Too Many Cooks Spoiling the Broth: Parallel Administrative/Criminal Law Enforcement against ‘Hard Core’ Cartels in Slovenia

Abstract

In Slovenia the parallel administrative/criminal law enforcement against hard core cartels has existed since the mid-1970s. But this dual regime existed in statute only; practice ignored the legally demanded priority of criminal procedure and enforced only the administrative law governing illegal cartels. Even the legislator silently paid tribute to this unwritten law of praxis and recently transplanted an American-style leniency programme into administrative procedure only. Realizing the problem, it is now proposed to introduce leniency into criminal procedure as well. But this criminal leniency is worded too vaguely and does not offer sufficient guarantees. We end up with two uncoordinated schemes where the less structured and predictable ought to have priority over the much more elaborate one introduced in administrative law. For the sake of clarity, consistency and predictability the best solution is to decriminalize hard core cartels. In this way the legislator would resolve all problems created by the parallel regime and at least in theory makes the leniency programme more attractive and thus more effective.