Critical science communication: Conceptual thoughts on explicating and practising normativity

Abstract

Science communication research and practice share a normative understanding of science communication as a democratically required, socially beneficial and therefore generally desirable act. At the same time, their presumptions about the authority and autonomy of science in society tend to be idealistic with regard to the political and economic environments in which global science operates. Such idealism is equally common in scientific practice across diverse cultures of science. This interdisciplinary conceptual article argues that the necessary contradiction between the normative commitment to global cooperation and social progress and the national and economic realities restricting the field of action of science (communication) so far has not been treated as the fundamental tension that it is. Recent political conflicts within Western hegemony, catalyzed through national authoritarian backlashes, bring this tension to the surface and offer a chance for science and science communication to re-evaluate their normative foundations and consequential research perspectives. In this, there lies a chance for science communication to facilitate a process of reflexive transition regarding the self-understanding and research programme of the field. Practically, this could mean for science communication researchers to categorically and critically embed their findings into systemic contexts—and to expect the same from practitioners.

1. Introduction

Just like all scientific research, the science of science communication in its disciplinary self-perception and research practice is shaped by (often implicit) values and norms. In a way, the field even constitutes a particularly complicated case, in that it necessarily operates on assumptions about both science and communication. Despite the potentially negative side effects of all applied science and technology (Beck et al., 1994), science is generally regarded as a collaborative quest (Merton, 1968) for positive change through knowledge by communication scholars and practitioners across scientific cultures alike. Communicating scientific results and their contexts (Bonfadelli et al., 2017) to broader audiences, while engaging these audiences at the same time (Trench, 2008), is widely seen as the most promising approach to work towards such progress. Science communication research has so far been reluctant to explore and explicate these normative foundations, partly for strategic reasons: Public images of science as a ‘pure’ and neutral activity prevail, and the potential public effects of communicating ‘science in action’ (Latour, 1987) are disputed.

However, in this conceptual article, I argue that there is a more fundamental reason for this restraint: Open, collaborative science with the goal to contribute to a better life for the many is restricted by a world order of nation-states competing territorially and economically. Thoroughly defining the norms of science and its communication and acting accordingly would imply a critique of the system on which today's scientific institutions stand.

Modern science is highly differentiated (Stichweh, 1979) and has lost its exceptional position in society, which for a long time had been characterized by high levels of trust, while at the same time, few accountability checks were in place (Weingart, 2023: 32). However, in the face of ‘economic stagnation’ and ‘intensified international competition in the context of globalization’ (Weingart, 2023: 33), scientific freedom and ‘disinterestedness’ (Merton, 1968) become increasingly restricted. Science, its institutions and its research output, especially in the form of technological applications, are blatantly reduced to factors in global national competition (Chrisafis, 2025). Although a global phenomenon, aggressive authoritarian political measures with fascist tendencies in major Western countries threaten, among many other things, the very fabric of the global scientific infrastructure due to their hegemonial status (Chomsky, 2003; Grimm and Hornidge, 2025; Larivière et al., 2015). It is in this political climate that appeals and self-commitments to scientific exchange, open data and benevolence (Hendriks et al., 2015) seem increasingly at odds with the political realities.

The purpose of this article is to map a conceptual way (see Reese, 2023) out of this situation, which threatens the freedom and integrity of science altogether: With the United States of America, Asia and Europe further accelerating the global technology race and competing for economically valuable scientific talent while defunding or silencing critical, reflective voices, the scientific ethos becomes harder to uphold every day (see Caplan, 2025).

The presented concept of critical science communication takes these publicly visible contradictions as a starting point for proposing a form of ideology critique based on Karl Mannheim's (2013) sociology of knowledge and Frankfurt School critical theory (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997) to be incorporated into science communication research and practice. The critical element thus introduced into science communication would function internally as well as externally through:

reflecting on and explicating norms and values guiding science communication (practice) itself (see Section 2);

explicating ideologies structuring systems of power affecting scientific research, its institutions and actors (see Section 3).

