Digital bazaars reimagined: Comparing platform work regulations in South Asia through the lens of the EU PWD and ILO standard-setting procedure

Abstract

This article examines the regulatory approaches to platform work in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Our analysis explores a critical socio-legal gap in labour law scholarship by providing a comprehensive comparative overview of the platform labour regulations across these three major South Asian economies. It reveals divergence in practices and approaches within the South Asian region, characterised predominantly by laissez-faire, soft law, and deregulatory frameworks. We also demonstrate how the platform economy has accentuated and exacerbated pre-existing informality throughout South Asia, which is grounded in the understanding that insufficient regulatory oversight perpetuates this informality in the labour markets even more.

Meanwhile, the recently adopted EU Directive 2024/2831 on improving working conditions in platform work (PWD) has emerged as a global benchmark for platform regulation. Our analysis examines three key areas of the PWD, namely, the presumption of employment, algorithmic management oversight, and collective rights safeguards across South Asian jurisdictions. We find that the existing regulatory framework in the region largely does not incorporate these regulatory aspects and provisions due to structural and institutional constraints, compounded by a deregulatory orientation. Therefore, we examine recent ILO platform standard-setting to evaluate its potential impact on South Asian jurisdictions, with the aim of transposing these principles through an international labour standard. We contend that the ILO standards might provide a promising framework for regulating platform work in these contexts only if it clearly reiterates the right of platform workers.

1. Introduction

A highly influential report by the Indian think tank, the National Institute for Transforming India (NITI Aayog), underscored India's potential to be a leader in the technical and economic transitions brought by the growth of digital labour platforms. ¹ While the report acknowledges the risks of precarity, misclassification of workers, and algorithmic management in platform work, it recommends significant government investment in platformisation by establishing a ‘Platform India’ initiative. It further emphasises that the growth of platformisation depends on ‘simplification and handholding, funding support and incentives, skill, development, and social and financial inclusion’. ² However, Cook and Rani argue the dominant narrative of ‘digital transformation’ through technology often overlooks the role of labour in the development process of lower-income countries. They note that the emphasis on digitalisation has failed to create ‘decent and productive employment’ necessary for structural transformation. ³ This narrative, however, remains influential and is actively promoted by South Asian countries, which position the platform economy as a key driver of growth. ⁴

South Asia, comprising, inter alia, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, has shared historical legacies and distinct national trajectories shaped by the British colonial regime and post-independence challenges. ⁵ These experiences have contributed to diverse socio-economic structures, employment regulations, and social identities. ⁶ A defining feature of this region is its large working-age population, primarily engaged in the informal sector — referred to as the ‘unorganised sector’ in some jurisdictions. ⁷ These workers are ostensibly engaged in casualised or self-employed work, masking ‘sundry forms of wage labour’. ⁸ This informal workforce is excluded from any many labour arrangements, lacks labour safeguards, and endures precarious working conditions. ⁹ In India, more than 90% of the workers are employed informally, ¹⁰ and, similarly, in Pakistan, an estimated 72.9% of the non-agricultural workforce is engaged in the informal sector. ¹¹ The availability of a large pool of inexpensive labour has contributed to the proliferation of platforms in South Asia. ¹²

Similar to the other parts of the globe, most labour platforms in South Asia portray themselves as intermediaries or ‘passive matchmakers’, classifying workers as independent contractors. ¹³ However, research has demonstrated that platforms exert significant control over workers, setting terms and conditions, determining wages, and monitoring performance. ¹⁴ The rise of algorithmic management has intensified managerial prerogatives, as workers are consistently surveilled and algorithmically managed. ¹⁵ This has led to the need for a regulatory framework governing platform work. ¹⁶ To this extent, limited discussions in South Asia have focused on extending minimal social security, rather than providing employment status and collective bargaining rights. The lack of engagement stems from the prevailing perception that platform work is a pathway to independence, entrepreneurship, and freedom from workplace hierarchies. ¹⁷ Moreover, it is viewed as a way of formalising the informal sector workforce.

Rani observes that many governments in developing countries perceive platforms as employment generators and a solution to the poverty crisis, believing that investment in digital infrastructure and literacy will address economic challenges. Therefore, even governments have actively supported the rise of platforms, considering them a ‘silver bullet’. ¹⁸

Against this background, however, the discourse surrounding platform work has catalysed debate on its regulation around the world. While worldwide approaches vary, ¹⁹ the EU's Directive (EU) 2024/2831 on improving working conditions in platform work (PWD) of October 2024 stands as the first supranational regulatory instrument and is often considered a blueprint for platform work regulation. ²⁰ The PWD establishes several critical elements. First, it provides clear criteria for determining the employment status of persons performing platform work, creating a legal presumption of employment. ²¹ Second, it implements provisions for algorithmic management, promoting fairness, human oversight, and accountability in automated decision-making systems. ²² Third, it enhances transparency requirements for both algorithmic systems and platform operators, ensuring workers can access information about work monitoring and evaluation. Finally, it strengthens social dialogue by promoting collective bargaining rights while respecting social partner autonomy and diverse national practices. ²³

