Abstract
This article presents a typology of the major religio-political discourses in the Shī ʿī world, namely Shī ʿa orthodoxy, governmental Shī ʿism, and reformist Shī ʿism. We compare the political stance of the former discourse, which has received the least amount of attention in academic circles, with the other two well-researched discourses. The typology offered in this article will be helpful not only in providing a comprehensive picture of Shī ʿī politico-religious discourses, but also in providing a useful framework for further comparative analyses. We investigate the political theology and history of these discourses, as well as their capacity to accommodate popular sovereignty. We argue that while both orthodox and reformist Shī ʿī discourses embrace popular sovereignty, the linchpin of governmental Shī ʿism is divine sovereignty, which cannot be reconciled with popular sovereignty.
Introduction
Orientalists typically centered their research on Sunnī Islam. If they did consider the Shī ʿī denomination at all, it was often through the perspective of Sunnī sources and Sunnī thinkers (Modarressi 2003, 11-12; Halm 2004, 3; Ahmadvand 1998). This circumstance was fundamentally altered following the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the subsequent rise to power of Shī ʿī clerics in Iran. Not only the media and policy makers, but also academics began to pay significant attention to the political theology of Shī ʿī Islam. The discourse of Ayatollah Khomeini, which is referred to as “government Shī ʿīm” 1 in this article, was the primary focus of the vast majority of the early literature on political Shī ʿism in the early 1980s. Since the late 1980s, the Shī ʿī world has witnessed the emergence of a new discourse that is referred to as religious reform movement. This discourse generated a substantial interest in studies of Shī ʿism as well, due to its vociferous presence in Iranian politics. Shī ʿī orthodoxy, which makes up a significant portion of mainstream Shī ʿa, has received the least amount of attention in academic circles, particularly in political studies. Hence, one could claim that a complete and accurate portrayal of the political-religious dynamics of the Shī ʿī world is not presented in the extant literature. The objective of this article is to propose a typology of political-religious discourses that are prevalent in the Shī ʿī world in an effort to make up for the lack of such a classification in the literature. This typology will be helpful not only in providing a comprehensive picture of Shī ʿī politico-religious discourses, but also in providing a useful framework for comparative as well as noncomparative analyses. In relation to the two discourses of governmental Shī ʿism and Shī ʿī reformism, there has been a substantial amount of discussion regarding a variety of issues, such as democracy, secularism, human rights, women’s rights, minority rights, and pluralism. We hope that by illustrating the Shī ʿī orthodox discourse alongside the two discourses mentioned above and highlighting its significance, scholars of the filed will be encouraged to investigate the perspective that orthodox Shī ʿa holds regarding the aforementioned subjects.
The contrast between the reformist approach and governmental Shī ʿism is another topic that has been the focus of a significant amount of research and writing over the last few decades. The political stance of orthodox Shī ʿism could be compared to that of the other two well-researched discourses by employing a similar comparative approach. In fact, one of the goals of this paper is to compare and contrast these three discourses. To determine which of the three religious-political discourses is most likely to accommodate democratic political system, an analysis of the theological, historical, and political aspects of all these discourses is presented. Rather than delving into a more in-depth analysis of democracy, we use it to refer to its most basic definition, that is to concede to the right of citizens to choose their rulers and the form of government, instead of conviction in divine sovereignty. Indeed, central to a democratic state is the idea that all members of society are considered to have an equal right to participate in government, meaning the right to rule is not confined to a particular group. This article examines the theological frameworks of the three discourses and argues that democratic sovereignty is embodied in the politico-theological convictions of reformist Shī ʿism and to a great extent orthodox Shī ʿism. This argument is supported by a number of examples that illustrate the role that these two politico-religious discourses played in Iranian political sphere. In regard to the governmental Shī ʿism, while it is true that the ruling clergy in Iran has adopted some democratic procedures, such as parliamentarism and periodic elections, nonetheless, divine sovereignty represents the linchpin of governmental Shī ʿīsm. This argument will be supported by an examination of the conceptual foundations of governmental Shī ʿism and the political thought of this discourse’s key thinkers, such as Ayatollah Khomeini, Mesbah Yazdi, and Javadi Amoli.
Shī ʿī orthodoxy’s approach to politics
Rajeev Bhargava’s notion of “principled distance” has inspired our attempt to conceptualize Shī ʿī orthodoxy’s political thinking and behavior. 2 We borrow Rajeev Bhargava’s notion of “principled distance” to articulate a more nuanced understanding of the Shī ʿī orthodoxy’s approach to politics. We suggest that throughout the centuries prior to the rise of governmental Shī ʿism, the notion of principled distance was the conceptual cornerstone of Shī ʿī orthodoxy.
The attribution of sacredness to the founding political claim of Shī ʿism, i.e., twelve specific individuals’ divine right to politico-religious leadership, is a constitutive element of Shī ʿīsm. However, only in the first century of Islam, and only twice, was this constitutive element of Shī ʿīsm substantiated. Imām ʿAlī, the first shīʿī Imām, served as caliph between 35–40/655–661, and after he died, his eldest son—Imām Ḥasan—claimed the right to govern the caliphate, but after a short period of time resigned from his position. In general, early Islamic history left Shī ʿas with bitter experiences in political life and proto-Twelver Shī ʿas were unable to rule. This failure caused proto-Twelver Shī ʿas to live in constant crisis. During the tenth century, this crisis grew into an existential crisis. Proto-Twelver Shī ʿa believed that the twelfth Imām was hiding and would soon rise and form the promised just government. The development of a messianic conception of the twelfth Imām not only rescued the proto-Twelver Shī ʿa from extinction, but also gradually helped turn it into the most important branch of the Shī ʿī faith. As Shī ʿī thinkers conceptualized the messianic notion of the twelfth Imām, they postponed the fulfillment of the necessity for establishing just government until his return. This gave rise to the emergence of the notion of awaiting (intizār), according to which Shī ʿas are expected to live in “a state of expectancy for the reappearance of the Hidden Imām… a doctrine of hope and trust that he will one day reappear and establish an ideal Islamic society” (Vasram and Toussi 2015, 68).
