The principle of child autonomy: A rationale for the normative agenda of childhood studies

Abstract

The normative aim of childhood studies is to show that children are and should be recognized as active shapers of their lifeworlds. In this article, we discuss which concept can best be used to accomplish this. Our thesis is that the agency concept ubiquitous in childhood studies only inadequately advances the field’s normative agenda. Mostly containing some hidden normativity, its meaning remains primarily descriptive. Indeed, children always have some kind of agency, regardless of the conditions they live in. They may exercise agency while still being manipulated or otherwise rendered incapable of acting as autonomous human beings. Against this backdrop, we first delineate the deficiencies of the notion of child agency and try to show why it should be replaced by that of autonomy in order to preserve and make explicit its hidden normative impetus. Second, we seek to clarify which understanding of autonomy is able to fulfill our aspirations. We oppose individualistic notions of autonomy and, by the same token, draw on criticism of the insufficient attention often paid to structural social factors. Eventually, we aim to develop a social concept of child autonomy that takes into account the relationality of human existence and replaces the asymmetrical relationship between children and adults with an equal appreciation of differences.

A central aim of childhood studies is to show that children are active shapers of their lifeworlds and to allow them to participate in social negotiation processes. As different as the approaches to these challenges may be, what they all have in common is that they oppose any attempt to degrade children into passive beings that need to be formed. This is a point on which scholars and activists committed to children’s life conditions widely agree. In her 1970 essay “Down with Childhood,” Firestone formulates her critique of the widespread contemporary view of childhood as follows:

Children, then, are not freer than adults. They are burdened by a wish fantasy in direct proportion to the restraints of their narrow lives; with an unpleasant sense of their own physical inadequacy and ridiculousness; with constant shame about their dependence, economic and otherwise (“Mother, may I?”); and humiliation concerning their natural ignorance of practical affairs. Children are repressed at every waking minute. Childhood is hell. (Firestone, 1970: 103)

If we agree that a conception of childhood that results in such worlds of experience is illegitimate, we confront the question of which concepts can be used to describe childhood more adequately. One particularly prominent concept in childhood studies is that of agency, which views children not as mere passive objects of parenting, but as full-fledged social players. This concept has a predominantly descriptive content—children are always active agents, regardless of the social and political conditions under which they live. The adversity they face is addressed primarily in the criticism of the prevailing generational order. We would like to examine such critiques of the agency concept. This may at first seem counterintuitive, but afterward we will propose replacing the concept of agency with that of autonomy, whose liberal use we also subject to criticism. In its place, we develop a revised concept of autonomy that is capable of showing the special features of child autonomy.

We begin our conceptual reflections by briefly describing the meaning of the agency concept (section “Agency—a social-constructionist, action-theoretical perspective on childhood”). Subsequently, we cite critical views and reconstruct how childhood studies situates child agency in the power structure of the generational order (section “Child agency and the generational order—a critique of power relations”). In our search for forms of children’s self-determination and self-unfolding, we draw on Bou-Habib and Olsaretti’s concept of the autonomy of children as children (section “The autonomy of children as children”). Finally, on the basis of our critical discussion of these very different approaches, we develop a concept of child autonomy that is rooted in the specific practical lives of children and, refraining from essentializations, builds on an equal appreciation of differences (sections “A social conception of child autonomy” and “Conclusion”).

Agency—a social-constructionist, action-theoretical perspective on childhood

What is the foundation of the paradigm shift in childhood studies that is marked by the rise of the concept of agency? Or, put another way, what is the content of this concept? According to James (2009), child agency implies above all that children should be seen as active shapers of their lifeworlds that have a dynamic role in forming their relationships and environments. This concept introduced a paradigm shift away from the conception of childhood solely as a journey to adulthood (James, 2009: 34). The content of these statements is thus action-theoretical and descriptive. In James’ further explanations, we indeed find references to the implicit normative dimension of the focus on child agency. As James points out, this development in childhood studies is embedded in academic and social discourses. In the academy, social-constructionist approaches emerged, built on the premise that social phenomena are produced and reproduced by social action. At the same time, feminist and postcolonial movements drew attention to the need to liberate subaltern groups (James, 2009: 38).

