The controllability of the Technosphere,an impossible question

Abstract

The notion of ‘technosphere’ has been proposed to refer to the whole of technological infrastructures, stressing the importance of technology in the Anthropocene. Peter K Haff introduced it in the field of Earth System Science a decade ago. His argument entangles the claim of the technosphere’s uncontrollability with an attempt to overcome anthropocentrism. We develop a critical analysis of this proposal, enriched by a literature review. The idea of a ‘technosphere’ has been present in the scientific literature for at least 50 years. We provide an analysis of the evolution of the uses of the ‘technosphere’ before Haff’s publications. Then, we discuss in which ways Haff’s contribution is in continuity or rupture with these older views. Finally, we argue that the technosphere has little relevance when addressing the question of technology controllability and for overcoming anthropocentrism. This leads us to introduce an alternative proposal to the technosphere: ‘technodiversity’.

Introduction

The term ‘technosphere’ can be traced back in scientific literature at least to the 1960s. In general, it refers to anthropic technical products and processes at a global scale. A decade ago, Haff (2014b) has introduced the ‘technosphere’ as a new object in the field of Earth System Sciences. In his view, the technosphere is a new geological entity, analogous to the other ‘spheres’ that the field handles (notably the atmosphere, the biosphere, the lithosphere and the hydrosphere as described for instance by Condie (2016)). The technosphere marks the specificity of the new geological era of the Anthropocene. As such, some research has been intended to date the Anthropocene thanks to the technosphere (e.g. Zalasiewicz et al., 2014). Moreover, the inscription of the technosphere in the Earth System Science research programme can be evidenced as well by its use in the ‘Anthropocene equation’ (Gaffney and Steffen, 2017). This equation describes the rate of change of the Earth System as a function of human activity. The magnitude of this driver is supposed to have now made negligible the other change drivers (namely the astronomical forcing, the geophysical forcing and internal dynamics). Human activity is furthermore described as a three-variable function that depends on population, consumption and the technosphere.

When he introduced the ‘technosphere’, Haff indicated that he has chosen this terminology in order to adopt a ‘non-anthropocentric view’ of technology. Haff defends a ‘technocentrism’, a ‘view from the outside’ of technological infrastructures (Haff, 2014b: 302). This is supposed to overcome the shortfall of anthropocentrism, namely considering technology as ‘a purely derivative phenomenon, dependent entirely on humans for its creation and continued existence’ (Haff, 2014b: 302) and forgetting the dependence of human beings towards technological infrastructures and its resistance to our control. Through this view ‘from the outside’, Haff defends the uncontrollability of the technosphere, as a dynamic system. In this paper, we aim to question this twofold argument: firstly, the relevance of the attempt to overcome anthropocentrism, and secondly, the benefits of the notion of ‘technosphere’ when questioning the controllability of technology.

Firstly, we undertook a literature review targeting the term ‘technosphere’. We aimed at finding out the variations of meanings of this term along with the epistemic questions it has raised, its benefits and limits over time and the span of scientific disciplines. We researched the term in the Scopus database and restricted our scope to literature published before 2014 when Haff initially formulated his proposal. We intend to study the contextual and conceptual meaning(s) of the ‘technosphere’ without the influence of Haff’s publication. A figure can be found in the Supplemental Appendix, which describes our dataset in quantitative terms.

The two first sections explore the results of our literature review. To avoid remaining too generic, we chose to develop commentaries of a few papers for each category (see Supplemental Appendix), in order to express the most prevalent ideas. We show first how the technosphere has been introduced in opposition to the environment, and how the narratives that accompany the technosphere stress the role of society in keeping the pace of technological evolution and regulating it. The second section is devoted to the largest part of the literature we reviewed, namely the technosphere as understood in environmental assessments (e.g. material flow analysis, life cycle assessment). We emphasise the difficulties and ambiguities of defining the technosphere, but our analysis shows that it is actually defined as the space of controllability of human beings. This demonstrates that the question of the control of the technosphere (in particular of material flows) is prominent.

After having developed this review, we introduce Haff’s publications and discuss the points of continuity and contrast of his proposal regarding the past understandings of the technosphere. The main point of contrast is the hypothesis of an uncontrollability of the technosphere, the main consequence of the ‘technocentric’ claim.

Our final discussion is divided into two parts. First, we demonstrate the lure of the claimed ‘technocentrism’, and the insufficiency of the notion of the ‘technosphere’ to provide a satisfying answer to the question of the controllability of technology. Indeed, on the one hand, asserting that the technosphere is controllable is difficult, as uncontrolled technospheric outflows are continuously documented. Yet, on the other hand, stating the incontrollability of the technosphere may lead to forbidding the ethical questioning of human responsibility in current phenomena. Therefore, the question of the controllability of the technosphere appears impossible to answer. To avoid this pitfall, we demonstrate in the second part of our discussion that the question of technology controllability poses questions of scales articulation. With this reframing, we suggest discussing ‘technodiversity’ emphasising the multi-scalar and inherent complexity of technology, just as ‘biodiversity’ expresses the similar complexity of the living world.

A technosphere to be rationally managed

The oldest occurrence we found of a ‘technosphere’ comes from IEEE Spectrum (at this time a young journal). The technosphere is introduced in analogy with the geosphere, the biosphere and a ‘sociosphere’ (Milsum, 1968). No definition of the ‘technosphere’ is given, but it is associated with the industrial development that we have known since the 18th century. Far from criticising it, Milsum assumes that the technosphere could already operate at his time without further need of human effort thanks to automation. Humans could thus be free from working (or some forms of working). However, when Milsum writes this situation has not occurred yet. According to him, the reason is to be sought in the ‘sociosphere’. This term is not defined either, but it can be considered a synonym for ‘society’. The sociosphere has not been able to follow the accelerated evolution of the technosphere. According to Milsum, this is supposed to be the cause of different issues: demographic growth, a work versus leisure imbalance, a growing concern for safety and a fear of others, and growing inequalities between societies. To better articulate the technosphere and the sociosphere, Milsum suggests applying to the sociosphere the optimisation approach that is already applied in firms’ management, that is, in the technosphere. He points out that the main obstacle to this application would be to find the relevant criterion that should drive the optimisation process. This position is exceptional in the literature we reviewed. It is the only one, which considers the technosphere as a model for solving social issues.