Thus, forming a religiously legitimate government during the occultation time deemed to be impossible for many Shī ʿī jurists. This renders all rulers, regardless of their performance, illegitimate usurpers of the twelfth Imām. In the absence of the infallible Imām, Shī ʿī jurists assumed leadership of the Shī ʿī community; however, they were required to maintain distance from the state apparatus. In reviewing the works of scholars such as Shaykh Mufīd, Sharīf Murtaḍā, Shaykh Ṣadūq, and Shaykh Kulaynī, it becomes clear that their main political concern was how to interact with the usurper (Shaykh al-Sadūq 1998; Shaykh al-Mufīd 1991, 1993; Gahramannezhad et al. 2014). These scholars believed that the twelfth Imām possesses an exclusive divine right to rule, and that a legitimate religious government can only be formed under his leadership.
One can find various examples of Shī ʿī leaders’ engagement in politics throughout history: particularly noteworthy was the involvement of senior Shī ʿī clerics of the early twentieth century in Iran’s Constitutional Revolution (1906-1911). Remaining loyal to their religious obligations, clerics made a significant contribution to the Constitutional Revolution, although they eventually stopped lending their support to the parliament and the government due to a variety of reasons. Before explaining the political approaches of some constitutionalist thinkers during the Iran’s Constitutional Revolution, we refer to Shaykh Murtaḍā Anṣārī whose views represent classical Shī ʿī orthodoxy’s approach to politics. According to Anṣārī, the twelfth Imāms were divinely appointed, but their political authority was not transferable to the jurists, meaning that they alone possessed the divine right to rule. The faqīh therefore is permitted to issue fatwas, engage in matters of judgeship, and undertake the duty of commanding good and forbidding evil ((amr bi maʿrūf wa nahy ʿaz munkar). However, the scope of faqīh’s involvement in public affairs should be limited to those which are not among the duties of the king, the latter being the administration of the financial wellbeing of the community, the raising of an army, maintaining order and security in society, and so on. In short, the faqīh should never surpass the king when it comes to matters of political authority and the management of public affairs (Ansārī 1973, 328-333).
During the Muslims’ initial encounter with democratic principles, constitutionalist clerics including Mīrzā Muḥammad Ḥusayn Gharawī (also known as Nāʾīnī (1860-1936)), and Mullā Muḥammad Kāẓim Ākhūnd-Khurāsānī (1839–1911) accommodated democratic notions such as parliamentarianism, elections, freedom of expression, equality, and liberty within an Islamic framework. In their endeavor to democratize Shī ʿī political theology, these clerics at no time strayed from the tenets of the Shī ʿī system of belief. Ākhūnd-Khurāsānī, who was the most eminent cleric in the Shī ʿī world at the time, classified forms of rule into two categories: Islamic governance (ḥukūmat-i mashrūʿe) and non-Islamic governance (ḥukūmat-i ghair-i mashrūʿe). His view was that the only religiously legitimate form of state would be one formed and ruled exclusively by the Hidden Imām (Farzaneh 2015, 152). Hence, until such time as the latter returns, no one including clerics could claim religious legitimacy to assume rulership (Boozari 2011, 112). However, this did not necessarily mean that other forms of governance (including democracy) were not acceptable from a religious point of view. A non-Islamic state is neither religiously unlawful (ḥarām) nor inherently contradictory to the Sharīʿa. Ākhūnd-Khurāsānī makes a case for a form of non-Islamic governance that is recommended from a religious perspective, a form that he terms a “non-Islamic just state” (ḥukūmat-i ghair-i mashrūʿe ādelāna) (Kadivar 2006, 12-16). The prevailing view, established in practice by the majority throughout Shiʿi history, has been that the qualities of “just” and “legitimate” are inseparable, and that is why the twelfth Imam is the only one considered a just and legitimate ruler. But there is also a second view, that just and legitimate can indeed be separated and that a non-infallible person can also be just and may have the right to assume political leadership, although such a person will lack divine legitimacy. Akhūnd Khurāsānī used the latter interpretation to support parliamentarism and constitutionalism against absolute monarchy. According to Akhūnd Khurāsani, although the system of parliamentarism, like other political systems, lacks religious legitimacy, it is closer to justice than absolute monarchy (Ghobadzadeh 2018, 66-77).
According to the political-cum-religious thought of Ākhūnd-Khurāsānī, neither religious authorities nor the scriptures were granted the right, responsibility, or authority to preside over all matters political. This provides the opportunity for political matters to be managed by a form of collective consensus-based decision-making. For Ākhūnd-Khurāsānī, parliamentarianism was the product of collective consensus. His argument relied more upon reasoning. As Gorji states: “he paid attention to reasoning and [did not] search for evidence. From his point of view, reasoning was principium” (quoted in Daryabeygi 2007, 360).Therefore, Ākhūnd-Khurāsānī issued unprecedented fatwās and substantiated his statements and rulings based upon reasoning instead of referring to religious scriptures alone. He grounded his political actions in only a few generally accepted theological canons (Ghobadzadeh 2108, 68). Drawing upon these canons, he perceived it as the religious duty of the clergy to actively engage in and endorse constitutionalism. The above principles included protection of the homeland of Islam, enjoining good and forbidding evil (al-amr bi al-maʿrūf wa al-nahy ʿan al-munkar), the expansion of justice, and the eradication of oppression (Zargari 2008, 295).
