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Abstract

Populist leadership has surged globally, yet its influence on climate adaptation remains insufficiently explored. This study examines the effects of left-wing and right-wing populist regimes on national readiness for climate adaptation. Drawing on a comprehensive dataset encompassing 24 countries from 1995 to 2020, the analysis applies advanced econometric techniques, utilizing the System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach to assess changes in institutional and fiscal capacities for climate adaptation. The results indicate that (a) populist governments are generally associated with reduced readiness, with (b) left-wing populist regimes exhibiting the most significant decline. (c) The findings underscore the pivotal role of political ideology in shaping climate policy outcomes. This study highlights the politicization of climate governance and offers critical insights for public policy debates, demonstrating that leadership ideology substantially influences whether a country progresses toward or regresses from sustained climate change preparedness.

Keywords

populism climate adaptation political leadership panel data analysis environmental governance

Introduction

As climate change accelerates, the capacity of nations to adapt—restructuring societal systems to withstand environmental shocks—has become a defining measure of governance. Adaptation readiness, encompassing institutional strength, economic resilience, and social capacity to attract climate-resilient investments, depends not only on technical expertise but also on the political dynamics shaping decision-making. The rise of populist leadership complicates this landscape. With its anti-elite rhetoric and a polarizing worldview that pits “the pure people” against “the corrupt elite” (Devinney and Hartwell, 2020; Mudde, 2019), populism threatens to disrupt the long-term planning and institutional coordination critical for adaptation. While scholars have documented populism’s corrosive effects on democratic norms (Huber and Pisciotta, 2023), fiscal stability (Devinney and Hartwell, 2020), and public health, its impact on climate adaptation remains strikingly underexamined—a gap made all the more urgent as populist regimes governed nearly 30% of the global population by 2020.

This study investigates how populist leadership—disaggregated by ideological orientation—influences national climate adaptation readiness across 24 countries from 1995 to 2020. Contrary to the assumption that left-wing populism, with its emphasis on social justice, might align naturally with environmental priorities, evidence suggests that both left- and right-wing variants erode adaptation capacity, albeit through different mechanisms. Right-wing populists often reject climate science, prioritize deregulation, and resist multilateral cooperation, redirecting resources toward large-scale infrastructure projects. While these investments may inadvertently enhance adaptive capacity, they rarely form part of a coherent climate strategy (Funke et al., 2023; Kulin et al., 2021). Left-wing populists, by contrast, tend to focus on immediate redistribution and welfare expansion, often at the expense of the institutional stability and fiscal discipline needed to sustain long-term resilience (Chazel and Dain, 2024; Silva, 2023).

This divergence reveals a paradox at the heart of populist governance. Leaders who rhetorically champion environmental justice can weaken the institutional underpinnings of resilience, while those who dismiss climate science altogether may inadvertently foster adaptation gains through development-focused policies. Yet in both cases, the continuity and foresight required for robust climate preparedness are undermined, underscoring the deeply political nature of adaptation.

Three contributions anchor this analysis. First, by distinguishing between left- and right-wing populism, the study uncovers their distinct effects on adaptation readiness, challenging the notion that populism’s environmental consequences are ideologically neutral. Second, it highlights how populist governance injects institutional fragility and fiscal volatility into adaptation policy cycles. Third, it reframes adaptation not as a purely technocratic or financial endeavor, but as a political process shaped by leadership styles and ideological commitments.

To probe these dynamics, the study applies a System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) framework within a cross-national time-series (CNTS) design. The analysis proceeds as follows: the study surveys the relevant literature, formulates hypotheses grounded in ideological differences, outlines the empirical strategy, presents the findings, and discusses their broader theoretical and policy implications.

