Man or Human? A Note on the Translation of Ἄνθρωπος in Mark 10.1-9 and Masculinity Studies

Abstract

The past decades have seen an increased sensitivity among Bible translators when it comes to matters of gender, in particular in relation to inclusive and exclusive aspects of language and their rendering in translation. Building on this feminist agenda, it can also be asked, following the lead of masculinity studies in general and its use in biblical studies in particular, what role masculinity plays in texts and their translation. This will be explored in this contribution using the example of the meaning and translation of ἄνθρωπος in Mark 10.7 and 9, which, it will be proposed, is, for gender-sensitive exegetical reasons, best translated as “man” (in the exclusive sense of the word), rather than as “human” (as an inclusive expression).

Introduction

The past decades have seen an increased sensitivity among Bible translators when it comes to matters of gender, in particular in relation to inclusive and exclusive aspects of language and their rendering in translation. Building on this feminist agenda, it can also be asked, following the lead of masculinity studies in general and its use in biblical studies in particular, what role masculinity plays in texts and their translation. This contribution will explore the question using the example of the meaning and translation of ἄνθρωπος in Mark 10.7 and 9, which, it will be proposed, is best translated as “man” (in the exclusive sense of the word), rather than as “human” (as an inclusive expression).

By paying attention to the gendered nature of the discussion in Mark 10.1-9, it is proposed to read ἄνθρωπος not as a generic reference to human beings, but instead as a reference to males. Thus, in line with a bon mot concerning the task of feminist and masculist scholarship, where the former enables women to be humans, the latter enables men to be males (rather than generic representations of humans).

This paper makes both a theoretical contribution to Bible translation and a contribution of content, albeit modest in scope. As far as scope is concerned, this paper can also be considered as an attempt to further the discussion about gender and the skopos of Bible translations (see de Vries 2008): while “gender sensitivity” often means sensitivity to the presence of “non-hegemonic” genders in a text (women, “queer” genders, etc.), the further extension of gender studies to encompass the study of masculinity in all its diversity calls for investigating the role and construction of masculinity.

This is a relatively new and desirable development ¹ that may become part of the aims of future translations of the Bible, furthering the concerns behind more gender-sensitive and therefore usually more inclusive ways of translating texts. However, here a case is made that sometimes a more gender-sensitive translation can be produced by translating in a more exclusive way. To be sure, the aim of all this is not to advocate a more “masculine” Bible: masculinity studies is a field that has developed out of and is deeply indebted to feminist scholarship and not an alternative to it. In this study, this will be apparent by the attention given to the interrelationship of gender and power. Finally, as this essay is primarily interested in the translation of the Markan text, it will not enter into a discussion of the ethics that Jesus of Nazareth may or may not have subscribed to, but remain at the level of their Markan representation.

The case of ἄνθρωπος in Mark 10.7 and 10.9

In a survey of various translations of Mark 10.7 and 9, it seems that the rendering of ἄνθρωπος in v. 7 poses a considerable challenge, even if the options available to translators are limited mainly to two: ² either as “human being,” the lexically dominant meaning and the one that is the most inclusive, or as “man,” a translation that is, or seems to be, less inclusive and a lexically secondary meaning of ἄνθρωπος. The latter rendering might be a better contextual fit in view of the full statement made in v. 7, where an “inclusive” translation would seem to require the modification of the entire verse if it is to make sense. This is illustrated by the 2006 Bibel in gerechter Sprache (Bible in just language), which offers “Deshalb wird ein Mensch Mutter und Vater verlassen, wird ein Mann sich mit seiner Frau verbinden und eine Frau sich mit ihrem Mann” (Therefore, a human being will leave mother and father, a man will unite himself with his wife and a woman will unite herself with her husband) as a translation of the full verse. This reflects a broader tendency in exegetical studies. For instance, Breytenbach states that the meaning of the verse concerns both male and female. ³ This is in line with the majority of scholarly discussions of this text, which usually focus on the matter of divorce in general ⁴ rather than on male-specific divorce, even if there is also considerable discussion concerning the actual historical possibilities for women to initiate a divorce in first-century Judaism.

