An information channel under technological blockade: The science and technology information system in China (1956–1966)

Abstract

In the 1950s, aided by the Soviet Union, the Chinese government established a multilevel science and technology (S&T) information system covering many regions and professional departments across the country. The system's primary objective was to improve scientific research conditions and promote information exchange. With the deterioration of the Western technological blockade in the 1960s, the system's primary focus shifted to the acquisition of foreign S&T information. This article provides an in-depth analysis of the set-up, growth and activities of China's S&T information system between 1956 and 1966, with particular emphasis on the Institute of Scientific and Technical Information, its core establishment. The article examines how China facilitated S&T exchanges, despite the challenging international environment, and the role of the S&T information system as a crucial information pathway during China's early years under the People's Republic.

1. Introduction

Modern science and technology (S&T) information emerged during World War II. Due to the information isolation caused by the extreme situation, France, the Soviet Union, the United States (US) and other countries organized different institutions to address the need for information collection in wartime. The rapid development of S&T after the war resulted in the birth of scientific information institutions, and S&T information science began to develop as an independent discipline. It is generally believed that China's S&T information work has a long premodern tradition. However, due to the inherent deficiency of scientific foundations in China, the war did not catalyse the maturity of the Chinese S&T information system as it did in France, although they both experienced the misfortune of being occupied. Even after the founding of the People's Republic of China, only a small amount of S&T literature work was carried out, such as compiling an index of science journals and establishing a reference group to carry out consulting services (Ministry of Science and Technology, 2019). Although some societies and organizations published indexes and abstracts in some disciplines, the overall situation remained unorganized and unsustainable.

The weak foundation is only one aspect of China's slow development in the S&T information system. Another significant factor was that China faced a technological blockade caused by the US for a long time during the early years of the People's Republic of China. This policy turned into a more comprehensive embargo in 1950, which included freezing foreign exchange and intervening in book orders, making it even more difficult for China to obtain high-grade S&T information (Feng, 2019). However, from 1956, China's ardent pursuit of S&T development made information and documents an urgent need, and the exploration of S&T information work was launched.

This article mainly focuses on the early history of China's S&T information industry. It examines how China drew lessons from international experience to design its S&T information system, as well as how it overcame obstacles to establish itself in the industry. The paper also pays attention to the effects of this work and its significance to S&T development.

2. Global trends and the influence of the Soviet Union: The background to the establishment of the S&T information system in China

The 1950s was a period when a large number of S&T information agencies were established worldwide. The Chinese government followed this trend not only because of suggestions from the Soviet Union but because it also closely coincided with China's internal demand for the development of S&T. Due to the practice of the revolutionary cause, S&T information as a special form of intelligence work could arouse resonance from the top of the Chinese government and win its endorsement. In this case, China's S&T information work was inherently characterized by international competition and ideology, and its importance was self-evident. However, China was in economic distress and faced a severe international blockade at that time, so it was extremely difficult to develop an S&T information system and carry out this work. These kinds of contradiction and tension were key factors in China's early S&T information work.

With the completion of the first five-year plan in 1957, the foundation of modern industry was established in China. Collecting international S&T information to serve the development of China's S&T became a pressing need (Ministry of Science and Technology, 2009). In a report meeting of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) in January 1956, Zhou Enlai questioned Zhang Jiafu (vice president of the CAS) and Wu Heng (general secretary of the CAS), after listening to their reports: ‘How could you fight the war for so many years without even establishing an intelligence agency?’ (CAS Library, 1985: 9). This shows that Zhou Enlai's understanding of S&T information work was mainly based on his personal work experience. Moreover, the comparison of S&T work to war reflects the sense of urgency and importance that China placed on its S&T development during that period. Some scientists put forward suggestions to the government on this issue, which may have become a force driving the government to make the decision to establish an S&T information system. For example, Qian Xuesen pointed out the importance of S&T data in his report titled ‘Opinions on the establishment of China's national defence aviation industry’, which was submitted to the State Council in February 1956. Some commentators even believe that Qian's opinions played a decisive role in the government's decision-making (Xi, 2011).

