Inclusivist discourses among contemporary Shia religious scholars about people of other faiths

Abstract

Given the importance of interfaith dialogue in the modern period, some contemporary Muslim scholars have challenged exclusivist attitudes towards non-Muslims that were prominent in the pre-modern era. Relying on a rich array of primary sources in Arabic and Persian, this article presents key arguments advanced by contemporary Muslim scholars within the Shia tradition, particularly those with seminarian backgrounds, in support of inclusivist trends. The article focuses on four arenas: (1) theologically inclusivist ideas, with particular attention to the notion of the salvation of non-Muslims in the afterlife; (2) the permissibility of consuming food prepared by non-Muslims; (3) interfaith marriage; and (4) friendship between Muslims and non-Muslims. For each of these arenas, the article first presents relevant exclusivist positions found in classical Shia sources, followed by corresponding inclusivist interpretations advanced in the contemporary period by Shia clerics. It demonstrates that these inclusivist positions exist along a continuum from “soft” to “strong.”

Keywords

Shia scholars inclusivism salvation of non-Muslims consumption of non-Muslims’ foods interfaith marriage friendship between Muslims and non-Muslims

Introduction

This article provides examples of some of the key arguments made by select contemporary Shia Muslim scholars in support of inclusivism, focusing particularly on those with seminarian backgrounds. It highlights how these scholars challenge longstanding exclusivist views about the people of other faiths—views that were dominant in the pre-modern era and have continued to remain influential in traditionalist circles in the modern period. In the context of the contemporary world, such exclusivist ideas, which can be seen in the interpretations of some extremist Islamist groups, are obstacles to the promotion of a better understanding and relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims. Given the global emphasis on interfaith dialogue and coexistence, a reconsideration of these ideas is both timely and necessary.

This article contributes to growing scholarship on Muslim perspectives toward non-Muslims, with a focus on emerging inclusivist thought within the Shia tradition. Indeed, the body of literature on inclusivist and pluralist attitudes towards other religions from an Islamic perspective in English is growing, with some Muslim and non-Muslim scholars contributing to it (e.g., Ayoub 2007; Esack 1997; Kamali 2015; Yusuf 2021). In addition, a number of studies have shown how Sunni Muslim scholars during the modern period, such as Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Rida, and Haji Abd al-Malik Karim Amrullah (known as Hamka), have argued in favor of inclusivism (Abdelnour 2020; Duderija 2008, 2015; Johns and Saeed 2010). While a few studies have explored how some contemporary Shia clerics have dealt with the rights of non-Muslims (Brunner 2013; Clarke 2020; Ghobadzadeh 2022; Edalatnejad 2022, 198–210; Akbar 2025a), how Shia scholars have contributed to inclusivist trends during the modern period remains an understudied topic.

The article is structured as follows. The next section defines exclusivism and inclusivism. The third section provides a brief overview of inclusivist trends among contemporary scholars, showing how they use selected Quranic verses to support their arguments. The fourth and main section examines the views of contemporary Shia clerics, highlighting a spectrum of inclusivist ideas—from soft to strong—across four arenas: (1) theological inclusivism, with a focus on the salvation of non-Muslims; (2) the permissibility of consuming food prepared by non-Muslims; (3) interfaith marriage; and (4) friendship between Muslims and non-Muslims. For each arena, exclusivist positions found in classical Shia sources are presented alongside contemporary inclusivist reinterpretations. The importance of examining contemporary clerics’ ideas about inclusivism lies in their potential to be embraced within the broader community of believers. In fact, given that in the Shia tradition, believers are religiously obliged to emulate the rulings of a qualified religious authority (a marjaʿ taqlid or “source of emulation”), reformist ideas—especially those advanced by such clerics—have a strong likelihood of being accepted by their followers.

This article draws on a rich array of source material in primary languages (Arabic and Persian), including clerics’ seminal jurisprudential work and fatwas as well as their books, articles published in both academic and non-academic journals, and interviews (such as those available on their websites). Although many Shia clerics still express ideas and issue fatwas characterized by exclusivism, we have found evidence of a shift towards inclusivism.

Different forms of inclusivism: Definitions and examples

The terms “inclusivism” and “exclusivism” are frequently used in the literature on interreligious relations, including that of Christian theology. In particular, in Christians and Religious Pluralism, Alan Race (1983) distinguished three typologies of Christian views on other religions, including inclusivism, exclusivism, and pluralism. According to Race, religious or theological exclusivism in Christianity refers to the idea that salvation is only possible through the Christian church. Conversely, religious inclusivism is based on the idea that followers of other religions can attain salvation, although the ultimate truth remains within Christianity and through being faithful to Jesus Christ. Indeed, based on this definition, religious inclusivism refers to the idea that “Christ fulfils or realizes the fragmented truths found or given elsewhere,” and that “Christ is already present, as universal Logos, in the heart of human spirituality wherever it is found” (Hebblethwaite 1984, 515–516). In the words of Race, inclusivism represents “both an acceptance and a rejection of other faiths, a dialectical ‘yes’ and ‘no.’” Finally, Race defined pluralism as the idea that “knowledge of God is partial in all faiths, including Christian faith. Religions must acknowledge their need of each other if the full truth about God is to be available to all mankind” (cited in Akay Dag 2022, 2). Race’s three-fold typology has become one standard categorization in the interreligious relations literature, despite some criticisms. In particular, Paul Hedges (2008, 30) considers the categorization “the most widely known and used approach” which “has a secure and useful role” in understanding interreligious relations.