By contrast, biologist Staudinger-Woit offers an analysis focused on the limits of two spheres, namely the biosphere and the technosphere (Staudinger-Woit, 1973). She develops a narrative in which the biosphere and the technosphere are each governed by their own laws (‘Gesetzlichkeit’). These two spheres have always functioned in harmony, entangled with each other, until the Industrial Revolution. From that time on, the evolution of the technosphere has disrupted the harmony. The systems of laws of the two spheres have been in opposition ever since. To restore this balance, the author argues, relying solely on technological advances to guarantee the survival of humans in a transforming environment is not enough. She explicitly contests the idea of Progress inherited from Modernity. Instead, the author describes a situation in which biological diversity, human genetic diversity, diversity in living conditions along with cultural diversity go ‘hand in hand’ (Staudinger-Woit, 1973: 169; our translation). The harmony could be restored by substituting the quest for Progress with a partnership with nature. The author gives strength to this position by describing it as ancient knowledge, ‘This partnership [. . .] is at the basis of a piece of old wisdom of the unity of all life’ (Staudinger-Woit, 1973: 170; our translation). Staudinger-Woit engages in a double approach: quantitative in encouraging management of the technosphere-biosphere equilibrium, but also qualitative through a cultural, ethical shift.

The two papers of Milsum (1968) and Staudinger-Woit (1973) present opposite points of view – a technosphere as a model for the management of a ‘sociosphere’, or a societal shift that would reverberate throughout the technosphere. However, two common points can be identified, emphasised further by our entire literature review: firstly, the figure of frictions at the frontier between the technosphere and its outside, and secondly the reference to some rational management ¹ typical of the 1960–1970s (see e.g. the UNESCO ‘Man and Biosphere’ programme, launched in 1971 (M’Bow, 1981)).

Echoing the first point, some authors refer to a ‘technosphere’ in an attempt to formalise the meaning of ‘environmental problems’. Kassas, a biologist as well, is an example. In several publications, he describes environmental issues as being at the interfaces between the biosphere, the technosphere and the sociosphere. He argues, ‘the Man-biosphere interactions can best be conceived as inter-relationships among three systems: biosphere, technosphere and sociosphere; environmental problems arise from failures in these three-pronged relationships’ (Kassas, 1984: 214).

He then defines the three elements of its triad.

1. ‘The biosphere is the nature system including the atmosphere, lithosphere, hydrosphere and the living biota’ (Kassas, 1984: 214).

2. ‘The technosphere is the man-made system of structures that Man sets within the space of the biosphere [. . .]. This man-made system is under control of Man in the present’ (Kassas, 1984: 214).

3. ‘The sociosphere is the man-made system of non-structures that Man has developed and adopts in managing internal societal relationships and the relationship with the other two systems. [. . .] It is the sum of the socio-political, socio-economic and socio-cultural institutions that prevail in a community’ (Kassas, 1984: 214).

Each sphere has its own functioning and is independently studied by different scientific disciplines (Kassas and Polunin, 1989). However, the treatment of environmental problems requires going beyond such a division, to reach ‘a different level of understanding’ (Kassas and Polunin, 1989: 8). Kassas does not translate this observation into a call for scientific pluridisciplinarity or interdisciplinarity, and he does not elaborate on the question of how to reach this ‘different level of understanding’. However, he attributes the responsibility to achieve it to ‘developed’ societies, ‘underdeveloped’ societies having not yet – according to him – the capacity to grasp such a level of complexity.

A similar formalisation of environmental problems can be found 30 years later. Noviks (2011) wants to define the object of environmental sciences. He first supposes a spatial dualism between the biosphere and the technosphere, with buffering areas making the transition between the two. He then makes the statement that the technosphere is ruled by humans, and adds a ‘noosphere’ to its model referring to both Vernadsky and Teilhard de Chardin. He represents these three domains as three gears of three spheres rolling on one another. He situates environmental problems at the frontiers of these interacting spheres. He then determines the mission of the environmental sciences as the research towards a harmonious articulation of these spheres. Furthermore, thanks to this schematisation, he formulates a triangular analysis matrix ‘Environment – Technology – Resources’ as a decision-making tool.

The justification for the introduction of a noosphere in Novik’s position brings us back to the second point we identified earlier: the reference to rational management. Indeed, Kassas also supports this opinion. He describes the solution to environmental problems as a ‘rational management of the affairs of society’ (Kassas, 1984: 8). He defends that this management is to be found in the sociosphere, ‘the sociosphere which we feel could be our world’s salvation’ (Kassas and Polunin, 1989: 7).

In accordance with this position, the reference to a technosphere may possibly be accompanied by a call towards policymakers. Solving the frictions between the technosphere and its neighbours is considered then as relevant to political action.

Such a position is evident in a publication of Hall (1975) in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. The technosphere is to be found in the figure of an ‘industriosphere’ among a triad: the atmosphere, the biosphere and the ‘industriopshere’. These three are designated as the ‘Three great energy systems of the Earth’ (Hall, 1975: 11). The ‘industriosphere’ is defined as follows:

‘the series of fossil-fuel powered patches of human industrial activity located within, and supported by, the biosphere. It has a relatively short history, some 200 or 300 years at most, and is presently characterized by positive feedbacks that contribute to its growth. Its future is uncertain: if dependent upon the concentrated fossil fuels that have nurtured it so far, the industriosphere might continue for another 300 years, although other circumstances may increase or decrease this span’. (Hall, 1975: 11)

From this basis, Hall studies the dangers brought about by the industriosphere and discusses the problem caused by: the (inevitable) limit of petroleum stocks; the knowledge and uncertainties of time on the consequences of human activities on the climate; the threat of the impoverishment of ‘“the public service function” of natural systems’ (Hall, 1975: 13) (that we would name today ‘ecosystem services’) often compensated by massive use of fossil energies. Hall concludes by calling for political reform at national and international scales. He lists several recommendations: development of scientific research for a better understanding of the biosphere, the atmosphere and of the impact of the industriosphere on these two firsts in order to adjust the management of human activity; an adaptation of national and international policies to face the coming petroleum shortage.

From the previous references, it can be concluded that although they present models of concurrent spheres, they share the hypothesis that the technosphere is manageable by humans. In this sense, the human is implicitly ‘above’ the technosphere.

The next section is focused on the use of the idea of ‘technosphere’ in the context of environmental assessments.

