Abstract
Farmer protests have characterised much of the debate on climate and the environment in the EU in recent years. The protests and the European Commission′s subsequent rollback on environmental requirements for farming have cast doubt on the viability of the European Green Deal (EGD). Work on farms is inherently intertwined with nature. Climate change—through rising temperatures and extreme weather events—is already impacting working conditions. At the same time, agriculture is responsible for 11% of greenhouse gas emissions in the EU and is a major cause of biodiversity loss. Most research on the EGD has tended to focus on energy-related sectors, with comparatively less research on what it means for sectors like agriculture. This article applies a social law lens to legislation on agriculture in the EU and asks: what does the EGD mean for those who work in agriculture, and, to what extent is a just transition envisioned for the sector? The article is situated within a broader turn in labour law scholarship to examine the labour-nature nexus. It identifies social measures within the EGD, the Farm to Fork Strategy and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), with a focus on two disadvantaged groups: smallholder farmers and farmworkers. The article argues that there are elements of a just transition in current EU policies and legislation on agriculture, such as income support provisions, targeted measures for young farmers, and the introduction of a social conditionality clause. However, the social dimension of these instruments require further development to strengthen the connection between social concerns on the one hand, and economic and environmental concerns on the other. More fundamentally, the article points to a lack of a coherent vision of what a just transition in agriculture should entail—particularly in terms of its economic model and the position of those most affected, including smallholder farmers and farmworkers. This gap may help in explaining some of the underlying reasons for the farmer protests.
Introduction
In February 2024, over a thousand tractors descended on Brussels, blocking key roads into EU institutions. 1 Farmers from across Belgium had come to protest against a range of new measures, including increased taxes on tractor fuel, competition from imports, reductions to pesticide use, and new regulations to green agriculture, all of which they claimed would be detrimental to small, low-income farmers. Amid burning tires, one tractor displayed the sign: ‘If you love the earth, support those who manage it’. 2 This protest was part of a series of farmer protests that have occurred across Europe since Dutch protests in 2019. The diverse range of organisations that partook in these demonstrations shared a common concern for the future of European farming. Following the February 2024 protests, the European Commission removed some of the environmental requirements from agriculture legislation. 3 Both the protests and the Commission's changes have raised questions as to the viability of the European Green Deal (EGD) and its pursuit of climate-neutrality by 2050 in a manner that is just and ‘leaves no one behind’. 4
Farm work is inherently intertwined with nature. Climate change, through rising temperatures and extreme weather events, is already impacting working conditions. At the same time, agriculture is responsible for 11% of greenhouse gas emissions in the EU and is a major cause of biodiversity loss. 5 Yet, since the announcement of the EGD in 2019, much of the subsequent legislation, policy, and academic literature have focused on carbon intensive industries and supports for workers in these industries, 6 with relatively little attention paid to agriculture. 7
This article asks: what does the EGD mean for those who work in agriculture, and, to what extent is a just transition envisioned for the sector? While EU legislation on farming and the EGD have been critiqued in terms of the extent to which they contribute to achieving the EU's environmental goals, 8 the purpose of this article is to examine the social components of the transition to a greener agriculture sector. A just transition is broadly understood as a transition to a greener economy in a manner that addresses current and future inequalities and is attentive to labour concerns, such as working conditions, income, representation, and training. The article examines the EGD and its Farm to Fork (F2F) Strategy, as well as the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), to identify the extent to which a just transition is pursued. It shows that while the legislation contains some provisions to address social issues, they fall short of developing a pathway towards a just transition for agriculture. This is because two of the core properties of a just transition, addressing inequality and labour, remain underdeveloped.
The article first elaborates on the just transition framework that underpins the analysis and provides an overview of the structure of the labour force in the agriculture sector in the EU. It then analyses the EGD, the F2F strategy, and the CAP respectively to assess the type of social and labour measures they provide for smallholder farmers and farmworkers. These two cohorts of people who work in farming are in a disadvantaged position in the market and, in the context of the just transition, their position merits further attention. 9 The final section reflects on the future of work in farming.
Current EU policies often frame farmers as individual entrepreneurs, overlooking broader social and labour concerns. In the context of negotiations for the next CAP 2028–2034, this article encourages reflection on the current economic and social model pursued by the EU for agriculture and, by corollary, in the EGD.