Race defined inclusivism, exclusivism, and pluralism based on the relationship between Christianity and other religions, wherein Christianity constitutes a reference point for salvation. Having expanded Race’s categorization beyond Christianity, the scholarship in religious studies has provided alternative definitions of exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism. Mohammad Hassan Khalil (2014, 7) notes that religious exclusivism means adherents of a particular religion will attain salvation alone and thus others will be punished in hell. Conversely, religious inclusivism is based on the premise that although a particular religion represents the path to Heaven, “sincere outsiders who could not have recognized it as such will be saved.” Pluralists, according to Khalil (7), reject these ideas, arguing that “there are several religious traditions or interpretations that are equally effective salvifically.” In the context of Islam, an exclusivist approach highlights that only those who recognize the prophethood of Muhammad and the divine status of the Quran will attain salvation, whereas an inclusivist position indicates that a person who is born after the Prophet Muhammad but does not recognize Muhammad’s prophethood and the divine status of the Quran can be saved in the afterlife provided that he or she subscribes to the basic principles of monotheism and engages in righteous acts (Duderija 2015).

Other scholars have extended the application of the terms exclusivism and inclusivism beyond the matter of salvation. In particular, inclusivism has been treated in the extant literature from a socially oriented perspective (Saeed 2020). This type of inclusivism refers to a positive social attitude towards adherents of other religions in the social arena, such as the permissibility of establishing good social relations with them; taking them as close friends; trading with them; buying, selling, renting or borrowing their goods; eating their foodstuffs or foods prepared by them; and, finally, marriage to them.

Both religious and socially oriented inclusivism are characterized by a range of ideas on a continuum from “soft” to “strong” (Saeed 2020). For example, from an Islamic perspective, the statement “other than Muslims, the People of the Book (a term used in the Quran and classical Islamic texts to refer mainly to Jews and Christians) may attain salvation, but followers of other religions such as Hinduism and Buddhism will not be saved in the afterlife” represents a soft form of religious inclusivism, while the statement “the door to salvation remains open for all non-Muslims” represents a strong theological inclusivist position. Similarly, the idea that “a Muslim male is only permitted to marry a woman from the rank of the People of the Book” represents soft socially oriented inclusivism, but the statement that “all forms of interfaith marriage (i.e., between a Muslim and a non-Muslim) is permissible” represents a strong inclusivist position. Based on this approach, this article acknowledges that different forms of inclusivist positions, from soft to strong, exist in contemporary Shia thought.

Challenging exclusivism: A brief overview of the extant literature

In the modern period, several Muslim scholars—some of them based in the West—have challenged the exclusivist attitudes toward non-Muslims that were prevalent in the pre-modern era. These scholars live and write in contexts that differ significantly from those of earlier times. Indeed, several changes that have taken place in the modern period have given rise to discourses through which inclusivism and pluralism have become more accepted among many Muslim scholars. Khalil (2014, 110) argues that the decline of traditional Islamic institutions, the growing presence of Muslims in the West and other predominantly non-Muslim regions, and the emergence of religiously diverse communities worldwide with significant Muslim populations have contributed to the rise of inclusivist literature produced by several Muslim scholars in the modern period. Further, rethinking exclusivist ideas is likely to result in more positive relations between Muslims and adherents of other faiths. This is particularly meaningful given the importance of interfaith dialogue in the modern context (Saeed 2020). Muslim scholars, depending on the context in which they live, may have other reasons for challenging exclusivist sentiments. For example, having witnessed South Africa’s struggles during the apartheid and post-apartheid periods, and observing Christian activists and thinkers working alongside others, including Muslims, to bring about positive change in the country, Farid Esack challenged the exclusivist tendencies of his coreligionists (his approach is discussed briefly below).

Inclusivist trends have been examined by several contemporary Muslim scholars. Fazlur Rahman (d.1988), who was originally from Pakistan but was later based in the United States, argues that the Quran, in many of its verses, confirms religious inclusivism and the salvation of followers of other religions (Rahman 1980, 136–138). Nurcholish Madjid (2005) argues that the salvation of people of other faiths is rooted in the Quranic worldview, since the Quran accepts religious diversity and considers it God’s plan for humanity (Madjid 2005, 209). Hamka (d.1981) refers to Quranic verses such as Q. 2:62 (“Those who believed and those who are Jews or Christians or Sabeans—those [among them] who believed in God and the Last Day and did righteousness—will have their reward with their Lord”) and Q. 5:69 (“For the believers, the Jews, the Sabeans, and the Christians—those who believe in God and the Last Day and do good deeds—there is no fear: they will not grieve”) to argue in favor of the possibility of salvation for the religious Other. These verses, according to him, concern a “universal promise from God to all mankind that they will be rewarded, regardless of their religious adherence, provided they are sincere in their faith and perform righteous deeds” (cited in Yusof 2005, 119). Q. 2:62 and Q. 5:69 have also been referenced by several scholars, such as Muhammad Asad, Muhammad Abed al-Jabiri (2015, 224), and Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd (2001), to argue that anyone who holds true belief (belief in God and the Day of Judgement) and acts righteously will be saved, meaning that salvation does not belong to Muslims alone.