These parameters introduced in the PWD carry significance as they establish a clear path for regulatory obligations and rights of platform workers. Within the context of this special issue, our analysis focuses primarily on three key regulatory areas established by the PWD: the presumption of employment, the governance of algorithmic management systems (including associated transparency requirements imposed on digital platforms), and the protection of collective rights. These benchmarks are not applied as evaluative standards against developments in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Rather, we examine these legal standards within the distinct socio-legal and institutional frameworks across South Asian jurisdictions and assess how platform work themes are addressed in domestic legal systems. ²⁴

Section 2 illustrates that the transition from the informal to the formal sector through platform work is largely illusory in South Asia. Instead, platform work exacerbates and accentuates the already entrenched social hierarchies in developing States, arguably reinforcing forms of informality. The South Asian context is particularly distinctive, as platform work often reproduces deeply embedded hierarchies of caste and class.

Section 3 examines whether and if Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India have approached regulating the presumption of employment, rules on algorithmic management, and the protection of collective rights of platform workers. A socio-legal examination of regulatory practices across regional contexts reveals divergent approaches to addressing informality broadly and platform work specifically: a laissez-faire approach in Bangladesh, a soft-regulatory approach in Pakistan, and deregulatory practices in India. Section 4 turns to the developments in the ILO standard-setting process instrument for platform workers. This analysis examines how the ILO's potential instruments might impact South Asia, noting the scale of the effect will depend significantly on both the instruments’ stringency and the extent of obligations they impose on digital labour platforms. The final section concludes.

2. Platform work: The informality redux

Work in the Global South has always been precarious. Munck notes that this is the archetype of the Southern experience marked by the nature of the post-colonial state. ²⁵ In this context, platform work is not a novel phenomenon in South Asia, but rather an extension of existing forms of informal work. Platforms ‘demutualise’ risks by engaging in non-standard forms of arrangements, resulting in persistent precarity. ²⁶ No guarantee of receiving tasks on the application coupled with high variable costs often results in extended working hours and limited earnings. ²⁷ Rani, Gobel, and Dhir, in their study highlighting this issue, find that while app-based taxi drivers in India earned more per hour initially, sustaining these earnings was challenging. Much of their income came from bonuses, which were contingent upon meeting targets that platforms often arbitrarily change. Consequently, drivers worked for over 67 hours per week, occasionally exceeding 12 hours a day. Moreover, platforms increased commission fees over time, reducing in-hand pay. Meanwhile, the high maintenance cost also made it difficult for workers to rely solely on platform work. ²⁸

Despite this, entrepreneurship and independence are often considered reasons for the rise of platform work in South Asia. D’Cruz and Noronha highlight how platforms, while precarious, provide workers with a sense of freedom from social discrimination, as witnessed in work life. ²⁹ Platforms are often perceived as more inclusive in terms of caste, religion, class, sex, and gender. Notably, women have reported gaining access to the labour market due to platform surveillance mechanism. Therefore, while D’Cruz and Noronha acknowledge the income and labour precarity attached to platform work, they also highlight how the platform economy has become a ‘site for the commodification-decommodification dynamic’. A recent study on women platform workers in Bangladesh revealed that some preferred platforms like Sheba due to the safety they provided. ³⁰ However, other findings in the same study indicate how customers on platforms of beauty and domestic care often ‘dehumanise’ gig workers. ³¹ Given the entrenchment of social hierarchy, class, and caste in South Asia, patterns of submission and power imbalance are consistently evident at work.

Platforms have been ostensibly seen as ways to formalise work and, importantly, provide dignity to workers. Therefore, platform work in the global south has rarely been associated with precarity. Instead, as Raval and Lalvani point out, platforms have ‘enmeshed themselves in the fabric of urban sociality’. ³² Nevertheless, the platforms governing the payment system, determining incentives for workers, and making arbitrary changes in working time, schedules, etc. indicate an increasing control over the workers. Therefore, Aloisi has rightly noted that the ‘price workers pay for extreme flexibility is uncertainty and insecurity’. ³³

Beyond economic precarity, the claim that platforms are a great equaliser is also fallacious. In South Asia, where caste discrimination and untouchability persist, platform workers experience systemic marginalisation. Kain's research shows how food delivery workers are often physically segregated, forced to use separate elevators and entrances. She notes that rather than dismantling social hierarchies, platforms reinforce and exacerbate them, intensifying the stigma of ghin — denoting repulsion and disgust — attached to marginalised workers. ³⁴

Moreover, platform work challenges fundamental labour rights at work. The informal, temporary, and dispersed nature of work has complicated unionisation. In South Asia, workers’ protests have been met with legal repression, with platforms filling cases of ‘unlawful assembly’ against organisers. ³⁵ Additionally, platforms have used punitive measures such as ‘implicit threat[s]’ of deactivation, ‘shadow-blocking’ users, and non-renewal of contracts to suppress collective action. Likewise, complex cultural, religious, and patriarchal norms in South Asian societies have considerably impeded women and transgender workers. In India, women perform 297 minutes of unpaid work per day, compared to 31 minutes for men, limiting their ability to engage in paid work. ³⁶ Platforms have used these constraints by imposing inflexible algorithmic targets pressurising women into accepting tasks, disregarding their unpaid care burdens. Lata, Walters, and Roitman describe how women in the Global South are burdened with ‘triple role of work’ — labour market, domestic, and reproductive work. ³⁷ The gendered restrictions over movement and access to spaces, as well as longstanding social and religious norms, often result in them being paid 8% to 10% lower wages than men for the same work. ³⁸ Likewise, platforms have been alleged to violate occupational health and safety rules, especially when they lay down unrealistic timelines for task completion, exacerbating worker precarity.