Literature review

Populism has occupied a central place in public policy debates, often scrutinized for its role in democratic backsliding, fiscal instability, and crisis governance. Yet its influence on environmental and climate-related decision-making remains surprisingly underexplored. This gap is particularly striking in the domain of climate adaptation, where success depends on long-range planning, technical expertise, and robust inter-institutional coordination (Huber, 2020). Unlike mitigation, which can be framed as a moral imperative with immediate global visibility, adaptation is inherently incremental. It involves layered governance frameworks, cross-sectoral investments, and the cultivation of resilience capacities—elements that clash with populism’s preference for rapid, visible outcomes and its suspicion of technocratic elites.

At the ideological core of populism lies a moral binary: the “pure people” set against a “corrupt elite” (Mudde, 2021). This dichotomy often permeates environmental discourse, framing climate adaptation initiatives as elitist impositions orchestrated by technocrats or international organizations detached from everyday realities. Such narratives risk delegitimizing adaptation strategies and undermining the expert agencies responsible for developing long-term resilience plans. Under leaders hostile to multilateralism and skeptical of expert knowledge, adaptation efforts can lose political traction—even as climate risks mount.

Right-wing populism exhibits a distinct set of challenges. In these regimes, climate change is frequently dismissed as an inflated or fabricated threat—a tool wielded by global elites to compromise national sovereignty and economic vitality. Leaders such as Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil and Viktor Orbán in Hungary have systematically rolled back environmental protections, casting them as obstacles to development (Öniş and Kutlay, 2020). Resources earmarked for environmental initiatives are often redirected toward infrastructure projects designed to stimulate employment and consolidate political support. Poland’s coal subsidies exemplify this nationalist economic agenda, serving key constituencies while signaling defiance of global environmental norms (Kulin et al., 2021). Yet paradoxically, such projects sometimes deliver unintended adaptation benefits, including enhanced flood defenses or upgraded energy systems (Funke et al., 2023). From a theoretical perspective, this highlights a paradox within right-wing populism: a rejection of climate science coupled with inadvertent contributions to resilience through state-led development.

Left-wing populism charts a different course. While rhetorically aligned with environmental justice and critiques of capitalist exploitation, left-populist governments often pivot to redistributive priorities upon assuming power. The experiences of Venezuela under Hugo Chávez and Ecuador under Rafael Correa illustrate this dynamic. Both regimes championed ecological protection in public discourse but pursued policies that expanded welfare programs and intensified resource extraction (Marquardt and Lederer, 2022; Silva, 2023). In Ecuador, Correa’s approval of oil drilling in ecologically sensitive regions typifies these trade-offs. The drive to fund social programs frequently comes at the expense of environmental oversight, weakening institutional support for adaptation. These challenges are compounded by fiscal constraints and a deep-seated distrust of international environmental regimes. Adaptation initiatives requiring specialized technical assistance, foreign financing, or adherence to international standards are often reframed as infringements on sovereignty, leading to delays, dilution, or outright abandonment.

Although scholarship on these dynamics is expanding, two critical gaps remain. First, few studies disentangle climate adaptation from broader environmental policy or mitigation efforts. This distinction is vital because adaptation tends to unfold over longer time horizons, relies on decentralized governance, and often attracts less public visibility—features that make it especially vulnerable to populist narratives about unseen elites and hidden institutional agendas. Second, cross-national analyses have too often treated populism as a monolith, failing to account for how ideological variations—left versus right—differentially shape environmental governance.

This study addresses both gaps directly. By focusing on climate adaptation rather than mitigation and distinguishing between ideological variants of populism, it examines how left- and right-wing populist regimes influence national readiness for adaptation. Drawing on a CNTS dataset and employing System GMM estimation, the analysis contributes to political science debates by unpacking how ideology, executive decision-making, and institutional configurations intersect to shape climate resilience strategies in the populist era.

Hypotheses

Debates over the intersection of populism and environmental governance have intensified in recent years, as scholars and policymakers grapple with how ideological leanings shape the influence of populist regimes on climate adaptation. Existing research suggests that populist leadership often undermines environmental policy (Huber, 2020), but the extent and character of this disruption appear to vary between right-wing and left-wing populist governments. This section advances three hypotheses that address these ideological differences.