Arguments presented by several contemporary Muslim scholars in favor of socially oriented inclusivism concern a range of ideas, such as friendship and marriage between Muslims and non-Muslims (including the People of the Book) (see Çoruh 2012). According to Farid Esack, the Quran has a positive attitude towards the People of the Book in matters related to food and marriage—a position that makes them distinct from mushrikūn (idolaters). Referring to Q. 5:5, Esack (1997, 160) argues that the Quran treats chaste Muslim women in the same manner as chaste women of the People of the Book and gives Muslim males permission to marry them. There is also the argument that this permission for Muslim men to marry women from the ranks of the People of the Book can be extended to include women from all non-Muslim communities. This argument is based on the idea that “all forms of discrimination on grounds of religion and belief should disappear” in the contemporary world and that “prevention of Muslims marrying non-Muslims is an interdiction that should disappear since the Qur’an considers people as equals, a single family whose members and inclinations vary and who seek and carry out the good in varying ways” (Charfi 2003, 7).

The idea that the Quran encourages dialogue between Muslims and non-Muslims and that they can establish a friendly relationship is another theme associated with socially oriented inclusivism that has been highlighted by several Muslim scholars over the past few decades. Some Quranic verses that classical Muslim scholars (such as al-Zamakhshari (d. 538/1074), Ibn Kathir (d. 774/1373) and al-Suyuti (d. 911/1505))¹ interpreted in a way that prevents Muslims from taking Jews and Christians as friends (such as Q. 5:51, Q. 3:28 and Q. 4:144) have been reinterpreted in a more inclusivist way. Tariq Ramadan (2004, 204) argues that there is a distinction in the Quran between those People of the Book who fight Muslims and those who do not, and concludes that the Quran does not forbid Muslims from establishing relations with People of the Book who fall into the latter category. Similarly, according to Fathi Osman (2008, 112–4), the Quran avoids “unfair and erroneous generalization, oversimplification, and stereotyping” of the People of the Book and thus does not ask Muslims to avoid close relations with all Jews and Christians. Referring to Q. 22:40 (“If God did not repel some people by means of others, many monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques, where God’s name is much invoked, would have been destroyed”), Asma Afsaruddin argues that the Quran promotes relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims. According to her, the Quran invites believers—be they Christians, Jews, or Muslims—to work cooperatively towards the realization of basic moral and ethical principles (Afsaruddin 2021, 39).

Inclusivist ideas adopted by contemporary Shia clerics

Relying on primary and original source material, in what follows we explore some inclusivist ideas adopted by Shia clerics in the contemporary period. We also explore whether and to what extent some of the ideas indicated above have been adopted by contemporary Shia clerics. Reformist scholars with a seminary background whose ideas are discussed in the following section include Mohsen Kadivar (b. 1959), Ahmad Qabel (d. 2012), Yusuf Sanei (d. 2020), and Kamal Heydari (b. 1956). They have instigated reformist approaches with regard to matters such as human rights, penal codes, women’s rights, and political discourses. Other clerics whose ideas are explored include Murtada Mutahhari (d. 1979), Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah (d. 2010), and Muhammad Jawad Mughniyya (d. 1979). The ideas of traditionalist clerics such as Naser Makarem Shirazi (b. 1927) are also considered to demonstrate how and to what extent they present inclusivist approaches. In order to highlight the significant shifts that have taken place in the ideas of contemporary Shia clerics about theological and social inclusivism, this article places emphasis on trends of thought rather than exploring the individual ideas of each of them in detail.

The salvation of non-Muslims

The possibility of the salvation of non-Muslims has been a frequent topic of discussion among Shia scholars in the contemporary period. In the pre-modern era, many Shia scholars, like their Sunni counterparts, tended to argue that Muslims alone attain salvation in the afterlife. This stems from the idea that, with the emergence of Islam, “the earlier versions of faith have now been rendered invalid (bāṭil)” (Winter 1999, 146; see also Winter 2013). According to classical Shia scholar Shaykh al-Mufid (d.413/1022), when crossing the bridge of sirāṭ in the afterlife, disbelievers will not be saved and will fall into hell (al-Mufid 2011, 32). Within the Shia tradition, some scholars have gone so far as to consider the belief in imamate as an important precondition for salvation (Meftah 2004; Khiyabani and Shariatmadari 2020, 169–170).

Recently, a range of inclusivist trends has emerged. Softer forms of inclusivism argue that although all previous religions, including Judaism and Christianity, have been abrogated since the emergence of Islam, their followers can still attain salvation. By contrast, harder forms of inclusivism maintain that the salvation of followers of other religions is guaranteed as long as their beliefs are based on reason and they engage in righteous acts. To begin, Murtada Mutahhari’s ideas about the salvation of non-Muslims represent softer forms of inclusivism. Mutahhari argues that people who believe in God and the afterlife and do righteous deeds will be saved in the afterlife even if they are non-Muslims (Mutahhari 1995, 1:341). Mutahhari pays significant attention to the importance of doing righteous deeds in attaining salvation in his book Divine Justice (Adl-e Elahi). Here, Mutahhari explores several narrations from classical Shia sources in which Shia Imams describe the historical conditions wherein non-Muslims have carried out righteous deeds; as a result they are promised they will encounter either less punishment in the afterlife or have their kufr (disbelief) forgiven. In one such narration, a kāfir is explained to have assisted his neighbor on several occasions, and in another, a kāfir accommodated a believer who fled from a cruel and tyrant king in his home country. In such narrations, these non-Muslims are described as those whose righteous deeds will seriously be considered in the afterlife. Mutahhari concludes that the Quranic verses and hadiths in which non-Muslims are said to reside in hell in the afterlife and be tormented do not include those who have done righteous deeds in their lifetime. Depending on the nature of their righteousness, these non-Muslims will be totally saved or their punishment significantly lessened (Mutahhari 1973, 283–285).