The ideas of Nāʾīnī, who was a student of Ākhūnd-Khurāsānī, are also relevant here. In his book entitled Tanbih al-Ummah va Tanzih al-Millah (Awakening the Community and Purifying the Nation), Nāʾīnī supported constitutionalism and explained how Islam and constitutionalism are compatible. Although Nāʾīnī believed that the political authority of Shī ʿī Imāms is transferrable to the jurists, he considered a jurist’s rulership impractical during his time. Therefore, he suggested that in the absence of an infallible Imām, the best form of a government is a constitutional one in which democratic principles should exist. A non-absolute system of rulership which abandons tyranny, according to Nāʾīnī, is a political system in which “every one of the people … is equal to the ruler and shares with him in all affairs, financial or otherwise” (Haeri 1977, 189). In such a state, the power of the ruler is limited; the ruler is “accountable, subject to watch, and [his rule is] based on responsibility” (189). According to Nāʾīnī, everyone who is “responsible for any office … [is] responsible to the people and liable to be questioned by them” (189). People have the right to question even the ruler and challenge his political decisions (190). The notion of “principled distance,” as we discussed in the beginning of this section, can be applied to Nāʾīnī’s theory. According to Nāʾīnī, jurists in a constitutional form of state are permitted to engage in hasbiyya matters, 3 issuing fatwas and engaging in judgeship. However, in his distinction between the legislative and judicial powers, Nāʾīnī argued that the country’s legislation must be channeled through the parliament. Indeed, for Nāʾīnī, legislative and judicial powers have always been separated from each other in the course of Islamic history, and in every city or region, different people were appointed for each of these positions. Nāʾīnī uses this approach to consider lowering the political responsibility of the ulama, arguing in favor of a higher role for institutions such as parliament (Feirahi 2019, 227). Based on Nāʾīnī’s theory, therefore, although the ulama can supervise the laws of the country to ensure they do not contradict fundamental Islamic principles, matters such as establishing order in society, creating the army, and other political duties that are considered to be among the ruler’s responsibilities stand beyond the jurists’ duties (227-228).
The lived reality of the constitutional movement in Iran is a telling testimony to a potential of the Shī ʿī orthodoxy to make a case for democracy. A case in point is the political engagement of the Najaf seminary in post-Saddam Iraq. The Najaf seminary has by and large remained loyal to the political orientation of the Shī ʿī orthodoxy, in particular to the idea that the jurists should not take political power and rule the country (Rahimi 2005, 13-14). The Najaf seminary in Iraq is currently under the stewardship of Ayatollah Sistani, the world’s most influential living Shī ʿī leader, according to some scholars (Khalaji 2006; Braam 2010; Visser 2006). After the occupation of Iraq in 2003, the United States and its allies lacked a clear understanding of the political thought and behavior of the Iraqi Shī ʿī leadership. In the intervening period, they have never been able to gain the support and cooperation of this group of individuals who comprise some of the most important players on the Iraqi political landscape. Ayatollah Sistani’s opposition to the Bush administration’s plans for the Iraqi constitution, his fatwa of jihād against ISIS, and his role in ousting Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in 2014 are examples of the decisive role of the Shī ʿī religious leadership in post-2003 Iraqi political developments. He did not, however, call for the establishment of a religion-based state. His participation in politics has been limited to matters such as advising the government on referendums, encouraging people to participate in elections, settling conflicts generated by figures such as Muqtada al-Sadr, and more notably, his call for Shīaʿs to defend holy shrines in Iraq from the attacks conducted by radical Sunni militants including ISIS. He frequently asked Iraqi governments to maintain the integrity of the country. For example, in April 2006, after the designation of Nuri al-Maliki to form a government in Iraq, Sistani stated: “The new government should exert all its effort to regain its full sovereignty on the country, politically, militarily, economically, and in every other aspect; and it must use every means to remove the traces of occupation” (Kadhim 2010, 74). In line with Nāʾīnī’s approach, Sistani, while supporting people’s participation in the political process, recommended that clerics take an advisory role alone (76).
This practice is not confined to the Najaf seminary alone. Orthodox Shī’ism has still an important place in the Qum seminary. Marāj-i taḳlīd such as Wahīd Khurāsānī and Shubairī Zanjānī are some examples of high-ranking clerics who have remained loyal to the political orientation of Shī ʿī orthodoxy. Furthermore, the statement of protest by Hassan Rahimpour Azghadi, a key theorist of governmental-Shī ʿism, attests to the existence of this tradition in Iranian seminaries: “instead of theorising Islamic government and civilization, advanced teachings (dars-i khārījs) have become secular and [have focused on] individual jurisprudence [which is about] worship, purity and impurity” (Rahimpour-Azghadi 2018). In light of its entrenchment in the theological tenets of Shī ʿism and its long-lasting history, this tradition has the capacity to be employed as a normative conceptual framework for envisioning a constructive dynamic between religion and the state—and, by extension, to make a substantial contribution to a prospective democratization process in the Shī ʿī world.
