Abstract
‘The child’s right to development’ tackles an interesting topic which has received little critical attention despite being discussed profusely in academia, policy and practice. Published in 2019, Noam Peleg’s monograph is innovative and timely given this was the year of the 30th anniversary of the most ratified international human rights treaty, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC, 1989).
Peleg convincingly argues there has been ‘insufficient respect for children’s agency’ (p. 167) underpinning the drafting of the right to development in the CRC. Despite claims of a paradigm shift in conceptualising children as capable and competent members of society in childhood studies, he argues this was not the premise employed by the drafters of the CRC. The historical legacy of developmental approaches to conceptualising children and childhood is partly to blame for the social and legal attitudes towards children and for the view that children are subject to the ‘law of growth’. So childhood was viewed in opposition to adulthood, and children were seen as ‘human becomings’.
Peleg argues that the developmental approach and the ‘desire to enable children to grow up’ (p. 5) led to the creation of the right to development in international law but also dictated its interpretation. As such, Peleg proposes a new framework to conceptualise children’s right to development, given current interpretations are ‘too abstract and fall short on respecting children’s agency’ (p. 3).
‘The Child’s Right to Development’ is structured in five chapters. The introductory chapter sets the scene and outlines the proposed new framework, which the author suggests will provide a ‘common language and shared knowledge’ (p. 7) to understand the complexity of the concept of child development and will contribute to concretising it in human rights terms. Peleg argues that the CRC falls short of providing a workable definition of the child’s right to development, and hence there is a need for cross-disciplinary fertilisations to rethink this right as an ‘independent right and as a guiding principle of the UNCRC’ (p. 19).
In Chapter 1, the author presents a historical overview of the different ways in which child development has been understood and interpreted in child law scholarship. Beginning in the nineteenth century and drawing on influential thinkers such as Ellen Key, Janusz Korczak and Eglantyne Jebb, Chapter 1 provides an interesting discussion around the emergence of the children’s rights movement and the philosophical underpinnings of the international human rights law of the 20th century.
Following early conceptualisations, the ‘human being’ approach to understanding children was introduced in the 1970s. According to these views, ‘children are active human beings who can and should participate in shaping their own lives and play an active role in communities’ (p. 9). This was one of the most important theoretical development in the recent history of childhood studies, and although the CRC accommodates both the ‘human becomings’ and the ‘human beings’ conception of childhood, Peleg argues for a new hybrid understanding of the child as ‘simultaneously a human being and a human becoming’ (p. 195) where ‘present and future are recognised as intertwined and equally important’ (p. 189). Only then will the law, according to the author, ‘move beyond the dependency-autonomy dualism’ (p. 195).
Chapter 2 presents the drafting history of the CRC based on extensive archival research. This is a surprisingly interesting chapter where the author provides an in-depth analysis of the different conceptualisations of childhood that have led to the diversity and ambiguity in interpreting the child’s right to development. The author cleverly presents evidence of the numerous ways in which child development was interpreted by the drafters of the Convention often being conflated with terms such as ‘wellbeing’, ‘full potential’, ‘integrity’, ‘welfare’, ‘right to life’, ‘survival’ and ‘healthy growth and development’ including ‘physical, mental, moral, social, cultural, spiritual, personality and talent’ (p. 85). Peleg argues this ambiguity is highly problematic given the protectionist approach of the ‘human becomings’ conception of childhood and the view that ‘it is the future that matters most for children’ (p. 84). These definitions assume that ‘child development has a universal and singular meaning’ (p. 86) resulting in ‘insufficient discussion about the diverse, rich and contextual meaning of the term it can have on the interpretation of the Convention in general, and on its commitment to protecting child development in particular’ (p. 86).
In Chapter 3, Peleg presents an analysis of the extensive work of the UNCRC, including the Concluding Observations (1993–2016) and General comments (2001–2017) and the resulting interpretations of the right to development. Peleg takes a ‘child-centred’ approach moving from early childhood development to the right to education, health, and issues of child labour. This analysis concludes with the author reaffirming the argument that the CRC ‘lacks any coherent interpretation of the child’s right to development’ (p. 143). Hence, this ambiguity ‘invites State Parties to develop a local interpretation or even worst to ignore the right to development altogether’ (p. 140). The proposition that there is little distinction between child development and the child’s right to development in the interpretation of the Convention sets the scene for the arguments presented in the last two chapters in the monograph.
In Chapters 4 and 5, Peleg presents further evidence to build his case for a rethinking and reframing of the child’s right to development beyond the dependency-autonomy dualism. Chapter 4 analyses various options for understanding human and child development with the view to broaden the scope of the CRC and develop ‘a more coherent and concrete interpretation of the child’s right to development’ (p. 144). Looking at the general right to development (legal instrument), the capability approach (moral theory), and the child indicator movement (social science scholarship), the author presents an innovative interdisciplinary approach to understanding the child’s right to development.
The main argument in this chapter is the need to respect children’s agency and their right to participate in their own development. As such, key principles of childhood studies are employed to theoretically frame and concretise the child’s right to development in international human rights law. Peleg argues that ‘thus far the interpretation of the child’s right to development has focused on protecting the outcome of the developmental process – creating the adult whom the child should “become”’ (p. 155). However, more importantly, we must take into account ‘the process of development’ in order to respect children as rights’ bearers and respect their right to participate in their own development. The capability approach would, according to the author, broaden the scope of the CRC while also addressing issues of intersectionality and acknowledging that there is no right way for a child to develop. Drawing on the capability approach in legal studies (e.g. Nussbaum), the child indicator movement (e.g. Land, Moore) and recognition theory (e.g. Thomas and Stoecklin), Chapter 4 discusses how a variety of capabilities, and corresponding rights that protect them, would facilitate a child’s freedom to develop in her own way and on her own terms.
In the final chapter, the author cleverly sums up the argument for a new framework to help us understand and interpret the child’s right to development, departing from the dualism of the ‘human becomings’ and ‘human beings’ models, to provide greater respect and recognition for children’s agency. As such, Peleg argues for a hybrid conception where we draw on interdisciplinary and contextual understandings of child development. By respecting children’s agency, we achieve a broader meaning of child development where the focus shifts from questions of ‘competence and welfare to questions of empowerment and human rights’ (p. 196).
‘The Child’s Right to Development’ makes a significant contribution not only to legal studies and international human rights law but to conceptual advancements in the field of childhood studies (Canosa and Graham, 2020), taking up the call from other scholars for more meaningful cross-disciplinary conversations between the law and childhood studies (Freeman, 2012). Peleg builds on key principles of childhood studies such as agency, participation, recognition and intersectionality to argue that there is no right way for a child to develop. The real contribution of the monograph lies in applying these important principles to broaden the scope of the CRC ‘in order to create a coherent and meaningful interpretation of the right to development’ (p. 13), which respects children’s agency and the heterogeneity of childhood.