Softer forms of inclusivism also exist in the ideas of other contemporary Shia scholars. Naser Makarem Shirazi believes that Islam has abrogated previous religions, including Judaism and Christianity, and thus remains the only valid religion (Makarem Shirazi n.d.-a). However, in terms of salvation, he presents three interconnected arguments that represent a form of inclusivist approach.² First, according to Makarem Shirazi, doing righteous deeds and having strong faith are necessary conditions for salvation. Therefore, being a Muslim does not necessarily guarantee one’s salvation: if a person is a Shia Muslim and does not do righteous deeds, they will not be saved in the afterlife (Makarem Shirazi n.d.-b). He expresses the second and third arguments as follows:

God will punish only those disbelievers who are stubborn (lajūj). That is, only those who follow a religion but are aware of its invalidity will reside in Hell in the afterlife. [Further,] God will judge people [in the afterlife] based on their ability and knowledge that He has provided to him or her. Therefore, there is no problem for the salvation of those non-Muslims who are intellectually weak and do not have enough knowledge about Islam (Makarem Shirazi n.d.-b).

Referring to Q. 50:24 (“Throw into Hell every stubborn disbeliever”), Makarem Shirazi argues that only those disbelievers who know that the religion they follow is invalid and does not represent the “truth” will reside in hell. According to him, since Q. 50:24 does not refer to all disbelievers, only pointing to “stubborn disbelievers,” the path of salvation remains open to many non-Muslims. Makarem Shirazi also refers to Q. 2:286 (“God does not require of any soul more than what it can afford”), arguing that a person who is unaware of the truth and has not enough capacity to familiarize himself or herself with the truth (i.e., Islam from his perspective) cannot be punished (Makarem Shirazi n.d.-b). Indeed, there are many non-Muslims who have not conducted enough research about Islam or who have no true knowledge about it. According to Makarem Shirazi, these people will not enter hell, and the door to salvation is open to them because God judges them based on their deeds and righteousness (Makarem Shirazi n.d.-b). Abdollah Jawadi Amoli also argues that individuals who remain unaware of the truth will not be subjected to punishment in the afterlife:

It is possible that a person who follows an invalid religion will not be punished by God in the afterlife. . . . If someone’s invalid belief is the result of his or her forgetfulness, being unknowledgeable or ignorance, and is not the result of his or her stubbornness, he or she will not be punished (Jawadi Amoli 2008, 6:212 cited in Yousefi 2021, 173–4).

Another scholar, Yusuf Sanei, presents an inclusivist approach to the salvation of people of other faiths. According to Sanei, the Quran affirms that disbelievers (kuffār) will be condemned to hell and tormented accordingly (Q. 2:257, Q. 41:27, and Q. 38:27), which may lead some to conclude that all non-Muslims will be punished in the afterlife. Sanei challenges this reasoning, stating that, from a semantic perspective, “kufr means ‘to conceal’ (sitr). To conceal [something] requires that there be knowledge to be concealed” (Sanei 2012, 37). Therefore, an individual who lacks full awareness of something cannot be held accountable for concealing it; in such circumstances, sitr does not apply. In this sense, a kāfir is a person who is fully aware of the validity of Islam vis-à-vis the religion he or she believes in, yet still seeks to deny its validity. This is a person who “knowingly moves in the opposite direction,” and intentionally “acts against what he or she knows to be true” (Sanei 2012, 37). Sanei concludes that not all non-Muslims are kāfir and subject to punishment in the afterlife, meaning that the door to salvation is open to all non-Muslims. According to Sanei, non-Muslims who perform righteous acts will be saved in the afterlife:

Some people say that those non-Muslims who perform righteous acts will still be destined for hell [in the afterlife], but people who are born as Muslims will attain salvation and reside in heaven. This approach cannot be accepted.... When we say in our daily prayer “Peace be upon us and upon all righteous servants of God,” we refer to all righteous people [who deserve salvation].... Righteous people include those who do not hurt others, act based on reason and dedicate themselves to serve society. (Shafaqna 2020)

The latter idea presented by Sanei in the above quotation—namely, the possibility of salvation for righteous individuals among non-Muslims—is further developed by Mohsen Kadivar. Kadivar (2013a) argues that adherence to a particular religion, such as Islam, does not necessarily guarantee salvation. According to him, the salvation of a Jew or a Christian who believes in God and the Day of Judgement and performs good deeds in accordance with their religious laws is guaranteed from an Islamic perspective. Referring to Q. 5:69 (the verse to which many contemporary Muslim inclusivist scholars have referred, as previously explained), Kadivar (2013b) maintains that there are three conditions for salvation in the afterlife: (1) holding true belief in God, (2) belief in the Last Day and (3) acting righteously (see also Q. 2:62). Righteous acts can be identified through reason and can also be observed in the common teachings of Abrahamic religions. Kadivar (2013b) concludes that God makes judgments based on people’s faithfulness to Him and their righteous acts, not on the specific religion they follow.

