India uses the single member plurality system (SMPS) to elect members of the lower house of its national (federal) parliament and the state assemblies. The electoral system has remained stable despite its inherent disproportionality, India’s highly heterogeneous population and, more recently, a fragmented party system. Using a comprehensive data set covering all national and some state assembly elections during the period 1952–2017, this article evaluates how SMPS has performed in India in comparison to its expected benefits, and whether there is a case for reform of the electoral system. The article finds that SMPS neither provides effective representation nor is likely to lead to stable single party governments in India – a situation that could be termed ‘the worst of both worlds’. It also highlights that a combination of rational-choice behaviour on the part of key actors as well as historical and institutional reasons has ensured the continuation of SMPS in India. The article concludes that it is time for India to seriously consider reforming its electoral system.
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