The first hypothesis posits that populist governments—regardless of orientation—tend to erode national capacity for climate adaptation. Populist leaders frequently cast environmental regulations and adaptation initiatives as elitist or technocratic, disconnected from the struggles of “ordinary people” (Chazel and Dain, 2024; Mudde, 2019). This framing can foster public skepticism toward climate policy, suppress funding for adaptation programs, politicize environmental agencies, and weaken the long-term planning essential for resilience. The risks intensify when populist administrations centralize power and weaken institutional checks and balances. From this perspective, populism itself—not its ideological variant—represents a structural impediment to adaptation.

Populist leadership reduces a country’s climate change adaptation readiness.

The second hypothesis turns to right-wing populism, which often carries a distinct set of political priorities. Climate change is commonly portrayed as an exaggerated threat or a strategy by global elites to constrain national sovereignty (Kulin et al., 2021). Policy agendas in these settings frequently emphasize deregulation, energy independence, and rapid economic growth, which tend to erode environmental safeguards. Yet there are exceptions. In some cases, investments in large-scale infrastructure projects—motivated by nationalist development goals—have yielded incidental adaptation benefits, such as improved flood management or upgraded energy systems (Funke et al., 2023). These dynamics suggest a more nuanced relationship between right-wing populism and adaptation capacity.

Right-wing populist leadership reduces climate change adaptation readiness, though the effect may be modest.

The third hypothesis examines left-wing populism, which presents a more complex and ambivalent picture. Left-populist movements often invoke environmental justice, seeking to integrate ecological priorities with social equity. Examples such as France’s La France Insoumise reflect a “popular ecology” approach that aspires to reconcile sustainability with redistribution (Chazel and Dain, 2024). On one hand, redistributive policies can strengthen social cohesion, reduce vulnerability among marginalized populations, and indirectly bolster adaptive capacity (Silva, 2023). On the other hand, the heavy fiscal commitments of welfare-oriented programs may crowd out long-term investments in adaptation infrastructure and undermine institutional stability. This tension makes the net impact of left-wing populism on adaptation readiness highly context dependent.

Left-wing populist leadership increases a country’s climate change adaptation readiness.

Methodology

From a vantage point spanning 24 countries over a quarter-century (1995–2020), this study employs a panel data design to examine how populist leadership shapes national readiness for climate change adaptation. Each country-year serves as the unit of analysis, producing an unbalanced panel of 589 observations wherever relevant data are available.

At the heart of this analysis lies the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN) Readiness Index, which captures a nation’s institutional, economic, and social capacity to mobilize and sustain adaptation investments (Chen et al., 2015; Grant et al., 2024). To enhance interpretability, the index’s original 0–1 scale is rescaled to 0–10, following Ko and Lee (2024), with higher values indicating greater readiness. The ND-GAIN Readiness Index has become a cornerstone in climate adaptation research, valued for its rigorous methodology, transparent construction, and reliance on internationally recognized data sources. It has been widely adopted not only in scholarly work but also by practitioners and policymakers as a benchmark for assessing institutional preparedness (Grant et al., 2024).

The index dissects readiness into three core components—governance, economic, and social readiness—each comprising a suite of nine sub-indicators, including political stability, regulatory quality, corruption control, ICT infrastructure, education, and social inequality (see Table 1). These indicators are standardized and scaled using the proximity-to-reference-point method, which measures a country’s distance from an idealized state of full readiness. The reliance on authoritative data sources such as the World Bank Governance Indicators and UN databases strengthens both the validity and comparability of these metrics (Chen et al., 2015).

Table 1.

Construction of the Climate Adaptation Readiness Index.