Another scholar, Mohammad Taqi Fadil Meybodi, argues that the Quran rejects religious exclusivism. Referring to Q. 2:111 (“They say, ‘No one will enter Paradise unless he is a Jew or a Christian.’ This is their own wishful thinking. [Prophet], say, ‘Produce your evidence, if you are telling the truth’”), Fadil Meybodi (2013) argues that salvation cannot be monopolized by any religion. Indeed, the Quran criticizes some Jews and Christians for their exclusivist claims about how they alone will enter paradise. This is supported, Fadil Meybodi maintains, by the following verse: “any who direct themselves wholly to God and do good will have their reward with their Lord” (Q. 2:112). According to Fadil Meybodi’s reading, whoever submits to God, believing in God as a creator and transcendental Being, will be rewarded by God in the afterlife regardless of his or her religious beliefs, meaning that the Quran rejects the monopolization of heaven or salvation. Fadil Meybodi also highlights the idea that besides submission to God, doing righteous deeds, as emphasized in Q. 2:112, is an important criterion for salvation. Like Sanei, Fadil Meybodi (2013) notes that righteous deeds include actions that serve other people and society and are consistent with common sense and ethics.

Over the past few decades, the most inclusivist approach to the salvation of the religious Other has been adopted by Kamal Heydari. According to Heydari’s theory, followers of all religions attain salvation in the hereafter if they possess reasons and evidence, grounded in research and study, for the validity of their religious beliefs—even if such reasons are unconvincing to others or are later recognized as insufficient in the afterlife (Heydari 2018). Referencing Q. 2:286 (“God does not require of any soul more than what it can afford”), Heydari (2018) argues that such a person has done his or her best in terms of discovering the truth and thus does not deserve to be punished. To quote from Heydari (2018):

If the followers of a religion have heartfully sought the Truth and after studying and researching to the best of their ability have recognized a particular religion as representing the Truth, even if it is discovered on the Day of Judgment that their beliefs do not represent the Truth, they will still be saved.

Heydari’s argument rests on three premises: (1) person X believes in religion Y; (2) on the basis of the reasons and evidence acquired in his or her lifetime, X firmly believes that Y is the correct and valid religion, representing the Truth; and (3) in the afterlife, X realizes that Y does not represent the Truth. Heydari’s conclusion is that X will be saved.

Heydari reasons that we human beings have natural epistemological limitations and can never ensure that our personal understanding or conception of religion is valid. Our religious beliefs are influenced by various factors, such as our prior knowledge, our assumptions, and modes of reasoning. Indeed, God has not granted us the capacity to ensure that our beliefs are absolutely correct; therefore, no one—not even the most knowledgeable person—can guarantee that his or her religious beliefs represent the absolute Truth. Heydari reminds us that there is only one absolute Truth and that there is only one religion that represents the Truth; consequently, the statement that all religions or all religious beliefs are valid is incorrect—an idea that distinguishes him from pluralist scholars. However, due to our human limitations as explained above, the Truth (or the religion representing the Truth) is not necessarily achievable for us. As a result, even if we choose a religion that does not represent the Truth, we may still achieve salvation in the next world, provided that our choice is grounded in reasoning (Heydari 2018).

Consuming foodstuffs prepared by non-Muslims

Another issue related to inclusivism and the social relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims concerns whether Muslims are permitted to eat food prepared by non-Muslims. The Quran (Q. 5:5) maintains that the food of the People of the Book is permissible for Muslims. The vast majority of classical Sunni scholars held that food prepared by Jews and Christians is permissible for Muslims to consume (Freidenreich 2011, 264). The dominant classical Shia approach, with a few exceptions, was that the meat of animals slaughtered by all categories of non-Muslims including the People of the Book and followers of other religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism, as well as atheists, was prohibited. Classical Shia scholars often limited the consumption of the foodstuffs of the People of the Book to raw foods such as vegetables, herbs (buqūl), and grains (ḥubūb). Freidenreich (2011, 145) considers the possibility that the “divergence in Sunni and Shi’i attitudes toward the food of Jews and Christians reflects… a difference in the ways Sunnis and Shi’is conceptualize Islam itself.” It is also likely that the Shia laws concerning the consumption of the food of the People of the Book emerged in response to Sunni attitudes towards the same matter, reflecting one of the ways in which Shia laws became gradually distinct from Sunni laws within the early centuries of Islamic history (Akbar, 2025b, 74).

Shaykh al-Tusi (d. 460/1068) and Sharif al-Murtada (d. 436/1044) were the earliest Shia scholars to theorize this viewpoint, and many later Shia jurists reiterated this position (Edalatnejad 2022, 37–38). Based on this approach, even raw foods belonging to the People of the Book should not be consumed if they have been used in cooking or touched with a wet hand—an idea that is based on dominant Shia scholars’ approach to the matter of impurity (najāsa). In addition, given the perceived impurity of non-Muslims, a Muslim should eat from a vessel previously used by the People of the Book only after it has been washed (al-Tusi, 1980, 589; Tsadik 2003, 385–87). Furthermore, on the same basis, Muslims are required to avoid consuming any food or beverage touched by non-Muslims, including the People of the Book (even if the food itself is halal), such as their leftover food and water (Pargoo 2018, 220).

While this socially exclusivist approach has dominated Shia fiqh literature since the classical period, many Shia scholars have demonstrated certain degrees of flexibility regarding the consumption of non-Muslims’ foods during the modern period, moving towards an inclusivist approach. First, some contemporary Shia clerics permit a Muslim to use the same container from which a person from among the People of the Book has already drunk water. This is consistent with the idea that People of the Book are intrinsically pure (see e.g., Sistani n.d.-a).