Just transition for agriculture
The concept of just transition has proliferated in use over the last decade. The numerous definitions have been categorised in terms of scale, from local to global, as well as scope, with some definitions including only workers and others including the whole population. 10 They also differ in the extent to which the transition envisioned is affirmative or transformative - in other words, the extent to which they maintain the status quo in pursuing measures such as green growth, or, instead, pursue a radical overhaul of the economic system. 11 Broadly, the just transition looks at the questions of ‘who wins, who loses, how and why’ in the shift towards a greener economy. 12 Instead of defining a just transition, 13 this article concerns itself with two of its key properties: addressing current and future inequalities and addressing labour concerns.
Labour law has taken up the concept of a just transition as part of a broader turn to develop a more ‘socio-ecologically attuned’ framework that critiques the historical separation of labour from nature. 14 Such scholarship explores how labour and nature are inherently interconnected. 15 The sector of agriculture, however, remains understudied. In turn, in literature on agriculture, references to sustainability – entailing three pillars of economic, environmental and social sustainability – are more common than references to a just transition. The two concepts are, nonetheless, similar: both understand social and environmental goals as interconnected. A just transition in agriculture examines how environmental changes affect jobs and social conditions, and how those social factors, including workers’ input on environmental measures, shape the environment.
The agriculture sector in Europe
Agriculture has long been at the centre of EU legislation and policy and only until recently received the vast majority of the EU's budget. 16 As context for the remainder of the article, this section provides a general overview of farming in the EU.
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is the EU's main agriculture instrument. It has gone through six significant reforms since 1962, the most recent of which was in 2023. 17 Throughout these reforms, the CAP has increasingly incorporated sustainability measures and the most recent reform incorporated references to the EGD. 18 Under Article 39 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the objectives of the CAP are threefold: to increase agricultural productivity, ensure a fair standard of living for the agriculture community, and ensure supplies reach consumers at a reasonable price. 19 The CAP is principally an economic tool and functions through two pillars: Pillar I which entails direct payments to farmers, and Pillar II, which is focused on rural development and environmental conservation. The amount of the EU budget set aside for agriculture is substantial, with approximately 33% of the total EU budget under the Multi-Annual Financial Framework for 2021–27 going towards the sector.
The most recent reform of the CAP has sought to address inequalities between farms and include more environmental requirements. Under the CAP 2023–27, there is a specific additional payment to support better distribution of payments. Additionally, the CAP 2023–27 contains Good Agricultural and Economic Conditions (GAECs) that must be met by those receiving direct payments and include conditions such as maintaining grassland and measures for water protection. 20 Where they are not met, the farmer may face a penalty in the form of a reduction in their payment, depending on the type of payment they receive.
The labour force in agriculture is distinct from most other sectors. Labour on farms is often atypical and figures for how many people are employed in the sector vary. In terms of the types of employment on farms, these can be categorised into farm owners, family members (paid and unpaid), and farmworkers; and can also be broadly categorised into employers, self-employed, employees, and part-time, seasonal and casual workers. Work on farms is typically measured in the form of an Annual Work Unit (AWU), which is the amount of work carried out based on the annual full-time equivalent of 1,800 work hours and combines various types of paid and non-paid work. However, work such as care work is not typically counted. In the 2020 Agriculture Census, the EU's agriculture labour force was estimated to be 17 million, but only 18.7% reported that they worked full-time in the sector. The total number of AWUs was calculated to be 8.2 million. 21 There is a large number of migrant workers in the sector, with approximately 2.4 million migrant workers, comprising both EU and non-EU nationals. 22 At the same time, there are also significant levels of informal employment and undocumented workers, making such estimations difficult.
In terms of farm income, this has increased across the EU in the last decade. The EU average farm income per AWU, including subsidies via direct payments, in 2022 was €35,767. 23 However, there are significant differences between Member States and farm types. Farms with an economic size over €100,000 account for just under a fifth of all farms in the EU, but account for four-fifths of production. In turn, smaller farms with an output between €2,000 and €25,000, account for over half of the farms of the EU, but just 7.5% of production and with annual incomes (per AWU) much lower, between €3,484 and €10,881. 24
Despite farming being an important employment sector, it is also one that is facing generational decline. In 2020, the percentage of farmers in the EU under the age of 35 was just 6.5%. In turn, 56.7% of farmers were over the age of 55. 25 There has also been a decline in small, typically family-run farms in recent decades, with an increase in the number of large, commercial farms. 26 The distinct structure of the labour force in farming means that the type of just transition pursued must be tailored to the sector's particularities.