The transition from informality to formality requires workers to have their fundamental rights, income and job security, and the opportunities for livelihoods and entrepreneurship. However, the modus operandi of the platform economy undermines this; an issue that is exacerbated in the case of South Asian countries. This, arguably, is an extension of the already existing forms of informality. In the newly independent South Asian states, informality was initially regarded as a ‘transitory phenomenon’ or a ‘residual category of labour’. ³⁹ However, rather than disappearing, it has continued to persist in myriad ways. Now, the digital platform economy is considered to be paving the way to formalisation in South Asia. However, this form of work allows the already prevalent precariousness of informal labour to continue.

3. Contrasting approaches to regulating platform work

The regulation of platform work in South Asian nations has ostensibly mirrored the regulation of informality in the South Asian states. While the modernisation perspective suggests that the informal economy would be a vestige of the past with development, the political economy perspective shows how the informal economy is a direct by-product of increasing flexibility, especially through State regulations. ⁴⁰ In India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, platform workers are classified as own-account workers; however, they typically work in disguised self-employment, rendering them extremely precarious. Consequently, they are more susceptible to experiencing informal working conditions rather than regular employees. ⁴¹

Williams and Lansky argue that, from the political economy perspective, informal employment is not only a key component in the subcontracting and outsourcing arrangements driven by global capitalism but is also a ‘receptacle into which surplus labour is cast to eke out a living’. ⁴² Moreover, informal employment is also a direct result of the State's shift away from formal welfare policies to deregulation and liberalisation. Therefore, workers in this economy are counted as ‘unfortunate pawns in an exploitative global economy’. ⁴³

Informality is not merely the object of state regulation; it may, at times, be actively produced by the State. Scholars such as Harriss-White and Bremen highlight that the informal economy is extremely beneficial for the State and is often ‘deliberately developed’. ⁴⁴ Firstly, it allows the transfer of risks onto the worker, as the onus is not on the government to provide social security and protection. Secondly, it allows for a reduction in expenses, especially by undercutting mandated wage levels. Thirdly, it allows for ostensibly new forms of work to be thrust into the informal economy. Meanwhile, it also allows for reliance on new forms of inexpensive labour provided by rural, immigrant, women, and transgender workers.

Since there are no protective measures in place, the State is absolved of its responsibilities, shifting the burden onto the people in respect of welfare arrangements. This lack of safeguards also eliminates the avenues for recourse, including the right to unionise. In South Asia, a ‘new augmented workforce’ has arguably grown through business models that employ a miniscule proportion of workers under formal contracts, while the majority are on-call, casual, temporary, or platform workers. ⁴⁵ This can largely be attributed to State regulatory policies, enabling the proliferation of precarious labour arrangements. Governance is a key issue here, as the 2002 International Labour Conference (ILC) Resolution indicated that informality develops due to ‘inappropriate, ineffective, misguided, or badly implemented macroeconomic and social policies…lack of conducive legal and institutional frameworks; and the lack of good governance for proper and effective implementation of policies and laws’. ⁴⁶ Governments in South Asia have taken different approaches to address informality in general, and platform work, more specifically. The rest of this section focuses on these approaches.

3.1 Bangladesh's laissez-faire approach

In Bangladesh, the Labour Act of 2006 represents the most significant development in labour law since independence. ⁴⁷ It was enacted to consolidate the previously fragmented legal framework that had been shaped by a combination of the British colonial regulations and the remnants of Pakistani labour laws. Having ratified several fundamental ILO Conventions prior to the Act's promulgation, Bangladesh drafted this legislation to reflect these international commitments, with social justice serving as its foundational principle. ⁴⁸ However, the Act has been criticised for its limited scope, exclusionary provisions, high thresholds for trade union registration, and failure to cover a large proportion of the workforce. ⁴⁹

Platform work occupies a legally amorphous position within the Bangladeshi labour law framework. The Labour Act defines a ‘worker’ in section 2(65) as ‘any person employed in any establishment or industry…’, ⁵⁰ with ‘industry’ encompassing a wide range of activities within section 2(60). ⁵¹ Additionally, section 4 lays down certain categories of workers, which include, inter alia, casual, temporary, seasonal, and permanent workers. ⁵² Lata has argued that platform workers are not be captured by any of these categories. ⁵³ However, the definitional breadth of some of the categories of workers, such as temporary or casual workers, could, at the very least, suggest the potential inclusion of platform workers. Nevertheless, this would still be of limited impact, as, in practice, the scope of protection between permanent and temporary workers varies significantly, thereby creating a substantial protection gap for platform workers. ⁵⁴ The Courts have emphasised that the primacy of facts is key in determining employment status over contractual designations, which might be crucial in providing employment status to platform workers. ⁵⁵ However, all of this is suggestive, making platform workers extremely precarious.