I argue that the first step is an act of scientific rigour in that it increases transparency and reveals collective paradigms (Kuhn, 1962) and individual standpoints (Stoetzler and Yuval-Davis, 2002) alike. Moreover, the second step would enhance existing interventions stressing the need for science communication to increasingly move from result-oriented towards process- and context-sensitive approaches in order to sustainably maintain public trust (Shapin, 1992; Kreutzer et al., 2025): Critical science communication could call for additional systemic layers of context in science communication research and practice—and thereby introduce a macro-level perspective into the trust-building process. It would thus move beyond the well-established scrutiny of private scientific actors and their motives in science communication (see Bauer, 2008) towards a perspective of systemic criticism.

Before getting into detail about the concept of critical science communication, the following section will first present indications for what I problematize as the vague normativity of science communication. I argue that the systemic contradictions described above have always existed, but hidden beneath the highly useful narrative of research as an interconnected, altruistic endeavor aimed at the good of the people and operating in an unbounded space solely sworn to the ‘forceless force of the better argument’ (Habermas, 1998). Political actors as well as scientists and science communicators have nurtured this narrative consciously as well as subconsciously, for different strategic, ideological, idealistic and normative reasons (see Prelli, 1989). At the same time, as shown in Section 3 on the systemic environment of global science, ‘scientific nationalism’ has been a subtle but constant element in science communication discourse. Section 4 then takes up these observations and presents the concept of critical science communication as a self-reflexive form of ideology critique based on Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge and Frankfurt School critical theory.

Throughout the article, the term ‘science’ is to be understood in the sense of the German Wissenschaft—as an umbrella term referring to the entire world of scientific research, spanning the whole spectrum from the natural sciences to the humanities.

2. The vague normative foundations of science communication

Critical science communication is about inward and outward reflection and transparency in science communication research and practice. This section presents the vague normative foundations of science communication as the first, internal starting point for this practice.

As a human activity, scientific research can never be value-free (see Weber, 1904; Latour, 1987; Jasanoff, 2011). This is particularly true for social science, which observes the social environment that the researcher him- or herself is part of—often in a variety of social roles with different non-scientific interests (Weber, 1904). Building on fundamental philosophical questions, pioneering fields for science communication research such as the sociology of knowledge (see Berger and Luckmann, 1966), social epistemology (see Hoppe and Vogelmann, 2024) and the philosophy of science (see Bloor, 1981) have reflexively studied conditions under which knowledge is produced and established. While there is a lively discussion in science communication discourse about values as influencing factors for ‘successful’ science communication (see Östman and Almqvist, 2010; Dietz, 2013; Jamieson, 2017), the community has engaged with its own values and guiding convictions rather sparsely. ¹ When Public Understanding of Science, one of today's main platforms of knowledge transfer and debate within the field, was launched in 1992, editor John Durant wrote in his editorial:

The authors of our launch perspectives appear to agree with one another that the public dimensions of science and technology are vitally important; but their reasons for thinking so, as well as their agendas for research, are significantly different. (Durant, 1992: 4)

Since then, key debates and ‘paradigm shifts’ (Kuhn, 1962) from ‘deficit model’ premises to more participatory approaches (Simis et al., 2016) have operated on exactly this shared normative foundation of science communication as something important and principally desirable. Discussions unfold along the ‘how’ of science communication, not about its raison d’être. This, in turn, has to do with a general appreciation of and belief in science among science communicators and science communication researchers. This attachment to the object of research initially paved the way for early ‘deficit model’ conceptualizations and rather uncritical, instrumental attitudes in some areas of science communication practice (Kohring, 1997). Science communication researchers seem to agree that ‘science is, potentially, the best source for the evidence needed to answer these questions’ relating to ‘effective decisions in our life’ (Fischhoff and Scheufele, 2013: 14031). This shared conviction then turns science communication into an imperative for well-meaning scientists: If there is a form of reliable knowledge universally applicable for all of us to better navigate our lives, its communication should be studied with the goal to make it more efficient. ²

However, there remain questions about the actual universality of the improvement and progress catalyzed through science communication. Psychological research on dimensions of trust in science among laypeople stresses the importance of the assumed benevolence of researchers and their work (Hendriks et al., 2015). However, this category remains highly subjective and particularistic when put into practice: A widely criticized example for this is what Bogner from a sociology-of-knowledge point of view has described as the ‘epistemization of the political’ (Bogner, 2021). In his work, he observes and criticizes the pervasive political practice of justifying political decisions based solely on selective reference to scientific knowledge. This way, values and a certain conception of human beings, which naturally prioritize particular social groups in policymaking, are denied. Scientific knowledge is instrumentalized for the benefit of selected groups.