The development of S&T information in China was also a response to the worldwide trend, especially to those suggestions from Soviet consultants in the context of the Sino-Soviet ‘Honeymoon Period’. In the 1950s, S&T information became a more important means of competition between the two camps during the Cold War. Especially within the socialist camp, several countries established S&T information systems based on the Soviet concentrated model. In 1952, the Soviet Union established an intensive national information centre within the framework of the Soviet Academy of Science—the Scientific Information Research Institute (ГСНТИ)—which was reorganized as the All-Union Institute of Scientific and Technological Information (VINITI, ВИНИТИ) in 1955 (Kirson, 1973). The institute ended the former decentralized situation and became the leading organization with the largest scale, the most advanced equipment and the most publications in the world at that time, and was thus admired by its Chinese comrades (Yang, 1981). Influenced by the world's first S&T information conference held by the United Kingdom (UK) in 1948, the US, Japan and other capitalist countries also established various agencies for S&T information in the 1950s. Although these countries usually adopted the form of multiple decentralized sectors, there were also some relatively intensive integrated institutions, such as the Division of Information Science and Technology and the National Technical Information Service in the US, and the Japan Information Centre for Science and Technology built in 1957 (Taguchi, 1967). Although China was not directly involved, all of these changes were observed by the Chinese government. Under the influence of ideology, it was a reasonable choice for China to follow the direction of the socialist camp. In November 1955, EP Lazarenko (БР Лазаренко), who served as a consultant to the CAS president, suggested that the CAS should also establish its own S&T information agency, based on the experience of the VINITI, to carry out the compiling of express reports and abstracts.

Suggestions from all sides promoted the need for corresponding policy support. At first, the government's understanding of this issue was in the context of improving scientific research conditions. At the conference on the issue of intellectuals in January 1956, Zhou Enlai's report was considered a mobilization order for ‘marching towards science’. He noted that, to develop S&T, all necessary conditions must be prepared for scientific research. Of primary significance was to enable scientists to obtain necessary books, technical materials and other working material. Therefore, China needed to improve the import situation of foreign books and periodicals, expand the translation of important foreign books, and rationally distribute the existing books and periodicals to relevant departments (Zhou, 1956). This can be viewed as Zhou Enlai's initial design for S&T information work.

At the national policy level, in May 1956, S&T information work was listed in the National Long-term Plan for the Development of S&T (1956–1967) (also called the 12-year Long-term Plan). The plan was to establish institutions, train experts in information work, comprehensively and rapidly collect, study and report on S&T development and new achievements both at home and abroad—especially in advanced countries—so that the Chinese S&T community could understand the latest achievements (Ministry of Science and Technology, 2018). Moreover, in October of the same year, S&T information work was listed as one of four urgent scientific tasks, and governmental policy emphasized that its implementation should be accelerated in the first few years of the Long-term Plan. All these actions on the policy level revealed that the Chinese government attached great importance to this issue, demonstrating the necessity of developing S&T information at that time.

3. Learning from the Soviet Union: The initial stage of China's S&T information work and its imitation of the Soviet model

Wu Heng, who was in charge of S&T information work in several different positions from 1956 to 1966, regarded the 1956–1961 period as the exploration stage of this career (Yang, 1996). At that time, the S&T systems of the Soviet Union—as a country at the forefront of this field in both theory and practice—became a model for China. When the CAS established its first S&T information institute in 1956, Dmitry Panov (Панов Дмитрии Юрьевич), one of the 16 members of the Soviet Advisory Group, who was the director of the VINITI and deputy director of the Institute of Precision Machinery and Computing Technology, put forward oral and written suggestions on the planning of China's S&T information system to Yuan Hanqing, who later served as the director of that institute (Yuan, 1985). From that time, learning from the Soviet Union was an important principle of China's S&T information work, and that principle was written into the Provisional Organizational System Table of the S&T information institute of the CAS in 1956. In 1958, Guo Moruo, president of the CAS, noted the importance of scientific information as an important aspect of learning from the Soviet Union in his summary report (ISTIC, 2016).