The absence of a comprehensive regulatory framework for platform workers remains an issue, given that approximately 500,000 individuals engage in platform work. ⁵⁶ Existing regulatory approaches, such as the ‘Ride-sharing service guidelines’ issued by the Road Transport Authority, have predominantly concerned consumer protection, and have remained silent on workers’ rights. ⁵⁷ The government's vision for a ‘Smart Bangladesh’ by 2041 has further relegated workers’ rights, prioritising technological growth and innovation. This is exemplified through the recent National AI Policy of 2024, which explicitly promotes the use of AI systems to ‘facilitate job matching and optimize employment opportunities through advanced algorithms and data analytics’. ⁵⁸ While the Data Protection Bill 2023 includes provisions on the processing of sensitive data, it grants employers (as data controllers) the right to process data if such processing is required for ‘the performance of a contract to which the data subject is a party’. ⁵⁹

In terms of collective rights, Bangladesh's ratification of the fundamental ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 affirms the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining. However, the implementation of these rights remains questionable, with several regulatory obstacles in the way. Section 176(a) of the Labour Act states that ‘all workers shall, without distinction…have the right to form trade unions…’. ⁶⁰ Yet, this is conditional on platform workers being recognised under the definition of workers in section 2(65), or the special definition in section 175. ⁶¹ Even beyond the classification issue, trade union formation and registration is difficult as a result of minimum membership thresholds. A formal complaint was lodged under Article 26 of the ILO constitution, highlighting systemic violations of the right to freedom of association, including denial of registration, and anti-union violence. Indeed, the Committee on Freedom of Association deemed the situation in Bangladesh to be ‘extremely serious’. ⁶² Although the government has asserted that some progress has been made in fulfilling its ILO obligations, such as increasing the number of registered unions and active labour inspectors, these have had a limited impact on the ground. ⁶³ Additionally, the recent National Action Plan by the Ministry of Labour acknowledges the need to amend the Labour Act, particularly the sections defining employer and worker status. ⁶⁴ However, this remains aspirational in the current political climate.

While Bangladesh has ratified many of the fundamental ILO Conventions compared to other South Asian nations, the prevailing approach concerning labour regulations seems to be one of laissez-faire governance. This is not unique in the case of platform workers, as many workers in the informal sector, such as construction workers and domestic workers, have no protection within the labour law structure. ⁶⁵

Bangladesh's labour law framework does guarantee collective rights for all workers, given its ratification of the fundamental ILO Conventions. However, these remain ineffectively implemented, inconsistent, and exclusionary in practice. Moreover, due to the regulatory apathy, platform workers fall outside the scope of labour laws, with no employment status whatsoever. The potential development of a regulatory framework, especially in relation to employment status and protection against algorithmic management, remains unlikely, given the political disinterest and an overarching development and technological advancement narrative, prioritising capital over protecting labour rights of platform workers.

3.2 Pakistan's ‘soft’ approach: A potential for rejuvenation

Since gaining independence, Pakistan has oscillated between democratic governance and periods of martial law, which has hindered the development of a stable industrial relations regime. ⁶⁶ Under successive governments, the right to freedom of association has been alternatively expanded or restricted, which has contributed to low levels of worker protection and a decline in trade union membership. ⁶⁷

Although democratically elected leaders have frequently pledged to align domestic legislation with the fundamental ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98, these promises have largely remained unfulfilled. ⁶⁸ Arguably, the most important change in the post-colonial labour relations landscape was the 18^th Constitutional amendment, which decentralised legislative authority, granting provinces autonomy over labour legislation. ⁶⁹ This led to the enactment of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 (IRA), applicable to the Islamabad Capital Territory, aiming to harmonise key aspects of labour law across different provinces, including trade union formation, collective bargaining, employment relations, and dispute resolution. ⁷⁰

As in other South Asian jurisdictions, Pakistan's labour laws largely exclude workers in the informal sector, including platform workers. Recent State initiatives, such as the ‘Mazdoor Ka Ehsaas’ (Compassion for all workers) programme, aimed to provide minimum social security coverage to all informal sector workers through micro-financing initiatives, including interest-free income support (Ehsaas Amdan), loans (Ehsaas Qaraz), funds transfers (Ehsaas Kafalat), and health and nutrition supports (Ehsaas Nashonuma). ⁷¹ While these have contributed to poverty alleviation, they lack a people-focused rights-based approach, limiting the overall impact of the initiatives. A key recommendation has been to concentrate on Human Capital Development and use the ILO Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention No. 102 as a guide to progressively meet social security goals. ⁷² Some provinces, such as Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, have prioritised the creation of a rights-based policy through their 2022 Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Social Protection Policy programme. ⁷³

