition for women. A 57-year-old beet picker describes her experience with this practice.

Before the border wall was built, many types of plants grew in the wild, especially in the fertile areas between Iran and Türkiye. We used to collect these plants for food, pesticides, and our animals. However, with the construction of this wall, this has come to an end. Therefore, the only thing left for us to do is collect beets. To do this, we can go out to collect beets by getting permission from the police station, especially the Esendere Police Station. Because these places have always been declared special security zones, many people have either stepped into mines or gotten injured recently. With the construction of this wall, the beets that we used to collect in groups and large groups in the summer months have become a risk for us because we are now terrified to collect them, or because the number of groups we go to has decreased a lot. (Interviewee 9)

Despite these difficulties and restrictions, local people continue to use the village’s green areas for picnics. To shed light on this persistence, a 34-year-old woman activist and academic interviewee comments on the issue:

There is a stubbornness among our people. In other words, they say these are our areas, and we want to use them. Rightfully so, and they do. They take all the risks and dangers. And they do this. Because they have no other areas, in other words, they have nothing else to do. (Interviewee 7)

The construction of the border wall has restricted local people’s access to agricultural and animal husbandry areas, altered waterways, caused water resources to dry up and limited animal mobility, resulting in significant ecological damage to the region. Despite these impacts, local people always seek ways to resist and exercise their right to the city. Furthermore, these circumstances illustrate how the EU’s environmental policies are deliberately ignored, leading to ecological destruction in the externalised border regions. Ultimately, the perception and belief that ecology matters only within EU borders causes border policymakers to forget that ecology is a whole and relational entity worldwide.

Discussion

The concept of the border has evolved from a fixed geographical line to a complex, dynamic structure that exercises power across space and time (Chouliaraki & Georgiou, 2022). Modern border technologies are deployed to manage, categorise and restrict both the movement and the identities of migrants (Seuferling & Leurs, 2021). Borders are no longer merely physical barriers, but process-based assemblages (Rossiter, 2011). Despite increased efforts by states to control migration, migrants continue to find ways to cross. These technological interventions do not stop migration; they simply push migrants onto more perilous routes (Jones, 2016). The situation in Hakkâri demonstrates that the EU’s externalised border policies and the Turkish state’s securitisation measures have not stopped migration. Instead, heightened securitisation and the construction of border walls have worsened local living conditions and economic stability, prompting some local residents to cross into the EU alongside migrant groups.

The environmental impact of border infrastructure is a critical issue in this region. The constructed border wall has severely damaged local ecology, illustrating that while natural ecological systems do not recognise political boundaries, state-imposed borders can create deep ecological crises. Political borders are artificial constructs that intersect with and fragment the environment (Yongge, 2000). Plants and animals ignore state borders, yet government policies impose ecological boundaries. Because ecological systems are interconnected, activities such as the construction of forest roads or other destructive practices threaten the sustainability of the entire region (Yongge, 2000). Hakkâri exemplifies ecological racism in two key ways: first, in the third country and, second, in Türkiye, where Hakkâri is the eastern part of the country. Global environmental degradation disproportionately affects areas populated by marginalised groups—a phenomenon described as ecological racism (Dinc, 2022). Additionally, long-standing securitisation policies in Hakkâri, driven by regional conflicts, have led to the construction of fortified infrastructure and the extensive use of security technologies such as thermal cameras and UAVs (Bozçalı, 2024). The environmental impact of military outposts is significant, as they often drive deforestation to improve visibility and monitoring (Akin, 2022). Similarly, while the EU enacts key ecological policies within its borders, it also supports the construction of border walls in external regions, which harm the environment.

Kurdish environmental activism demonstrates that nature is central to both survival and identity. Like many indigenous peoples, they see nature as part of who they are. Environmental destruction is not just a material loss but also a broader loss (Wiktor-Mach et al., 2024). For local people, forests are not just resources; they also offer water, animal feed, shelter, and cultural and spiritual spaces (Dinc, 2022).

The contrasting understandings of the border by the Turkish state and local populations form the central dynamic in the region. While the Turkish state views the border through a security and sovereignty lens, people in the border region see it primarily through a lens of kinship and trade, creating ongoing tension (Tekin, 2025). Complicating this dynamic, the EU is involved through its border externalisation policies, treating the border as a control zone to stop migrants and ignoring local communities.

While the state enacts policies of militarisation, strong kinship ties across borders maintain the area’s social, cultural and economic openness (Tekin, 2025). Therefore, the border is not just a dividing line but also a dynamic space where solidarity and identity are constantly evolving. For the state, the border is a security barrier; for locals, it is an unjust obstacle separating families (Tekin, 2025). Smuggling economies in Kurdish border areas have developed as adaptable forms of resistance to state surveillance and punishment (Bozçalı, 2023). As one interviewee pointed out, resistance goes beyond serving local needs alone. The EU’s isolating border policies, symbolised by the border wall, have led residents to view helping migrants cross as a duty, which, in turn, has sparked resistance in this sphere as well.

Conclusion

This research examines how the EU’s external border policies affect daily life and the environment in Hakkâri. Findings show that such policies increase surveillance, disrupt local ecologies with border walls, limit livelihoods, restrict agricultural access and drive internal and external migration. Those remaining develop resistance practices. While this study emphasises both ecological and social impacts, it is limited to one city. Broader, comparative research across affected regions is needed to capture the global effects of EU border policies.

EU policymakers and stakeholders must immediately address the difficulties faced by residents of border regions. They should conduct urgent policy reviews, establish mechanisms to monitor effects on ecology and local livelihoods, and consult directly with affected communities. Concrete steps must be taken to revise border policies, integrating enforceable standards for migrant rights, local people’s rights and ecological protection at every stage of formulation and implementation.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers and editors for their constructive and insightful comments, which significantly contributed to improving the manuscript. The authors are also grateful to Dr. Ömer Özcan for his time, thorough reading, and invaluable feedback.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Note

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