Second, some clerics have ruled that, given that the People of the Book are intrinsically pure, the food prepared by them, including that in which meat is used, is not impure by itself and thus is permitted for consumption, unless the meat itself is impure (najis) or marinated with things such as wine that are considered forbidden in Islam (al-Nahar n.d). In line with this approach, it is permitted to consume cooked meat prepared by any non-Muslim, be they People of the Book or people of other religions, if one knows the raw meat (before being cooked) is purchased from a Muslim market (Sanei n.d). Based on these fatwas, therefore, it is not the non-Muslims’ physical contact with the meat that makes its consumption illegal; the Muslim who seeks to consume their food should only ensure that the food itself is halal.

Third, the most inclusivist approach pertaining to the consumption of non-Muslims’ foodstuffs is that a Muslim is permitted to eat all types of food, including those that contain meat, prepared by People of the Book. Kadivar (2020), an advocate of this approach, challenges the traditional ideas that distinguish the foods in which meat is used from those which contain vegetables, grains, and herbs, arguing that such a distinction has no Quranic basis. He begins his discussion by arguing that the Quran’s aim in the early verses of Chapter 5 is to instruct believers not to eat certain things such as meat of the swine and foods slaughtered for the sake of idols—a ritual practiced during the pre-Islamic era:

Considering the numerous Quranic verses that emphasize the mention of God's name [before slaughtering animals] and prohibit the consumption of what has been slaughtered in the name of something other than God, it becomes clear that the Quran sought to abolish the pre-Islamic custom, according to which animals were scarified in the name of, or, for idols. Chapter al-Maida [of the Quran], which contains some of the latest verses revealed to the Prophet, clarifies that certain things such as carrion, blood and swine, and whatever has been slaughtered in the name of anything other than God should not be consumed by Muslims. It then permits the consumption of the food of People of the Book (Q. 5:5). The term food in this verse cannot be limited to grains [and vegetables]; rather, it refers either specifically to meat foodstuffs [as consumed at the time] or to foods in which meat is used. (Kadivar 2020)

For Kadivar, since Q. 5:3 lists the foodstuffs that cannot be consumed by Muslims and then Q. 5:5 permits Muslims to eat the foods of the People of the Book, the Quran does not restrict the consumption of lawful foodstuffs prepared by Jews or Christians. Indeed, reading Q. 5:3 and Q. 5:5 together, Kadivar maintains that the Quran only forbids Muslims to eat the foodstuffs of the People of the Book that may contain those indicated in Q. 5:3 (e.g., pork). Kadivar (2020) concludes that “it is permissible for Muslims to eat the meat slaughtered by People of the Book.”

According to another approach presented by Shia scholar Ahmad Qabel which represents an extension of Kadivar’s idea, the Quran’s aim in the early verses of Chapter 5 (i.e., Q. 5:3 and Q 5:4) is to list certain foodstuffs that should not be consumed by Muslims. In these verses, according to Qabel (2013, 170–80), the Quran does not specify certain people or groups whose foodstuffs are not permitted for consumption by Muslims. Therefore, a Muslim can eat any food prepared by followers of other religions, whether it contains vegetables alone or meat as well, on the condition that the meat does not include pork or any other type of meat prohibited in Islam or slaughtered for, or, in the name of idols as practiced by certain communities (Qabel 2013, 180).

Interfaith marriage

Another issue related to social interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims concerns marriage, i.e., whether a Muslim is permitted to marry a non-Muslim. In the pre-modern era, given that the “regulations on marriage and divorce are seen as devices instituted to maintain the distinctive social identity of the believers,” Muslim jurists, like scholars of other religions such as Judaism, Christianity, and Zoroastrianism, restricted interfaith marriage in one way or another (Edalatnejad 2022, 41). The Quran forbids Muslims from marrying polytheists: “Do not marry polytheistic women until they believe... And do not marry your women to polytheistic men” (Q. 2:221; see also Q. 60:10). However, the Quran permits Muslim men to marry women from among the People of the Book. In the same verse in which the foods of the People of the Book are permitted for consumption (Q. 5:5), the Quran gives such permission as well.

In classical Islamic jurisprudential texts, a Muslim female was not given permission to marry a non-Muslim, including anyone from among the People of the Book, and this restriction is endorsed in both Sunni and Shia legal texts. Unlike most Sunni scholars, who believe that a Muslim man is permitted to marry a Jewish or Christian female, the vast majority of Shia jurists call for the limitation of marriages between Muslim men and women from among the People of the Book. Indeed, the dominant Shia view in the pre-modern era was that a Muslim man may marry a Jewish or Christian woman only through a temporary or a limited-term marriage (mutʿa), meaning that a permanent marriage was unlawful (Edalatnejad 2022, 42). A temporary (and by extension permanent) marriage with non-kitābī people (followers of non-Abrahamic religions such as Hinduism or Buddhism and atheists) is not permitted. These exclusivist perspectives on interfaith marriage have been largely accepted by many Shia jurists in the modern period (see e.g., Sistani n.d.-b).

Despite the predominance of this approach, various trends of inclusivism regarding interfaith marriage, ranging from soft to hard inclusivism, have appeared in the contemporary period. For example, some have argued that it is permissible for a Muslim man to enter into a permanent marriage with a woman from among the People of the Book. In fact, the permission given in classical Shia texts concerning temporary marriages between Muslim men and women from among the People of the Book has been extended to permanent marriages by some jurists such as Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah (Fadlallah n.d, 145) and Yusuf Sanei (2015, 42). Another scholar Muhammad Jawad Mughniyya rules that “regular marriage with Christians and Jews is permitted, although it is, ‘disliked’ (makrūh), i.e., better avoided” (cited in Clarke 2020, 188). According to Mughniyya, the Quran explicitly states that Muslim males can marry the chaste believing women from among the People of the Book and that Q. 5:5 does not refer to temporary marriage. Making a sharp distinction between mushrikūn and People of the Book, Mughniyya (2007, 3:39) refers to Q. 2:221 (“Do not marry polytheistic women (al-mushrikāt) until they believe”), arguing that the Quran only prevents Muslim men from marrying mushrikāt (polytheists), not the People of the Book.