Component	Indicators	Details	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Economic readiness	Doing business	Uses the world Bank’s “doing business” index, which evaluates and ranks countries based on 10 business-related factors (e.g., starting a business, getting electricity, and resolving insolvency). Scores reflect the ease of conducting business and attracting adaptation investments	4.428	1.363	0.954	8.806
Social readiness		Consists of four indicators related to social readiness in climate adaptation with an equal weighting	3.695	1.661	0.916	7.924
	Social inequality	Measures the share of national income or consumption of the poorest 20% of the population. High inequality indicates greater difficulty in ensuring equitable adaptation benefits	4.305	1.504	0.597	7.537
	ICT infrastructure	A composite measure of mobile subscriptions, fixed broadband subscriptions, Internet users, and fixed phone subscriptions per 100 people, reflecting technological capacity for adaptation efforts	3.989	1.492	1.891	7.327
	Education	Operationalized as the ratio of tertiary education enrollment (regardless of age) to the population of the corresponding age group. Higher scores indicate improved adaptive capacity	3.342	1.679	0.348	9.541
	Innovation	Measures patent applications per capita (filed either nationally or internationally). Reflects the ability to generate technological solutions for climate adaptation	3.094	3.763	0.006	10
Governance readiness		Consists of four indicators related to governance readiness in climate adaptation with an equal weighting	5.247	1.420	1.179	8.431
	Political stability	Based on the world governance indicators (WGIs), it assesses the likelihood of political instability or politically motivated violence, including terrorism	5.431	1.376	2.095	7.868
	Corruption control	Derived from WGI, it captures perceptions of corruption (e.g., misuse of public power for private gain) in government institutions	4.663	1.759	1.584	9.017
	Regulatory quality	Also, from WGI, it evaluates the government’s ability to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations conducive to private sector growth	5.760	1.505	0.319	9.050
	Rule of law	From WGI, it measures confidence in legal institutions, contract enforcement, property rights, and the absence of crime and violence	5.380	1.618	0.506	8.772

Note: All of the possible range of scores were normalized from 0 to 10, where 0 means the lowest possible performance and 10 means the highest possible performance in a particular aspect. All of the original scores were normalized from 0 to 1 by Chen et al. (2015).

This disaggregated framework enables a more granular exploration of how populist governance may influence specific dimensions of adaptation readiness. Rather than treating adaptation capacity as a monolithic construct, the ND-GAIN Index allows for the identification of mechanisms through which leadership style and political ideology shape institutional resilience—or its erosion—in the face of climate risks.

The key independent variables are three binary indicators: Populism, Left Populism, and Right Populism. These variables are coded as 1 for country-years during which a populist, left-wing populist, or right-wing populist leader, respectively, held office (Funke et al., 2023). In our data, every populist leader is classified as either left-wing or right-wing, with no residual “centrist/other” populist category. Specifically, Populism = 1 if either Left Populism = 1 or Right Populism = 1, as these two latter categories are mutually exclusive (a leader cannot be both left-wing and right-wing populist at the same time). Conversely, Populism = 0 indicates that the country-year was governed by a non-populist leader. This means that countries are categorized into one of three mutually exclusive groups: non-populist, left-wing populist, or right-wing populist, based on the type of leadership during that year. Building on the ideational tradition in political science, Mudde (2019, 2021) and Funke et al. (2023) define populist leaders as those who portray society as divided between two irreconcilable groups—“the pure people” and “the corrupt elite”—while claiming an exclusive mandate to represent the people’s will.

To identify these leaders, Funke et al. (2023) conducted a systematic review of over 770 academic sources, including case studies, political science research, and historical analyses. This extensive digitization effort underpins a comprehensive dataset that distinguishes populist leaders not only by their populist rhetoric but also by their ideological orientation. Left-wing populists are characterized by an emphasis on economic grievances and redistribution, while right-wing populists focus on cultural issues such as nationalism and opposition to immigration.

Although the CNTS framework currently provides only binary indicators of populist leadership, Funke et al.’s coding approach avoids conflating populism with policy outcomes or electoral success. This methodological precision bolsters internal validity and enables systematic cross-national and temporal comparisons—an essential step in expanding the study of populism beyond its Eurocentric origins.