Parallel to these initiatives, the status of platform workers has been the subject of several legislative debates. ⁷⁴ Given their independent contractor status, these workers are not covered by any labour laws, excluding them from the scope of the Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010, which was specifically amended to include platform workers. Some provinces have introduced targeted legislation, such as the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Transport by Online Ride Hailing Company Bill, which provides safety guidelines; and the Home-based Workers Acts in Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh, and Balochistan, providing, inter alia, social, medical, and maternity benefits and ensuring rightful contractual terms. ⁷⁵

Moreover, as per the Fairwork report, given Pakistan's constitutional requirement that laws conform to the ‘Injunctions of Islam derived from the Holy Quran and Sunnah’ and supported by the Council of Islamic Ideology and the Federal Shariat Court, the principles of decent work, fair compensation and adequate working conditions could be leveraged to expand labour protections. ⁷⁶

The instrumental draft of the Islamabad Capital Territory Platform Workers Protection Bill (Islamabad Bill), produced by the Center for Labour Research (CLR) and Fairwork, represents a significant development. ⁷⁷ A draft of the Bill has also been presented to the Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis and Human Resources Development. It introduces provisions on, inter alia, minimum and overtime wages, social security protections, access to works councils, and the formation of a platform worker protection council. Importantly, it provides all workers with the right to form and join unions and includes provisions regulating automated monitoring and decision-making systems. Additionally, it also adopts a broad definition of an employer, stating that if the platform meets at least two out of the five criteria — determining remuneration, supervising work, restricting flexibility, setting specific rules, and restricting the possibility to build a client base — then the platform is considered an employer. ⁷⁸ Beyond this, the draft Punjab Labour Code 2024 contains a definition of platform worker, ⁷⁹ and also includes provisions on collective bargaining ⁸⁰ and algorithmic transparency. ⁸¹ However, despite these advances, platform workers are still not recognised as employees, which significantly affects the applicability of key protections.

Based on the parameters identified in the PWD, the legal framework of Pakistan has several deficiencies. Despite ratifying ILO Convention Nos. 87 and 98, Pakistan struggles with their domestic enforcement, especially for informal and self-employed workers, including platform workers. Article 17 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of association, but this is subject to ‘reasonable restrictions’ ⁸² that are quite broad, and the IRA requires union registration by at least 20% of an establishment workforce - a threshold that is difficult to meet for the fragmented platform workforce. Furthermore, since platform workers are not yet recognised as employees under the current IRA, core labour protections are ostensibly not applicable.

Privacy protections also remain underdeveloped. Although Articles 9 and 14 of the Constitution enshrine the right to life and privacy, the absence of a comprehensive framework makes it difficult to gauge how workers’ data rights are operationalised. ⁸³ The Personal Data Protection Bill 2023 also does not address sensitive data processing by employers. ⁸⁴ Additionally, the enforcement of labour protections remains weak due to a shortage of inspectors and limited coverage of the informal sector. ⁸⁵ Therefore, regulatory mechanisms to implement PWD-like provisions are functionally absent.

Pakistan's government has historically adopted a laissez-faire regulatory approach, like Bangladesh, in protecting informal workers and self-employed workers, including platform workers. Although the country ratified fundamental ILO Conventions on collective bargaining, their enforcement remains inconsistent. ⁸⁶ Recent initiatives to protect informal workers, including platform workers, indicate a ‘soft’ regulatory approach to transition to formality. ⁸⁷ Nevertheless, meaningful labour protections, with a rights-based approach and sustained legal and institutional reforms, might be required to correct labour market inequalities.

3.3 India's (de)regulatory approach: Conflicting policy logics to facilitate neo-techno-nationalism

India's labour regime has long been characterised as a ‘legal labyrinth’, wherein the State has enacted regulations that seemingly empower workers and provide social justice at one moment, only to subsequently disempower and marginalise them. ⁸⁸ This regulatory inconsistency has long prevailed, particularly for the disadvantaged workers outside the formal economy. For instance, laws such as the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (IDA) narrowly define the category of ‘workman’, conflating labour with industrial work. As a result, disputes are categorised as ‘industrial disputes’, thereby excluding workers who fall outside the restrictive definition. ⁸⁹ This has effectively left a large segment of the workforce outside the purview of labour law protections, thrusting them into the informal sector.

Recently, the central government aimed to consolidate existing labour law into four codes: the Industrial Relations Code, the Code on Social Security (CSS), the Code on Wages, and the Occupation Safety, Health, and Working Conditions Code. ⁹⁰ These reforms were promoted as efforts to rationalise labour laws and improve the ease of doing business. However, they have faced criticism from workers and unions for weakening the already limited protections. ⁹¹ Notably, these reforms were made without consulting workers, contrary to the ILO's Tripartite Consultation Convention 1976.

Among these measures, the CSS has subsumed the Unorganised Workers’ Social Security Act 2008 (UWSSA) — an Act which provided social security to informal workers. The CSS was drafted with the goal of extending social security to all workers both in the formal and informal sectors. ⁹² However, it has been heavily criticised for its recommendatory nature, absence of mechanisms to ensure justiciability, definitional quandaries, and excessive reliance on executive for framing schemes through delegated legislation. Notably, the CSS has introduced provisions for gig and platform workers, aiming to provide them with social security like the informal workers.