In general, such research reflects a tendency to read the text as inclusively as possible, with attention to both the male and the female role in marriage and divorce. This is notwithstanding the fact that many translations do represent ἄνθρωπος in v. 7 (correctly) with “man” (either in the sense of “male human being” or in a generic sense as “human being,” as may be the case in translations stemming from an older tradition of translating the Bible, such as the KJV and translations that are descendant from it). Yet, such translations do not prevent an inclusive interpretation of Jesus’ argument in the pericope, which, I would argue, achieves precisely the opposite of what is intended: the focus is on male behaviour and agency vis-à-vis women only, not the other way around as well.

One important reason for such interpretations of Mark 10.7 is probably the generic interpretation that Mark 10.9 has received. Representative translations of v. 9 in German, Dutch, English, and French, for instance, all offer a translation with the meaning of “generic human being.” ⁵ Scholarship on the matter is also in agreement that the text represents Jesus of Nazareth’s strict stance vis-à-vis divorce. ⁶

By contrast, an argument will be offered here for a translation of ἄνθρωπος as “man” rather than as “human being” in both verses. This argument is based on some general exegetical observations and especially on insights from the field of masculinity studies. As such, this note provides a case study for the use of such theory in Bible translating, where it has not yet had much impact, even if it is becoming an increasingly accepted part of gender-sensitive approaches to biblical texts. ⁷

The argument that follows is based on the text of NA28, while taking into account a substantial textual tradition that does not have the final clause καὶ προσκολληθήσεται πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτου (and be joined to his wife), as well as variations in the formulation itself. Yet, as the longer version of the text has provided the basis for most translations of the New Testament, it is useful to consider it here. At the same time, the problem is still present even in the shorter text of v. 7 and much the same argument could be mounted in favour of a translation of ἄνθρωπος as “man” rather than as “human.” In a similar manner, the question whether or not Jesus’ interlocutors are explicitly identified as Pharisees is of secondary importance, given that, as it will be argued below, a discussion in the public sphere is a situation closely related to the question of masculinity. ⁸ The proposal to translate ἄνθρωπος as “man” in v. 9, which does not present any serious text critical issues (according to the NA28 apparatus), will be based on the interpretation of the verse itself and the general flow of the narrative and the dispute between Jesus and the Pharisees that is part of it.

Masculist, rhetorical, and tradition-historical observations on Mark 10.1-9

With this overview of representative translations and interpretations, the argument proper can now be developed. I will first offer a brief outline of masculist concerns when it comes to gender sensitive exegesis, and then provide observations on the significance of masculinity in the narrative of Mark 10.1-9 and the argument embedded in it. The second part of the pericope of which Mark 10.1-9 is usually considered to be part, that is, vv. 10-12, will be left out of consideration here. A number of reasons can be adduced for this omission.

First, from a literary perspective, the shift of scene from the outside to the inside indicates, as it frequently does in Mark, a shift of focus, or at least a further elaboration of the preceding topic from a distinct angle. Second, in line with the first observation and Markan literary technique, the topic clearly changes. Divorce as such is not the problem anymore; in fact, it is not even problematized, but a second marriage following divorce is rejected as constituting adultery—vv. 10-12 can be read in such a manner that divorce without remarriage is a viable option. Furthermore, female agency in initiating a divorce is suddenly introduced (v. 12).

Third, for the literary and thematic situation in Mark 10.1-12, a tradition-historical explanation has been advanced and quite convincingly so. It amounts to the following: the first part of the pericope has a primarily Jewish background (possibly Jesuanic in its core), to be located in the legal debate in the Jewish community of which Jesus is part, as are the Pharisees with whom he is presented as discussing the issue (and probably the Markan community as well). The dominant attitudes in this discussion came to be exemplified by the respective “liberal” and “strict” attitudes of the houses of Hillel (divorce for multiple reasons) and Shammai (only in the case of sexual misconduct). ⁹ In this spectrum of opinions, Jesus’ apparent total prohibition of divorce is often seen to be quite singular, a major reason for considering Mark 10.1-9 Jesuanic in its core. By contrast, vv. 10-12 have a background in the broader Roman world, where the law permitted women to initiate divorce, and are likely of a later date, ¹⁰ when the Christ movement had to address this situation (see also 1 Cor 7.10–11.13; note also the agreement in solution: divorce is permissible, remarriage not). ¹¹ At some point, possibly the Markan stage of the tradition, the two were combined. The relevant discussions, especially concerning the tradition-historical issue, are a topic of their own, full discussion of which would overburden the present contribution. ¹² Instead, I will focus on vv. 1-9, which constitute a distinct unit in Mark from a literary, thematic, and tradition-historical perspective.