These binary populism indicators are incorporated into separate regression models to tease out ideological differences in their associations with climate adaptation readiness.

Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for these variables alongside key controls, including democracy levels, opposition vote share, EU membership, GDP per capita, foreign direct investment, national debt (logged), population density (logged), and urbanization rates. The variation across these covariates provides a snapshot of the diverse political and economic landscapes in the sample, illuminating the broader context in which populist leadership and climate adaptation capacity interact. A System GMM approach, underpins the estimation. The baseline models are shown below:

Model 1 (General Populism):

N D_{-} G A I N_{i, t} = β_{0} + {β_{1} N D_{-} G A I N_{i, t - 1} + β}_{2} P o p u l i s t_{i, t} + β_{3} X_{i, t} + ε_{i, t}

(1)

Model 2 (Left-Wing and Right-Wing Populism):

N D_{-} G A I N_{i, t} = β_{0} + {β_{1} N D_{-} G A I N_{i, t - 1} + β}_{2} R i g h t P o p u l i s t_{i, t} + β_{3} L e f t P o p u l i s t_{i, t} + X_{i, t} + ε_{i, t}

(2)

Table 2.

Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables.

Variable	Description	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Source
Climate adaptation	Government readiness to utilize public and private investment for climate adaptation (0 = no readiness and 10 = full readiness)	4.456	1.260	1.872	7.584	Chen et al. (2015)
Populist	Populist leader in power (1 = yes and 0 = no)	0.378	0.485	0	1	Funke et al. (2023)
Left-populist	Left-wing populist leader in power (1 = yes and 0 = no)	0.162	0.369	0	1	Funke et al. (2023)
Right-populist	Right-wing populist leader in power (1 = yes and 0 = no)	0.216	0.412	0	1	Funke et al. (2023)
Democracy	V-Dem index average (participatory, egalitarian, electoral, liberal, and deliberative); 0 (least) to 1 (most democratic)	0.584	0.167	0	1	Coppedge et al. (2019)
Opposition voting share	Percentage of votes received by opposition parties (proxy for political competition)	28.592	23.595	0	83.550	Scartascini et al. (2021)
EU membership	A binary variable indicating whether a country is an EU member in a given year (1 = EU member and 0 = not an EU member)	0.229	0.420	0	1	European Union (2025)
GDP per capita	Gross domestic product per capita (logged and current USD)	8.955	1.159	5.923	11.091	World Bank (2024)
FDI	Foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP (logged)	0.604	1.053	−4.605	4.668	World Bank (2024)
Population density	De facto population per km² per country-year (logged)	4.475	1.085	1.946	6.275	World Bank (2024)
Urbanization	Percentage of population living in urban areas (logged)	4.199	0.278	3.281	4.528	World Bank (2024)

The models estimate the relationship between populist leaders (and their ideological left-right variants) and national adaptation preparedness, using a dynamic specification with System GMM. The dependent variable, $N D_{-} G A I N_{i, t}$ measures national adaptation preparedness at year $t$ for country $i$ . The two models differ in focus:

• Model 1 examines the overall effect of populist leader governance, denoted as $P o p u l i s t_{i, t}$ on adaptation readiness.

• Model 2 separately analyzes the effects of left-wing populist governance ( $L e f t P o p u l i s t_{i, t}$ ) and right-wing populist governance ( $R i g h t P o p u l i s t_{i, t}$ ) on adaptation readiness. The analysis uses a 3-way categorical variable setup, where the reference category is country-years without populist governance (non-populist governance). The coefficients (β₂ for left-wing populism and β₃ for right-wing populism) represent the predicted effects of left- and right-wing populism, respectively, on national adaptation preparedness, compared to the reference category of non-populist governance.