This is just one example of the inconsistencies that a vague conception of normativity can display when confronted with practical realities. Others can be found in the scientific dependency on funding fostering research in specific areas led by political or economic interest. Such research is destined to serve a certain purpose, which in many cases will not be a better life for ‘the many’. Science communication research and practice, if aware of these tensions, have so far maintained a conveniently flexible practical approach to them. I argue that current political and economic developments confront science communication with a new situation, in which these tensions and incompatibilities are laid bare publicly and call for a clear positioning within the field. Disciplinary self-reflection in the spirit of critical science communication would therefore mean for science communication researchers and practitioners to work towards a maximum of clarity and transparency regarding values, norms and goals of the discipline.

Before I describe the form that such a transition towards a new conceptual clarity followed by consequential action in science communication could take, I will go into more depth about some of the norm conflicts sketched above, since implicit norms and ideologies are what critical science communication would be aimed at externally. The following section therefore reviews selected literature on globally dominant political and economic norms and ideologies with regard to the organization of scientific research.

3. The systemic environment of global science

3.1 Scientific nationalism

The relationship between science and society is subject to the constantly changing shape of the public(s) throughout history. Science in Western ‘mass democracies’ operates in a fundamentally different environment than it did in pre-bourgeois patronage systems (Weingart, 2011). Today, science largely depends on financial and time resources allocated by the nation-state and paid for by taxpayers’ money. Although technically free, most science constantly relies on being in the favour of public opinion to receive resources according to its needs (Weingart, 2011). Competition is a natural state, which for example can be illustrated by the internationally growing number of positions and increasing time spent on communication activities at research universities (Entradas, 2021). ‘Ranking regimes’ (Gonzales and Núñez, 2021) globally put universities under increasing pressure to concentrate their research and communication resources on few visible flagship projects (Wissenschaftsrat, 2020).

Despite efforts to delegate a certain number of funding decisions to independent research-funding bodies, national governments usually make no secret of their overarching visions and expectations regarding the payoff from science funding. In their analysis of 20 national science policy documents, representing about 60% of the world's population, Sá and Sabzalieva found a ‘striking convergence’ in the way that the documents framed the national ‘desire to become (or remain) globally competitive’ (Sá and Sabzalieva, 2018: 156): ‘Across the national policies that discuss the regulation of academic science, we found clustering around measures to enhance university‒industry cooperation, and in accountability and evaluation frameworks’ (Sá and Sabzalieva, 2018: 158). As a key term in the papers, ‘innovation’ surpassed even ‘science’—an observation additionally illustrating the competitional framing dominant in the documents. Sá and Sabzalieva embed their findings into a broader historical context when they observe ‘where scientific nationalism in the nineteenth and early twentieth century was framed around nation building, it is now more commonly associated with developing or consolidating national economic advantage’ (Sá and Sabzalieva, 2018: 152). In the fact that ‘both historically and in the present, the scientific nationalism logic has coexisted with the scientific globalism logic, rooted in the very constitution of the idea of modern science’ (Sá and Sabzalieva, 2018: 163), lies the bridge to the implicit inner tension in science communication (research) described above. According to Robert Merton, one of the pioneering figures of the said modern science, the results of scientific research become a common good (Merton, 1968). At the same time, empirical work, such as Sá and Sabzalieva's as well as the aforementioned anecdotal examples of politicians framing one country's crisis of academic freedom as another one's chance for drawing skilled workforce, illustrate the practical dominance of the scientific nationalism logic. Operating in a world of concurring nation-states, academia, scientific research and science communication have been forced to constantly balance both logics as well as possible.