A more detailed explanation of the basic characteristics of a social-constructionist perspective on childhood can be found in Prout and James’ (1997) essay “A New Paradigm for the Sociology of Childhood? Provenance, Promise and Problems.” Their theory of childhood is based on six principles, the first of which they express as follows:

Childhood is understood as a social construction. As such it provides an interpretive frame for contextualizing the early years of human life. Childhood, as distinct from biological immaturity, is neither a natural nor universal feature of human groups but appears as a specific structural and cultural component of many societies. (Prout and James, 1997: 8)

Thus, if Prout and James are right, the dependence of children is not simply a biological fact, but a historically and culturally specific conceptualization of childhood. The two authors distinguish their approach in particular from developmental psychology, which they view as one-sidedly focused on the desired outcome—namely, the rational adult. As they argue, scant attention is paid to the state of being a child because it is considered deficient and in need of being overcome (Prout and James, 1997: 10–11).

According to Valentine (2011), the normative function of the agency concept is to demonstrate that the idea of restricted child agency is based on false assumptions. Research into social movements, for example, shows that subaltern groups repeatedly succeed in demonstrating both agency and resistance in various circumstances. Like Valentine (2011: 351–352), a critical approach reminds us of the fact that these groups have always had agency. If children are wrongly denied the opportunity to participate because their agency is underestimated, one can derive from this erroneous view the normative demand for greater participation on the part of children. As Valentine summarizes, “Childhood studies argues that children demonstrate their agency through competence, strategy and awareness, and that their agency entitles them to greater participation and more rights” (Valentine, 2011: 347).

The descriptive interpretation of the agency concept implies that the view of children as mere passive objects of parenting is inappropriate. According to Valentine, this view represents a misunderstanding of the realities of the children’s lives. As she notes, even the children’s lifeworlds, which are narrowly pre-structured by family and school, leave scope for willful construction processes. In its normative dimension, the agency concept emphasizes that children are illegitimately denied opportunities for self-paced action and far too rarely invited to participate. Following from this, one can formulate the demand for more participatory options for children. However, this semantic dimension has generally remained unexamined due to a lack of systematic reflections on the social conditions that facilitate agency and equal participation. We share this criticism of the agency concept with Valentine. She proposes a social concept of agency that starts with the question of the social conditions in which agency forms. In other words, researchers must focus not only on how children and childhood are shaped by social conditions but also on how children and childhood are pre-formed in different ways according to the privileges children are granted. As Valentine writes, it is vital to adopt an intersectional perspective that grasps inequalities among children across the categories of race, class, and gender (Valentine, 2011: 355).

We also regard a purely descriptive characterization of child agency as inadequate. It is absolutely necessary to look at the social conditions that not only facilitate but also inhibit it. Agency cannot be seen as always already given and always still given. Rather, the description of its social preconditions can be turned into a normative yardstick by which specific agency supporting or agency hampering life circumstances of children can be evaluated or criticized. On this point, too, we are in agreement with Valentine. In the following, we will systematically examine the question of the construction of childhood by reviewing perspectives on child agency that are informed by a criticism of power relations. But we do not wish to leave it at that. We will take these power-critical reflections seriously and develop an emancipatory approach that re-incorporates the normative dimension of the agency concept—namely, the demand for equal participation by children. To this end, we will draw on and revise a socio-philosophical concept of autonomy.

Child agency and the generational order—a critique of power relations

The central criticism that authors such as Alanen (1988, 2012) or Bühler-Niederberger and Sünker (2006) direct at an action-theoretical approach is that it tends to neglect the notion of children’s tutelage under adults by pointing to an always existent agency for children. These authors insist that childhood is always embedded in power relations, with the prevailing childhood concept modeled on the contrasting principle of adulthood and subordinated to it in a hierarchical relationship. As Alanen (1988: 53) observes, children are viewed merely as successors to the adult members of society. In her eyes, the position they assume in modern societies results from a highly ambiguous attitude that regards childhood as different and strange, on one hand, and as part of the genesis of an individual’s personality, on the other. The predominant understanding of children as essentially different from adults stands in opposition to the fact that the childhood concept exists exclusively in relation to adulthood. Compared to adulthood, childhood is considered to be a blank slate, a condition that needs to be overcome in the course of the child’s development into an adult (Alanen, 1988: 56).