It has been considered a massive step forward legislatively, as it was among the first legislative drafts in South Asia to address social security for platform workers. However, the protections provided under the CSS to platform workers fall drastically short compared to those afforded to formal and informal sectors under the same legislation. Some of the major concerns include: 1) the convoluted distinction between platform and gig work, placing both categories outside the ‘employer-employee relationship’; ⁹³ 2) the differentiated and unequal social security provisions relating to informal, gig, and platform workers, with platform workers receiving the least support; ⁹⁴ 3) the cap on aggregator contributions set at 2% of annual turnover, which is far less than formal sector contributions under the Employees Provident Fund; ⁹⁵ 4) eligibility conditions requiring 90 days of engagement with the platform and an age limit between 16 and 60 years; ⁹⁶ and 5) a mandatory Aadhar — a unique social identification number — to register for schemes. ⁹⁷

Based on the CSS, some States have introduced or drafted their legislation concerning platform work. The State of Rajasthan was the first to enact a law, defining a ‘gig worker’ as one who ‘performs work or participates in a work arrangement and earns from such activities outside of traditional employer-employee relationship…’. ⁹⁸ It also mandates the formation of a welfare Board, which has the power to, inter alia, ensure registration of aggregators and platform workers, set up a monitoring mechanism, and enforce compliance. ⁹⁹ The Act also levies a transaction-based ‘welfare fee’ on aggregators and prescribes significant penalties for non-compliance. ¹⁰⁰

Other States, including Karnataka, Telangana, and Jharkhand, have released draft Bills which are currently being deliberated in their respective State legislatures. While these Bills also lay down provisions pertaining to welfare boards, they also represent an improvement in the Rajasthan legislation. For example, Jharkhand's draft Bill includes provisions pertaining to ‘automated monitoring and decision-making systems’, requiring aggregators to be transparent regarding their usage, and mandating safeguards against algorithmic discrimination. ¹⁰¹ Meanwhile, Karnataka's Bill includes obligations for aggregators to disclose how ratings systems work, how platform workers are classified, and the usage of personal data. ¹⁰²

While these pieces of state-level legislation certainly seem to represent an improvement on the CSS, critical issues persist. Due to the limits of the CSS, under these Bills platform work has been left as a ‘work arrangement’ outside of the standard employment relationship, ¹⁰³ the terms ‘aggregators’ and ‘platforms’ have been conflated, ¹⁰⁴ and the issues pertaining to algorithmic management have not been addressed adequately. As Chintala notes, ‘the state takes ab initio the position that platform workers are not employees of platform companies’. ¹⁰⁵ This has severe consequences for platform workers’ rights to collective action, at least through the legal channels.

The parameters identified in the PWD would be difficult to introduce in India due to the underlying structural limitations of its regulatory framework, arguably created by the State. India has ratified only six of the ten fundamental ILO Conventions, which do not include those pertaining to collective bargaining and freedom of association. Sankaran posits that the lack of ratification might be deliberate on the part of the State, as it would allow for the creation of exceptions to prohibitions on the unionising of members of the armed forces and public servants. ¹⁰⁶ Although the Constitution of India provides a right to freedom of association, it is riddled with exceptions and caveats. ¹⁰⁷ Rather than amending the domestic laws to expand the ambit of labour rights, successive governments have consistently chosen to avoid the ratification of ILO Conventions altogether.

Moreover, the central government has consistently prioritised capital over labour, with many reforms introduced under the guise of ‘efficiency’, resulting in labour precarity. The recently passed Digital Personal Data Protection Act (DPDPA) illustrates this, as it allows employers to collect the data of the employee ‘for the purposes of employment or those related to safeguarding the employer from loss or liability…’. ¹⁰⁸ Reforms, such as the CSS and DPDPA, are arguably representative of a broader government agenda of deregulation.

Roychowdhury ¹⁰⁹ and Mezzadri ¹¹⁰ refer to these as ‘reforms by stealth’, where the institutional structure appears unchanged, but the framework is altered to serve certain capitalist interests. Nathan, Kelkar, and Mehta highlight that one ostensible reason for this deregulation is the support the government intends to provide high-tech industries, which include platforms. It is claimed to be a part of a broader phenomenon of techno-nationalism through which rules are introduced to support platforms but not benefit workers. ¹¹¹ This, however, resembles a rise of neo-techno-nationalism, which Yamada notes provides support for domestic high-tech industries but also aims to attract substantial foreign investment to facilitate start-ups. ¹¹²

In the Indian context, this manifests itself through the ‘Make in India’ initiative and the refurbished ‘swadeshi’ (of one's own country) ideology that paradoxically supports Indian enterprises alongside substantial foreign investment. ¹¹³ In this context, labour deregulation has become a tool for attracting foreign investment, grounded in neoliberal ideology. Mezzadri notes that informality then is not something that occurs in the ‘shadow of the state’. The State is an ‘active agent’ in the process of creation of informalisation through policies and alignment with the interests of capital. This is particularly apparent in India's handling of platform workers. ¹¹⁴

The regulatory approaches to informality and platform work have diverged across South Asian jurisdictions, reflecting varied institutional priorities. Moreover, the heterogeneity of the platforms further complicates the advancement of regulations. Given the structural and institutional limitations, coupled with deregulatory orientation of some States, it is difficult to gauge the feasibility of introducing the parameters set out in PWD within the aforementioned jurisdictions. Arguably, some of the provisions, like the presumption of employment, would be incompatible with existing legal and institutional structures of the region. Therefore, in the next section, we consider the work that has been done by the ILO to assess the potential implications for South Asian jurisdictions.