Divine Sovereignty: The linchpin of governmental Shī ʿism
The notion of divine political sovereignty is evident in the ideas of Ayatollah Khomeini and his doctrine of wilāyat-i faqīh. Khomeini made a case for the implementation of the Shī ʿī ideal form of governance in the absence of the Hidden Imām.
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The seeds of the theory of fuqahāʾ’s rulership appeared in Khomeini’s Kashf al-Asrār where he juxtaposes “guardianship” and “government” (Sadeghi-Boroujerdi 2019, 87). Kashf al-Asrār, however, does not systematically make an argument in favor of the doctrine of wilāyat-i faqīh. Prior to writing his book exclusively dedicated to the issue of wilāyat-i faqīh, as explained below, Khomeini discussed the idea that the responsibility of rulership should be granted to a faqih in the second volume of Kitāb al-Bayʿ (the Book of Sale). While in exile, Khomeini delivered thirteen lectures in Najaf (Iraq) between January 20, 1970 and February 8, 1970. They were later compiled and published as a book entitled Islamic Government: Governance of the Jurist. The text was printed inside Iran under the title of Namehʾi az Imam Musavi Kashef al-Ghitaʾ in 1977 (Sadeghi-Boroujerdi 2019, 94). The clergy’s political authority was the mainstay of Ayatollah Khomeini’s doctrine. Khomeini focused mainly on the characteristics of the ruler rather than providing a detailed explanation of any proposed model of governance. Further as to the general qualifications, i.e., being of sound mind, wise, and just, Khomeini singled out jurisprudential knowledge as the most important attribute of the ruler. In his view, because the central function of an Islamic state is to implement sharīʿa, a ruler must have deep and extensive knowledge of sharīʿa (1976, 58-61). According to Khomeini, the Prophet Muhammad and the twelve Imāms were leaders of the Islamic community. He contended that the Prophet Muhammad appointed a successor not only to expound articles of faith and sharīʿa, but more importantly, to ensure the implementation of sharīʿa and divine ordinances. He stated that it was these functions—the implementation of sharīʿa and the establishment of Islamic institutions—that made the appointment of a successor such an important responsibility. Had he neglected it, the Prophet would have failed to fulfill his mission (Khomeini and Algar 1981, 40). Stressing the need to implement sharīʿa at all times and in all places, Ayatollah Khomeini argued that a person whose authority with respect to political matters is similar to the Prophet’s ought to exist in the present to facilitate the implementation of sharīʿa. Relying on several Shī ʿī hadīths, he maintained that the political authority of the jurists did not differ from that of Prophet Mohammad. He stated: God has conferred upon government in the present age the same powers and authority that were held by the Most Noble Messenger and the Imāms (‘a), with respect to equipping and mobilizing armies, appointing governors and officials, and levying taxes and expending them for the welfare of all Muslims. Now, however, it is no longer a question of a particular person; government devolves instead upon one who possesses the qualities of knowledge and justice (Khomeini and Algar 1981, 62).
In his conceptual articulation, Ayatollah Khomeini left no space for speculation vis-à-vis a role for the people in the appointment of a head of state. However, one could entertain certain reservations regarding this claim due to some of Ayatollah Khomeini’s political statements which placed an emphasis on the role of the people. 5 For example, his statement “the benchmark is the vote of the people” (mīzān ray-e mellat ast) is frequently used by those who attribute democratic ideas to Ayatollah Khomeini. However, one may suggest that statements like this allude more to the administrative aspects of governance rather than to the election of the head of a state. On more than one occasion, Ayatollah Khomeini emphatically stressed that the notion of the position of wilāyat-i faqīh had nothing to do with the people. For example, challenging the view that the walī-yi faqīh (jurist) is indirectly chosen by the people’s vote through the mediation of the Assembly of Experts, 6 he stated: “The wilāyat-i faqīh is not something created by the Assembly of Experts; the wilāyat-i faqīh is something created by Almighty God. It is the same guardianship of the Noblest Messenger” (2006, 95). Thus, the task of the “Assembly of Experts is to substantiate the wilāyat-i faqīh… they want to ratify something which is told by Almighty God” (Khomeini 2000, 27). On another occasion, Ayatollah Khomeini emphasized the importance of the walī-yi faqīh’s endorsement of the president, 7 proclaiming that if a president were not endorsed by the walī-yi faqīh, his presidency would be illegitimate. This means that the final decision regarding a president’s legitimacy rested on his endorsement by a walī-yi faqīh (Khomeini 2006, 118).
Khomeini subscribed to a school of thought in Shī ʿism which is known for the use of reasoning in jurisprudence (the Uṣūli School). The Uṣūlī School emphasizes the role of religious scholars in the interpretation of religion and favors the legitimacy of reasoning as a source for the derivation of Islamic law. The Uṣūlī school stands in direct opposition to textualism which is known as the Akhbārī school. Akhbārīs do not consider intellect trustworthy. They maintain that whenever an act is not explicitly permitted in the scriptures, one should refrain from performing it by way of precaution (iḥtīyāṭ) to avoid the possibility of committing a sin (Enayat 1982, 168). In contrast, the Uṣūlīs maintain that in situations where access to a “definite ruling” is not feasible, it is permissible to issue a ruling based on conjecture (ẓann). Therefore, the Uṣūlī perspective posits that any act ought to be considered permissible unless there exists a precise and explicit religious ruling that prohibits it. As Enayat (1982, 168) observes, the Uṣūlī approach “allows wide scope for juridical innovations through their belief in the validity of ‘probable knowledge’ to deduce canonical rules.”