Alanen adopts a deconstructive approach that is characterized in particular by its focus on the processes by which social categories emerge. Feminist research has revealed, for example, that the family is marked by unequal conditions for women (Alanen, 1988: 61). This insight can be applied to a child-centered perspective: “Childhood emerges, not as an idea of the child in the first place, but as a particular social status within specially constituted institutional frames” (Alanen, 1988: 64). Childhood always forms in specific social contexts with varying dimensions of inequality. Alanen calls for an ontological and relational turn in childhood research. According to this position, childhood should be seen as a social relationship (Alanen, 2012: 24). In such a relational understanding of childhood, the generation concept plays a central role: “If we wish to understand ‘youth’ and childhood we have to proceed not by studies of discrete phenomena but by studies of relationships, since youth is not a function of age but a social category constituted in relation to, indeed in opposition to, the category adult.” (Fitz and Hood-Williams, 1982: 65; cf. Alanen, 2012: 25–26) Hence, in the generational order, Alanen finds a dimension of inequality comparable to that in the categories of race, class, and gender. These categories were also understood as natural constants for a long time and, like them, the category of the generational order requires deconstruction (Alanen, 2012: 29). An individual’s positioning in the generational order has a critical impact on how he or she is situated between the poles of the public and private sphere. Children are relegated to the private sphere. Their lives unfold within the family and at school and they are hardly permitted to take part in public life. As a result, they are excluded from the role of political actors in the public sphere.

In their criticism of the concept of developmental childhood (Entwicklungskindheit), Alanen, Bühler-Niederberger, and Sünker are in agreement with James and Prout. The objection that Bühler-Niederberger and Sünker raise about socialization theory is that it degrades children into the passive objects of a development process that is always designed to socialize children into an existing society so as to reproduce this society (Bühler-Niederberger and Sünker, 2006: 25). Here children do not appear as subjects entitled to a good, independent life in which they have the opportunity to participate in shaping how they would like to live. Bühler-Niederberger and Sünker describe this view as a social integration perspective that is overvalued in socialization theory and thus loses track of the children themselves.

Criticism of developmental childhood and related socialization concepts can also be found in postcolonial theory. According to its exponents, the concept of development per se hierarchizes differences by interpreting all lifestyles as points on a path leading to the ideal of the enlightened adult European. In this view, colonized peoples and children are just starting out on their journey (Nieuwenhuys, 2013: 5). Here, the biologization and passification of children are no longer presented as random category-mistakes (as suggested by the agency concept) that can be rectified with the correct view—namely, that of children who possess agency. Rather, these are processes underlying a social power structure and its justification order (Sutterlüty and Tisdall, 2019). “The social reality of socialization was to be seen in its constraining effect on individuals, this appearing as the internalization by them of social facts originally external and independent of them.” (Alanen, 1988: 57) In this comment, Alanen characterizes socialization as a process of internalizing facts that are external to the socialized subject and thus align the subject with social requirements. What seems particularly objectionable in Alanen’s eyes is the power asymmetry embedded in the process, which stands for the dominance of social institutions. Subjects are shaped in such a way that they can make a useful contribution to reproducing society (Alanen, 1988: 58). In her view, socialization theory conceptualizes children as unfinished beings who, as they grow up, face the task of acquiring skills that enable them to participate in the society they encounter. As Bühler-Niederberger and Sünker (2006: 31–35) note, the relationship that is created here between the individual and society is determined by a preponderance of societal requirements.

According to Alanen, what is systematically overlooked in this “outcome-centered” approach is the process that culminates in the adult subject. At the same time, all subjectivizations that are not socially compliant receive little attention. If we no longer view childhood merely as a transitional phase or “black box,” then children appear as competent actors who creatively shape their social relationships. Alanen argues that, as a matter of principle, this perspective should prohibit us from assigning children the status of victims, regardless of how they behave in specific everyday situations. Instead, attention should be paid to the fact that, like adults, children are always caught up in the tension between individual agency and social structure (Alanen, 1988: 60).