Regarding the more inclusivist ideas, some Shia scholars have extended the aforementioned permission to marriage between a Muslim female and a male from among the People of the Book. The classical ruling reflects pre-modern gender and social hierarchies that presupposed the superiority of Muslims over non-Muslims. Given the change in context in the modern period and the important role that women play in family and society, both types of interfaith marriage mentioned above—between a Muslim man and a woman from the People of the Book, and between a Muslim woman and a man from the People of the Book—are considered permissible. Kadivar (2013b) writes,

There is no difference between the marriage of a Muslim woman with a man from the People of the Book, on the one hand, and the marriage of a woman from the People of the book and a Muslim man, on the other. If one type of marriage is forbidden, the other should likewise be considered forbidden; if one is permitted, the permission should be granted to both. The unanimous scholarly opinion [in the classical period] that forbade the marriage between a Muslim woman and a man from the People of the Book resulted from prevailing views regarding the inferiority of women; otherwise, there is no valid reason for such a prohibition.

Some ideas and fatwas even permit a Muslim female to marry a male whose religion does not adhere to that of the People of the Book (i.e., non-kitābī people). According to Sanei (2012, 52), if the non-Muslim male does not seek to impose his ideas about religion on his female Muslim partner, the marriage is lawful. Based on this fatwa, since the fundamental purpose of marriage from the Quranic viewpoint is to establish mercy and compassion between partners (Q. 30:21), if such conditions are met in a marriage between a Muslim female and a non-Muslim male, their marriage is acceptable from an Islamic perspective. Ahmad Qabel endorses such a viewpoint, arguing that although marrying inside the faith is better, it is permissible for a Muslim (male or female) to marry any person who “is committed to rational and logical principles,” “avoids imposing his or her beliefs upon others,” and “is committed to basic ethical norms” (Qabel 2012, 53; see also Qabel 2013, 180).

Friendship with non-Muslims

The last topic related to inclusivism covered in this article concerns friendship between Muslims and non-Muslims, with a particular emphasis on Q. 5:51, one of the most frequently quoted Quranic verses that appears to forbid Muslims from forming friendly relations with Jews and Christians. It reads, “You who believe, do not take the Jews and Christians as awliyāʾ (understood often as ‘allies’ or ‘friends’); they are awliyāʾ only to each other. Anyone who takes them as an ally becomes one of them—God does not guide such wrongdoers.”³ Given the seemingly exclusivist tone of this verse, and its exclusivist interpretation by many Muslim scholars even during the modern period (see McAuliffe 1999; Pink 2010),⁴ including that of the well-known Shia commentator on the Quran Muhammad Hussein Tabatabaʾi, the author of Tafsir al-Mizan (Brunner 2013; Tabataba’i 2011, vol.5, 608), it is important to present the ideas of some contemporary Shia scholars who have not interpreted the verse from an absolute exclusivist stance; instead, they have endorsed the idea that a friendly relationship between Muslims and the People of the Book is lawful from an Islamic perspective.⁵

In the contemporary era, the idea that forbids a friendly relationship between a Muslim and a person from the People of the Book has been challenged by many Shia scholars. To begin with a softer form of social inclusivism, Makarem Shirazi states that Q. 5:51 “warns Muslims against collaborating with Jews and Christians.” The verse stresses that “faith in God necessitates that Muslims do not cooperate with the People of the Book for material gains and financial benefits” (Makarim Shirazi n.d.-c). In his interpretation of Q. 5:51, Makarem Shirazi (n.d.-c) notes that the verse has a polemical nature, highlighting the idea that “had the Jews and Christians acted based on their own scriptures, they would have been appropriate allies for you [Muslims],” meaning that the People of the Book deviated from following their own religious texts. Makarem Shirazi, however, indicates that, based on the occasion of the revelation for the verse in question, we should not take it to mean that Muslims should not establish any social relations with Jews and Christians. According to him, the term awliyāʾ has meanings other than friendship such as political alliance and guardianship. Taking these meanings into account, the verse warns Muslims not to take the People of the Book as their political allies, nor should Muslims rely on their alliance against enemies (Makarim Shirazi n.d.-c).

A more inclusivist approach is presented by Mughniyya (2007, 3:119), who argues that Q. 5:51 should be interpreted in light of Q. 60:8–9, which reads, “God does not forbid you from dealing kindly and fairly with those who have neither fought nor driven you out of your homes... God only forbids you from befriending those who have fought you for faith, driven you out of your homes, or supported others in doing so.” According to Mughniyya, the Quran distinguishes between those People of the Book who fight Muslims and those who do not, and thus, a Muslim can establish a friendly relationship with any person from the People of the Book who falls into the latter category. When interpreting Q. 5:51 in light of Q. 60:8–9, Mughniyya (2007, 3:119) concludes that the former verse should be interpreted as follows:

O! who you believe, do not take Jews and Christians as friends if they show enmity with you and seek to fight you, but if they seek to live in peace with you, you should be also peaceful to them and treat them with good manners, so that all of you can live in peace and harmony. [If they do not seek to fight you,] you should deal with them justly and treat them with fairness.