4. Emerging platform work discussions at the ILO: A potential template for South Asia?

ILO has engaged with the subject of platform work as an emerging frontline in the future of work. ¹¹⁵ Its engagement with platform work is marked by several institutional milestones, which have led to platform work being placed on the ILC's standard-setting agenda. Beginning with research initiatives in the late 2010s, the ILO has produced a myriad of country studies examining digital labour platforms around the world. ¹¹⁶ Policy direction was stirred by the human-centric ideas of the ILO Centenary Declaration, which urged the ILO Member States to address digital transformation challenges. ¹¹⁷ While the Governing Body of the ILO (GB) addressed platform work following the 2015 Expert Meeting on Non-Standard Employment and ILC discussions in 2015 and 2018, the 335th Session in 2019 endorsed proposals prioritising platform regulation, by referencing the 2018 resolution extending collective rights to digital workers.

The ILO Meeting of Experts on Decent Work in the Platform Economy, held in Geneva from 10–14 October 2022, was another important event in ILO's engagement with the topic. ¹¹⁸ This tripartite meeting took place to consider whether an international labour standard was necessary to ensure decent work in the platform economy. Despite four days of deliberations, the meeting failed to reach conclusions, primarily due to employer opposition. The Employers’ Group argued that generic global standards could not address the diverse nature of platforms, and called for more research before initiating any standard-setting process. ¹¹⁹

However, shortly after GB Session 347 — comprising ILO Member States and social partners —platform work regulation was placed on the agenda of the 113th Session of the ILC scheduled for June 2025, thereby initiating a standard-setting process for this area. ¹²⁰ The discussion reflected rather typical polarised interests of the social partners: workers’ representatives emphasised the evident gaps in labour protections for platform workers, while employers’ representatives insisted on the lack of a ‘solid basis for standard-setting action on decent work in the platform economy’. ¹²¹

The GB was provided with two procedural options: tabling the platform topic for ‘general discussion’ or ‘standard setting with a double discussion’ at the ILC. General discussions explore issues within a single ILC session and conclude with non-binding recommendations for future ILO work. In contrast, standard-setting discussions follow a formal, often multi-year procedure, to create legally binding Conventions or non-binding Recommendations that Member States must consider by virtue of their ILO membership.

During GB Session 347, representatives from the governments of India, Bangladesh and Pakistan outlined their positions on how they wanted the ILO to proceed in respect of the issue of platform work. Their opinion was expressed through both direct representatives and those speaking on behalf of the Asian Pacific Group (ASPAG), of which the three governments are a part. ASPAG representatives pointed out that the platform economy offered an avenue for a path to formality, and generally emphasised the positive impact platforms could have on economic prosperity. They acknowledged, however, that protections afforded to platform workers were not equally distributed. During the GB, the representative expressed that more investigation was needed to determine whether a standard-setting procedure was appropriate, stating that the group would be ‘open to general discussion at the conference in 2025 for the purposes of sharing information’. ¹²²

Both Bangladesh and India expressed doubts regarding the necessity and appropriateness of the standard-setting proceedings, while considering the diverse legal practices among Member States. ¹²³ They cautioned that any standards should be created to reflect the specific needs of each Member State. Ultimately, the governments of India and Bangladesh favoured pursuing a general discussion route, with Bangladesh demonstrating a willingness to be flexible should there be overwhelming agreement to place platform work on the standard-setting agenda. ¹²⁴ Pakistan, however, took a different approach, ¹²⁵ expressing the need for a separate Convention. It argued that a new Convention would more effectively address the problems that platform economy poses to vulnerable workers. As a result, the majority of GB favoured the standard-setting procedure, which was scheduled for the 113th session in June 2025. ¹²⁶

The ILO is following a structured institutional process for developing platform economy standards. Initially, a first-year report was discussed at ILC 2025. In preparation, the ILO distributed a questionnaire to constituents regarding platform regulation perspectives ¹²⁷ alongside the report on decent work in the platform economy. ¹²⁸ Governments must consult with employer and worker organisations before submitting responses, which will form the basis for the initial ILC discussion. Following this dialogue, a draft instrument will be introduced for ILC 2026, constituting the second-year review. After the first discussion, a second report containing a revised draft instrument will be circulated for comments before submission to the subsequent conference session. During the second discussion, the draft may be amended before it is proposed for adoption. For the instrument to be adopted, it must receive a two-thirds majority vote.