The European Green Deal and the Farm to Fork Strategy
In 2019, the European Commission published the EGD, marking a moment of significant change in the EU's approach to climate change. 27 Framed as a ‘new growth strategy that aims to transform the EU into a fair and prosperous society’, 28 the Deal seeks to achieve a climate neutral economy by 2050 and to decouple economic growth from resource use. 29 The Communication recognises the link between environmental, economic and social change, pointing to the European Pillar of Social Rights as a key reference in ensuring that ‘no one is left behind’. 30 The EGD heralded in a new wave of legislation and policy measures, including the European Climate Law and legislation under the Fit for 55 package, which seek to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by 55% by 2030. With this expansion of legislation, some have identified the emergence of a just transition framework in the EU, 31 but have at the same time critiqued this emerging framework for its patchwork nature and the underdevelopment of its social dimension. 32 A similar trend can be identified in the EGD's main policy for agriculture, the F2F strategy. 33 The F2F strategy seeks to make Europe's food system more sustainable from the producer to the consumer. 34 From the outset, the strategy recognises that all individuals should benefit from a just transition, and that a ‘shift to a sustainable food system can bring environmental, health and social benefits’. 35 Yet, as detailed below, it falls short in addressing the location of farmers and particularly farmworkers within this broader vision of change and therefore in envisioning a just transition for the sector.
For farmers, the F2F strategy describes ensuring sustainable livelihoods for producers as essential. It sets out how food producers will need to rapidly transform the way they produce food and frames this transformation as an economic opportunity for farmers; one that allows them to make sustainability their ‘trademark’. 36 Such changes are seen as key to ensuring the growth of the sector and its competitiveness. The F2F strategy specifically highlights organic farming, which it seeks to increase to 25%, as an emerging market, and one that creates more jobs and attracts young farmers. Other than organic farming, it encourages farmers to transform their production methods to ‘make the best use of nature-based, technological, digital, and space-based solutions to deliver better climate and environmental results, increase climate resilience and reduce and optimise the use of inputs (e.g., pesticides, fertilisers)’. 37 The F2F strategy points to the CAP and describes the need for improvements to the direct payments to farmers system to ensure they are better targeted. It also describes an intention to clarify the competition rules for collective initiatives under the CAP, such as groups of self-employed farmers, to support initiatives that promote sustainability and strengthen the position of farmers in supply chains. Relatedly, the strategy mentions that the Commission will monitor the implementation of the Unfair Trading Practices Directive 2019/633 for agricultural products in particular. 38 Beyond incomes, the F2F strategy highlights a role for education and training, with reference made to the structures already established under the CAP, in the Agricultural Knowledge and Innovation Systems (AKIS). In terms of participation, it describes an invitation for ‘all citizens and stakeholders to engage in a broad debate to formulate a sustainable food policy including in national, regional and local assemblies’. 39 In all, the F2F identifies farmers as playing a key role in the pursuit of a more sustainable sector, recognising the need to support their efforts and reduce barriers faced. However, the strategy primarily presents these changes as an economic opportunity for farmers, thereby failing to substantively advance the social sustainability dimension of farm work, including the connections between agricultural labour, environmental protection, and inequality.
In turn, for farmworkers, there is only one explicit reference to this group in the F2F strategy. It is made in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, which ‘made us aware of the importance of critical staff, such as agri-food workers’ […], which ‘is why it will be particularly important to mitigate the socio-economic consequences impacting the food chain and ensure that the key principles enshrined in the European Pillar of Social Rights are respected, especially when it comes to precarious, seasonal and undeclared workers’. 40 It refers to workers’ ‘social protection, working and housing conditions as well as protection of health and safety’ as central to ‘building fair, strong and sustainable food systems’. 41 The link to the European Pillar of Social Rights is an important one, along with the reference to housing conditions, a key issue raised by groups such as the European Federation of Food, Agriculture and Tourism Trade Unions (EFFAT). 42 However, the strategy itself contains no concrete measures to address labour and inequality concerns for farmworkers, and fails to point to legislation that will better protect these workers. This echoes the vague language used in other parts of the EGD on social matters. 43
Lastly, in terms of working conditions for all who work in the sector, the F2F strategy calls for a reduction in the use and risk of chemical pesticides and more hazardous pesticides by 50% by 2030, a reduction in the use of fertilisers by at least 20%, a reduction in the sale of antimicrobials for animals and aquaculture of 50%, and an increase the amount of agricultural land dedicated to organic farming to 25%. 44 All such measures have a direct impact on improving health and safety at work, albeit this link is not explicitly made in the strategy.