As it would also go far beyond the scope of this article to outline fully the field of masculinity studies, even if only in relation to biblical studies, the following two statements from introductions to representative contributions to the field should serve to sketch the significance and scope of “masculinist” ¹³ approaches to biblical texts and, therefore, also to their translation. In her introduction to a recent issue of Biblical Interpretation, Økland has described the situation as follows:

For students of biblical masculinities . . . there is an overwhelming number of examples waiting to be explored: men at the higher ends of the various social hierarchies, those of the better means, of free birth, of the desirable ethnic background and with heteronormatively acceptable relations to other men and to women. It has taken us longer to read them as males, and not just as generic representations of the human norm and condition—and women as particularities and deviations. It has taken us longer to read them as males representing current notions of gender and masculinity at the time—and not just as outstanding individuals and “men of God.” (Økland 2015, 481)

Studies that explore this field seek to redress a situation in which, on the one hand, masculinity, men, and their role and construction are taken for granted, while, on the other hand, women are treated as “special cases” that need to be approached through the lens of gender studies and gender-sensitive exegesis. It is a broad field, therefore, as is also apparent from the following observation by Creangǎ:

Defining “masculinity” and the field of “biblical masculinities” is more difficult than it first appears, but very simply put, biblical masculinities is the study of the representation/s of the male gender (what “mans” a man or a woman, including what “mans” God) in biblical and related literature. . . . It is the multiple de- or re-constructions of the male gender in biblical literature that drives the investigation, not the sex of the character/s examined. (Creangǎ 2014, 4–5)

Many insights for the study of the construction of biblical masculinities can be gained in interaction with masculinity studies of the ancient Near East and Greco-Roman world. ¹⁴ For the interpretation and translation of a text like Mark 10.1-9, studies such as Larson 2004, Moore 2003, Moore and Anderson 1998, Conway 2008, Mayordomo 2006, Leutzsch 2004, and Wilson 2015, all considering New Testament masculinities in the context of the Greco-Roman world (including the Hellenistic Jewish “subculture”), are of particular importance.

These studies show that gender, including masculinity, was understood to be rather fluid in antiquity, where the human body was thought to possess a single sex which could be performed in more or less masculine ways. Such performance was always placed in competition with others and aimed at retaining self-control and exercising control and influence over others, be it physically (e.g., by showing ανδρεία “courage” in battle, or by enduring martyrdom) or rhetorically (by being successful in the arena of public debate), and typically took place in public, given that the public sphere was understood as a male space. Masculinity, therefore, was never a given, it had to be acquired and consolidated constantly. Accordingly, boys were not born masculine, they were raised and trained to be men.

When reading Mark 10.1-9 informed by these and other studies on biblical masculinities, we can note a number of elements when it comes to the dimension of masculinity, which, of course, needs to be anchored in the text itself, rather than to be forced upon it. ¹⁵ They will be listed in sequence, with brief comments as to what is at stake precisely.

First, in the narrative introduction to this discussion of divorce, ¹⁶ Jesus is presented as a rather masculine and authoritative figure, given that he teaches in public and attracts large crowds (Mark 10.1). ¹⁷ This is of relevance, since an authoritative and commanding public performance, especially as a speaker, was a key part in the construction of an ideal Greco-Roman man (see Mayordomo 2006). From a spatial perspective, it could even be argued that Jesus, by entering Judea and teaching there, may well be “penetrating” the territory of other men, in this case represented by the resident Pharisees.