According to Mughniyya, the last part of Q. 5:51 (“Anyone who takes them as an ally becomes one of them—God does not guide such wrongdoers”) confirms the idea that the Quran limits the prohibition of relationships between Muslims and the People of the Book only to those who fight Muslims. This part of the verse means “whoever is allied with those Christians and Jews who are hostile to Islam and Muslims will be considered as one of them and will be punished [by God]” (Mughniyya 2007, 3:121). Mughniyya (137) also references Q. 5:57 (“Do not seek the guardianship of those given the Scripture before you and the disbelievers who have made your faith a mockery”), arguing that the Quran precludes Muslims from establishing relationships with those People of the Book who mock Islam. For Mughniyya, friendship with the People of the Book is not problematic as long as they do not belittle Islam or fight Muslims.⁶ Indeed, in their friendly relationships with the People of the Book, Muslims should ensure that their religion is not subjected to mockery and ridicule. Mughniyya (2007, 3:119) maintains that although a disbeliever or one who denies the existence of God commits an injustice against himself or herself, this should not disqualify such a person from friendship. Therefore, in all matters ranging from friendship and neighborliness to commerce and cooperation, Muslims can establish relationships with non-Muslims.

Kadivar also presents an inclusivist approach to Q. 5:51. According to Kadivar (2014), the term awliyāʾ should be interpreted to mean the guardianship, leadership, or legal power of non-Muslims over Muslims; that is, the verse does not prohibit Muslims from entering into friendly relationships with people of other faiths. The idea that non-Muslims should not be leaders or guardians of Muslims is highlighted in other verses of the Quran, including Q. 4:144, Q. 5:57, Q. 9:23, and Q. 60:1. Interpreting Q. 5:51 in light of the latter verses, Kadivar (2014) concludes that it does not concern friendly relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims; rather, it prohibits Muslims from taking non-Muslims, including the People of the Book, as their political leaders and guardians. He also maintains that the Quran explicitly states that Muslims and the People of the Book can be “nearest” to one another—i.e., in Q. 5:82 (“you will find the nearest of them in affection to the believers those who say, ‘We are Christians.’ That is because among them are priests and monks and because they are not arrogant”)—an idea that endorses friendly relationships between them (Kadivar 2014).

Conclusion

This article has highlighted a range of theologically and socially inclusivist positions toward non-Muslims advanced by contemporary Shia scholars. The inclusivist views fall along a spectrum from “soft” to “strong.” For example, regarding the salvation of non-Muslims, scholars such as Makarem Shirazi and Jawadi Amoli adopt more moderate forms of inclusivism, while Kamal Heydari offers a stronger position, arguing that salvation is accessible to both Muslims and non-Muslims alike, provided their beliefs are grounded in sincere reasoning and inquiry. Similarly, views on issues such as consuming food prepared by non-Muslims, interfaith marriage, and forming friendships with non-Muslims also vary, with some scholars limiting these permissions to the People of the Book and others extending them to all non-Muslims. We have demonstrated that several Shia scholars have played a notable role in shaping the discourse of inclusivism. It is important to note, however, that these views do not represent the position of all contemporary Shia scholars; many continue to maintain various degrees of exclusivist attitudes towards non-Muslims. Nonetheless, by examining these emerging inclusivist perspectives, we hope to contribute to a clearer understanding of how inclusivist discourse is evolving among Muslim scholars, particularly those grounded in Shia seminarian traditions.

Footnotes

ORCID iD

Ali Akbar

Notes

Author biographies

Dr. Ali Akbar is a researcher at the University of Melbourne in Australia, where he received his PhD in Islamic studies. He is an expert in the fields of Islamic studies with a focus on contemporary Islamic thought and Middle Eastern politics as well as Iranian politics with a focus on Iran’s foreign policy in the Middle East and beyond. He is co-author of Iran’s Soft Power in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Edinburgh University Press 2023) and co-editor of Political Secularism and Religion (MDPI 2023). He is the lead author of Contemporary Approaches to the Qur’ān and Its Interpretation in Iran (co-authored Abdullah Saeed, Routledge 2020) and sole author of Contemporary Perspectives on Revelation and Qurʾānic Hermeneutics (Edinburgh University Press 2020). He is also the author of a recently published book entitled Contemporary Reformist Responses to Traditional Shiʿa Discourses (Edinburgh University Press 2025). Dr. Akbar has also published extensively more than forty articles in journals including Middle East Critique, Arabica, Die Welt des Islams, British Journal of Middle East Studies, Iranian Studies, Mediterranean Politics, Contemporary Politics, Third Word Quarterly and Political Theology.

Prof. Abdullah Saeed is a well-respected scholar of Islamic studies with a particular research interest in contemporary approaches to Qurʾānic interpretation. Over the course of twenty-eight years of research, Saeed has developed methods and frameworks for contextually interpreting the Qurʾān that have assisted interpreters in the process of negotiating between the text and its context and helped Muslims engage with modern ideas, institutions, and values without sacrificing their commitment to Islam. His scholarship has been published by highly regarded academic publishing houses, including Routledge, Oxford University Press and Edward Elgar Publishing, as well as in internationally peer-reviewed journals such as Middle Eastern Studies, Islamic Law and Society, The Muslim World and Journal of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations.

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