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Based on his Uṣūli approach, for example, Khomeini reasoned that the existence of a religious tax validated the necessity to form an Islamic state. He claimed that religious taxes such as Khums and Zakāt were huge sources of income that could and should serve the purpose of administering the Islamic state’s financial affairs. Furthermore, he maintained that the objective of the imposition of such taxes was not merely the upkeep of the clerics and seminaries; rather, the scale of this income proved that it was designed to meet the financial needs of the great institutions of government (Khomeini 2005, 38-9). One key aspect of Ayatollah Khomeini’s reasoning was the idea that sharīʿa ought to be implemented in its full capacity in all places and at all times. He argued that it was neither reasonable nor acceptable to claim that the implementation of divine rules and regulations should be delayed for centuries (37). Ayatollah Khomeini wrote: From the time of the Lesser Occultation
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down to the present (a period of more than twelve centuries that may continue for hundreds of millennia if it is not appropriate for the Occulted Imām to manifest himself), is it proper that the laws of Islam be cast aside and remain unexecuted, so that everyone acts as he pleases and anarchy prevails? Were the laws that the Prophet of Islam labored so hard for twenty-three years to set forth, promulgate, and execute valid only for a limited period of time? Was everything pertaining to Islam meant to be abandoned after the Lesser Occultation? Anyone who believes so, or voices such a belief, is in a worse situation than the person who believes and proclaims that Islam has been superseded or abrogated by another supposed revelation. (2005, 37)
When Ayatollah Khomeini became head of state, he used the principle of maslaha (expediency), arguing that if there was any contradiction between sharīʿa and the expediency of the state, the latter would receive priority: “I should state that the government, which is part of the absolute deputyship of the Prophet, is one of the primary injunctions of Islam and has priority over all other secondary injunctions, even prayers, fasting and hajj” (Khomeini quoted in Mallat 1993, 92). Khomeini granted the state the authority to modify religious precepts based on a realistic assessment of how it applies in light of political considerations. The rational and pragmatic approach of Khomeini has been referred to as “a process of secularizing Shiite fiqh” (Hajjarian 2001; Salehpour 1995, 1999; Yasuyuki 2009). Other scholars interpret this as a systematic process of secularization, the inevitable result of an Islamic state. They contend that the modern religious state will inevitably result in a process of self-secularization (Kazemi and Faraji 2003; Kazemipur and Rezaei 2003; Roy 2007, 62-64; Vasigh 2005, 11). In Khomeini’s lexicon this was conceptualized through the transformation of the notion of ‘wilāyat-i faqīh’ into ‘wilāyat-i muṭlaḳ-i faqīh’ (absolute authority of the jurisconsult). Further, it was institutionalized in the political system of Iran through the establishment of a new institute known as The Expediency Discernment Council of the System (Majma' tashkhīs-e maṣlaḥat-e nezām). This Council is authorized to legalize those laws which may have been rejected by the Guardian Council because they were considered to violate sharīʿa. Thus, according to Ayatollah Khomeini, the Islamic state is Islamic not because it implements sharīʿa but because it is led by a walī-yi faqīh. Therefore, the idea of forming an Islamic state was allegedly initiated with the aim of Islamizing the state and governance. However, what happened in practice was the governmentalization of religion, an outcome we identify as “governmental Shī ʿism.” The ruling clergy have managed to expropriate a wide range of religious activities that were previously governed by the orthodox religious establishment. They have established innumerable state-run institutions that have taken charge of various issues related to religion. Included among these institutions are the Hajj and Pilgrimage Organization, the Endowment and Charity Affairs Organization, Staffers of the Headquarters for Promoting Prayer, the Centre for the Management of Seminaries, the Central Headquarters of Friday Prayers, and the Friday Prayers Policymaking Council (FPPC), to name but a few. Government intervention in seminaries is another manifestation of the governmentalization of religion. Over the past forty years or so, the ruling clergy in Iran has demonstrated a keen interest in the internal environment and affairs of seminaries. They have invested heavily in seminaries’ educational systems, financial configurations, and power dynamics. They have introduced a new educational system, poured copious amounts of government funding into the seminaries, and set up numerous government institutions inside the seminaries. (Kholdi 2010; Khalaji 2006; Gieling 1997; Isaniya 2016; Roy 1999; Khalaji 2010; Eshkevari 2000; Hajjarian 2007; Montazeri 2006, 601-07).
In governmental Shī ʿism, a specific person holds ultimate authority but not necessarily Islamic precepts. Further, this person’s authority is derived from divine will. Therefore, people do not play a significant role in his appointment or in legitimizing his reign. Like his predecessor, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei (2013, 516), Iran’s current supreme leader, believes that the walī-yi faqīh exercises all the political authorities of the Prophet and the infallible imams in the sense that “without the principle of guardianship (wilāyat), the objective of prophecy remains incomplete.” For Ayatollah Khamenei (2012, 265-266), in the absence of the Hidden Imam, the state must be governed by the faqīh who is just (ʿadil) and has extensive knowledge of Islamic law. Without the implementation of the Islamic law through the rule of the faqih, the state is incapable of guiding people to perfection and salvation. According to Khamenei, the walī-yi faqīh has the duty of guarding the Islamic order, establishing justice, and thwarting injustice. Khamenei argues that when public interest matters, the decisions of the walī-yi faqīh take precedence over other decisions, even if they are not necessarily in line with public opinion (Hovsepian-Bearce 2016).