Second, the public setting is of significance, given its connotation as a male space and the space in which masculinity had to be performed and proven; masculinity was nothing if not something to be performed in public (see Mayordomo 2006). (See also the change of scene in v. 10, if εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν is taken to mean “in the house” and not “at home,” which is also possible.)

Third, with this background, the confrontation between Jesus and the Pharisees is a confrontation that has everything to do with competing masculinities. It is, even without regard to the content of the discussion, a public confrontation in which rhetorical skill and ability are at the forefront. In v. 2, the note that the Pharisees are testing Jesus (πειράζοντες αὐτόν) underlines this dimension. ¹⁸ In this respect, the form-critical classification of the pericope as a “dispute story” is of relevance to a gender-critical analysis as well; ¹⁹ as soon as controversy is initiated, the performance of gender roles becomes both important and potentially fluid. “Male” characters can become effeminate and fail to live up to their standing as masculine figures, while feminine characters can travel the reverse trajectory.

Fourth, when considering the content of the discussion, it appears to be a highly masculine affair as well. To begin with, the question of the Pharisees in v. 2 is not just whether divorce is or isn’t permissible as such, but whether it is permitted for a man (εἰ ἔξεστιν ἀνδρὶ) to send away his wife or to discard her (γυναῖκα ἀπολῦσαι). ²⁰ In other words, it is phrased very much in terms of a question about male agency and power over a woman, a person of decidedly less masculine status, at least in general. ²¹ The reader of Mark will be quite familiar with this topic already—it was a question that proved to be fatal to John the Baptist, whose criticism of the marriage of Herod and Herodias (who had divorced Herod’s brother) incited the latter to plot his death (Loader 2005, 86). ²²

The Pharisees’ testing of Jesus has a political background as well, therefore. The wrong answer could well prove to be fatal for Jesus. Furthermore, to the extent that the later two dominant rabbinic opinions concerning divorce, as already mentioned, were both already extant in either Jesus’ or Mark’s day and known to Mark’s readership, the Pharisees’ question appears to be particularly tricky: Jesus would have disagreed with one of the two traditions. ²³ In this context, even those translations that would render ἄνθρωπος later on as “human” do not translate ἀνδρὶ in this verse in a similar manner; clearly the discussion starts out as one about men and male behaviour and it would seem likely that it continues in that vein.

Fifth, it may well be asked whether this question, as it will unfold in the course of the discussion, is not also related to another aspect of ideal-typical (“hegemonic”) masculinity as well, that is, piety, expressed in this case through the proper knowledge of and obedience to the precepts of the Jewish religion. ²⁴

Sixth, considering the authorities that the Pharisees and Jesus appeal to, we can discern a dimension of masculinity in terms of authority and the capacity to exercise influence on others: when Jesus asks about the law of Moses (and displays a considerable amount of rhetorical cunning—the law could just as well be referred to as the law of God!), he refers to a high status male as a source of authority. At the same time, he heightens the stakes by making it a debate about a key authority for the Pharisees. Indeed, as Breytenbach (2006, 33) observes, with Jesus’ response “the question whether something is generally allowed for a man has been referred to the law of Moses—the authority for the Pharisees (cf. the use of ὑµῖν).” ²⁵

Upon the Pharisees’ answer, duly producing a reference to Deut 24.1 while omitting the reason for Moses’s permissiveness, that is, the somewhat opaque עֶרְוַת דָּבָר / ἄσχηµον πρᾶγµα, ²⁶ Jesus shows that he has a superior command of the law and its inner workings. ²⁷ That is to say, he is familiar with the original intention of the precepts at stake, ἀπὸ δὲ ἀρχῆς κτίσεως (from the beginning of creation; v. 6). And he is familiar with God’s intention, given that God is the subject of the clause ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ ἐποίησεν αὐτούς (male and female he created them; also v. 6), ²⁸ which derives from Gen 1.27 and which Jesus subsequently combines with a quotation from Gen 2.24. ²⁹ Jesus, therefore, aligns himself with the authority of God, rather than that of Moses, at least in the flow of the rhetoric in this pericope. The fact that God is not mentioned in v. 6 according to the best manuscripts is largely mitigated by the inclusion of God as the explicit agent in v. 9: ὃ οὖν ὁ θεὸς συνέζευξεν ἄνθρωπος µὴ χωριζέτω (therefore what God has joined together, let no one separate; NRSV).