A technosphere defined by its controllability

Our literature review shows a diffusion of the term ‘technosphere’ starting in the 1990s in fields relating to environmental assessments. We gather onto this label research that attempt flow quantification of human activities and of their impact on the environment; most of them are Material Flow Analysis (MFA), Substance Flow Analysis (SFA), Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) or Life Cycle Inventory (LCI). The expansion of the reference to the ‘technosphere’ is particularly visible in literature coming from Central and Northern European countries (Sweden notably). ² It follows a growing concern for environmental degradation in public policies. The general aim of such studies is to list and quantify hazardous substances in their movement in and eventually out of the technosphere. So, they distinguish human activities from natural phenomena.

As a first example, Perrier and Tuzet (2005) resort to the triad biosphere-technosphere-anthroposphere as a background for a study of the water cycle. They aim to pave the way towards sustainable management of water resources thanks to a holistic vision of the water cycle. Natural components of the water cycle are therefore biospheric. The technosphere and the anthroposphere represent the disturbances of the cycle caused by human use (the ‘anthroposphere’ designates human water consumption).

Frische et al. (1982) seem to be at the origin of the introduction of the ‘technosphere’ in such a perspective. They first present the ‘technosphere’ in reference to the environment and in opposition to it. This statement is shared among all the studied literature on environmental assessments. However, by analysing this pool of literature we will now attempt to provide a positive definition of the technosphere that is not a description of what it is not, but of what it is! Our starting point is the following definition: ‘The technosphere, in opposition to the environment, comprises the human-made world’ (Deubzer et al., 2001: 290). This ‘human-made world’ first refers to a determined space as Månsson et al. (2009) explicitly state, ‘the physical environment altered by human activities’ (Månsson et al., 2009: 94). This description is paradoxical if we consider that the technosphere is firstly defined as opposed to the environment: it appears here as part of it.

Furthermore, in the Anthropocene, such a definition implies considering the whole surface of the Earth. Thus, the opposition between the technosphere and the environment would have no meaning on a spatial dimension. However, this dualism is indeed mobilised in a spatial dimension. It can be best illustrated by the example of Blok (2005). He studies zinc pollution on roadsides and has to define the frontier between the technosphere and the environment. He writes, ‘Those zones road border that are designed for typical traffic-related functions are considered part of the technosphere’ (Blok, 2005: 177). The technosphere stops where the human design for some specific function stops. Here, the discriminatory criterion is the intentional human activity and with it, above all, the controlled action. Furthermore, it echoes the two main differences that Frische et al. (1982) establish between the technosphere and the environment. The first one is the knowledge we have of the technosphere (which substances it contains, in which concentrations, which flows etc.) whereas our knowledge of the environment is fragmentary. The second is that we control, or, at least, that we can control the technosphere whereas we cannot control the environment. From that, we can suggest that the technosphere is the spatial area subject to human activities on which control is possible. This position can explicitly be found in some papers, for example, ‘Within the technosphere, material flows and toxicity can be controlled’ (Deubzer et al., 2001: 290).

This hypothetical definition can be tested by confronting it with the ways the technosphere is practically used in the studies. In general terms, the following status of the technosphere can be identified from our literature review: to delimitate the studied system (in SFA) or as a framework covering the identified processes in a LCA; to designate particular flows in opposition to ‘natural’ flows observed out of human activities; to designate a stock.

The SFA from Jonsson et al. (2008) exemplifies the first case. It focuses on four chemicals in the system corresponding to the City of Stockholm. The technosphere marks its boundaries, as it is suggested by the following expressions: ‘Emissions are here defined as outflows from the technosphere of the City to the environment’ (Jonsson et al., 2008: 436); ‘APEO has a somewhat lower inflow whereas DEHP still is added to the Stockholm technosphere at a higher rate [. . .]’ (Jonsson et al., 2008: 441; APEO and DEHP being two of the studied chemicals).

The considered flows are differentiated according to the different products for which the four studied substances are used (textiles, paint, paper, electronics and so on). For each product, an estimation of the produced and rejected quantities of the different substances is given, as well as the accumulating stocks. This approach considers a technosphere attached to human control. Indeed, the inflows are the implemented flows for the production and placed under human control for this purpose, ‘[. . .] inflow (the amount of substance added to the system through new products during the period)’ (Jonsson et al., 2008: 435).

After entering the technosphere, there are three possibilities: a persistence into the technosphere as stocks, elimination or an outflow. Each of them brings a different issue. In case of an outflow, it is environmental pollution, ‘[. . .] outflow (the amount that leaves the system, for example as waste or emissions to the environment)’ (Jonsson et al., 2008: 435).

The ‘environment’, or more broadly the outside of the technosphere, is generally approached in two distinct ways, marked by a vocabulary change. In the first one, the ‘environment’ simply appears as a passive outside in which outflows of the technosphere accumulate. One example is Ricklund et al. (2008) who focus on the treatment of sewage sludge to counteract the dissipation of decabromodiphenyl ethane into the environment. Another example is Monakhov et al. (2004), who quantify the dissipated vanadium into the environment.

The second approach considers the outside of the technosphere as crossed by flows. Authors then speak of the hydrosphere, the atmosphere, the lithosphere, or the biosphere rather than of the ‘environment’. (In the following, when needed, we will speak of ‘geological spheres’ to refer to the whole of these four spheres). Their analysis includes descriptions of the dissemination mechanisms of the studied substances outside of the technosphere. For example, Palm and Ostlund (1996) compare the evolutions of lead and zinc flows in the biosphere and the technosphere in the Stockholm area; Chernousov et al. (2003) compare the natural chromium flows into the atmosphere, the hydrosphere and soils with those induced by human activities coming from the technosphere. Such approaches are in line with the third possible mobilisation of the technosphere that we enumerated: designating particular flows in opposition to ‘natural’ flows observed outside of human activities.

Whether they speak of environmental or geological spheres, these studies aim to bring to light outflows and disturbances from the technosphere, which were until then ignored and thus unmonitored. They were not subject to any particular purpose except possibly wasting materials. This last case however does not always apply (for instance, corrosion creates involuntary material flows). Figuratively, we may say that the technosphere leaks. The knowledge of these flows constitutes a first step towards their monitoring, possibly their stop. In this way, it contributes to reintegrating these flows into the technosphere and to making its frontier more opaque, at least regarding hazardous substances.

This monitoring (or stopping) of outflows is often sought on the legislative side. Authors call for regulation in the waste treatments, but also in the use and production of the substances themselves. In this way, Palmquist and Hanæus (2004) focus on the issue of controlling water pollution by establishing a list of hazardous substances. Another example is Månsson et al. (2008), they lead a study on alkylphenols and alkylphenol ethoxylates and conclude with the following recommendation: ‘The low concentrations in goods, which give rise to ecologically undesirable effects in the aquatic environment in Stockholm, call for harder controls and regulations also of chemical content in goods like textiles’ (Månsson et al., 2008: 454).