China's S&T information system copied the radiating network model of the Soviet Union. The main experience of the Soviet Union was to establish a comprehensive national institution, because ‘scattered information is often one-sided and unreliable, while a small intelligence agency often could not do comprehensive work’ (Wu, 1992). In the first statutory document on information work, the Plan on Carrying Out S&T Information Work, issued in 1958, China redesigned the system to accommodate decentralized institutes that had already been established. The S&T information institute of the CAS, which was established in October 1956, was recognized as the national centre and renamed the Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (ISTIC). ISTIC was under the dual leadership of the State Science and Technology Commission and the CAS, similarly to the situation of VINITI, which was also subordinate to the State Science and Technology Commission and the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union (Li, 1980). At the same time, the State Science and Technology Commission set up the Scientific Information Bureau as an administrative unit responsible for the construction and management of intelligence agencies at all levels throughout the country; it was also an imitation of the Soviet Scientific Intelligence Agency. At the local level, China also learned from the Soviet Union to establish a multidimensional information system, including institutes in 17 professional departments, such as the ministries of Weapons, Electronics, Nuclear Industry, Aviation, and Chemical Industry. Seven major cities, including Beijing and Tianjin, established regional information centres. Primary-level offices were also established in 18 provinces and autonomous regions by the year 1960 ¹ (Li, 1981). To facilitate the ‘third-line construction’, ² ISTIC set up a branch in Chongqing, which played an important role in the later development of S&T information.

The research of the Soviet Union's information science also influenced China to a great extent. China sincerely believed that the socialist information system represented by the Soviet model had incomparable advantages (Wu, 1992). Because the science of scientific information had been established only recently, China's theoretical basis was mainly absorbed from the Soviet Union. For example, in terms of the definition and the connotation of the term ‘S&T information’, different countries had varied opinions on whether information work is equivalent to documents and materials. The S&T information centre in East Germany was called the Institut für Dokumentation, showing that the Germans regarded literature as the most important part, while, in the Soviet Union, it was called the Institute of Science and Technology Information. When ISTIC was built, China also had a dispute between those two definitions, and it finally followed the Soviet method and believed that literature work was crucial but not the whole thing (Yuan, 1983). The focus of this highly comprehensive work was to transmit S&T information through translating, processing and reporting literature (ISTIC, 1963). The Soviet Union also had a deep impact on China through work experience and theories published in journals in this field (Yan, 1992). In the first year of its publication, the journal Scientific Information Work introduced the situation, especially the experience of the Soviet Union. According to statistics, 89 documents were published in the first year, of which 61 introduced foreign intelligence work, and the literature introducing the Soviet Union accounted for a large proportion (Chinese Library Society, 1992).

When S&T information was first mentioned in the 12-year plan in 1956, its mission was interpreted as extracting papers from S&T journals all over the world and publishing them in the form of express reports and abstracts. However, this policy was not fully implemented, and the range was limited to the introduction of Soviet achievements. At the first National Intelligence Work Conference held in 1958, the collection and collation of important domestic inventions and scientific research achievements was placed before the collection of foreign ones. The timely and systematic introduction of the S&T achievements of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries was emphasized, while those of capitalist countries were only selectively reported. This policy was determined by the specific historical background of the Great Leap Forward. Under the policy of ‘catch up with the UK and the US’, it is not surprising that the focus of S&T information work was on the reporting of domestic S&T achievements. However, it does show that China's S&T information work at this stage did not focus on introducing the S&T situation of various countries.

In less than five years, China established a radial intelligence system from the central government to the local provinces, which was enough to show China's determination. The imitation of the Soviet model undoubtedly played a positive role. The S&T information work in this period had a distinct ideological slant, but, with the increasing tension between China and the Soviet Union in the 1960s, China chose to end its follow-up to the Soviet experience.

4. A new system of organization: China's independent exploration of S&T information work after the rupturing of Sino-Soviet relations

Although China never shies away from admitting it once followed the ‘Soviet road’ in the establishment of its S&T information system, it was defined only as a ‘short way’ (Zhou, 1984). After the 1960s, facing the great pressure of the split in Sino-Soviet relations, China put forward the countermeasure of ‘working hard and being self-reliant’, and S&T information work was given great practical significance because it could reveal the world's latest information. That led to the rescheduling of the organizational system and operational model. At the second S&T Information Work Conference held by the State Science and Technology Commission in January 1961, Wu Heng pointed out that, under the conditions of the technological blockade, a faster and wider collection of foreign scientific information was the key to changing the situation. To establish an efficient translation system, Wu required the ISTIC to become a core institute in translating and introducing foreign scientific achievements, especially those involving cutting-edge theories and comprehensive strategic intelligence. During the 1961 conference, a new two-year working draft dealing with the translation of foreign documents, and a series of policy documents on the methodology of carrying out the collection, were formulated. This included a plan on how to register documents collected from various channels and a plan on how to divide the work of translation among different institutes—a radical shift in the focus of China's S&T information system.