The models also include a set of control variables ( $X_{i, t}$ ) to account for other factors influencing adaptation readiness, such as GDP, inequality, or governance quality. The coefficients of these control variables capture their marginal effects on the dependent variable. The error term ( $ε_{i, t})$ represents the unobserved influences that vary across country-years. System GMM is particularly well-suited for these models because it addresses key econometric challenges, including endogeneity, omitted variable bias, and unobserved heterogeneity. By including the lagged dependent variable, the models account for dynamic relationships, while endogeneity in the populism and control variables is addressed using lagged levels and differences as instruments. These features ensure that the estimates are both consistent and efficient. By combining these techniques, System GMM provides robust evidence on the impact of populism and its ideological variants on national adaptation preparedness.

In subsequent robustness check in Section 5.2, Figure 1 visually complements the System GMM analysis by plotting the annual ND-GAIN scores for each country, with shaded areas indicating periods of left- or right-populist governance. The red and blue shaded regions correspond to years of left- and right-wing populist governance, respectively. These plots serve as a diagnostic tool to observe whether the trends and shifts in national adaptation readiness align with the estimated effects derived from the System GMM model, which provides additional context for interpreting the dynamic impacts of populism on climate readiness while accounting for potential persistence and endogeneity captured in the GMM specification.

Figure 1.

Climate readiness trajectories under populist leadership in 24 countries (1995–2020). Note: Each panel depicts yearly climate adaptation readiness (ND-GAIN, rescaled 0–10) for one country. Red shaded areas indicate years with a left-wing populist leader in power. Blue shaded areas indicate years with a right-wing populist leader in power. Countries without shading experienced no populist leadership during the observation period. Climate readiness data are drawn from the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN), and populism classifications are based on Funke et al. (2023).

Similarly, Appendix: Table A2 presents an alternative populist leader binary variable from Kyle and Meyer (2020), which does not differentiate between left- and right-wing populist leadership. This variable is incorporated as part of the sensitivity analysis to assess the robustness of the findings across different measures of populist leadership within a CNTS framework. Section 5.3 further analyzes the specific mechanisms through which populist leadership influences climate adaptation readiness by examining the three sub-components and nine individual indicators of the ND-GAIN Index. This approach allows for the identification of pathways through which populist leadership affects distinct aspects of climate adaptation preparedness.

Results

Baseline findings

Table 1 presents regression estimates linking populist leadership to national climate adaptation readiness, assessed using a System GMM framework. Model 1 captures the overall influence of populism, while Model 2 examines the effects of left- and right-wing populism, using non-populist governance binary variable in country-years as the reference category.

In Model 1, populist leadership shows a significant negative coefficient of −0.047 (p < .01). In Model 2, left-wing populism deepens its negative impact to −0.67 (p < .01), while right-wing populism registers a coefficient of −0.039 (p < .01). The lagged dependent variable (L. Climate Adaptation) demonstrates strong persistence, with coefficients ranging from 0.918 to 0.936 (p < .01). Opposition votes share, GDP per capita, FDI, and population density is consistently positive and significant, with coefficients between 0.075 and 0.081 (p < .01), 0.063–0.072 (p < .01), 0.011–0.012 (p < .05 to p < .01), and 0.026–0.031 (p < .05). However, urbanization is shown to have significant negative relationship with coefficients between −0.065 and −0.073 (p < .01 to p < .05). Other control variables, including democracy and EU membership remain statistically insignificant throughout. Diagnostic tests confirm model validity. AR (1) indicates first-order autocorrelation (p < .01), while AR (2) finds no second-order autocorrelation (p = .123–.126). Hansen tests confirm the validity of the instruments (p = .515–.658). Overall, the findings suggest that populist leadership undermines adaptation readiness, with left-wing populism having a significantly stronger negative effect compared to its right-wing counterpart.

Robustness checks

Robustness analyses using Kyle and Meyer’s (2020) alternative populism measure confirm the baseline results. The lagged adaptation variable remains highly persistent, and the alternative populism variable shows a significant negative impact (p < .01). Diagnostic tests again show model integrity (AR (2) p = .435; Hansen p = .420).