3.2 Systemic incompatibility

The inadequacy of this arrangement and its effects from global down to local levels of science organization and research are touched upon time and again (see Kalleberg, 2007; Kim and Kim, 2018). However, merely calling for science communication networks to pool scientific research on specific, socially relevant topics free from institutional competition and committed only to the scientific ethos (Wormer, 2022) ignores the systemic realities. Even pioneering projects of seemingly ‘disinterested’ (see Merton, 1968) transfer of scientific knowledge such as the various national science media centres ultimately rely on public funding and have been criticized for promoting government and industry interests (Fox and St Louis, 2013). Competition in higher education at both national and international levels has ‘dramatically developed in the last decades’ and taken a ‘multi-level form’ most visible in the self-positioning of research universities (Musselin, 2018: 657). The national and global dynamics of this competition cannot be separated from each other (Marginson, 2006): The hegemonial position of English as the main academic language (Curry and Lillis, 2007) allows for governments to attract foreign workforce in the national interest.

Taken together, these systemic realities and the political and economic expectations towards science are ultimately barely compatible with the normative ideal of it promoted in science communication. Most national science policies are first and foremost supposed to increase global competitiveness and not to contribute to a better life for the global population. In fact, one of the cornerstone documents of science communication (research), the 1985 Royal Society report ‘The public understanding of science’, vividly demonstrates the described incompatibility between the global ideal and the national reality within just two consecutive sentences:

Would the world be a better, or even a different, place if the public understood more of the scope and the limitations, the findings and the methods of science? A basic thesis of this report is that better public understanding of science can be a major element in promoting national prosperity. ³ (Royal Society, 1985: 9)

Here, the initial claim to global well-being through science communication is almost immediately replaced by national economic wealth as a main objective. The text keeps referring to ‘strong economies’ and ‘new technologies’ (Royal Society, 1985)—closely relating the document to the national economic framings dominating science policy in most leading Western countries, as described above. To a certain degree, science communication research has always been aware of the tensions at its core.

The fact that many researchers across diverse scientific cultures might individually believe in global and universal scientific ideals and try to act and communicate accordingly holds its very own pitfalls. Idealizing science and its processes, even for well-meant reasons, can open gateways for fundamental delegitimization. The interplay of fast-paced developments and scientific as well as political responses during the COVID-19 pandemic raised questions about the short- and long-term effects of communicating scientific uncertainty on public trust in the scientific system (Kreps and Kriner, 2020). Seemingly erratic political measures severely infringing citizens’ rights can cause irritation when their evidence base turns out to be exaggerated. In extreme cases, more science can even make controversies worse (Sarewitz, 2004).

Psychological research on trust in science has shown that such idealized communication, however well meant, will not stand the test against reality. Instead, public experts will be held accountable based on the rules of their profession and their assumed intentions (Hendriks et al., 2016). If these rules and processes are not communicated in their full imperfection in the first place, disappointment and mistrust sooner or later are inevitable.

Science communication discourse has been aware of this for a while, which is why studies measuring the public understanding of science from the very beginning asked about scientific facts as well as processes (see Durant et al., 1989). At the same time, the salesmen's practices apparent in science journalism's national competition and sensationalist frames (see Nelkin, 1987) and demonstrating the economic dependencies of science communication intermediaries have seldom been problematized on a systemic level. ‘The ideologies or social priorities that guide science policy decisions … are seldom considered news’ (Nelkin, 1987: 173).

Based on the introductory observations about new political developments publicly laying bare old fundamental contradictions between scientific ideals and realities, I argue that it is time to further enhance the contextual layer in science communication: It will not be enough anymore to communicate (idealized) accounts of ‘science in action’ (Latour, 1987). While the structural inclusion of individual values and social conditions in the communication of and about science remains an important and yet unfinished project, science-external contexts need to be equally considered. Transparency about dependencies and imposed rules interfering with even the most excellent, honest and benevolent research might in the long run increase trust in science (however to the disadvantage of the systems and institutions surrounding it).

I have argued that this practice, which in the tradition of critical social theory I call critical science communication, can serve as means of addressing an old core tension that so far has been conveniently concealed. In the following section, I will provide more theoretical context to define and operationalize this proposed critical practice for science communication. Drawing from social philosophy and sociology of knowledge, I will discuss the role of critical science communication in increasing trust in science through transparency regarding internal disciplinary norms and values (Section 2) as well as through raising awareness of dominant political and economic ideologies (Section 3).