In the period of imitating the Soviet Union, China accumulated a lot of information through compiling international abstracts and express reports, and the translation work became the core mission of the ISTIC. As soon as the ISTIC was founded in 1956, it translated and published two Soviet abstract magazines (Mechanical Engineering Volume and Metallurgical Volume) and 11 professional express newspapers. In 1957, the ISTIC published a journal named Metallurgical Abstracts, which was a direct translation of the original edition from the Soviet Union. Therefore, when ISTIC was initially established, the majority of its staff were Russian translators mobilized from the north-east part of China, whereas the S&T personnel accounted for only 9% (ISTIC, 1996).

Translating foreign literature was a convenient path, but the information often lagged, making it impossible to assess the latest S&T progress, and content could not be acquired to meet the actual requirements. In October 1961, the Foreign Science and Technology Literature Compilation Committee of China (FSTLCC), an organization especially responsible for translating and compiling foreign scientific documents and journals, was established. As the core organ for introducing foreign S&T literature, it was not only responsible for the translation work—especially for those documents and patents that were difficult to obtain—but also for formulating the guidelines, tasks, annual plans, long-term plans, relevant rules and regulations for the overall operation. The mission of the FSTLCC was to change the form of the translation work, from completely translating the documents of the Soviet Union to independently compiling original documents from countries around the world. After 1962, to make full use of the collection of more than 10,000 kinds of S&T documents, reporting on this collection became the primary task. The FSTLCC formulated a 10-year plan, striving to approach the world level in the amounts of collection within 10 years and to ensure the coverage of a relatively complete range of disciplines.

How China spared no effort in introducing and translating scientific literature can be seen in the case of Shanghai. Although an open city in modern China, Shanghai's accumulation of foreign S&T documents was poor at the early stage. In February 1960, to facilitate the formulation of relevant policy, the Shanghai Municipal Committee requested the Institute of Science and Technology Information of Shanghai (ISTIS) to provide relevant information on foreign S&T development. However, the ISTIS was not clear about documents stored in the Shanghai area, not to mention understanding the trends in world science development. Thus, it had no choice but to translate some content from the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (ISTIS, 2008).

This situation reminded ISTIS workers of the gap between actual needs and supply, and they then began a series of explorations. In 1961, the ISTIS investigated the information needs of the metallurgical industry. It was found that 80% of the 118 items proposed by experts and technicians were foreign S&T documents, and they could only provide a small part of them (ISTIS, 2008). Therefore, the institute focused its work on the collection and compilation of foreign patents and government research reports, especially in the fields of industrial technology, applied science and new technology. These materials were scarce at that time but were the most useful for promoting industrial production. In 1962, the ISTIS established a foreign literature office responsible for collecting, sorting and translating foreign patents. To implement this task, the staff of the institute expanded from nine in 1958 to 323 in 1966 (ISTIS, 2008). However, the international blockade and limited foreign exchange at that time made obtaining foreign literature a difficult task. Especially after the souring of relations with the Soviet Union in the 1960s, China had to invest more than ever in this cause.

In addition to Mao Zedong's instructions, the 10-year plan issued in 1963 pointed out that China should improve the management methods for imported books and periodicals, open up a wide range of channels, and accumulate and store all the important documents and materials publicly distributed abroad. In Shanghai's case, the ISTIS collected patent documents scattered in various departments in Shanghai and acquired a batch of documents from the CAS and ISTIC. With the support of the State Science and Technology Commission, the ISTIS went on an international exchange to order a batch of American patent documents of the 1950s (ISTIS, 2008). The ISTIC also explored indirect methods to acquire S&T materials, such as transiting through Eastern Europe or other Asian countries. Some documents were collected directly by those returnees, and this secrecy made this work more distinctive as ‘intelligence’.

5. International exchanges driven by S&T information work

International exchange is an internal attribute of S&T information work. Especially for China, which was under internal ideological control and external technological blockade, the S&T information system became an important window to carry out S&T exchanges with other countries. China participated in a series of academic and technical exchanges in the field of scientific intelligence. To learn from the experience of the Soviet Union, the ISTIC maintained continuous interaction with its Soviet counterparts in the first few years of its establishment. For example, in 1958, China sent several business cadres to the VINITI to learn about machine-translation technology. In the following year, CM Lisipkin (СМ·лисипкин), deputy director of the VINITI, visited the ISTIC. In his report titled Overview of the Soviet Union's scientific and technological information work, he pointed out that China should pay attention to publishing scientific abstracts to actively participate in international exchanges (Chinese Library Society, 1992). His related works were also widely translated as references for China's scientific intelligence community.

