Abstract
For over two decades, I’ve had an active interest in epistemology and truth-seeking and have woven elements from my own investigations in these areas into my classroom teaching because I am committed to providing sound philosophical foundations for my students. Accordingly, when I saw Byerly’s book, I knew I needed to dig deeply into it. However, I am not a trained philosopher—despite personal interest and aspirations—and this meaty volume was no doubt intended for professional philosophers.
Byerly argues convincingly that we all depend upon others in the life of inquiry, which “require[s] dynamic activity aimed at achieving epistemic goods,” yet not all to whom we might turn are dependable (p. 13). He aptly distinguishes the intellectually dependable from the mere subject-matter expert. Someone may have vast knowledge of a discipline yet not have the other-regarding intellectual virtues that would make them intellectually dependable, such as “a distinctly personal kind of dependability that is pertinent to cases in which we depend on other persons as members of the community of inquiry in our pursuit of epistemic goods” (p. 2). He describes epistemic goods as the ability to obtain true belief, avoid false belief, obtain justified attitudes, acquire understanding, etc. Byerly acknowledges a broad spectrum of intellectual virtues but argues that five virtues distinctively constitute the warp and woof of intellectual dependability, which he expands upon in the successive chapters of his book.
First, Byerly explains that the intellectually dependable person must be characterized by intellectual benevolence, “a stable and refined motivation to promote epistemic goods in others’ inquiries” (p. 35). Second, he parses out what he means by the virtue of intellectual transparency, namely, “the tendency to share one’s own perspectives with other inquirers in order to enhance the quality of their inquiries” (p. 35–36). Third is communicative clarity, “a tendency concerned with eliminating or resolving sources of confusion in one’s communications to others” (p. 36). Fourth, Byerly unpacks the virtue of audience sensitivity; one having this trait “regulates their communications in light of the distinctive intellectual interests, needs, views, abilities, and tendencies of their audience in order to best advance the audience’s achievement of epistemic goods” (p. 36). Finally, the fifth virtue is epistemic guidance, “a tendency to aid others in making good decisions in the dynamic conduct of their inquiries out of a motivation to promote their epistemic goods” (p. 36). Byerly also evaluates other significant intellectual virtues—for example, intellectual courage, intellectual autonomy, and epistemic justice.
For each of the virtues he discusses, Byerly also surveys a range of related but opposing vices that obstruct movement toward or directly war against intellectual dependability. For example, epistemic malevolence, rather than intellectual benevolence, might characterize a teacher; this vice is “a dispositional ‘opposition to another person’s share in knowledge or to her epistemic well-being as such’” (p. 97–98). Another such vice is intellectual arrogance: “Out of a desire to maintain their epistemic superiority over others, a person may seek to make others pervasively depend upon themselves for epistemic goods” (p. 99). Intellectual grandiosity and pretentiousness are vices that oppose the virtue of intellectual transparency. The final chapter of the book, “Being Intellectually Dependable for Groups,” is probably the most significant for classroom teachers, given that students “may depend on us to enable them to cultivate or exercise group intellectual virtues” (p. 184).
Every teacher would likely benefit from looking at themselves in light of the attitudes and dispositions Byerly explores and evaluates whether these virtues, or the opposing vices, characterize their teaching. However, the book is neither an easy read nor a page-turner. Although it is everything I had hoped it would be, it was a bit of a slog because of Byerly’s careful, methodical exposition of profound ideas. The book is a deep mine, and from it precious ore is there for the taking, by Christians and non-Christians alike. However, because of the cost of the book, it is likely that the chief miners will be other epistemologists and virtue theorists. Nevertheless, I strongly encourage chief academic officers of colleges and universities, deans of faculty at universities and K-12 schools, and other school administrators to read and distill the main ideas from this fine book to guide and refine the professional development goals of their teaching faculty. This mine’s ore will enrich the many stakeholders of every educational institution.