4. Approach: Critical science communication

I have suggested that formulating and applying a concept of critical science communication can be seen as an act of scientific rigour, a logical consequence of explicating and following through the implicit normative ideals of science communication research. The argument is that taking the scientific ethos seriously and acting and communicating accordingly will automatically imply systemic criticism. From this perspective, internal self-reflection and transparency regarding the norms and values of science and science communication (Section 2) and critique of the surrounding political and economic systems (Section 3) are two sides of the same coin. The following section further discusses specific notions of critique and ideology in order to relate the proposed concept to critical social theory and the sociology of knowledge. By specifying these key terms, the practical potential of critical science communication will be demonstrated.

4.1 Defining the critical

‘Thinking critically is at the heart of science, and at the heart of the relationship between science and society’ (Sanitt, 2005: 1). Both understandings of critical thinking mentioned here have fundamentally different scopes and normative objectives. According to Merton (1968), ‘organized skepticism’ is one of the four fundamental norms of science. The scientific community is obliged to continually try to ‘falsify’ (Popper, 2005) its findings. In a way, science can be described as inherently critical insofar as it sets high methodical standards for sound knowledge which distinguishes that knowledge from everyday observations and anecdotal evidence. The traditional, positivistic modus operandi set forth by Merton and Popper is driven by a general mistrust towards singular new findings. From their perspective, strong evidence emerges over time and through consensus (see also Oreskes, 2021).

Critical science communication as understood here, however, stands in the tradition of critical thinking in critical social theory, which is more interested in ‘the relationship between science and society’ (Sanitt, 2005: 1) than in positivistic methodologies. This understanding of critical thinking is rooted in philosophy and the humanities and champions holistic questioning and interpreting. According to Mittelstraß (1982), it complements ‘instructional knowledge’ (Verfügungswissen) about nature and society with ‘orientational knowledge’ (Orientierungswissen) adding context and interpretative frameworks to practical findings. As explained above, this is at least partly practised in science communication (research), which increasingly stresses the importance of including research processes and contexts in communication activities.

The described implicit normativity of science and science communication, however, goes further in that it formulates a social demand, which, if explicated, is deeply at odds with the way in which modern science is embedded in national economies and power relations today. In this, there lies some common ground with the interdisciplinary research programme of the Frankfurt School, which processed the devastating experiences of World War II into a highly influential, power-critical theory of radical scope, lastingly connecting the term ‘critical’ to Adorno, Horkheimer, their companions and their students (see Wiggershaus, 1994; Jay, 1996). Explicitly arguing for critical science communication in this article has therefore been a deliberate decision, which calls for further conceptional and theoretical explanation and precision.

The main link connecting the proposed concept of critical science communication to Frankfurt School critical theory lies in the realization that a world order of competing capitalist nation-states does not primarily serve the interests of ‘the many’ and that scientists and intellectuals are in a position to point out the underlying contradictions of this dominant order through complex critical analysis. In fact, the scientific ethos can be argued to even urge them to do so. A normative understanding of roles with a long tradition in academia, as pointed out by Chomsky, is as follows:

Perhaps the most important role of the intellectual since the enlightenment has been that of unmasking ideology, exposing the injustice and repression that exists in every society that we know, and seeking the way to a new and higher form of social life that will extend the possibilities for a free and creative life. (Chomsky, 1968: 6)

By describing the totalitarian aspects of the Enlightenment ideal, Adorno and Horkheimer (1997) by no means intend to delegitimize science and scientific research altogether. On the contrary, they defend categorical scepticism in the face of seemingly knowledge-based absolutizations, with a special focus on underlying power relations: ‘Knowledge, which is power, knows no obstacles: neither in the enslavement of men nor in compliance with the world's rulers’ (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 4). In this, they were merely anticipating the current science and technology studies and sociology of knowledge critique of scientism (see Jasanoff, 2007; Bogner, 2021). Critical science communication follows this tradition in that it creates transparency about the institutional contexts and power relations shaping scientific knowledge production and by practizing epistemic humility (see Jasanoff, 2007).

What poses an obstacle when adapting Frankfurt School critical social theory for science communication research is the unresolved and heavily disputed theory‒practice relationship within the school: From the very beginning, the critical and at times openly political approach of its theory raised expectations towards practical efficacy that could not always be fulfilled (see Kailitz, 2007). As a discipline rooted in transfer, the science of science communication needs to go beyond the nihilistic diagnosis that there can be ‘no right life in the wrong one’ ⁴ (Adorno, 2022: 43) and describe concrete potentials for application. I argue that a specific form of ideology critique can fit this task.

