This study examines how partisan biases in economic evaluations persisted and intensified during South Korea's COVID-19 economic crisis. Using data from the 2020 legislative election, it challenges traditional retrospective voting theories that predict opinion convergence in response to severe economic downturns. The findings reveal that partisanship profoundly shaped economic perceptions and blame attribution: ruling party supporters maintained favorable economic views, attributing hardships to external factors like the global recession, whereas opposition supporters remained critical, irrespective of economic realities. By comparing perceptions during the crisis with those from more stable periods, this research demonstrates that crises can exacerbate political polarization, complicating democratic accountability. These results underscore the resilience of partisan loyalty and highlight its implications for governance and policy-making in polarized societies.
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