However, were these outflows stopped, the question of the management of the persisting products in the technosphere would remain. These persisting products are referred to as stocks and defined as follows: ‘the accumulated amount that is present in products within the area’ (Jonsson et al., 2008: 435); ‘The stock is calculated by multiplying the annual inflow by the estimated life-length and reducing for the outflow (waste + emissions)’ (Jonsson et al., 2008: 435).

Stocks are only described here through the spatial dimension of the technosphere. There is no mention of possible human monitoring. Then, can stocks exist in the technosphere while not being subject to human control? This would refute our hypothesis of a technosphere defined by its controllability. However, this case is dismissed by various authors, ‘Disposal is also considered as a loss to the environment. Disposed materials are no longer used and there is no long-time control about the materials’ (Deubzer et al., 2001: 290); ‘Controlled landfilling is a kind of process and belongs to the technosphere as long as it is controlled’ (Klöpffer, 2009: S48).

The technosphere is still characterised by human control, or at least controllability. The challenge is to make sure that this controllability continues, to make sure that technospheric stocks do not turn into outflows. This is why they are described as a possible future environmental pollution, ‘However, the remaining 85% or 2900 t [of cadmium] have accumulated in the technosphere and constitute a future potential risk’ (Bergbäck et al., 1994: 21); ‘If the waste is handled within the system they are principally a redistribution of the stock, e.g. from buildings to landfills. From there, they may in turn cause emissions to the environment’ (Jonsson et al., 2008: 436).

This controllability challenge must take into account as well the proximity of human beings to these hazardous chemicals. Indeed, the studied substances often present a threat to human health. However, by its definition, the technosphere is intimately linked to human beings. As it is supposed to correspond to a spatial reality, it would seem reasonable to state that humans live inside of the technosphere. Then, it is not enough to protect the outside of the technosphere. This leads Éntin et al. (1998) to the ambiguous expression of a ‘protection of the technosphere’ (Éntin et al., 1998: 375). In their context, it consists in limiting the material loss during the manufacturing process, with the dual purpose of avoiding financial loss and protecting workers’ health. ³ The inside of the technosphere should therefore be protected from itself, as long as its outside. This is a rather confusing problem formulation.

Šalkauskas (1998) dismisses the difficulty by considering humans as part of the environment to be protected. Again, only the outside of the technosphere needs to be preserved. However, if the idea of the technosphere opposed to the environment is based on the opposition of humans against environment, then, positioning human as part of the environment is rather counter-intuitive.

Therefore, the positioning of humans towards the technosphere seems problematic: positioning them outside or inside is both inappropriate. However, the very idea of a sphere calls for this dualism, for a distinction between an outside and an inside. Then, it can be argued that the idea of a technosphere seems limited in formulating human health issues along with environmental protection.

To sum up, the technosphere as used in MFA is above all the material set, that is, raw materials or manufactured products for instance, which can be subject to human control. In that perspective, it is mostly mobilised to isolate or highlight flows and stocks, which are not only from anthropic origin but also designed and controlled by humans. Therefore, the technosphere is originally constructed on the assumption of a dualism between humans and the environment (or the other geological spheres). This dualism is then turned into a dualism between the technosphere and the environment, in which both terms are conceived in a relation of exteriority to each other. In accordance with our analysis of the previous section, this opposition serves to describe environmental problems. Pollution consists of flows of (hazardous) substances from the technosphere into the environment. Moreover, our analysis shows that in addition to this dualism, the technosphere is defined by the possibility that humans have to control it. In consequence, flows and stocks that are controllable are part of the technosphere and are not considered pollution anymore. Finally, this translation of pollution problems seems problematic and limiting when it comes to human health, as human beings cannot logically be considered as out of the technosphere.

The technosphere as a set of resources

An adjacent perspective of the ‘technosphere’ in environmental assessments considers a technosphere as a set of resources to handle the threats of shortages. It accompanies the development of ‘urban mining’ or ‘landfill mining’ (Jones et al., 2012; Krook and Baas, 2013). It can as well be used in a defence of the hypothesis of resource substitutability (Steinbach and Wellmer, 2010; Wellmer and Dalheimer, 2012).

In either case, the opposition ‘technosphere vs geosphere’ predominates to distinguish between two types of resources. The ‘geosphere’ does not refer to the geological spheres as they were understood in environmental assessments. It is not a dynamic entity exchanging flows with the technosphere, but it now designates what has not (yet) been manipulated by humans. This evolution of meaning leads to question whether the delimitations of the technosphere would change as well.

A shift in the meaning of the technosphere seems to appear in the taxonomy of Johansson et al. (2013). They motivate their study by the observation of a broadening of the common range of mining activities. ‘Mining’ can now refer to resource recovery from waste or end-of-life products. Johansson et al. choose to designate these peculiar mining activities as ‘technospheric mining’ and propose a taxonomy in six sub-categories of these new ‘mines’ or ‘stock types’. One category will draw our attention: uncontrolled technospheric stocks. This seems to broaden the technosphere. However, ‘uncontrolled’ does not mean ‘uncontrollable’ and the concerned literature does not allow us to conclude whether or not this perspective broadens the technosphere definition.

Nevertheless, we can wonder whether outflows from the technosphere still exist in this taxonomy. On this point indisputably lies a difference with the perspective shared in environmental assessments. As technospheric stocks are subject to long-term geological dynamics, it can be suggested that they return this way to the geosphere. However, Johansson et al. (2013) do not comment on the subject and do not seem to consider outflows from the technosphere.

We can conclude that, either in this perspective or in the different works formerly commented, the idea of a technosphere relies on a view of humans as being central. They are perceived as separated from the environment or from the geological spheres. Moreover, human beings are called to monitor the technosphere. Thus, the technosphere is inscribed in and supported by an anthropocentric position. We will now analyse the way Haff introduces a ‘technosphere’ and in which ways he articulates a refusal of human control of the technosphere with a claim to overcome anthropocentrism.