Another theorist of governmental Shī ʿism is Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi who developed the theory of divine designation. This theory is also referred to as “maximizing the reach of religion” given that Mesbah advocates the maximum presence of religion in politics (Siavoshi 2010, 126). For Mesbah-Yazdi, the ideal political system is that represented by the divine; God is the only perfect being and thus should be the source of law, meaning that any law ordained by human beings is imperfect and subject to criticism. Like Khomeini, Mesbah-Yazdi argues that fuqahā should enjoy a special advantage over other people in the matter of rulership, indicating that an Islamic state must be governed by the faqīh. The walī-yi faqīh’s legitimacy, according to Mesbah-Yazdi, does not depend on election or even people’s satisfaction of his policies, since he is the deputy of the Hidden Imām. According to Mesbah-Yazdi, in the same way that the Shī ʿa Imāms were divinely appointed and their position was endorsed by God, their representative, i.e., the ruling faqih, when gaining political power, is not necessarily required to obtain their legitimacy from people’s consent (Mesbah-Yazdi and Shahrabi 1999, 317). Here, Mesbah-Yazdi distinguishes between the legitimacy of the state which he refers to as mashru‘iyyat from its public acceptability which he refers to as maqbulīyyat, arguing that the legitimacy of an ideal politico-religious system comes from God, not people. According to Mesbah-Yazdi, public acceptability helps the government function appropriately and thus increases government efficiency. However, since the ultimate source of government legitimacy is the will of God, and the walī-yi faqīh is the representative of the Hidden Imām, public dissatisfaction cannot render the walī-yi faqīh or his rule illegitimate (Mesbah-Yazdi 1999, 25). Accordingly, if the majority of people challenge the leader, he loses his maqbulīyyat and may encounter difficulties exercising absolute power, but this does not have an impact on his mashru‘iyyat.
Another key figure who has developed the idea of governmental Shī ʿism through his defense of the theory of wilāyat-i faqīh is Ayatollah Abdullah Javadi-Amoli. According to Javadi-Amoli, the fuqahāʾ have an exclusive right to rule, and thus the ruler must be from the rank of fuqahāʾ. The ruling faqīh is the deputy of the Hidden Imam, meaning that he is divinely appointed: “leadership belongs to the infallible imām, and when we do not have access to him, the person who has been appointed by him as his deputy, i.e., a faqīh, should bear the responsibility of leadership” (Javadi-Amoli 2019, 225). Accordingly, people are obliged to obey the political orders of the valī-ye faqīh. Like Mesbah-Yazdi, Ayatollah Javadi-Amoli does not argue against people’s participation in the political process, but believes that the legitimacy of the state and the ruling faqīh do not necessarily depend on public acceptability (maqbulīyyat), given that the position of the walī-yi faqīh is divinely appointed: “Although people are honored in the Islamic system and their votes and opinions are highly respected, in the final evaluation [of the legitimacy of state], their ideas do not play a key role” (Javadi-Amoli 1989, 162).
In sum, unlike Shī ʿī orthodoxy’s approach, what we label as “governmental shīʿism” in this section does not accommodate key democratic principles since the appointee is accountable to no one except God, nor is it consistent with the principle of political equality, given that the fuqahāʾ enjoy a specific position to rule the country. The leader of the country, i.e., faqīh, has divine authority as he is the representative of the Hidden Imām and has a lifetime position. Based on the principle of maṣlaḥa (expediency) and the condition of time, he is permitted to cease implementing some religious rulings and prioritize other rulings, meaning that he has the ultimate authority to govern the Islamic state.
Reformist Shī ʿism and Political Secularism
The theory of wilāyat-i faqīh in the form presented by Khomeini and followed by other scholars, as discussed above, has been criticized by some Shī ʿa scholars. During the second decade of the Islamic Republic, the Shī ʿī reformist scholars initiated a religious reformist project that sought to accommodate modern notions such as human rights, women’s rights, democracy, and secularism within a Shī ʿī framework. Their ideas published in magazines such as Kiyan in the 1990s as well as a number of other venues, which, as Sadeghi-Boroujerdi (2019, 44) notes, responded to “questions which had long been asked but were rarely discussed in the public domain.” The reformist movement culminated in the election of Mohammad Khatami to presidency in 1997 and flourished in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Khatami’s administration itself emphasized matters such as the need to develop civil society, freedom of expression, the rule of law, and cultural freedom. Such discourses were less emphasized after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became the president in 2005 but emerged again in the 2009 election when reformists sought to regain power (Akbar 2020). Reformist Shī ʿī scholars conceptualized a cohesive discourse of democracy and secularism—the foci of this section—which is now the leading competing discourse against governmental Shī ʿism in Iran’s contemporary political milieu.
In addition to their efforts to decouple political Islam and fanaticism, Shī ʿī reformists are also renegotiating the conventional understanding of secularism. In their view, secularism is not a universal paradigm, but rather, a notion with multiple possible forms and understandings. The contested nature of both ideologies—Islamism and secularism—invalidates the conceptualisation of a dichotomy between the two. Instead, a broad and dynamic spectrum is envisaged between the two extreme possibilities. In Shī ʿī reformist discourse, secularity does not stand in direct conflict with religion or Islamic principles. Reformist Shī ʿī scholars have built their politico-religious discourse based upon two interrelated arguments. Given the dominant status and troubling politics of governmental Shī ʿīsm, it comes as no surprise that a significant proportion of the arguments mounted by reformist Shī ʿī scholars center on discrediting the assertions made by proponents of governmental Shī ʿīsm. To employ a term from discourse analysis, one could suggest that “othering” claims a decisive role in the formation of Shī ʿī reformist discourse. Following from this “othering” argument, the second argument formulated through the intellectual endeavors of Shī ʿī reformist scholars, as demonstrated below, is their case for secular democracy within a Shī ʿī theological and jurisprudential framework.