The criticism leveled at the developmental childhood concept by Alanen, Bühler-Niederberger and Sünker—as well as by exponents of postcolonial approaches—is justified. Not only the developmental childhood concept but also socialization theory mostly regard children in an overly one-sided manner as “not-yet” people in need of formation. In addition, the power asymmetry inherent in this concept is often overlooked when children are chained to their familial and societal ancestors in the socialization process (Sutterlüty and Mühlbacher, 2018). However, such criticism runs the proverbial risk of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. In other words, socialization theory rightly emphasizes a genuinely human dependence. Agency always forms with and in relation to other people. In a later section, we will explain in greater detail our proposal for a relational conception of agency or rather autonomy. According to the abovementioned authors, this asymmetrical relationship, which constructs children as the “other” and subordinates them to adults, goes hand in glove with a specific exclusion mechanism that denies children the right to participate in the political sphere. The authors justifiably question the fact that inequalities and exclusions that have long been considered scandalous in other areas of society are still barely challenged and even tolerated in the relationship between children and adults.

However, neither Bühler-Niederberger nor Alanen discuss the further implications of their stance for a social relationship beyond the asymmetric generational order. In the following, we will address the criticism of the inequality between children and adults. In addition, we aim to present a model that derives its normative frame of orientation from the idea of an equal appreciation of differences. The social concept of autonomy that we propose makes it possible to conceive of children as participants in shared negotiation practices. At the same time, it compels us to acknowledge that their actions always have a political dimension. From this insight we derive the concrete demand that children should be allowed to participate not only in the private sphere but also in the public and political spheres. In order to work toward such a perspective, we will next introduce an approach that focuses on the concept of autonomy rather than on that of agency. In the course of our analysis we want to revise the individualistic or solipsistic conception of autonomy, as it is uphold in the liberal tradition, and propose an alternative one that situates autonomy in shared social practices.

The autonomy of children as children

In their essay “Autonomy and Children’s Well-Being,” Bou-Habib and Olsaretti (2015) highlight the intrinsic value of a specifically child-sensitive autonomy concept. Such an approach, which aims to strengthen the autonomy of children as children, shares the goal of showing that children are active shapers of their lives. However, Bou-Habib and Olsaretti are less interested in the social construction of the category of childhood than in the inherent logic of child autonomy. Rawls’ autonomy concept is the point of departure for their reflections. In so doing, their reasoning follows the liberal tradition by situating autonomy in independent individuals. Rawls’ concept appears to suggest a strict distinction between children and adults, because Rawls portrays children as not being fully able to take responsibility for their own goals and simultaneously respect others’ autonomy (Bou-Habib and Olsaretti, 2015: 16; Rawls, 2001). Nevertheless, as Bou-Habib and Olsaretti note, child autonomy is an important issue to pursue. How we answer the question of whether a person is autonomous has an impact on his or her well-being (Bou-Habib and Olsaretti, 2015: 16–17). Bou-Habib and Olsaretti’s reflections are guided by their critical reference to two highly prominent concepts in childhood studies: Feinberg’s (1980) “right to an open future” and Clayton’s (2012) principle of “retrospective consent.” Bou-Habib and Olsaretti discuss these two approaches as creditable attempts to conceptualize child autonomy. However, they see key weaknesses in both.

In their eyes, the consequence of Feinberg’s concept of a right to an open future is that any parenting practice that restricts the future adults’ potential choices must be viewed as illegitimate. They formulate three convincing objections to this approach. First, in order to meet the condition just mentioned, parents must present an infinite number of choices to their children, which would appear unrealizable and likely to confuse the children. Second, it is possible that the parents would be tempted to force an introverted child to become more active and make a larger number of contacts in order to ensure a broader variety of options and choices for their child later on. Third, and most importantly, Feinberg’s account shows tremendous disregard for the childhood phase of life. If the later autonomy of the future adult is the only guiding principle for parenting, it would seem to suggest that childhood should ideally be skipped over completely so that the child could transform into autonomous adults as soon as possible. In this vein, childhood cannot be seen as a desirable form of life (Bou-Habib and Olsaretti, 2015: 18–21).