Haff’s proposal: A technosphere in the Anthropocene

The introduction of the ‘technosphere’ idea by Haff goes beyond the singular emphasis of anthropic activity. Indeed, Haff positions its proposal in contrast with the idea of an ‘anthroposphere’ that would emphasise the role of humans in the present phenomena (Haff, 2014b). Instead, the technosphere must refer to an emerging complex system. Due to its complexity, Haff supports that the technosphere should not be considered completely dependent on human beings. He supposes, through his claim, to consider the whole of our technologies not from the inside as the mere result of our actions but from the outside. The technosphere has its own dynamics. In this way, he adopts a ‘non-anthropocentric view’ (Haff, 2014b: 302) of technology, and wants to subsume a ‘technocentrism’ to anthropocentrism. The technosphere is described in these terms:

‘technosphere - the set of large-scale networked technologies that underlie and make possible rapid extraction from the Earth of large quantities of free energy and subsequent power generation, long distance, nearly instantaneous communication, rapid long-distance energy and mass transport, the existence and operation of modern governmental and other bureaucracies, high-intensity industrial and manufacturing operations including regional, continental and global distribution of food and other goods, and a myriad additional “artificial” or “non-natural” processes without which modern civilization and its present 7 × 109 human constituents could not exist’. (Haff, 2014b: 301)

As an Earth scientist, Haff makes the technosphere dialogue with the other spheres that his field traditionally handles: the atmosphere, the lithosphere, the biosphere, the hydrosphere. The description of the technosphere is elaborated by analogy with those. This analogy is based on five points: the planetary scale of the technosphere, the consumption of resources from the other spheres, the conservative nature of the system, waste recycling and the autonomy of the system.

The first point is justified by the examples of transport and communication networks. The technosphere appears then to us as the material side of the globalisation of exchanges. Elaborating on the second point, he develops the way the technosphere appropriates materials and energy from the other spheres to build itself. It results that humans are part of the technosphere: the latter is the fruit of human activity and is maintained by collective action. Haff also points out the difference in the orders of magnitude between energy flows in the technosphere and those energy flows in the other spheres, which are much greater. This leads to the third point: a system is supposedly of a conservative nature, guaranteed by negative feedback loops. However, the technosphere is in a growth stage. The question is open whether the technosphere will gain this conservative nature and become an established ‘paradigm’ in equilibrium with other spheres or fail.

This question of the viability of the technosphere is in line with the perspective we developed in the second section of this paper: the problem of establishing harmony between the technosphere and its outside. Haff, however, does not formulate the resolution of this issue in terms of a societal evolution or political actions, but in terms of an evolution of the internal functioning of the technosphere. The fourth point of his analogy expresses it. He notices that, massive recycling and low waste emissions can be observed in the biosphere, but not in the technosphere. By analogy, he concludes that the technosphere has to evolve towards circularity to become viable.

The fifth point of analogy dismisses the understanding of this issue as a governance issue. Haff supports that the technosphere is autonomous. This argument constitutes the central idea of his ‘technocentrism’. He states that humans depend on the technosphere for their survival as individuals. Due to this dependence, human actions are directed towards maintaining the technosphere. Here, Haff wants to find the defence mechanisms of the technosphere for its own survival. According to him, this situation provides that the technosphere is autonomous. Then, Haff’s technocentrism considers human beings as unable to control the evolutions of the technosphere.

This statement is further developed in a subsequent publication (Haff, 2014a). Haff explores the interactions between humans and the technosphere by introducing a ‘coarse graining’, a three-level scale. Level II contains the considered system (S) and those of a similar size; level I contains the components of S and exterior elements that are much smaller than it; symmetrically, level III concerns the much bigger elements than S. Haff therefore establishes then six rules for the articulation of these levels. They are often justified by an exemplification with a human being as system S. The rules are the following:

• Inaccessibility: the impossibility of direct interactions of II on I (a human cannot manipulate microscopic elements with his bare hands);

• Impotence: the lack of impact of an element from I on II;

• Control can only be exerted on less or equally complex things than oneself (commonly known as the law of requisite complexity in systems theory);

• Reciprocity: the direct and mutual interaction is only possible between systems of II;

• Performance: most components of a system must contribute to its functioning;

• Provision: the system must provide its components with an environment in which they can satisfy the previous rule.

The result of these rules is a vision of a system whose major dynamics are disconnected from its components. Those can only contribute to dynamics that are already (rule of performance) in progress, but do not take part in their evolutions (rule of impotence). Only competing systems, of the same size as the considered one, can impact them (rule of reciprocity). Applied to the interaction between human beings and the technosphere, the consequences of these rules are that human beings, as components of the technosphere (parts of level I) cannot pretend to control the technosphere (i.e. more complex than them: rule of control). They cannot even impact its evolution trajectory (rule of impotence). They are forced by incentives that can be more or less constraining to contribute to this evolution trajectory (rule of performance). For this aim and for their survival, they depend on this same technosphere (rule of provision).

Haff (2016) doubles down his argument with an examination of the notion of ‘purpose’. In line with his aim to overcome anthropocentrism, he offers to reconsider purposes from a perspective that would be independent ‘on details of system construction or function, or on intention’ (Haff, 2016: 56). He states that such purposes can be observed in dynamic systems in general, thus, not only humans. He establishes a typology. First, he argues for an intrinsic purpose shared by all dynamic systems: survival. ‘Each dynamic system through the action of its parts dissipates energy to do the work necessary to maintain itself and to meet external challenges. This activity can be interpreted as acting-as-if-to-survive’ (Haff, 2016: 56).

In consequence of this intrinsic purpose, all components of the system are assigned a functional purpose. This is a translation of the performance rule: they must participate in the survival of the system (ex: the functional purpose of a heart is to support the survival of the living being to whom it belongs). Reciprocally, the rule of provision can be understood as a provisional purpose. Finally, imputed and personal purposes remain the privileges of humans. The first ones are purposes that we attribute to what surrounds us, and the latter that we attribute to ourselves. Both can encounter and even participate in the realisation of functional purposes if we recognise the latter in the action of what surrounds us or in ours, and if we choose to follow them.

However, this last case is not a necessity. There comes the problem of the articulation of this scheme with the figure of the human with feelings, free to decide of her or his objectives. This involves autonomy from the rule of performance. Haff (2017) describes the existence of a space of freedom left to humans, or more generally to the components of the technosphere, outside of or along with their functional purposes. These functional purposes are not necessarily expressed in the form of constraints. They can be more or less harsh incentives. This gives space for free actions out of functional purposes (like listening to music while working or enjoying free time) or in conflict with it. In this case, two scenarios are suggested. The first one is a shift in the expression of the rule of performance: the incentives turn into constraints. The second possibility is that the rule of provision may cease to apply for this component that has become useless or a parasite. This would induce discarding the human individual. This second scenario may as well be a consequence of the autonomous evolution of the technosphere. Indeed, there is no guarantee that an established, circular technosphere may need nine billion human components. At least some part of them may be replaced by technological systems that are more efficient. In such a scenario, a part of the human population would be left aside, not supported anymore by the rule of provision. We should then worry about remaining useful to the technosphere for our survival.

