Corrigendum

Abstract

Eppner S and Ganghof S (2015) Do (weak) upper houses matter for cabinet formation? A replication and correction. Research & Politics 2(1): 1–5. (DOI: 10.1177/2053168015577969)

The authors regret to inform that they have noticed an error in the first two rows of Table 1. The names of the variables in the first two rows were incorrect, and the table was therefore misleading. A correct version of Table 1 is now provided below.

Table 1.

Replication of DMT’s conditional logit models.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	1:1 Replications		Symmetric only	IRL excluded	IRL recoded
	DMT Interaction	DMT Model 4
Upper-Chamber Majority	0.78	1.11 **	0.63	0.73	0.70
	(1.41)	(2.14)	(1.07)	(1.36)	(1.39)
Upper-Chamber Majority X	1.97 *
asymmetric Bicameralism	(1.83)
Lower-Chamber Seat Share	−0.58	0.02	−0.02	0.28	0.28
of Coalition	(−0.36)	(0.02)	(−0.01)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Lower-Chamber Seat Share	13.06 ***	11.80 ***	12.54 ***	10.59 ***	12.36 ***
of Minority Coalition	(3.74)	(3.57)	(3.40)	(3.12)	(3.61)
Minority Coalition	−4.96 ***	−4.31 **	−4.13 **	−3.94 **	−4.83 ***
	(−2.67)	(−2.41)	(−2.10)	(−2.17)	(−2.65)
Oversized Coalition	−0.10	−0.18	−0.05	−0.19	−0.17
	(−0.25)	(−0.46)	(−0.13)	(−0.47)	(−0.42)
Number of Parties in the	−0.46 **	−0.48 **	−0.45 *	−0.45 **	−0.51 **
Coalition	(−2.04)	(−2.14)	(−1.95)	(−2.01)	(−2.27)
Largest Party in the	0.06	−0.01	−0.02	0.12	−0.03
Coalition	(0.13)	(−0.03)	(−0.03)	(0.24)	(−0.06)
Median Party in the	−0.18	−0.21	0.01	−0.11	−0.20
Coalition	(−0.55)	(−0.63)	(0.02)	(−0.33)	(−0.61)
Ideological Divisions in the	−5.04 ***	−4.90 ***	−6.15 ***	−5.26 ***	−4.78 ***
Coalition	(−3.26)	(−3.17)	(−3.64)	(−3.24)	(−3.10)
Ideological Divisions within	−3.73 **	−3.52 **	−4.42 **	−3.06 *	−3.10 *
Majority Opposition	(−2.20)	(−2.06)	(−2.39)	(−1.72)	(−1.84)
Previous Prime Minister in	0.09	−0.01	0.16	0.17	−0.06
the Coalition	(0.21)	(−0.02)	(0.37)	(0.39)	(−0.15)
Incumbent Coalition	1.62 ***	1.56 ***	1.74 ***	1.62 ***	1.55 ***
	(5.38)	(5.19)	(5.83)	(5.42)	(5.15)
Minority Coalition where	−0.95	−0.86	−1.52 **	−0.97	−0.99
Investiture Vote Required	(−1.53)	(−1.36)	(−2.19)	(−1.53)	(−1.59)
Anti-System Presence in the	−16.62 ***	−17.45 ***	−16.89 ***	−17.05 ***	−17.56 ***
Coalition	(−4.17)	(−4.32)	(−4.16)	(−4.22)	(−4.33)
Pre-Electoral Pact associated	3.72 ***	4.03 ***	3.48 ***	3.82 ***	3.78 ***
with the Coalition	(3.05)	(3.32)	(2.58)	(3.09)	(3.19)
Very Strong Party in the	0.38	0.51	1.03	0.98	0.51
Coalition	(0.49)	(0.66)	(1.07)	(1.04)	(0.66)
Very Strong Party Alone in	1.39 **	1.25 **	1.11 *	1.08 *	1.24 **
the Coalition	(2.33)	(2.12)	(1.74)	(1.72)	(2.08)
Merely Strong Party in the	0.60	0.63	0.65	0.63	0.67
Coalition	(1.35)	(1.45)	(1.37)	(1.42)	(1.55)
Merely Strong Party Alone	−2.38 **	−2.43 **	−1.97	−2.37 **	−2.31 **
in the Coalition	(−2.07)	(−2.12)	(−1.63)	(−2.04)	(−2.02)
Proto-Coalitions	13852	13852	13734	13796	13852
Countries (Cabinets)	8 (110)	8 (110)	6 (97)	7 (106)	8 (110)
Log-likelihood	−246	−248	−231	−240	−249

t statistics in parentheses *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.