Clayton’s approach does not fare any better. Clayton proposes that a yardstick be introduced to ensure that parenting practices do not illegitimately restrict their children’s autonomy. Clayton calls this principle “retrospective consent.” All measures are deemed legitimate that the subsequent adult would view as conforming to his or her views. According to Bou-Habib and Olsaretti, this approach is ineffective for two reasons. First, it cannot prevent restrictions of the child’s current autonomy if these restrictions can in some way be legitimized by the guarantee of the future adult’s autonomy. Second, because children’s ideas about what is good and desirable do not develop until they are socialized, the retrospectively acquired consent cannot eliminate the possibility that children are influenced in extensive ways (Bou-Habib and Olsaretti, 2015: 21–26).

In contrast to Feinberg’s and Clayton’s lopsided conceptions, Bou-Habib and Olsaretti develop a concept of the autonomy of children as children. As they explain, the precondition for this specific form of autonomy is the idea that children are already autonomous to a certain degree. They demonstrate this using three criteria they consider to be adequate indications of autonomy. The first is the ability to draw rational conclusions, the second is the capacity both to recognize values and to commit to these values, and the third is the determination to live by value judgments formed in this way. Bou-Habib and Olsaretti rightly state that there are only gradual differences between children and adults, that is even fairly young children already do have these abilities in rudimentary form. As far as parents go, this finding leads primarily to obligations: parents must provide children with the information they need to make decisions that are as autonomous as possible. At the same time, they must avoid influencing their children with beliefs that the children cannot sufficiently validate themselves (Bou-Habib and Olsaretti, 2015: 27–32).

Of course, the question now arises as to whether we can regard Bou-Habib and Olsaretti’s approach and its implications as plausible. An immediately persuasive point is their suggestion that a head start in knowledge and experience—for example that of parents over their children—establishes an obligation to share this knowledge. What requires further discussion, though, is the notion that children should not be confronted with beliefs they do not have the knowledge to verify. While it is hardly controversial to claim that esoteric assumptions about the world are not based on fact, in other aspects of life the dividing line between ineluctable facts of natural law and ideological assumptions is more fiercely contested. For example, many people still view the existence of two sexes as a biological constant. A comprehensive feminist critique was needed to demonstrate that this alleged fact is a social construct (Butler, 1990).

Bou-Habib and Olsaretti’s approach is compatible with our reflections because it allows us to recognize forms of autonomy that are not directly contained in the prevailing concept of autonomy in its rationalistic, solipsistic form. Of course, these aspects remain oddly vague in Bou-Habib and Olsaretti’s explanations. This means we have to transcend their approach if we wish to name tentatively two of the aspects that distinguish the forms of autonomy prevalent in children’s lifeworlds. First, as Bou-Habib and Olsaretti rightly note, children are indeed able to explain why they consider something good or desirable. However, in many cases the reasons they give differ from those of adults. For example, the children’s assessments are at times more grounded in the present and less focused on the future (Brennan, 2014). Their logic often runs counter to the typical adult view that unsatisfactory circumstances in the present must be accepted in order to achieve a particular goal later on. Second, children are often better able than adults to reflect on the interdependencies governing their scope of action and decision-making. For example, in divorce cases, children often base their decision on the view that a separation would be too much for one of their parents to bear (Freeman, 1992: 58).

As indicated above, there is another area where Bou-Habib and Olsaretti’s concept shows limited compatibility with ours. Rawls’ solipsistic, rationalistic autonomy concept applies only partially to adults. When it approaches subjects with demands, it requires them to deny a genuinely human reliance and dependence. Here, child autonomy is possibly a better blueprint for a successful life than those forms of autonomy that are one-sidedly based on independence. At this point, then, let us note two of the most important features of the child-centered model of autonomy that we wish to propose. First, this model is based on pluralizing the yardstick used to measure what can be viewed as autonomous agency. In other words, this autonomy concept must enter into an alliance with an understanding of equality that is able to treat differences as being of equal value. Second, this model must abandon an individualistic view of autonomy and conceive of the concept as pertaining to a social practice and relationship. We would like to discuss both of these aspects in the following.