His ‘technocentrism’ leads Haff to offer an understanding of the Anthropocene through two main issues. The first one is the evolution of the technosphere towards massive recycling. The second one is the conservation of a space for humans in the technosphere, without which we cannot presumably survive.

Haff’s technosphere is still defined as resulting from human action. On this point, Haff is in line with the previous ideas of the technosphere. The particularity of Haff’s publications is that the technosphere is described as ‘autonomous’ from human control. It is the main point of contrast with the previous literature we reviewed. It is as well at the core of the Haff’s attempt to overcome anthropocentrism. For these reasons, the following discussion focuses on this debate around the control of the technosphere or the lack thereof.

Discussion: A technosphere under (un)control?

Aporias of the notion of technosphere

All the studied authors designate by ‘technosphere’ the products of human technological activities. It follows that those are given the status of a new geological sphere. Because the technosphere definition is always based on humans, it still constitutes our species as an exception. Thus, the technosphere remains the translation of a certain anthropocentrism. Furthermore, our literature review highlights a problem that constantly accompanies the idea of the technosphere. This question is about the positioning of human beings regarding the technosphere and their ability to monitor, to control its functioning and its evolution. In this perspective, what is behind the technosphere is the more general question: is technology controllable? The technosphere can be understood as a particular proposal to help addressing this question. Now, we analyse what perspectives the technosphere offer on this question and demonstrate its limitations.

As a quick synthesis, the oldest found mentions of the technosphere highlight the importance of the evolution of human society (sometimes referred to as ‘sociosphere’ or ‘noosphere’) for the regulation of the technosphere. Our analysis shows that the idea of the technosphere as being controllable by humans is central to environmental assessments. It is even the criterion that defines what belongs to the technosphere or not. Nevertheless, these studies aim at highlighting accidental outflows from the technosphere. Those are consequences of human actions that escape control, thus, escape the technosphere. In that sense, these studies constitute as well an acknowledgement that we do not control the whole of the technosphere. This results in unmonitored outflows that cause unanticipated pollution problems. In the face of this situation, several strategies may be engaged. One of them is to continue to seek control. This first strategy is illustrated in two different ways in our literature review. On the one hand, most of the articles we reviewed in environmental assessments call in their conclusion for more control by technical or legislative means, in accordance with the hypothesis of a controllable technosphere. The implicit objective is then to make the border of the technosphere less porous. On the other hand, this search for control may take the form of an expansion of the technosphere. This perspective is found in urban mining studies. Indeed, as we argued, they reintegrate into the technosphere what was considered as, or about to be, externalised in the previous perspective: uncontrolled technospheric stocks. Thus, controllability is to be expanded to those stocks, in order to turn them into resources or inflow.

However, it may be argued that this strategy is infinite and pointless. Our knowledge will never be complete. For this reason, our technological actions will always have an unexpected side. There will always be unattended and uncontrolled consequences, and unwanted leaks from the technosphere. As to the perspective of urban mining, it is limited by the inability of numerous products and materials to be recycled. Some authors rely on the hypothesis of human ingenuity to overcome this problem (Jones et al., 2012; Wellmer and Dalheimer, 2012). However, it is an ambitious bet on the future.

Another strategy when it comes to the incomplete control of the technosphere, is, opposingly, to assume that human beings have no control over it. Haff is in this line of thought. However, his position appears too extreme to us and eventually untenable.

To start with, the technosphere involves a globalising, thus totalising, view of technological infrastructures as a whole. By contrast, the induced gigantism of this supposedly unified entity dwarfs the multitude of particular diverse situations. Peša (2022) among others (see e.g. Bonneuil and Fressoz, 2017) already develops the same counterargument regarding the notion of ‘Anthropocene’. It is rooted in a western understanding of our epoch but states this particular standpoint as universal. The technosphere perpetuates this bias. Peša develops three examples of African situations to illustrate the variety of forms and reactions to the ‘Anthropocene’. It seems to us that these examples are just as convincing regarding the technosphere. Considering just the first one, Peša shows how scientific knowledge about pollution has not stopped copper mining from being developed in Congo, and acceptance from the inhabitants helped by paternalistic policies. Such studies describe much more complex realities than humans’ global undifferentiated vital dependence towards one undifferentiated technosphere that Haff describes. One may see here the manifestation of the provision and performance rules of the technosphere. But, that would only mask the political decisions, the firms’ responsibility, and the specificity of this local history. That leads us to an ethical criticism of Haff’s technosphere.

Some authors have already engaged in such criticism. In particular, Schmidt (2019) describes how the technosphere consists of a naturalisation of technological infrastructures: it makes them analogous to natural phenomena. He shows how such views of the Earth System become a basis for ethical norms. Here, we want to go deeper in a similar analysis, stressing the risk of such naturalisation of the technosphere, while still focussing on Haff’s writings.

To this end, we borrow the arguments of Charbonneau (1963) in his criticism of Teilhard de Chardin’ views. Teilhard develops a teleological narrative of Earth evolution. He postulates a Noosphere that should emerge as a layer over the Biosphere, but that only constitute an intermediate stage. He calls the end and driver of evolution the ‘Omega-Point’ and describes it as ‘the fulfilment of the spirit of the earth’ and ‘end of the world’ (Teilhard, 2008: 287–288; Levit, 2000). ⁴

Charbonneau argues against the totalising viewpoint that the Teilhard’ theory supports and its consequences. He focuses in particular his counter-argumentation on the later work of Charon (1961), a disciple of Teilhard. Charon interprets Teilhard’ work as overcoming anthropocentrism. Synthesising these views, Charbonneau writes: ‘human particularism must adopt the point of view of the cosmic interest: in the great whole of Evolution, human species is only one individual like the others’ (Charbonneau, 1963: 163; our translation). However, Charbonneau argues, from such a cosmic point of view, ethics cannot make sense. In regard to this global Evolution, violations of individual human rights would appear anecdotic, and moral principles in themselves would seem contingent, as attached to a particular context, to a temporary era. In any case, they are irrelevant to the Evolution as a whole.

