The UK’s Uncertain Future

© Peter Morrison / Alamy Stock Photo

With Scottish nationalists on the retreat and power-sharing returning to Northern Ireland, the UK union appears to be on stabler ground than for many years. But any such unionist relief is misplaced, writes Michael Kenny.

The historic vote to leave the European Union in September 2016 sparked a series of political crises that brought into question the UK’s governing institutions and the nature of its territorial constitution. Rising tensions, and some open conflicts between Scottish and Welsh administrations and successive British governments peppered this period, and added to the sense of constitutional turmoil and political turbulence. Various polls suggested that support for the idea of independence from the UK grew in both Scotland and Wales, as the character and future of the UK’s own internal Union once more moved into the political foreground.

As part of a wider project examining the implications of the UK’s decision to swap the EU for its own ‘internal market’, I conducted many interviews with members of both Houses of Parliament in these years, and with officials working within the different governments. What was most striking in those disparate conversations was how pessimistic many British unionists were about the Union’s prospects, and how uncertain most were about what the UK’s asymmetrical system of devolution meant for its future.

Contradictory responses

The response of British government to post-Brexit constitutional tensions has been uncertain, and at times downright contradictory. During his premiership, Boris Johnson vacillated between the desire of some to use Brexit as the means of reasserting the central state’s authority in relation to devolved governments, and the ingrained inclination of British politicians to avoid constitutional questions altogether.

But relief at the prospect of a return to ‘normality’ in relation to the Union is misplaced, and comes at the price of ignoring the very difficult questions about the nature of sovereignty and governing authority within the UK which the last few years have forced to the political surface.

This contradictory approach was evident in the reflections Johnson offered to the Covid enquiry. While he blithely claimed that relations between his government and the devolved administrations had been collegial and productive during the pandemic, he declared that it would have been better if the UK government had overseen behavioural rules for the whole of the UK – a brave conclusion to draw given the chaotic nature of Whitehall decision-making laid bare in the enquiry to which he was speaking. The same enquiry has also shone an unflattering light on key aspects of the decision-making of the Scottish government during this episode.

Johnson’s successor, Liz Truss, appeared keen to double down on the idea of pushing back against devolution, declaring her unwillingness to meet with Scotland’s First Minister. But Truss’s time in office was too brief to formulate – never mind prosecute – any kind of strategy in this area. But the arrival of Rishi Sunak has, for the most part, resulted in the return of the recurrent preference of Britain’s governing parties to try to keep issues relating to devolution and territorial government in the political margins.

Sunak swiftly committed himself to securing an agreement with the EU (the Windsor Framework) which was designed to address some of the frictions arising from the implementation of the Northern Ireland Protocol agreed between the UK and the EU in 2019. Sunak has had some notable conflicts with the Scottish government during his premiership, particularly over the implications of the Edinburgh government’s gender ID legislation for the UK’s equalities law, and of the UK government’s recourse to the rules of the Internal Market Act to override Holyrood’s glass deposit scheme. But the abiding wisdom in Westminster has been that the travails of the Scottish National Party have significantly damaged the prospect for the independence cause. This judgment reflects the notable change in the political weather in Scotland following Nicola Sturgeon’s shock resignation in March 2023, and the subsequent police enquiry into the party’s financial affairs; the uncertain performance of her successor Hamza Yousaf; and the gradual erosion of the party’s support over several years as its policy failures in relation to key public services have been exposed.

Recent damage to the SNP’s political standing may well have made a Labour recovery in Scotland at the next general election a more likely prospect – although the governing party in Scotland is still regularly polling over 30 per cent. And the growing likelihood of Labour winning a majority of seats across all parts of Britain at the next general election has cemented the assumption at Westminster that ‘normal service’ in relation to the Union will soon be resumed.

Misplaced relief

But relief at the prospect of a return to ‘normality’ in relation to the Union is misplaced, and comes at the price of ignoring the very difficult questions about the nature of sovereignty and governing authority within the UK which the last few years have forced to the political surface. There are good reasons to think that such complacency will not survive contact with post-election realities.

First, the assumption that the SNP’s current difficulties means that the independence question will disappear is belied by the fact that support for separation has held steady despite them. The uncomfortable truth, from a unionist perspective, is that nearly 50 per cent of Scots still support independence, and support for this idea is strongest among younger generations. These polling figures also suggest a growing disconnection between attitudes towards the main party of Scottish nationalism and perceptions of its main cause.

Equally, while it is far from unreasonable to assume that a Labour government in power at the UK level could be a stabilising factor for the Anglo-Scottish Union, there is no guarantee that this will be the case, especially given the weakness of the UK economy and the immensity of the challenges that the next government will inherit. After many years of Conservative rule, hopes and expectations among the Scottish electorate about the difference that a Labour government will make, in the short term, will be hard to manage.

Furthermore, there is every chance that the SNP government in Edinburgh will choose to keep injecting political energy into constitutional issues, in part to signal its difference from a UK Labour Party that occupies much of the same centre-left policy ground. When the British Labour Party previously won power after a lengthy period of Conservative rule, in 1997, it delivered a major set of reforms to the territorial government of different parts of the UK – including the historic restoration of the Edinburgh Parliament – in direct response to the demands for change which swept across Scottish society and politics in the 1980s.