4.2 Operationalizing the ideological

Following Marx, the Frankfurt School understands ideology as a ‘false consciousness’ stabilizing the interests of the ruling class: ‘The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas’ (Marx and Engels, 2010: 169). This understanding culminates in their famous dictum of ‘enlightenment as mass deception’ (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 94).

Broadly accepted paradigms in academia such as the global hegemony of the English language and the Anglo-American oligopoly in publishing (see Knoche and Fuchs, 2020) as well as the primacy of research serving national interests mentioned above can be viewed as symptoms of such stabilizing ideology. Journalists as main sources for public information about science are equally affected by the economic interests of publishers and therefore limited in their critical potential (see Knoche, 2025).

A powerful and applicable concept of critical science communication should take these existing interdependences into account and propose a more subtle form of ideology critique, justified on the basis of commonly accepted ideals of scientific logic, rigour and comprehensiveness. Ideology critique in this practical sense would mean no more and no less than communicating transparently about one's own norms as well as contexts and concurring interests shaping knowledge production and application. In other words, it would provide the bigger picture of the environment that science operates in whenever possible. For this, I propose following Karl Mannheim's observations regarding the inevitability, even necessity, of ideology in public discourse, most prominently described in his main work Ideology and Utopia (2013). Mannheim conceptualizes ideology as a necessary precondition for social interaction and proposes a ‘value-free understanding of ideology’, more interested in how different interpretations of reality are generated than in passing judgement on actual truth (Mannheim, 2013). Accordingly, his political sociology is not primarily interested in dictating decisions but rather in explaining why specific actors under specific historical circumstances influenced by specific sets of values see the world as they see it and act accordingly (Mannheim, 2015: 142).

Although the term ‘value-free’ has to be viewed critically in the light of the state of research in sociology of knowledge, sociology of science and social epistemology, I find the core of this approach to be highly suitable for a critical science communication practice for several reasons.

First, it cautions even the forefathers of ideology critique to be self-reflective (Mannheim, 2015: 65) and thereby refutes possible accusations of partisan bias. In addition, the problem of totality in Marxist critique (see Jay, 1984; Struwe, 2025)—meaning the arguably reductionist tendency of criticizing a complex world solely on the basis of, for example, a certain economic order—is bypassed through the descriptive and multifactorial nature of the sociology of knowledge approach.

Second, it leaves it open to the public to detect systemic contradictions, and thereby fosters critical thinking abilities in general, by merely explicating ideological elements connected to scientific knowledge production instead of naturalizing them. This way, critical science communication could strengthen general information sovereignty and resilience in a public sphere increasingly at risk of losing its critical thinking abilities in an unprecedented artificial intelligence (AI) takeover (Chow, 2025).

Third, it contributes to good scientific practice in science communication (research) by explicating normative commitments of science and science communication. Benevolent science (communication) can describe ideological obstacles in the way of the application of research for a better world and gain trust and integrity along the way.

5. Practice and perspectives

What concrete forms can a critique of ideology, building on Mannheim's political sociology of knowledge, take in critical science communication practice? I have argued that a critical practice in science communication would include an inward perspective of disciplinary self-reflection and normative transparency and an outward perspective of critical disclosure of systemic norms and ideologies affecting science. Both perspectives are connected insofar as that the scientific ethos is incompatible with a system of concurring capitalist nation-states: To consequently explicate the communitarian norms of science and science communication means to also disclose their practical systemic limitations.

However, practizing critical science communication internally and externally affects the intertwined research and practice domains of science communication differently. The following section provides an outlook onto cornerstones of reflexive disciplinary debates, potential research agendas, and practice examples made possible by applying the concept.