The EGD and F2F strategy are non-binding policy instruments designed to outline a future direction for climate policy in Europe. The F2F contains a number of references to the importance of the work of farmers and farmworkers in pursuing a more sustainable sector. These include references to addressing barriers faced, such as in the form of competition rules and access to training for farmers. However, there is little in respect of concrete plans or proposals to support these two cohorts of people who work on farms. Instead, the F2F points, in particular, to the CAP as a means to achieve change in the sector.
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
Negotiations for the current CAP 2023–2027 ran in parallel to the EGD. The CAP legislative package was adopted in 2021 in the form of three regulations: CAP Strategic Plans Regulation 2021/2115, Horizontal Regulation 2021/2116, and the Common Market Organisation (CMO) Regulation 2021/2117. The framework describes a need for Member States, through their National Strategic Plans, to show ‘a greater overall ambition’ with regard to the climate and environment. 45 In approving the National Strategic Plans, the Commission was required to assess their consistency with the ‘Union's environmental and climate legislation and commitments’, which include the EGD, the F2F strategy and the Biodiversity Strategy. 46 However, a subsequent assessment of the plans by the European Court of Auditors found that while the submitted plans were greener, they were insufficient in meeting the ‘EU's ambitions for the climate and the environment’. 47 While the report showed limited progress as regards environmental goals, it did not examine the social components of either the CAP or the national plans.
One of the main objectives of the CAP is to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community. 48 While a broad term, it shows a social goal lies at the heart of CAP. This section examines the social dimension of the CAP with an analysis of two cohorts of people who work in the sector: smallholder farmers and farmworkers. Smallholder farmers make up the majority of farmers in the EU: approximately two-thirds of farms in the EU are just 5 hectares or smaller in size. 49 Small farms are important for local food production and rural employment, and smallholder farmers play an important role in landscape and biodiversity stewardship. 50 In recent years, smallholder farmers have lamented the decline in the viability of their work. The second cohort of workers are farmworkers. There are various types of farmworkers, from seasonal workers, to employed family members, to part-time workers. This section shows that while there is no explicit link in the CAP to the social dimension of the EGD or a just transition, there are nonetheless various measures that can be viewed through a social lens and linked to the just transition. They are, however, limited and should be strengthened if an effective just transition is to be pursued.
Minimum income guarantees for farmers
Most of the support for farmers under the CAP comes in the form of direct payments. CAP funding is divided into Pillars I and II, with most of the funding for direct payments falling under Pillar I. Smallholder farmers are typically self-employed and their income is sourced from the sale of their produce, with direct payments under the CAP providing a form of income support. The CAP Strategic Plans Regulation recognises the importance of small farmers as a ‘cornerstone of Union agriculture […] they play a vital role in supporting rural employment and contribute to territorial development’. 51 The various payments in the CAP, described below, can be understood as an form of a minimum income guarantee to support farmers in pursuing environmental change and providing social support, but there remain a number of limitations.
The main payment for farmers is the Basic Income Support for Sustainability (BISS). It is an annual payment that is decoupled from the productivity of the farm and is allocated according to farm size, with a payment typically paid per hectare. 52 The payments are subject to meeting the GAECs listed in the CAP, with exceptions for small farmers with less than 10 hectares that were brought in following the 2024 protests. 53 The annual amount of BISS payment per hectare varies by Member State, with an EU average of €260 per hectare. 54 As part of the BISS, Member States may introduce measures to cap the maximum amount a farmer can receive at €100,000 and implement degressivity measures, which entail proportionally reducing payments after a certain amount is surpassed, but before the maximum cap is reached. 55 There are also requirements around convergence to ensure that payments are gradually adjusted, so farmers that have historically received high payments see reductions in their payments, whereas those with historically lower payments see increases. 56
The BISS payment can be topped up by various other payments. This includes a decoupled payment called the Complementary Redistributive Income Support for Sustainability (CRISS). 57 The purpose of the CRISS is to redistribute payments from high payment farms to low payment farms under the CAP. Its objectives include ‘income stability for small farmers, the sustenance of local agricultural activity and the preservation of rural areas and landscapes’. 58 Under the CAP, Member States should allocate a minimum of 10% of funds towards redistribution. Member States are also permitted to set up alternative funds for smallholder farmers. 59 This is primarily in the form of the Payment to Small Farmers – according to which Member States can provide a lump sum direct payment capped at €1,250 annually for smallholder farms. 60 However, only five Member States implement this. 61 Other payment schemes under the CAP include payments for farms in Areas of Natural Constraint (ANC), as well as some coupled payments for specific crops or for socio-economic reasons. One of the key reforms of the CAP 2023–27 was the introduction of eco-schemes, which are voluntary for farmers to join. These are schemes that are set up at national level and should support interventions by farmers that address the environment, climate and animal welfare.
