Natural resources and the dynamics of civil war duration and outcome

Abstract

How do natural resources influence the duration of civil wars? Previous studies argue that resource wealth increases rebels’ motivation for private gain (motivation mechanism) and provides rebel leaders with sufficient funding opportunities to continue their insurrectionary activities (feasibility mechanism), thereby increasing the likelihood of prolonged conflict. While these two mechanisms are very important arguments for explaining the role of natural resources in the continuation of civil wars, there are not enough existing studies that analyze these two mechanisms separately. To examine the two mechanisms, this article introduces three important factors to the analysis: the lootability of natural resources, types of conflict termination, and power balance between government and rebels. Empirically, this article examines the effect of natural resources on conflict duration for the period of 1946–2003, using a competing risk modeling approach. Findings from the quantitative analysis reveal that lootable resources (onshore oil production) are negatively related to the duration of a civil war that ends in rebel victory and positively related to the duration of a civil war that ends in peace agreement when rebels have enough military capability. On the other hand, empirical analysis shows that non-lootable resources (offshore oil production) tend to reduce the duration of a civil war that ends in government victory.