5.1 Critical self-reflection

‘Total ideologies’ (as opposed to ‘particular ideologies’), according to Mannheim, structure world views and normalize a specific way of thinking (Mannheim, 2015: 54), which naturally makes them hard to detect and even harder to address. However, a logical starting point for an ideology-sensitive critical science communication would be the increasingly visible incompatibility between the scientific ethos and the global economic, cultural and geostrategic competition between capitalist nation-states, which also has been the starting point for the present article. Newly formed ideological coalitions between AI oligarchs, cyber-fascist thought leaders and right-wing politicians illustrate the need for immediate ideology-critical communicative action even further (see Mühlhoff, 2025). In science communication research, there have been attempts to emphasize the grave importance of knowledge about at least certain economic basic principles, with for example Macknight and Medvecky (2023: 3) stating: ‘Economics affects us all, in deep and multiple ways, both individually and collectively, yet it is largely dislocated from the public’. However, such publications speak to an inner-academic audience and often merely touch upon the ideological omnipresence and influence of economics as ‘not only a source of power but also a product of power and domination’ (Benz et al., 2023: 18).

Structurally embedding critical perspectives into the discipline's research agenda would therefore first require a fundamental internal debate explicating norms, values and ideologies shaping science communication research, held at relevant conferences and in journals. The common ground thus generated would then need to be consolidated and continuously reflected further through teaching (Kankaria et al., 2024) to eventually become part of the disciplinary self-conception.

5.2 Critical science communication in research and practice

Applying a broad definition of science communication as ‘all forms of communication focused on scientific knowledge or scientific work, internal and external to institutionalized science, including their production, contents, uses and effects’ ⁵ (Bonfadelli et al., 2017: 5), critical science communication would apply to very different forms of (semi-)professional, institutional and non-institutional science communication and journalism. It goes beyond the scope of this conceptual contribution to describe in detail potential forms and formats of critical science communication and science journalism. The systemic blind spots of the latter, too, have however been described in depth (see Knoche, 2025; Polkowski et al., 2025), which underlines the importance of the holistic scope of the concept presented here.

However, some measures central to critical science communication in research and practice can be outlined in order to pave the way for eventually turning the concept into a fully developed practice instead of just a ‘vibe’ (Bosch, 2025). First, an updated research agenda could further explore the intersections of critical media studies (Fuchs, 2011) and higher education research in order to investigate systemic power relations and their influence on scientific research and science communication. Second, science communication researchers have been actively contributing to stakeholder guidelines and policy papers defining quality in science communication (see Wissenschaft im Dialog, 2016) and will keep doing so. Advocating for systemic contexts to become an integral part of good science communication through such publications could have a long-term impact on science communication practitioners.

With regard to practical science communication, one applied form of critical science communication could lie in a journalistic practice softening the barriers between result-oriented science journalism and ‘science policy journalism’ mainly observing science through an institutional lens (Kreutzer et al., 2025). In science journalism, the accepted and expected disclosure of funding and (financial) conflicts of interest ironically can help stabilizing what Nelkin (1987: 71) has described as the image of general ‘purity of the social system of science’. As long as ‘aberrant individuals, sloppy corporate practices, or unfortunate decisions’ can be singled out as flaws in an otherwise functioning system, general systemic questions will be secondary. Critical science communication in science (journalism) would not be about abolishing such established practices but about going further: What are the motives for public or private research funding in a specific technological sector? Who may profit from new innovations based on scientific progress in a specific field? Such could be the nature of ideology-critical reflections in science coverage.

Once started, the list of naturalized ideologies to be disclosed is long: From the default position of the nation-state, naturalizing ‘imagined communities’ around the globe (Anderson, 1983), over neoliberal conceptions of necessary growth and meritocracy to supposed objectivity resulting in scientism—most systemic conditions affecting scientific knowledge production and utilization are seldom explicated.

Scattered examples of critical practices in science journalism and communication might serve as starting points for further explicating and criticizing systemic power relations in science. For example, the science journalist Ann Finkbeiner has proposed a set of test questions to critically assess the depiction of science women in the media (Brainard, 2013). In Germany, a science policy blog critically observing funding structures, precarious work and politicization in science has become a main journalistic source for stakeholders of all kinds (Wiarda, 2025). Building on similar examples, further research could empirically explore other concrete practical applications of critical science communication and their effects on practitioners and audiences.

Overall, in rethinking the field in research and practice, there lies the chance for a transition towards an engaged form of science communication, which in the face of political attacks sharpens and elevates its moral and scientific profile by explicating its normative commitment towards a better world and applying systemic critique in a self-reflective, empowering way.