There are also payments targeted at specific groups of farmers, principally young farmers. The Complementary Income Support for Young Farmers (CIS-YF), is an additional payment for this group. The barriers to entry for new farmers can be high, including the purchasing or leasing of land and for credit lines. 62 When distributing payments, Member States are required to prioritise young farmers who are setting up a holding for the first time, and new farmers. 63 Member States are also required to allocate a minimum amount of funding from Pillar II funds for rural development to contribute to supporting young farmers. This support can take the form of investment aid or start-up grants, and Member States can set specific conditions for young farmers to access this support. In some Member States, this takes the form of a stipend for young farmers. For example, France provides an annual stipend of €4,500 per beneficiary, the Netherlands provides a stipend of €2,800, and Luxembourg provides €6,660 per beneficiary. The CAP recognises the need to make the sector an attractive place to work, and these supports are important in encouraging young farmers to enter farming. However, a link to other EU-level efforts to support young workers within the European Pillar of Social Rights and the European Youth Guarantee would assist in giving stronger recognition of the social supports needed for young farmers.
Combined, these payments provide a base income for farmers, most of which is decoupled from their productivity. Farmers, and smallholder farmers in particular, are typically self-employed and therefore do not fall within the remit of most labour law measures, including the Adequate Minimum Wages Directive 2022/2041. These payments, and in particular the BISS payment, can be understood as a form of minimum income guarantee for farmers and similar to basic income guarantees used in other sectors. 64 Environmental and social conditionalities on these payments tie them to broader eco-social goals. Scholars of eco-social welfare policies have described how such income guarantees can be crucial not only in supporting those who face difficulties in accessing work or are affected by climate change in the workplace, but also in supporting participation in ecological measures and in moving towards the decommodification of work. 65
However, there are a number of limitations to the direct payments system under the CAP. The first is that most of the payments are based on land size, and therefore larger farms receive higher levels of funding. As such, the structure of payments both incentivise farm growth, and mean that most small farms are kept as secondary semi-subsistence farms. While the CRISS payment seeks to redistribute funds, the overall amount allocated to distribution, a minimum of 10% of Pillar I funds, is low. Beyond differences in the amount received, for smallholder farmers, they are required to apply for various different schemes, all of which, even when combined, provide a relatively low payment per hectare. A further limitation of these payments is that they are paid to the ‘active farmer’, typically the owner or leaser of the land. There is a defined set of agricultural activities, which excludes care work, that qualify a person as an active farmer, and Member States are permitted to set their own definitions. 66
A further limitation is that the introduction of environmental conditionality to payments has faced pushback from farmers and has been criticised by environmental NGOs for being inadequate in meeting climate, environment and biodiversity goals. Following the 2024 protests, there was agreement at EU level to review the CAP and its implications for farmers. By May 2024, the Simplification Regulation was adopted, which, inter alia, introduced a number of exemptions to the various environmental conditionality terms and increased flexibility on the part of Member States, particularly for small farmers farming 10 hectares or less. 67 A further Simplification Regulation was adopted in May 2025. The removal of conditionality requirements on small farmers may remove incentives to achieve environmental compliance. This highlights that introducing environmental requirements from the EU level may not work when it plays out at a national and individual level. Thus, from a just transition lens, while the direct payment system in the CAP can be understood as a form of minimum income guarantee for farmers that is linked to environmental goals, its various limitations, crucially, the inequality in distribution, limit its effectiveness.
Social protection
Related to minimum income guarantees and ensuring a fair standard of living for farmers is social protection. However, social protection is not mentioned in the CAP. While the CAP may not be the place for such provisions, in the broader pursuit of fair income for farmers, with many Member States providing specific social protection supports for farmers, a recognition of the need for social protection within the CAP is lacking and is important in terms of linking social sustainability to other forms of sustainability. Examples such as Soziale Betriebshilfe in Austria where temporary farmhelp is provided where the farmer is sick could be looked into.
The Council's Recommendation on a Fair Transition in 2022, albeit non-binding, encourages Member States to reconsider their social protection mechanisms in the context of the green transition. 68 In the context of work in farming, it is important to not only ensure a fair income, but also to ensure measures such as sick pay, and maternity and parental leave are understood as part of a fair standard of living for the sector, and particularly in a sector in which many are self-employed.