Besides direct contact with the Soviet Union, China also participated in exchanges within the broader socialist camp. For example, in 1960, China organized an academic delegation in the field of S&T information to visit the Soviet Union, East Germany and the Czech Republic. In the following year, China participated in a meeting about S&T information held within the socialist camp in Prague on how to establish a unified information network and make full use of the Soviet literature. In 1962, representatives of Cuba and Vietnam came to China to attend a conference on international standards of S&T information work and paid a special visit to the ISTIC (ISTIC, 2016).

Another form of communication is the exchange of data and equipment. Through the activities of the ISTIC, China established S&T literature-exchange relations with many other countries. In 1959, for example, the ISTIC ordered 6824 copies of S&T journals, of which 6016 were not in Chinese or Russian. In 1965, China imported several large copiers from the Federal Republic of Germany and broke through the blockade to purchase a Boolean punch-card computer from France (ISTIC, 2016). By 1966, China had established data-procurement relations with the UK, France, Switzerland, Sweden, Japan, Denmark and other countries, as well as indirectly importing some equipment.

This exchange was not a one-way input—China also transmitted its scientific achievements to the outside world. In 1958, according to the provisions of the Sino-Soviet S&T cooperation project, the ISTIC selected more than 200 domestic S&T journals, translated those abstracts into Russian (or English) and sent them to the VINITI for compiling the Abstract Journal—the most famous S&T information publication in the Soviet Union. By 1963, China's self-compiled journal, Scientific Abstracts of China, had established exchange relations with 1628 institutes in 50 countries, and 2242 books and periodicals had been exchanged with 52 countries.

As a special institution focusing on the introduction of foreign literature, the ISTIS attached great importance to exchanges with relevant foreign organizations and institutions. Due to the constraints of the international environment at that time, international exchanges were difficult. However, the leaders overcame the difficulties to create favourable conditions for ‘bringing in’ and ‘going out’. In the early 1960s, the ISTIS hosted an exhibition of Japanese industrial products, which attracted people from all walks of life. After the exhibition, a technical discussion was arranged to exchange with Japanese delegates on the technical issues of industrial products. The exhibition resulted in an enthusiastic response in Shanghai (ISTIS, 2008).

China's exchanges with the rest of the world were now not limited to the socialist camp and included other international organizations. In 1961, Nie Chunrong, director of the intelligence bureau of the State Science and Technology Commission, led a delegation to participate in the 27th Conference of the International Federation for Documentation held in the UK. The delegation's intention was to investigate the international background of the federation and its cooperative relationship with Taiwan. Although this process was interrupted by the political situation, the experience at the meeting had an enlightening effect on China's S&T information work. For China at that time, carrying out such S&T exchange activities was a particular focus, but that work was still limited in many aspects—as Wu Heng concluded, ‘in general, foreign cooperation at this stage was limited, and intelligence work was basically closed’ (Wu, 1958).

6. Serving the development of science: The role of the S&T information system

By 1965, the documentation centre of ISTIC had collected 11,000 foreign S&T periodicals, 54,472 volumes of materials, 5 million patents from 24 countries, 350,000 product samples from more than 20 countries, 170,000 national standards from 42 countries, and more than 200 foreign S&T films (ISTIC, 1996). ISTIC was also the only institution in China that had a complete collection of the ‘four sets of reports’ (documents of the Armed Services Technical Information Agency, Publication Board, National Aeronautics and Space Administration and American Engineering Council) from the US.

Another example of the work of S&T information agencies was that of the ISTIS, which specialized in collecting foreign literature. It had more than 3 million patent documents, nearly 5000 domestic and foreign S&T periodicals, 300,000 foreign S&T reports and other documents, and about 100,000 domestic and foreign S&T materials. As a local scientific information agency, such a reserve was enough to make it a data centre in Shanghai (ISTIS, 2008).

To display the collected materials and provide services to the public, China invested 2 million yuan in 1965 to build an eight-story building as the base for ISTIC. Four of the floors were used to store documents, including 30 reading rooms and 700 reading seats, as well as some expert reading rooms.