A social conception of child autonomy

A social conception of child autonomy recognizes that freedom is dependent on the social conditions that make it possible in the first place. Thus, an important goal is to do away with factors that restrict freedom, such as a generational order that subordinates childhood to adulthood and thus bars children from spaces of autonomous action. At the same time, the prerequisites for freedom are themselves of a relational nature. In other words, we can be autonomous only with and in relation to others. On this point, the autonomy of children does not, as a matter of principle, differ from that of adults. It is dubious to assume that the process of moving from childhood to adulthood consists in outgrowing dependent relationships and developing into an independent person who is fully aware of all of his or her motives. Such an autonomy concept is based on the idea of an opposition between dependence and autonomy and overlooks the fact that autonomy is—in its ontogenesis as well as in its contextual situatedness—inextricably linked to human dependence (see also Sutterlüty, 2017: 203–211; Sutterlüty and Mühlbacher, 2017).

Thus, autonomy should not be imagined as the opposite of dependence or be based on the notion of independent individuals completely aware of their motives. It is only in interactions with others that we are given the opportunity for autonomous action. That children are particularly dependent on others—mainly on their closest caregivers—is an undisputed fact. However, dependence is not a special characteristic of children that justifies their living in a state of nonage; it is a fundamental prerequisite of human existence. Dependence on others and autonomy are therefore indissolubly linked. Of course, this social conception of autonomy and freedom runs the risk of turning into heteronomy. Adorno (1997), for example, rightly points out that the invocation of ties can quickly prove illusory if these ties are experienced as bereft of meaning. Likewise, every dependent relationship carries the danger of heteronomy, which stands in opposition to the capacity for “non-participation” that Adorno views as a core element of raising people to be autonomous. The goal is thus to keep an eye on the constitutive bonds between people. However, these bonds must be shaped in such a way that they allow for resistance against such an affiliation with others. Viewed from this perspective, the demand for the formation of an autonomous individual who is free from external influences and unconscious biases is neither feasible nor desirable.

Furthermore, children clearly need support in order to develop the capacity for a self-conscious integration and mastery of their impulses. As suggested above, the reference to socialization theory can indeed be advantageous. The conditions that restrict autonomy—that is not only a person’s integration into a pre-structured lifeworld but also the forces of the unconscious that are never completely accessible to individuals—are at the same time the conditions that make autonomy possible. According to interactionist socialization theory, which goes back to the work of Mead, agency emerges in relation to others who are initially specific and then generalizable: when taking on roles, children learn to see themselves from the perspective of others and thereby acquire social agency. In this process, children constitutively gain an autonomous capacity to act in interplay with others (Mead, 1934).

Pointing in the same direction is the concept of the unconscious that focuses on that part of the human mind from which all reactions and creative impulses are said to emanate in psychological processing mechanisms. Freud explained this fundamental insight using the metaphor of a rider (the ego) who must control his horse (the unconscious impulses of the id) while at the same time drawing power from it (Freud, 1964: 25). However, the subject never becomes fully aware of the unconscious impulses and drives underlying the activities of consciousness.

Prout and James persuasively argue that biological facts are never pre-social; hence, the reference to universal facts of development constitutes an ahistorical fallacy. However, the constructionist perspective is also mistaken when it declares the social formation of “childhood” to be a random category-mistake that can be corrected by understanding alone. In fact, it is a lived social practice and, such as gender, a “mode of existence” (Maihofer, 1995). The stability of such modes of existence should not be underestimated. On one hand, the historical emergence of childhood is closely interrelated with other areas of society (the legal system, for example, is based to a large degree on the distinction between adult and minor subjects). On the other hand, it should be emphasized that the reference to social construction cannot reasonably mean declaring the body or materiality to be irrelevant. An important characteristic of unconscious drives is that they have a sensory, physical core. However, they are also historical because they are always fulfilled in social environments and interactions (Görlich and Lorenzer, 1980: 312, 345–349).

In this context, it is worthwhile to take a look at feminist debates. In “Bodies that Matter,” for example, Butler (1993) offers a similar explanation of gender. Here the body is regarded as the result of a materialization process that is never completed; at the same time, it is assigned meaning as part of this materialization process. If we apply these ideas to the concept under discussion, it becomes clear that childhood is not a random construct detached from the facts of physiological development. However, it is also not a simple response to pre-social bodily conditions. Or, to put it differently, “In this sense, to know the significance of something is to know how and why it matters, where ‘to matter’ means at once ‘to materialize’ and ‘to mean’” (Butler, 1993: 32). Following Butler’s objective to overcome the distinction between materiality and signification, it can be said that even if the child’s body as such is not shaped by attributions, this body never exists outside the meaning that is socially attributed to childhood.