Social conditionality
The most recent CAP 2023–2027 includes a new social conditionality mechanism. Framed as a contribution towards socially sustainable agriculture, 69 it aims to improve the working conditions of farmworkers in the EU. 70 The mechanism conditions direct payments to farmers and other beneficiaries, or certain payments under Pillar II on rural development schemes, on compliance with labour and social standards for farmworkers. 71 Failure to comply shall result in an administrative penalty for beneficiaries, which is set by the Member State in consultation with national social partners. 72 The social conditionality mechanism does not introduce new social or labour requirements, 73 rather it seeks to reinforce those already in place. In this regard, the Strategic Plans Regulation explicitly references three occupational health and safety instruments: the Directive 2019/1152 on transparent and predictable working conditions, Directive 89/391/EEC on measures to encourage improvements in safety and health of workers, and Directive 2009/104/EC on minimum safety and health requirements for use of work equipment by workers. 74
However, importantly, some beneficiaries of direct payments may be exempt from this social conditionality where they only receive payments under Chapter III of the Strategic Plans Regulation 2015/2115, which relate to sectors including harvesting fruit and vegetables, apiculture, wine, hops, olive oil and table olives, among others. 75 This exemption applies specifically to Producer Organisations (POs) and Associations of POs (APOs) as they do not directly employ farmworkers. However, the funds for the farmer are channelled via the POs and APOs. Many farmworkers are employed on these types of farms. This means there is a gap in coverage and in sectors such as fruit and vegetable-picking, where there are high numbers of farmworkers are not covered by the social conditionality clause. 76
In terms of implementation, Member States could voluntarily introduce the measure from 2023, with Italy, France, Germany, Spain and Portugal opting to do so. The measure became compulsory for all Member States from 1 January 2025. While it marks an important advancement in terms of the recognition of farmworkers in the CAP and their social and labour rights, it relies on adequate enforcement of labour and social standards already in place in Member States. 77 The practical effectiveness of the provision has been critiqued due to the fact that no new legal obligations are created and thus limiting its dissuasive effect. 78 Nonetheless, the social conditionality mechanism serves as an important link to social rights within agriculture legislation.
Information, education, and training
Beyond fair livelihoods, the CAP also supports measures for information provision and education and training for farmers. These measures can be understood as a means of supporting those who work in farming to upskill, to encourage participation, and to adapt to changing work environments.
The information and education measures in the CAP are primarily pursued through the Farm Advisory Services and its promotion of Agricultural Knowledge and Innovation Systems (AKIS), which are implemented in different bodies at a Member State level. 79 Under the Strategic Plans Regulation, Farm Advisory Services are required to cover all three pillars of sustainability, economic, environmental and social. 80 Moreover, Farm Advisory Services should also promote understanding of the relationship between farm management and land management, and improve awareness on standards, requirements and information including environmental and climate ones. 81 The Farm Advisory Services shall be adapted to the types of production in the Member State and territory, and include not only environmental and economic training, but also shall cover ‘conditions of employment, employer obligations, occupational health and safety and social support in farming communities’. 82
Information, education and training are important in any worker's career trajectory and farmers are no different, and it is particularly important in the context of changing farming practices to ensure economic, environmental and social sustainability and a just transition more broadly. One key limitation is that Farm Advisory Services are primarily targeted at farmers and are not addressed to farmworkers.
Collective representation and participation
Collective organising in the traditional sense of labour relations is much less common in the agricultural sector than other sectors. This is because many who work in the sector, principally smallholder farmers, are self-employed, and there are high levels of part-time, seasonal and casual workers. A 2016 report by Eurofound on collective organising in the agriculture sector highlighted how employment in the sector ‘does not fit into the dual categories of trade unions on the one hand and business interest organisations on the other when it comes to collective interest representation’. 83 Below, the forms of organising in the sector are reviewed, with reflections on what this means for a just transition.