It seems to us that part of Charbonneau’ arguments are as well relevant concerning Haff’s technosphere. Indeed, pretending to detach the technosphere from human action, to look at it from the outside as a geological, natural phenomenon, risks detaching the technosphere from any notion of responsibility and ethics. From the point of view of the technosphere, of this dynamic emotionless entity autonomous from humans, any notion of justice or ethics cannot make sense. That means that ethics cannot apply to the technosphere. A flagrant example of this consequence is the second challenge of the Anthropocene that Haff identifies: preventing the growth of a ‘waste stream of human components’ (Haff, 2017: 107), the replacement of humans by more efficient means in the technosphere. Haff calls it ‘a potentially more serious problem for humanity [than global warming]’ (Haff, 2017: 108). Such ‘waste’ of humans is obviously ethically unacceptable. That is why we should worry about assuring that humans remain unreplaceable in the technosphere. In that perspective, the dynamics of the technosphere, their supposed tendency to select the most efficient components, are placed beyond ethical questioning. The only question that remains is how to make sure that humans continue to be necessary to those dynamics. To that point, Haff stresses the individual responsibility and becomes normative, encouraging beliefs in human exceptionality, ‘resistance to cooption, e.g. to offers of efficiency or of other temptations that lessen opportunities for performance and open the door to human replacement’ (Haff, 2017: 108).

Furthermore, we are humans, thus, we can only think as humans do. In that sense, pretending to detach our thinking from ourselves is an illusion. As Charbonneau writes, ‘The man who pretends ‘overcoming anthropocentrism’ only risks being fooled by its own individual or collective subjectivity, for having refused to become aware of it’ (Charbonneau, 1963: 165; our translation).

To our mind, a flagrant example of this can be found in the re-conception of the notion of ‘purpose’ that Haff (2016) develops. Purpose is a category that primarily exists in human minds, just as the technosphere is nowhere else than a human idea. Then, attributing purposes to the technosphere, describing a technosphere ‘acting-as-if-to-survive’ (Haff, 2016: 56), what is this if not anthropomorphism?

To sum up, overcoming anthropocentrism by pretending to abandon the point of view of a human being to adopt the one of an emotionless entity such as the technosphere is an illusion and thus pointless. Moreover, the consequences of such claims are dangerous. Adopting such a global view does not allow space for considering the multitude of particular situations. It contributes then to masking inequalities among this diversity behind a few general chosen characteristics (among them here: appropriation of resources and waste emissions, evolution driven by efficiency gains). Posing the technosphere as autonomous from human governance prompts the prohibition of ethical questioning of these macro characteristics. Those and the technosphere in itself are then considered ethically unnegotiable, although they are no more than particular human ideas of our world. Such transformations of human ideas into unquestionable global dynamics of societal evolution may find dangerous echoes in totalitarian ideologies.

The controllability of the technosphere is then an impossible question. On the one hand, we are forced to admit that human technological activities have consequences that we do not control, that we had not anticipated: the technosphere ‘leaks’. On the other hand, if we suppose that the technosphere is free from any human monitoring, then, its dynamics are out of our hands, and in a way ‘inevitable’. Therefore, it makes no sense to judge them ethically, which is highly problematic. In this way, the idea of the ‘technosphere’ appears inappropriate for addressing the ‘technology controllability’ problem. Yet, it shows that this problem is crossed by a tension between a factual lack of control and an ethical concern regarding responsibility. That brings about the question: how to acknowledge that humans actually do not control technology as a global phenomenon without denying the existence of human responsibilities? We are going to sketch a line of thought that may allow addressing this issue.

Articulating a multi-level understanding of technology

We are going, firstly, to demonstrate that this question is a problem of scales articulation, secondly, to argue that the technosphere is ill-suited for answering it, thirdly, to introduce an alternative proposal: ‘technodiversity’.

Technology and responsibility both exist at global and lower scales, even if not in the same manner. Peša (2022) that we quoted earlier gives examples of the specificities of technology studied at particular scales. He shows the complex entanglement of scientific knowledge, policies and technological development in the development of copper mining in Congo. Furthermore, behind this entanglement are obviously to be found individual and collective human actions and responsibilities. Then, technology as a global scale – the technosphere – does exist, but only from the interconnections of numeral infrastructures situated at lower scales. Of course, this technosphere is not the mere mechanical consequence of the sum of lower scales. As such, the technosphere does not articulate with responsibility in the same way as technology does at lower scales. Yet, that does not mean that responsibility does not exist at the global scale: there are human responsibilities behind climate change. Else, policies aiming at reforming our collective actions and behaviours would have no sense. That is why we state here that technology and responsibility both exist in specific ways at global and lower scales, that they show specific articulations in-between at each scale and in-between scales.

It follows that the above stated problem can be reformulated as a problem of scales articulation. It asks first how to acknowledge specific existence and articulation of technological phenomena and human responsibilities at global and particular scales? Consequently, the specificity and irreducibility of each of those scales are to be recognised. It asks second how to articulate those scales in-between while not forgetting their irreducibility? ⁵

Now, is the technosphere nevertheless helpful to adress these questions? As developed in our literature review, the technosphere primarily concerns the global scale. That is a first limitation. However, some of the environmental assessments we reviewed handle particular cases. Indeed, they focus on a given place (e.g. Stockholm City), and some substances only. Yet, we defend that these studies illustrate the weakness of the notion of ‘technosphere’ at those scales. This weakness is first illustrated by the difficulty that the authors have to define it. Our analysis in environmental assessment literature points out the ambiguities around the description of the technosphere as opposed to the environment. In particular, defining a clear boundary between them on a geographical dimension appears rather uncertain. Secondly, these studies support the hypothesis of the technosphere as controllable. Yet, they stress the existence of unmonitored outflows. Consequently, the controllability hypothesis appears questionable. We face here again the impossible question that we identified in the previous subsection. On the one hand, human beings obviously have responsibilities on their particular actions. On the other hand, it seems hard to prove the controllability of the technosphere even at particular scales. Consequently, the idea of the technosphere appears useless to address the problem of technology controllability at particular scales. Moreover, as we face the same impossible question while considering the global scale or particular ones, the technosphere idea appears to miss the specificities of each scale. For these reasons, we dismiss the notion of technosphere and offer to propose another one for addressing the problem of technology controllability. This other category must allow addressing and explicitly articulating particular scales and the global one, while recognising their irreducibility.