Discrediting Governmental Shī ʿism
As discussed earlier, governmental Shī ʿīsm was introduced based upon the claim of divine sovereignty for a jurist which grants exclusive right of political leadership to the clergy. Conflation of the institutions of state and religion is an expected outcome of this conceptual proclamation. However, reformist Shī ʿī discourse targets this very aspect of governmental Shī ʿīsm by offering alternative interpretations of relevant Qurʾānic verses and ḥadīths. Some scholars such as Ayatollah Montazeri and Mohsen Kadivar agree with governmental Shī ʿīsm in the sense that the Prophet Muhammad and the Shī ʿī Imāms possessed divine political authority in addition to divine religious status. However, these scholars refuse to extend this right to jurists as long as the Hidden Imām remains in occultation. Other scholars, including Mehdi Bazargan, Mehdi Haeri-Yazdi, and Hasan Yousefi-Eshkevari, question the historical legitimacy of divine sovereignty in Shī ʿī tradition, confining the sacred quality of the Prophet and Imāms to religion only. They argue that the sacred figures of Shī ʿī Islam, i.e., imāms, did not possess divine political authority nor do jurists in the contemporary age. They also reject the unification of state and religion on the grounds that this would be detrimental to religion and could result in the exploitation of religion by those in power (Yousefi-Eshkevari 2009; Haeri-Yazdi 1994; Bazargan 1995).
Furthermore, from a reformist Shī ʿī perspective, the clergy are not trained to take on the responsibility of governance. Indeed, one of the key approaches presented by some reformist Shī ʿī scholars is the idea that the jurists are not well qualified to rule a country given their lack of expertise in matters related to governance (Kadivar 2000, 560-61; Abdolkarim Soroush 2011; Montazeri 2003, 160-61). For example, Ayatollah Montazeri argued that a number of people with a wide variety of expertise are required to manage the state and public life: “Due to the specialization of different fields of knowledge in today’s world, complicated social, political, military, cultural, economic and international matters… [cannot be expected to be addressed by] a person who has jurisprudential expertise alone” (Montazeri 2009, 179). Similar to Montazeri, Kadivar argues that because its teaching is limited to jurisprudential knowledge, the seminary education system fails to provide comprehensive knowledge required to effectively manage modern socio-political issues (Kadivar 2008, 413; 2006, 155).
Another claim of governmental Shī ʿism that is targeted by reformist discourse is related to the role of religion in the socio-political context. The assertion that Islam is the final religion has contributed to a perception that Islam not only provides guidelines for all aspects of life, but also provides answers to each and every problem to assail humankind, an approach which has played a significant role in the discourse formation of governmental Shī ʿism. In contrast, proponents of reformist Shī ʿism offer a different interpretation of the notion of the seal of the prophethood, one discharging religion from any role in governance. For example, Mehdi Bazargan asserts that setting worldly aims for religion contradicts the spirit of the Islamic teachings. In his view, there are two goals for religion: God and the hereafter. Following his investigation of the entire Qurʾān, he came to the conclusion that the Qurʾān is primarily concerned with God and the hereafter (Bazargan 1995, 52) and that the social precepts of the Qurʾān are intended only to facilitate believers’ devotion to God. Bazargan further maintained that if some precepts impact on the worldly lives of Muslims, it is only a subsidiary outcome, not the main goal (47).
Secular Democracy in a Shī ʿī Framework
The second part of the argument offered by reformist Shī ʿī discourse focuses on the accommodation of secular democratic norms on religious grounds. In effect, when claims vis-à-vis: a) the necessity to implement sharīʿa; b) the divine sovereignty of governance in the modern age; and, c) an understanding of religion as all-encompassing, are discredited, it is not hard for reformist scholars to make a case for the necessity to manage politics through rational/non-religious reasoning. Since the most recent development in human political advancement is the democratic form of governance, reformist Shī ʿī adherents claim that Muslims should follow this model. Hasan Yousefi-Eshkevari’s idea is relevant here. Arguing that the Islamic scriptures do not offer any blueprint for governance, Eshkevari states that in any given time and place it is left to the believers to establish their own form of state. According to Yousefi-Eshkevari et al (2006, 87), “government is mentioned neither among the ‘religious principles’ (oneness of God, resurrection, prophethood, justice, the Imamate) nor among the ‘practices’ (prayers, fasting, hajj, etc.) [of Islam].” He uses this idea to argue that the form and legitimacy of a government—and of those who claim the position of political leadership—lies in its bestowal by the people (90).