As far as the discussion in the pericope itself is concerned, Breytenbach’s observation rings true: the whole discussion “does not reach its climax with a statement by Moses . . . , but with a statement by Jesus” (2006, 33). ³⁰ Jesus’ authority is vindicated, as is his masculinity. There may yet be another layer to this aspect of the discussion, which has to do with the difference in nuance between what Jesus asks—what has Moses commanded (ἐνετείλατο)—and what the Pharisees refer to in their answer, that is, something that Moses had permitted (ἐπέτρεψεν). ³¹ Unlike the Pharisees, then, Jesus is able to refer to an actual commandment, the imperative formulation in Gen 2.24. ³²

Whereas Jesus thus demonstrates his superior command of the law, one might also suggest that his claim to be aligned with God’s intention in creation associates him, more firmly than the Pharisees, with God as a source of authority and therefore of masculinity. This might be the case all the more because Jesus discredits the Pharisees morally when responding to their appeal to Deut 24.1, πρὸς τὴν σκληροκαρδίαν ὑµῶν ἔγραψεν ὑµῖν τὴν ἐντολὴν ταύτην—because of your hardness of heart, he, Moses, wrote this for “you Pharasaic men.” ³³ Another “he,” God, gave a different commandment and had a different intention. The questionable moral character thus ascribed to the Pharisees suggests that they are weak, ³⁴ unable to live up to the real thing, God’s intention in creation. In the process the force of Moses’s permission is relativized, as Breytenbach has it: “The Markan Jesus invokes the order of creation in order to reject what Moses permitted” (2006, 36). ³⁵ Considered against the background of the ancient discourse on masculinity, it seems that this accusation also suggests that the Pharisees are not particularly masculine. It is against this background that v. 7 comes in, as the part of the quotation from Gen 2.24 that continues in v. 8, and prefaced by the quotation from the first creation account from Gen 1.27 in v. 5.

Finally, to all of this it could be added that the notion expressed in v. 8, καὶ ἔσονται οἱ δύο εἰς σάρκα µίαν· ὥστε οὐκέτι εἰσὶν δύο ἀλλὰ µία σάρξ (and the two shall become one flesh. So they are no longer two but one flesh), is also one that limits male agency, given that it dissolves the male agent who, like the woman, disappears into the µία σάρξ “one flesh” that appears here both as a protological given and an ethical and relational ideal, if not norm. ³⁶

Therefore, as masculinity and male behaviour are so much at stake in this pericope, it becomes likely that the remark in v. 7 is not about generic human behaviour but rather has to do with male behaviour in particular. In fact, Jesus seems to curb the male exercise of power over persons of non-masculine status (wives) ³⁷ to a substantial extent, by appealing to God’s authority to steer the interpretation of the “law of Moses” as presented by the (male) Pharisees, at Jesus’ own prompting. In fact, Jesus’ closing statement, ὃ οὖν ὁ θεὸς συνέζευξεν ἄνθρωπος µὴ χωριζέτω, frequently quoted in the context of the discussion of marriage and divorce in Christian tradition, also appears in a different light. That is, if rhetorical and source-critical arguments (cf. below) substantiate the claim that ἄνθρωπος in v. 7 is best rendered as “man” in the sense of “male human being,” then it would also make sense to translate the same noun in v. 9 in a similar way.

The flow of the argument demands that the same kind of person is in view in both v. 7 and v. 9. This would turn the statement into “what God has brought together, no man should separate,” and it would refer to male behaviour vis-à-vis that which brought them together. For these reasons, rendering ἄνθρωπος as “man” rather than as “human” in vv. 7 and 9 seems to make much more sense in this context. This idea can be supported further with reference to rhetorical analysis of the pericope, in particular when considering the exchange of arguments between Jesus and the Pharisees in vv. 1-9.