Is it therefore necessary to consider the agency of children as different from that of adults? And what elements should we adopt from Bou-Habib and Olsaretti’s proposal that we look at the autonomy of children as children? The strength of this position lies in the fact that it refrains from smoothing over differences and allows us to see forms of autonomy that are ignored by traditional autonomy concepts—especially those that are highly sensitive to ties with others. Ultimately, this view implies that different forms of autonomy can exist side by side without being treated unequally. Here it is once again useful to take a look at feminist debates, where we also find criticism of the liberal ideal of equality.

According to Maihofer (1997), the modern concept of equality, which is primarily legal in nature, prevents a non-hierarchical recognition of differences. The normative achievement of legal rights consists in the recognition of all human beings as equal, that is it views differences as individualized and thus as a legally irrelevant part of the private sphere. However, the social realization of legal equality often depends on the compensation for inequalities; equal political participation rights and their support by welfare policies are a case in point here. On a basic level, the legal system has to make decisions on which differences between individuals and groups have to be treated as legally relevant or irrelevant—and in what respects as relevant or irrelevant. For example, differences between men and women were declared irrelevant by the implementation of universal suffrage and equal political rights. Against the backdrop of some important differences between child and adult sexuality, in turn, most age-specific protection rights against the sexual abuse of minors are widely considered legitimate. But by and large, cultural change in recent decades has fostered attitudes that challenge the assumption that the specific characteristics of children can legitimize their exclusion from equal participation. Childhood studies’ normative agenda can be seen as an expression and proof of this cultural trend.

An important impediment to this trend is the fact that the idea of legal equality tends to abstract from social differences and therefore thwarts the possibility of equal recognition of these differences (Maihofer, 1997: 354–356). Maihofer proposes to pluralize the yardstick of equality in order to allow for several forms of rationality and autonomy without hierarchizing them. In this way, one can further develop an understanding of norms that is informed by the knowledge of their historicity and sociality (Maihofer, 1998: 156). A social concept of autonomy is thus able to grasp social conditions as an obstacle to, and a prerequisite for, the free agency of both adults and children. Using it, we can subject the categorical distinction between children and adults to criticism without smoothing over differences or underestimating the persistence of historically and culturally evolved modes of existence.

Conclusion

The social autonomy concept that we propose shares the normative focus of those approaches in childhood studies that center on the concept of agency—that is the recognition of children’s ability to shape their lives in their own fashion. However, as we have argued, this normative concern remains vague when it is understood solely through the lens of the agency concept. Even in authoritarian families or a rigidly structured school environment, children can demonstrate agency. In order to better grasp this normative focus of childhood studies, we propose using a socio-philosophical concept of autonomy (see also Daly et al., 2019). Our proposal does not put the case for a solipsistic, individualistic autonomy ideal, but for a concept of autonomy that situates freedom in our ties with others. This concept is particularly well suited to examine the social conditions of freedom—both the power relations that restrict it and the relations that constitute the precondition for autonomous agency. What is needed are non-hierarchical relations in which adults and children can be equally free. Only then can we grasp children as players in shared negotiating practices who are able to shape society as equal participants and overcome their exclusion from the political and public spheres.

We share an additional key focus with both the action-theoretical agency concept and the objections to it that are rooted in a critique of power: namely, the strong reservations about the concept of a developmental childhood that views this phase of life as a mere preliminary stage of adulthood and, as a result, degrades children into passive objects of socialization processes. However, we wish to go beyond this criticism of the passification of children. It is exactly this aspiration in respect of which our concept of social autonomy can unfold its strength. Contrary to liberal concepts of autonomy, we propose a pluralization of the yardstick used to measure which life orientations, forms of dependence, and modes of social embeddedness can be regarded as equally fostering autonomous choices. At the same time, this understanding of freedom rules out the possibility of universalizing specifically Western ideas about what it means to be autonomous (see also Edmonds, 2019). Such a pluralistic concept of autonomy advocates for the recognition of differences between children and adults, between children from different cultural backgrounds, social classes, and so forth. Therein, we see a central requirement for free and equal participation—as long as the recognition of differences does not resort to an essentialist conception of childhood.