An unprecedented line of reasoning proposed by some Shī ʿī reformists is that democratic norms ought to be promoted independently of religious sources. Their argument is that any effort to extract a democratic model of governance from the religious scriptures is likely to prove fruitless. Abdolkarim Soroush (2005) contends that resorting to Shī ʿī scriptures and Islamic history to make a case for democracy is not only impossible but doomed to fail. Rather than extracting democratic norms from religious scriptures, proponents of this approach cite the fundamental Shī ʿi principle of justice, not only to argue for the compatibility of the Shī ʿī denomination with democracy, but also for the necessity to adhere to democratic norms. Another reformist scholar, Mohammad Mojtahed-Shabestari postulates that the essential nature of justice provides a rationale for popular sovereignty. The pursuit of justice is worthy of support not because it is decreed by the Qurʾān and/or ḥadīths but because it is the only plausible method of capturing the essence of religion. Subsequent to his hermeneutic reading of the holy text, Mojtahed-Shabestari concludes that Islam does not identify any timeless form of state. Rather, it is the responsibility of the believers to formulate a viable political system capable of fulfilling justice. In the contemporary world, human rationality advocates the establishment of a democratic political system as an appropriate means to meet this goal (Mojtahed-Shabestari 1999; Akbar 2020). Yousefi-Eshkevari, who also characterizes justice as the main objective of Islam, claims that a democratic government is compatible with Islam in this age because it would facilitate this objective. Arguing that democracy—while not free of error—is the most effective, logical and Islamic way of administering society, he proposes that Muslims should devise an Islamic model of democracy, one free of the flaws of liberal and social democracy (Yousefi-Eshkevari, Mir-Hosseini, and Tapper 2006, 73-100).
Other modes of argument employed by Shī ʿī reformists to support the idea of secular democracy are built upon the vitality of the voluntary and individualistic nature of genuine religiosity. Islamic teachings are explicit in stating that a person’s religious experience should be free of any form of coercion and intervention. Mojtahed-Shabestari, who minimizes the role of mediators in man-God relations, downplays the importance of both behavioral mediators (sharīʿa) and human mediators (jurists). He states: “The core of Islamic faith…exists in the relationship between a human being and God, with or without revelation” (Mojtahed-Shabestari 2008). However, practice of the sharī’a is considered crucial by proponents of governmental Shī ʿism. Emphasizing that faith must take priority over ritual, Mojtahed-Shabestari maintains that every individual directly associates with God and personal religious experience cannot be imposed (cited in Mortazavi and Manouchehri 2004). State intervention in religious matters stands in direct contradiction to the true essence and spirit of religion and inflates the more spurious expressions of religion that do little to benefit believers’ religious experience (Mojtahed-Shabestari 2005, 97). According to Mojtahed-Shabestari, religious experience requires personal and socio-political liberty if it is to be genuinely pursued. As every believer attempts to gain genuine religious experience, his or her volition ought to be free of internal conflict and external barriers (such as political dictatorship). Internal freedom, according to Mojtahed-Shabestari, is subject to external freedom. Those seeking religious experience are at risk not only of suffering but of victimization by an authoritarian political system. Thus, a democratic political system is not only compatible with religion, but also crucial to maintaining genuine religious conviction (Mojtahed Shabestari 2000, 34-45; Vahdat 2004, 215-6). Like Mojtahed-Shabestari, Soroush asserts that coupled with political power, religion-based governance compromises genuine religiosity and suppresses the very heart of religiosity—esoteric belief (Abdulkarim Soroush 1994, 13-15; Akbar and Saeed 2020, 169-170). In essence, reformist discourse urges the state to abandon its religious claims in favor of cultivating genuine religiosity.
In sum, for reformist Shī ʿism, the doctrine of governmental Shī ʿism is detrimental to religion itself. Resolution of this dilemma demands the emancipation of religion from the state. The key argument of reformist Shī ʿism discussed in this section is built upon: a) exposing the problems implicit in the ideology of governmental Shī ʿism; b) relieving religion and the sharīʿa of all socio-political responsibilities; and finally, c) making a case for the implementation of a democratic form of governance that offers an environment in which believers can safely pursue a genuine religious lifestyle. Their discourse stands in sharp contrast to governmental Shī ʿism, and aligns with key features of democracy, particularly the principle of political equality and popular sovereignty.
Conclusion
For a long time, sociologists believed that secularization would lead to the loss of religious influence in politics. This is why the religious revival in the Islamic world in the later decades of the twentieth century, which Peter Berger (1999) describes as the “desecularization of the world,” caught political analysts and politicians off guard. One clear example of the unexpected nature of such revivalism was the key role of Shī ʿī religious leaders in the 1979 Iranian revolution. From that point onwards, religious discourse regained their place in political analysis. But the ones considered are generally those religious discourses that have a vociferous presence in the political arena. This approach, when applied to the Shī ʿī world, gives priority to the two discourses of “governmental-Shī ʿism” and “religious reformism.” However, we suggested that one can identify at least another significant discourse in Shī ʿism, ‘Shī ʿī orthodoxy,’ which has not yet been subject to the level of political analysis it deserves. As discussed in this article, Shī ʿī orthodoxy has also a strong foothold in seminaries in Iran, and a significant number of senior religious leaders eschew engaging with governance-related issues.
During the course of the last few decades, Shī ʿī-majority nations such as Iran, Iraq, and Bahrain as well as Lebanon where there are significant Shia communities have witnessed a multitude of political developments in which religious discourses have played a significant role. It is reasonable to anticipate, in light of the current state of affairs, that religion will continue to play a significant role in the politics of these countries. Once again, analysts and politicians can be taken aback by the fact that there is no comprehensive picture that encompasses all existing religious-political discourses. In this article, we made an attempt to present a typology of the different discourses, and as an illustration, we compared how each of these discourses approaches the most fundamental principle of a democratic system, i.e., the sovereignty of the people. Further comparative studies of these three discourses can shed light on a variety of other topics such as women’s rights, religious freedom, and the rights of minorities.