The main form of organising for farmers under the CAP legislation is through Producer Organisations (POs) and Associations of Producer Organisations (APOs). POs are groups of producers that pursue a specific objective, such as concentrating the supply of products or providing technical assistance to their members, they make agreements with suppliers and providers of produce, such as supermarkets, and APOs are groups of POs. Importantly, there are explicit exemptions under EU competition law for cooperatives in agriculture, pursuant to Article 42 TFEU. The CAP provides funding to POs and APOs, principally in the horticulture, hops, olive oil and table olives, and dairy sectors. It allows for farmers to work together in navigating and bargaining with the other businesses and purchasers, but does not necessarily provide for representation beyond this. However, scholars have highlighted how POs and APOs tend to be focused on their position in value chains and the economy, and do not develop the various other important historical roles of cooperatives, including their social and educational role. 84
Cooperatives and collectives provide an important mechanisms for farmer organising. Under the new CAP 2023/2027, Article 77 of the Strategic Plans Regulation 2021/2115 provides support for new cooperation initiatives, including for producer groups, producer organisations or interbranch organisations, insofar as they pursue the objectives of the CAP. This includes environmental and climate objectives. In the Netherlands, for example, collective agri-environmental schemes allow for different stakeholders to regularly interact on a regional level and coordinate on environmental measures. 85 Beyond setting prices and managing interactions with suppliers, collectives also allow farmers to collectively participate, and recognition and support for such cooperatives is encouraged in the CAP. However, the coverage of such collectives and cooperatives varies by Member State. The Commission, in a 2024 non-paper, acknowledged the need to improve access to collective bargaining in agriculture, with power currently concentrated in the hands of ‘stronger actors concerning the provision of inputs, food industry and food retail’. 86 Bijman and Höhler have highlighted the important role that can be played by cooperatives in guiding an environmental transition to more sustainable food systems, particularly through training and knowledge sharing. Cooperatives can be a way to regenerate social participation of farmers. 87 However, overall, the role of participation in cooperatives remains underexplored.
For farmworkers, there are relatively low rates of unionisation across the sector, and membership of sector-relate trade unions is voluntary, except for in Austria, where membership of the Chambers for Agricultural Employees (LAK) is mandatory. Despite the low levels of trade union membership, there is nonetheless a high level of collective agreement coverage, but again, this varies significantly by Member State, with some with rates of between 80% and 100% and others with rates of 15% or less. 88
Beyond cooperatives and unions, at EU level, there is the social dialogue mechanism. The two main actors are the European Federation of Food, Agriculture and Tourism (EFFAT), which mainly represents farmworkers; and Copa-Cogeca, which represents farmers and farmer cooperatives. 89 Other forms of participation include Civil Society Dialogues, which were established in 2014 as a mechanism at EU level for the Commission to consult civil society on agriculture-related issues. Despite being the most representative of the options available, they may still not be capable of representing the voices of small farmers, in particular due to the dominance of bigger farms.
Overall, while the CAP contains various mechanisms for participation, the role of agricultural cooperatives and collectives as mechanisms for participation in a just transition remains underexplored in the CAP. There may also be a disconnect between local and EU level participation, and in particular for smallholder farmers and farmworkers. Public participation in environmental legislation is a key tenet of the Aarhaus Convention, along with the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants Rights, 90 and if farmers are to be recognised as ‘guardians of the land’, 91 mechanisms for inclusion should be stronger.
Conclusion
The above analysis shows that the CAP does contain social measures that speak to the two central just transition properties of addressing inequality and labour concerns in transitioning to a greener economy. Direct payments to farmers, such as the BISS payment, can be understood as a form of minimum income guarantee connected to environmental requirements, the social conditionality clause links direct payment supports to employers to protecting workers’ rights and health and safety, training and education provisions support participation and upskilling, and farmer cooperatives and collectives may provide a mechanism to encourage participation in the pursuit of a greener economy. Notwithstanding these provisions, one of the key limitations of the CAP is its understanding of farmers through an economic lens, principally as market actors. As a result, the overarching aim of a fair standard of living for the agricultural community is principally focused on income and competition. Measures such as social protection go unmentioned. The social provisions the CAP contains are important and can be built on, however, in its current form the CAP falls short of fully supporting a just transition for farmers that addresses inequalities in the sector, and of addressing labour concerns, particularly those of farmworkers.
The future of work in farming
Agriculture is a sector that faces demographic decline, recurring labour shortages, and the harsh consequences of climate change. In the face of recent farmer protests, the European Commission has sought a re-orientation of the sector. This section reflects on these developments and what they might mean for the future of work in agriculture
In September 2024, the Strategic Dialogue on the Future of EU Agriculture published its final report. 92 Its recommendations included a number of socially-oriented concerns and just transition relevant supports, including a just transition fund for agriculture that, if implemented, could improve the viability of a just transition in the sector. In its vision for the future, the report described an agriculture sector in which ‘all agricultural workers, be they permanent, seasonal, subcontracted or migrant, benefit from quality jobs with fair working conditions and contracts. Improved national policies that provide for better social rights in agriculture, whether they relate to parenthood, sickness, unemployment or retirement’. In terms of farmers’ place in broader society, it also called for greater social appreciation of agriculture. The report described a significant recalibration in how the agriculture sector is regulated and understood within the EU, and recognises a role for participation and redistribution of resources. It was also attentive to groups such as farmworkers, and those who are seasonal and migrant workers.