The meaning of statements and the words that they contain is to a large extent determined by the way in which they are being used (rather than by the context from which they are taken or by the lexicographical meaning of words). Thus the original contexts of Gen 1.27 and 2.24 are of less concern than their current use. Even without stressing that the whole encounter is one between men, it is obvious that the question asked by the Pharisees in v. 2 is about what is permissible for a man to do and that Jesus’ closing statement in vv. 5-9 addresses precisely that question again, albeit by way of a detour to Moses’s law. For this reason, it is likely that Mark portrays Jesus as saying something about the desired behaviour of a man, rather than of a human being in general. In addition, the statement that a “human,” who can be either male or female, is to be united with a γυνή does not present itself as a contextually plausible statement in the setting of first-century Judaism (or even the Greco-Roman world at large).

Against this view, it could be argued that the linguistic question of the referent of ἄνθρωπος in vv. 7 and 9 is the same, but the context of the two verses is different. In v. 7 the contrast is between ἄνθρωπος and γυνή, whereas in v. 9 it is between ἄνθρωπος and θεός, which would favour a “generic” interpretation of ἄνθρωπος. This would be the case if v. 9 were not part of vv. 1-9, certainly when this pericope is read with masculinity studies in mind, as has been proposed here.

First, if v. 9 is an answer to the very specific question in v. 2, which emphatically concerns male behaviour and is asked in a public debate between men, then it is highly likely that the person (ἄνθρωπος) whose agency is curbed in v. 9 is also to be thought of as gendered male. A masculist perspective can help bring consistency in translation and interpretation: translations that represent ἄνθρωπος in v. 7 exclusively (even if they frequently permit “inclusive” interpretations) should also do so in v. 9 in order to remain consistent thematically.

Second, this point of view is strengthened by the gender-historical observation that the text likely stems from a context in which there was virtually no possibility for women to initiate divorce. In other words, divorce was something that was gendered masculine and the agent of a divorce should be represented accordingly.

Third, when it comes to the male–female contrast in v. 7 and the ἄνθρωπος–God contrast in v. 9, it can be argued that, precisely when reading the entire corpus of biblical texts from a gender-sensitive or masculist perspective, this would not be the first time that a male human being’s autonomy vis-à-vis God is problematized in the tradition of Israel, whether this concerns the disciplining of male leaders (notably kings) or other male individuals (e.g., Job). It also would not be the last time: staying close to the topic of divorce, a text such as Matt 1.18-25 also deals with the contrast between male and divine behaviour in relation to divorce. In that text, Joseph’s maleness is essential to the narrative. In a similar way, Mark 10.9 can be seen as referring to a situation in which an ἄνθρωπος might have wished to initiate a divorce but is prevented from doing so. In a twenty-first-century Western European situation, however, in which divorce law allows women to initiate divorce, a “generic” interpretation of ἄνθρωπος here would be misleading. It would confuse first-century divorce proceedings with present-day ones—sending a person away is not the same as divorcing in modern society—and it would obscure the enormous importance of the gendered power inequality that plays a role in the pericope and in the behaviour of the ἄνθρωπος that is being addressed. Again, masculist exegesis helps to uncover this and to formulate a plea for its representation in translation, both in v. 7 and in v. 9.

Such an interpretation would receive support even from an approach that is not concerned with matters of gender but with the coherence of the quotation of Gen 2.24 in Mark 10.7-8 and with the textual transmission of the pericope. In fact, the textual tradition shows that ἄνθρωπος in this verse has been understood emphatically as “male human being,” rather than as “generic human being.”