But now, after another lengthy period of Conservative political rule at the UK level, Labour has no equivalent reforming offer to make to Scotland. The idea of extending the devolution settlement in Scotland in more than incremental ways has very few champions, and there appears to be little appetite at senior level for the more ambitious ideas floated in the final report of the Commission on the UK’s Future chaired by former Prime Minister Gordon Brown, published in December 2022.

Northern Ireland

The assumption that the Union has returned to stability is particularly ill-fitting in the case of Northern Ireland. Johnson’s Brexit deal triggered deep internal conflicts within Ulster unionists. This resulted in the Democratic Unionist Party walking out of the Stormont power-sharing arrangement in February 2022. Although this decision was eventually reversed, in early 2024, there remains staunch opposition to Sunak’s Windsor Framework.

The consequences of the unique devolution arrangements in Northern Ireland going into abeyance have been dire. The absence of a functioning devolved administration created a situation in which Northern Ireland was governed by unelected officials without the legal powers and political mandate to make the key decisions – about public services, budgetary allocations and public sector pay deals – which have become increasingly imperative. If it were any other part of the UK, it is hard to imagine this situation being acceptable to Westminster politicians.

The resumption of Stormont means the UK government is no longer under pressure from unionists to impose direct rule, a move that would have come with significant political costs. But the return to power-sharing in Northern Ireland still brings huge challenges. While DUP leader Jeffrey Donaldson did manage to get his party’s agreement to return to government, many of his members remain implacably opposed. The sight of a first Irish republican First Minister, Michelle O’Neill, will not have made Donaldson’s position any easier. There are other challenges ahead. With Sinn Fein leading in polls south of the border, there is the possibility of the republicans winning power in elections to the Irish Dail that must be held by March 2025. The prospect of the former political vehicle of the Irish Republican Army assuming power in both jurisdictions will have a major impact upon the psychology and judgements of unionists and their political representatives.

Wales

In Wales, political conflict over constitutional questions has remained prominent in the aftermath of Brexit, during which the relationship between the governments in Cardiff and London hit its lowest point. There have been sharp political divides over controversial policies such as the introduction of a 20-mph speeding restriction across Wales, with some critics querying the legitimacy of the government introducing them. More generally, the Labour administration in Cardiff has evolved a federalist mindset on the UK’s territorial constitution, and this has underpinned its calls for the devolution of some key additional responsibilities, namely justice and policing.

The report of The Independent Commission on the Constitutional Future of Wales, published in January 2024, sketched out three different possible futures – which ranged from independence to a more devolved settlement – and has sparked some sharp responses from Conservative unionists. And in a foretaste of potential tensions to come, the Commission’s proposal for the devolution of justice and policing to Wales has been coolly received by some Labour figures at Westminster.

Whither England?

And, finally, to England where disagreements about the future of local and regional government continue to be aired. One immediate challenge for an incoming government will be to decide if it continues with plans being laid by Rishi Sunak for the establishment of more Combined Authorities across England. And if it continues in this direction (as senior figures have signalled it will), might it seek to do English devolution differently? Might a Labour government, for example, remove the requirement for directly elected mayors, enabling region-wide collaboration between the mayors of adjacent city-regions, as advocated by the Brown Commission? Labour may also move to abolish the preferred mechanism of recent governments of making local councils and devolved governments pitch for small amounts of resource, on a competitive basis, from pots controlled by Whitehall.

Surface-level political commentary remains fascinated by the possibility of rows between city-regional mayors like Andy Burnham, and Labour’s Westminster leadership. But more important policy challenges – and deeper-lying pressures – will command Labour’s attention if it gains power at the UK level. The trickle of councils announcing that they are on the verge of bankruptcy will most likely be a steady flow by the time an election is called, and will present a major fiscal challenge, reopening longstanding, unresolved debates about reforms to the structure and internal working of local government in England.

The current policy response from Whitehall has been to point these councils towards the option of conducting fire sales of their assets – an approach that is very likely to have major consequences for the fragile social infrastructure of England’s poorer cities and towns, with the likelihood that buildings which currently house key community services, like libraries, are sold off. A prospective Labour government will be under considerable pressure to adopt a different approach in this area.

The financial vulnerability of local councils aside, the next UK government will soon discover that its political fortunes are to a considerable degree contingent upon a readiness to address the profound challenges associated with increasing economic growth across the whole of England. The political mantra of ‘levelling up’ became a progressively hollow political promise, but the deep-seated geographical inequalities, within and between regions to which it was addressed – have done much to deepen English disenchantment with the UK’s governing institutions.

Looking to the further political horizon, the future direction and leadership of the Conservative Party, should it lose the election, will have a significant impact upon the prospects of the UK as a territorial entity. On current trends, there is a good chance that it will shift more decisively in the Anglo-British nationalist and devo-sceptic directions explored, at times, by the Johnson government. Were that to happen, and if the SNP was to make a comeback in Scotland, then the prospect of renewed conflict around the Anglo-Scottish Union before the end of the current decade would be a very real one.

Looking to the further political horizon, the future direction and leadership of the Conservative Party, should it lose the election, will have a significant impact upon the prospects of the UK as a territorial entity.