Figure 1 supports these findings. Time-series plots (1995–2020) show adaptation readiness trajectories alongside periods of left- (red) and right-populist (blue) governance. Venezuela, Bolivia, and Indonesia exhibit pronounced declines under left-populist regimes. Brazil and Turkey show steadier trajectories under right-populist leadership, while Ecuador illustrates adaptation gains under a right-populist government, later reversed under left-populist rule.

Tracing the mechanisms: Sub-component analysis

Tables A2–A12 examine populism’s effects across economic, social, and governance dimensions.

• Economic Readiness: Both populist variants have significant negative effects (left: −0.125, p < .01; right: −0.092, p < .05). The aggregate populist variable also shows a significant negative effect (−0.097, p < .01).

• Social Readiness: Mixed effects emerge. Left-populists enhance ICT infrastructure (0.048, p < .01), while right-populists has no significant effects (0.015, p > .1). Likewise, left-populists has modest negative effect on innovation (−0.065, p < .1), while right-populists has significant improvement on innovation (0.020, p < .05). Effects on social inequality and education are insignificant.

• Governance Readiness: Right-populists significant degrade regulatory quality (−0.057, p < .01), compared to left-populists (−0.033. p < .1). Effects on other governance components are insignificant.

These findings highlight uneven pathways through which populist leadership affects institutional and societal capacities critical for adaptation.

Discussion and conclusion

This study probes how populist leadership shapes national readiness for climate adaptation, focusing on the ND-GAIN Index’s three core dimensions: economic, social, and governance readiness. Disaggregating these domains reveals a sobering pattern. Populist governments—regardless of ideological stripe—tend to erode economic readiness, weakening their ability to attract and mobilize investment for climate resilience.

The social dimension tells a more fragmented story. Left-wing populist administrations sometimes bolster ICT infrastructure, while their right-wing counterparts often undermine it. Conversely, right-wing populist administrations tend to promote innovation, whereas left-wing populist administrations undermine it. However, when it comes to education and social inequality, populism’s influence is muted and inconsistent. Governance readiness emerges as a vulnerable dimension under populist administrations, particularly with right-wing populism, where regulatory quality significantly deteriorates. Broader governance indicators, such as political stability and corruption control, show less consistent patterns. This granular analysis underscores the uneven pathways through which populist leadership disrupts institutional and societal capacities vital for translating investments into durable climate adaptation.

Across 24 countries (1995–2020), evidence points to a destabilizing relationship between populist rule and climate preparedness. Institutional capacity for long-term planning declines under populist governance, but the nature of this decline diverges by ideology. Left-wing populism exerts a stronger negative influence, while right-wing populism exhibits a more variable pattern—ranging from adverse to neutral, and occasionally even contributing to adaptation gains.

This challenges the assumption that redistribution-oriented regimes are natural allies of environmental priorities. Left-wing populists often espouse strong environmental rhetoric, yet fiscal frameworks and governance styles may succumb to short-term social spending and skepticism toward global conditionalities (Chazel and Dain, 2024; Silva, 2023). Paradoxically, some right-wing populist governments—despite climate skepticism—have made infrastructural investments in flood control or energy modernization that incidentally strengthen adaptation capacity (Funke et al., 2023; Öniş and Kutlay, 2020). Yet in both cases, the erosion of institutional planning capacity remains a consistent undercurrent, driven either by fiscal fragility or politicization of expert governance.

The findings reveal a deeper tension between environmental justice and resilience. Redistributive policies, while critical for equity, can weaken institutional structures when pursued amid fragile governance or fiscal stress. Yet this relationship is neither inevitable nor universal. Numerous welfare states show how robust redistribution and climate resilience can coexist, particularly when strong institutions channel social investments into health, education, and community-based adaptation. Viewed this way, environmental justice and resilience need not be in opposition; their alignment depends on governance quality, policy design, and administrative stability.