In the current text preferred in NA28 (ἕνεκεν τούτου καταλείψει ἄνθρωπος τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν µητέρα καὶ ἔσονται οἱ δύο εἰς σάρκα µίαν ὥστε οὐκέτι εἰσὶν δύο ἀλλὰ µία σάρξ) a misunderstanding is possible. Strictly speaking, οἱ δύο refers to the father and mother mentioned in v. 7 ³⁸ rather than to the newly united man and woman who must be intended given the flow of Jesus’ argument. In order to solve the problem without assuming sloppy work on the part of Mark here, the apparent omission of καὶ προσκολληθήσεται πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ (now in brackets in NA28) has been explained as a case of combined homoioarcton and homoioteleuton with regard to the words καὶ προσκολληθήσεται and καὶ ἔσονται in vv. 7 and 8 respectively (influencing the textual tradition preserved in א B Ψ 892* 2427 and the Syriac Sinaiticus). ³⁹ This could overrule the principles of lectio brevior and difficilior, given that it would provide a technical rationale, rather than one of content or style, for the disagreement among the variants.

Conversely, it could also be argued that the longer text is now in Mark because of textual harmonization with Matthew, a well-known phenomenon, caused in no small part by Matthean dominance in the early church. The presence of the longer quotation in Matthew shows in any case that Matthew read the verse in the sense proposed here as well. Whichever way one decides the issue, however, both the original inclusion and the later addition of the reference to the wife would demonstrate that ἄνθρωπος has been understood to mean “male human being” or “husband,” rather than “human,” as would be possible on the basis of the marred quotation.

The argument that the original text of v. 7 had a more inclusive sense, ⁴⁰ however cumbersome it may be otherwise because of the antecedent of οἱ δύο, is problematic for another reason, one that is tradition-historical in nature. It has to do with the source of the quotation, Gen 2.24, where, again, only a man is meant. Of course, the sense of a quotation can be altered by quoting incompletely, but the high frequency of LXX translations of אִישׁ as ἄνθρωπος should make one very hesitant to argue this. This tradition of translating אִישׁ as ἄνθρωπος strongly suggests that the noun should have an exclusive sense here as well. ⁴¹

These observations move beyond an earlier generation of research on this pericope which concluded that Jesus advocated an egalitarian view of marriage, given the verses from Gen 1.27 and 2.24 that he cites and combines. Such an assessment, along with interpretations that stress Jesus’ defence of vulnerable women, ⁴² was criticized by others for turning Jesus into a “proto-feminist.” ⁴³ For all of these exegetes, however, the focus remains on the case discussed by Jesus and the Pharisees. The question of masculinity is only addressed to a very limited extent, just as the broader gender dynamics and the question of power is only partially addressed. ⁴⁴

Conclusion: The translation of ἄνθρωπος and the interpretation of Mark 10.1-9

It seems clear that, in order to do justice to the full force of Mark’s narration of the encounter between Jesus and the Pharisees in Mark 10.1-12 (especially vv. 1-9), the word ἄνθρωπος in Mark 10.7 should be rendered exclusively as “man” rather than “human.” “Human” in this case would be misleading: what is at stake is a particular kind of male behaviour in a particular cultural context with a specific construction of masculinity, not general human behaviour. It was argued that the same applied to the use of the word in v. 9.

Resulting translations might look like the following. The question in v. 7 could be phrased as, “it is permissible for a husband to dismiss his wife.” ⁴⁵ Verse 9 could be rendered as, “what God has brought together, let no man separate.” This challenges translations that use inclusive language in both verses and those that do so in one of the two instances. Of course, given that the argument presented here is also exegetical in nature and leads to a certain interpretation of the pericope, it also challenges “inclusive” interpretations of the pericope, those that read it as if it were dealing with divorce in general, rather than with very specific male gendered agency in divorce.

Although this paper has been primarily about matters of translation, the proposed translation may have a consequence for the general point of the text. Rather than a text concerned with the indissolubility of marriage as such, the pericope may well be much more a potentially paradigmatic story about managing and negotiating hegemonic masculinity and male agency in a heavily patriarchal setting, for which the discussion of the dismissal of a wife serves as a case. In other words, the text is about the curbing of the way in which those in dominant and gendered social positions and roles can have their way with other, weaker persons. It may well be imagined that another case, for example, the treatment of a slave (cf. the Letter to Philemon), could have been used to make the same point. The tradition behind the pericope as the renegotiation of power relationships might still be Jesuanic, given that the historical Jesus’ ministry included a substantial amount of attention to social imbalances. ⁴⁶