Based on the Dialogue, the European Commission published a Vision for Agriculture and Food in February 2025. 93 It set out a roadmap for the future of farming in Europe. Among its key priorities were ensuring a fair income for farmers, promoting generational renewal, and making the sector more competitive. As regards social rights, the Vision stated that ‘the availability of better education, quality jobs and career opportunities, better mobility, basic health services, and connectivity are all pre-conditions for the vitality of rural areas and for attracting new workforce in the food sector. Food and feed production in the EU is also dependent on farm workers, which are frequently coming from other EU Member States or from third countries and too often work under precarious conditions. This needs to be, more than before, proactively addressed and considered in public policies. Linked to this, social dialogue and collective bargaining have an important role to play, in line with national law and traditions’. 94 Albeit the only reference to social and labour issues in the sector, the Vision nonetheless recognises their importance. Whether this will materialise in subsequent legislation remains to be seen.
In addition to the green transition, one key area that will have consequences for the future of work in agriculture is a transition to greater digitalisation and the use of artificial intelligence (AI). Precision agriculture tools that rely on AI have gained prominence. 95 Such advances may increase productivity levels on farms and lead to a shift in the type of work required, with the potential for jobs such as fruit-picking to be carried out by AI-operated machinery. 96 For workers, AI may also mean an increase in the monitoring of the workplace, including in terms of monitoring conditions such as the temperature of greenhouses. While it may mean that employers have better tools to ensure compliance with health and safety requirement, a key differentiation is necessary between workplace monitoring and workplace surveillance. The latter increases the power and control of the employer over workers and violates workers’ rights to privacy. 97 Notwithstanding such innovation, it is also important to recognise that many farms remain disconnected from broadband and thus the introduction of AI tools would be well out of reach. 98 This disparity points towards a need to question what type of farms and farmers will benefit from technological advances and the costs of these developments.
When thinking to the future of farming in Europe, it is important to not lose sight of the inequalities in the sector and the labour and social protections of those who work on farms. The European Commission has started proceedings to negotiate the next CAP 2028–34. 99 Centrally, this article has shown attention needs to be paid across the CAP to strengthening the link between environmental and social concerns if a just transition is to be pursued in the sector.
Conclusion
Farmer protests across Europe in recent years put the European Commission and the EGD on the backfoot. Instead of dismissing the concerns of farmers, or simply rolling back on environmental requirements, it is instead important to take seriously what the EGD means for those who work in farming.
This article sought to understand the extent to which the EGD and the CAP pursue a just transition for those who work on farms. It shows that the various relevant instruments contain a number of social measures that, while they may not have initially been framed through a just transition lens, can be understood as an important start in linking social concerns to environmental concerns. In the CAP, such measures include income supports delinked from productivity and connected to environmental requirments, such as the BISS payment, a social conditionality clause to promote compliance with labour legislation, training and education, and agricultural cooperatives and collectives as mechanisms for participation.
However, such measures need to be built upon and expanded if a just transition is to be pursued. Among the gaps in current provisions are limited acknowledgement of the importance of social protection, including provisions such as sick leave and parental leave, as well as stronger connections to broader measures such as the European Pillar of Social Rights.
The 2025 Vision for Agriculture and Food presents farmers as principally market actors. Environmental and social concerns are understood as secondary to this position. Framing farmers as ‘innovators and entrepreneurs by nature’ is not only reductive; it once again fails to engage with the deeper, more long-term structural transition required in the agriculture sector if climate change and environmental degradation are to be addressed in a manner that is attentive to inequality and the labour concerns of those who work in it.
Footnotes
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Mark Bell, Suryapratim Roy and Kalina Arabadjieva for comments on earlier versions of this article as well as the participants of the 15th Seminar for Young Researchers in Wittenberg, Germany in May 2025 for their valuable feedback.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The author received financial support via the Trinity Research Doctorate Award (TRDA) for the research, authorship, and publication of this article; Trinity College Dublin.