Biodiversity, as studied in biology and ecology, refers to a diversity of scales or levels. Yet, it is also a twofold object. Indeed, the term ‘biodiversity’ has been proposed in the 1980s to gather onto one term all kinds of biological diversities (Devictor, 2015). Takacs (1996) has however demonstrated that this proposal was formulated by biologists to create a rallying concept to promote the fight against the living world destruction. Since, biodiversity has taken a major place in both scientific publications and political discourses. Then, we understand biodiversity as both a scientific and political concept.

First, as a descriptive scientific object, biodiversity refers as much to the biodiversity at global scale as to the biodiversity at more restrictive scales. Consequently, it can be derived at various levels; some examples include: genetic diversity within a population, population diversity within a species, species diversity within an ecosystem, ecosystem diversity within the biosphere. Moreover, while being in relation, these different levels are irreducible to one another. To start, they are not all reducible as a sum of elements from the inferior level, for example, an ecosystem is not just a sum of species but an organised unity, capable of self-sustaining. Then, these different levels have different peculiar attachments to their environment. For instance, when studying an ecosystem, we may speak of the ecological niche of a species, referring to its role in this niche (consumed and created resources). Whereas, while speaking of a population, we may refer to its habitat (in terms of climate, geographical or geological conditions) (see Petren, 2001 for a discussion of these distinctions). Finally, these different levels correspond to distinct scientific disciplines with distinct and specific questionings. For example, ecosystem ecology develops a functional approach, studying ecosystems dynamics and stability from a macroscopic perspective whereas population ecology is more concerned with external factors such as abiotic conditions and their effect on biodiversity structures and abundances (Bowler, 2021). In conclusion, any perspective on biodiversity is always a partial one, a little one we may say, situated in a particular epistemic landscape, even when it concerns the global scale.

As a political concept, biodiversity refers to a world in crisis (Devictor, 2015): it has been coined to advocate for the urge to act politically to halt the destruction of the living world. Takacs (1996) demonstrated that with the buzzword ‘biodiversity’, biologists engaged in a renewal of the boundary work of science. At the same time, they build a new discourse on nature of which they are the most legitimate specialists and assume a political engagement for the conservation of their object of study. In the aim of mobilising for their cause, ‘biodiversity’ is used as well to give echo to the diversity of values and emotional dimensions that one may attach to nature. Biodiversity then concerns as well cultural diversity (Maris, 2010). ⁶

Is it possible to think and study technology in a similar manner? Is it possible to speak of ‘technodiversity’? ⁷ This notion has notably been introduced by Philosopher Yuk Hui, as accompanying his concept of ‘cosmotechnics’ (Hui, 2016). Cosmotechnics expresses that technology is always cosmologically situated, then a ‘technodiversity’ follows from the plurality of cosmotechnics, that is to say, from the cultural diversity. ‘Technodiversity’ invites awareness of the axiological plurality that may be attached to technology. It opposes the research of universal and neutral discourses on technology. As such, this perspective may prevent a naturalisation of technology, reminding that technology is no else than human phenomena and is understood by human beings.

We offer here to further explore this idea of ‘technodiversity’, understanding it as an analogy ⁸ with biodiversity. Technodiversity would be to technology what biodiversity is to biology. Exploring the epistemological benefits and limitations of such an analysis of technology is the subject of ongoing research that is beyond the scope of this paper. Here, we will limit ourselves to postulate how this notion may help to address our problem of scales recognition and articulation, thus possibly opening a door for addressing in a more fruitful way the ‘technology controllability’ problem. In the first way, it helps not to focus on one particular scale. Instead, analogically with the biodiversity, would be to question what diversity of levels is relevant to technology, to a ‘technodiversity’? How do they interact with, influence each other? If one level is not to be preferred before another, then, what are the irreducible specificities of each one? Finally, the question of the technology controllability can be reformulated into: how human actions, and monitoring actions specifically, entangle with these different levels?

Conclusion

The term ‘technosphere’ refers in general to the whole of human technological products and processes, distinguished from natural objects and flows. Notably, it has been gaining a growing interest in the field of Earth System Science thanks to P.K. Haff. Our literature review aimed to put his particular contribution in perspective with previous and different uses of the ‘technosphere’. Interestingly, it shows as well that the notion of technosphere is constantly accompanied by the issue of its monitoring and control. Yet, our analysis shows that the technosphere is an ill-suited notion for addressing the question of technology controllability by human beings. However, this same analysis allowed us to highlight the necessity to consider and articulate a plurality of scales (global and lower scales) while addressing the problem of technology controllability. In this perspective, we introduced the term ‘technodiversity’ analogical to biodiversity.

The oldest papers call for society to better adapt to the technosphere’s evolutions or to regulate them politically. Later, from the 1980s on, we demonstrate that, in environmental assessments, the technosphere is defined by a criterion of controllability: what is found in the technosphere can be subject to human agency and control. Nevertheless, these studies mainly aim to document uncontrolled outflows from the technosphere. Thus, they illustrate the limits of the assumption of a technosphere under human control.

In opposition to this hypothesis, Haff assumes that we have no control at all over the technosphere. He describes it as a dynamic entity on which humans have no hold. The consequence is that these dynamics are inevitable, detached from human actions. We criticised his views from an ethical perspective. Indeed, this supposed autonomy of the technosphere implies that it makes no sense to question its dynamics ethically. Notions like responsibility or justice would thus be irrelevant when it comes to technological phenomena.

To sum up, stating that we can control the technosphere is dubious, and the opposite is ethically untenable. In order to overcome this impasse, we first demonstrate that to answer the problem of technology controllability, different irreducible scales need to be considered (global and lower scales) and articulated in-between. We finally propose to develop the notion of ‘technodiversity’ in place of the technosphere. We understand it as an analogy with biodiversity. Indeed, biodiversity refers to a diverse set of biological levels (from the genetic to the biosphere) that are irreducible to one another, even if constantly interacting. Thus, ‘technodiversity’ aims to defend the existence of similar multi-level complexity in technology. The question is now not whether we control a technosphere or not, but how our monitoring actions are entangled with this complexity.

Supplemental Material

sj-pdf-1-anr-10.1177_20530196231187242 – Supplemental material for The controllability of the Technosphere, an impossible question

Supplemental material, sj-pdf-1-anr-10.1177_20530196231187242 for The controllability of the Technosphere, an impossible question by Pauline Picot and Bertrand Guillaume in The Anthropocene Review