This tension arises sharply where populist redistributive agendas converge with weak institutions and short-term horizons, diverting resources from long-term adaptation strategies. Conversely, redistribution embedded in stable, transparent frameworks can foster social cohesion, empower marginalized communities, and build the human capital essential for adaptation. The critical variable, then, is not redistribution per se, but the institutional context in which it occurs.

These insights have implications for policy and practice. Framing climate adaptation as job creation and public health improvement may resonate with populist constituencies. Decentralizing adaptation authority to subnational or community-led initiatives can also mitigate central-level volatility. Kerala’s participatory flood management model illustrates how grassroots engagement aligns with technically sound mitigation strategies (Grant et al., 2024). International actors, meanwhile, may find greater success with flexible, bilateral engagement rather than imposing uniform global frameworks, often perceived as intrusive by populist leaders. At its core, this paper argues that institutional readiness for climate adaptation is shaped as much by political dynamics as technical or economic factors. Leadership ideology, administrative stability, and governance credibility condition a country’s ability to prepare for climate risks. Adaptation is not merely technocratic—it is inherently political, shaped by contestation of ideas, institutional fragility, and shifting incentives of populist rule.

Several limitations temper these conclusions. The 24-country sample cannot capture all regional variations—especially where religious or postcolonial legacies shape populism’s interplay with climate policy. The 1995–2020 window omits earlier populist waves, particularly in Latin America. The ND-GAIN Index, while useful for cross-country comparison, may obscure sector-specific dynamics such as agriculture or energy systems. Future studies should explore these domains directly, using granular data where possible.

Finally, the binary populism measure—dictated by CNTS dataset limitations—risks flattening the heterogeneity of populist movements. Future research would benefit from developing gradated metrics capturing differences in populist intensity, rhetoric, and policy orientation, revealing subtler patterns of interaction between populism and climate governance.

Notwithstanding these constraints, this study offers a crucial foundation for understanding political determinants of climate adaptation. It highlights how populist regimes disrupt institutional pathways critical for long-term resilience. By clarifying how fiscal populism and anti-technocratic sentiment weaken adaptation planning, these findings provide a roadmap for scholars and policymakers. Resilience strategies must account not only for climatic and economic variables but for the political realities shaping governance under populist leadership (Table 3).

Table 3.

System GMM Results of Populist Leader on Climate Adaptation Readiness.

Variable	Model 1	Model 2
L. Climate adaptation	0.936*** (0.020)	0.918*** (0.021)
Populist	−0.047*** (0.012)
Left-populist		−0.067*** (0.020)
Right-populist		−.039*** (0.015)
Democracy	0.070 (0.067)	0.100 (0.068)
Opposition voting share	0.075*** (0.020)	0.081*** (0.021)
EU membership	−0.025 (0.020)	−0.024 (0.022)
GDP per capita	0.063*** (0.018)	0.072*** (0.017)
FDI	0.011** (0.004)	0.012*** (0.005)
Population density	0.026** (0.012)	0.031** (0.012)
Urbanization	−0.065* (0.034)	−0.073** (0.036)
AR (1) p-value	0.017	0.017
AR (2) p-value	0.126	0.123
Hansen p-value	0.515	0.658
Number of countries	24	24
Observations (N)	566	566

Note. Standard errors in parentheses. *p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01.

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material - Populism vs. the planet: How leaders undermine climate adaptation (1995–2020)

Supplemental material for Populism vs. the planet: How leaders undermine climate adaptation (1995–2020) by Jeremy Ko, James Downes, Chun Kai Leung, and Wai-Kit Ming in Research & Politics.

Footnotes

ORCID iDs

Jeremy Ko

Chun Kai Leung

Funding

The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Hong Kong Government, Grant number (RFS2021-7H04); City University of Hong Kong, Grant number (7020093).

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

The replication files are available at:

Carnegie Corporation of New York Grant

This publication was made possible (in part) by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

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