At the beginning of the S&T information work, the reason why it received attention was to carry out soft science research to cooperate with the formulation of relevant policies, just as Guo Moruo put it in his speech at the national advanced producer representative conference in 1956. This function was retained even after the scientific intelligence institutes had operated for many years. In 1969, an internal publication named the Reference for Technology Catch-up was issued by ISTIC to serve and help ISTIC leaders to learn current trends in foreign S&T in a timely and comprehensive manner (Liang, 1992).

The practical value of S&T information that could provide intellectual resources for China's S&T development was highly emphasized. Wu Heng positioned S&T information work as a political task rather than as technical work (Wu, 1958). It was required that S&T information work be carried out in conjunction with the key projects in the 12-year plan and the 10-year plan. For example, agriculture had always been an important priority in this work and, after 1962, it was regarded as a key project, along with industry. S&T information had played some roles in development, especially in the provinces. For example, the Chongqing Branch of ISTIC supported the third-line construction projects and provided subject determination information services and tracking services for the construction of the Gezhouba Dam, the 1.7-metre rolling mill of the Wuhan Iron and Steel Company, and other national projects. In 1966, a south-west information station was established to provide services for the exploitation of vanadium and titanium deposits in Panzhihua.

In terms of cutting-edge science, the ISTIC introduced several scientific signs of progress to China, such as the green revolution and the recognition of the problem of plastic pollution. It also directly served basic scientific research by providing information to top scientists, such as Hua Luogeng, Li Siguang, Zhu Kezhen, Qian Weichang, Wang Ganchang, Tong Dizhou and Chen Jingrun. Hua Luogeng believed that the information provided by ISTIC made it easier to see the broader prospects of his theory, which led him to carry out the research and promotion of systems theory. ISTIC served not only top scientists but also a large number of other scientific researchers. For example, the ISTIS investigated the needs in production and compiled an introduction of patent documents and distributed them to the majority of S&T personnel (ISTIS, 2008). In the south-west region, intelligence workers used baskets to bring reference books to technicians in remote factories (ISTIC, 2016). This attitude of overcoming difficulties was called the ‘basket spirit’ and became a much-told tale in the field of S&T information.

7. Conclusions

During the 1950s, the general trend in the development of S&T information around the world was to actively establish intelligence agencies at all levels. In the 1960s, countries began to explore diversified classification and multiple service modes. China followed this general trend and was more advanced in some fields during its early exploration. The construction of the S&T information system was promoted through the convening of three national S&T information conferences. Thus, China found a path that was suitable for its national conditions and put forward the idea of establishing a national information network. In the publication and printing of S&T information journals, a relatively complete system of ‘three categories and nine subcategories’ was established. Therefore, China's S&T information work from 1956 to 1966 was fruitful, reaching a peak in institutional construction, data storage, international exchanges and other aspects. More importantly, it seems to have created a feasible development path. However, due to changes in China's domestic political situation, contact with foreign countries was interrupted in December 1966, the exchange of information publications completely stopped, the foreign S&T film libraries were sealed up, and organizational expansion and services broke down. As a result, China's S&T information work fell into a state of near paralysis, essentially led to the end of the early exploration stage of development.

The decade from 1956 to 1966 marked the first stage of China's S&T information work. Its achievements in introducing international S&T achievements are beyond doubt, although it is difficult to quantify its actual value for China's S&T development. The important value lies in the fact that it had broken through ideological restrictions, opened up a channel for China's foreign exchanges and laid a solid foundation for the normalization of S&T exchanges. This was proved by the fact that the S&T information system was not completely abolished even in the 1966–1970 period, when the situation was serious after the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution. The ISTIS maintained technical discussions with Japan, the US and other countries. When a large number of enterprises were forced to interrupt their exchanges with the outside world, the S&T information system played a crucial role in obtaining foreign S&T information. For example, in 1972, the Shanghai Institute of Petroleum Chemistry planned to import an atomic absorption spectrometer. The ISTIS assisted the institute in consulting about several product samples from Japan and the UK, analysing the performance of equipment from manufacturers in various countries, and finally selecting the most suitable model from the Pye UNICAM company in the UK. This facilitated the output of the institute's scientific research. After the political situation improved, S&T information work was among the first fields to recover, thus opening a new chapter in China's international S&T exchanges.