Campaign-style enforcement has been increasingly adopted by local governments in China. In this article, we analyze 282 case cities in China using crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis (csQCA) to investigate which combinations of diverse conditions lead to the occurrence of local campaign-style enforcement. Our findings suggest that different combinations of eight conditions involving institutional, organizational, and individual factors could stimulate the occurrence of local campaign-style enforcement. We also find that local campaign-style enforcement significantly reduced PM2.5 and SO2. These findings increase our understanding of the mechanisms of local campaign-style enforcement and provide multiple paths through which local governments’ environmental policy implementations can be effectively improved.
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