The implications of the result of this standard-setting discussion for the South Asian region largely depends on the type of standard that might ultimately be adopted. Several potential pathways exist. First, a standalone Convention — typically robust and comprehensive — would place a responsibility on Member States to guarantee platform workers’ rights. Such a Convention might specifically address algorithmic management, an area identified in the gap assessment as requiring particular attention. ¹²⁹ However, if the ILO adopts a Convention, a subsequent ratification campaign would be necessary, as Conventions only become effective following Member State ratification. Given their ratification records and domestic policy positions outlined earlier in this article, all three South Asian countries might demonstrate reluctance to sign such a Convention. ¹³⁰

An alternative approach would be the adoption of a less stringent Convention paired with a comprehensive Recommendation. When a Convention is less prescriptive, the accompanying Recommendation may carry greater influence. Conversely, if a robust Convention is adopted alongside an elaborate Recommendation, the latter might have a diminished impact. For instance, Recommendation 198 concerning employment relationship determination has been a fundamental instrument in labour law and has significantly influenced analyses of the presumption of employment of platform workers.

Finally, another option is the adoption of a strong Recommendation without an accompanying Convention. While not legally binding, such a Recommendation could serve as an important guiding instrument for Member States regulating platform work. In this context, the ILO could leverage soft power and diplomatic negotiations, with the Recommendation functioning as a regulatory compass. Unlike Conventions, Recommendations do not require ratification, meaning South Asian states would not need to take formal action or be subject to the Committee on the Application of Standards reporting procedure.

Should the ILO deliberations result in a Convention, foretelling the adoption by South Asian countries of any potential instrument remains challenging based on current domestic discussions. Analysing domestic action along with the positions expressed during the GB forum and the ratification record of the South Asian states, it would be easy to conclude that South Asian countries would not be the first states to ratify the Conventions.

The symbolic importance of platform work discussions, however, should not be underestimated either. Ongoing processes already shape the discourse on platform work regulation in South Asia through Member State engagement. The ILO's normative approach — built on multilateralism, flexible implementation, and simultaneous emphasis on decent work — may resonate more with the South Asian regions. By conducting these discussions at the ILC, both Member States and social partners have a voice in designing the instrument. This inclusive approach represents the ILO's greatest conceptual strength as an organisation, ensuring tripartite participation in developing a regulatory framework. ¹³¹

Its clarity and normative strength will fundamentally determine the efficacy of the regulatory instrument. The ILO's instrument on platform work should substantively acknowledge workers’ positional vulnerabilities while addressing collective rights and establishing minimum social protection thresholds. Significant challenges may emerge in defining the personal scope of International Labour Standards — an issue that De Stefano highlights regarding recent ILO Conventions, particularly the 2019 Convention on Violence and Harassment. ¹³² Analogous definitional complexities are likely to manifest themselves when establishing the scope and coverage parameters for platform work regulation. The ILO's consultative framework approach may demonstrate particular contextual suitability for South Asian economies, potentially facilitating a balanced regulatory approach that reconciles social protection imperatives with economic development objectives. The instrument will presumably address algorithmic management practices, a critical domain requiring regulatory intervention. The degree of its authoritativeness, precision and unambiguity will directly correlate with its substantive impact on platform workers’ conditions.

The potency of the international regulatory instrument will decisively influence the position of South Asian nations within the evolving digital platform economy landscape. An unambiguous international standard would create a normative imperative that transcends traditional justificatory narratives centred on developmental exigencies and pervasive informality. While South Asian economies have historically contended with extraordinarily high levels of informality, a clear international benchmark on platform work would establish minimum thresholds. Articulating precise standards concerning algorithmic management, worker classification and social protection would compel South Asian nations to develop regulatory frameworks that reconcile economic growth narratives with workers’ fundamental rights. Through establishing authoritative parameters for platform work regulation, a well-crafted ILO instrument would have a role to play in instigating meaningful policy reform across South Asia, which would effectively dismantle the false dichotomy between economic development and labour rights protection that has historically impeded progressive regulatory action in the region.

5. Conclusion

While in the Global North, platform work is seen as a driver of informalisation, in the Global South, it is considered as a path towards formal employment. ¹³³ This article has analysed labour law frameworks across three South Asian countries, arguing that despite their shared historical threads, their regulatory approaches, especially concerning informal work, including platform work, have diverged significantly. Although shaped by common regional challenges — entrenched informality, rigid social hierarchies and technological advancement pursued in the name of economic development — current regulatory frameworks are charting different paths. Our examination suggests distinct approaches to regulating platform work: Bangladesh adopts a laissez-faire approach, Pakistan implements soft regulatory mechanisms, while India pursues deregulatory practices. It can be concluded that the path toward regulated platform labour remains elusive across South Asian jurisdictions, as regulatory frameworks consistently circumvent meaningful oversight of digital platforms. The route to formality is not merely neglected but strategically abandoned — a string of deliberate policy choices that maintain precarity in the South Asian region.

Moreover, the comprehensive protections embodied in the EU's PWD are reflected only in a fragmented and piecemeal fashion across these South Asian jurisdictions. Given the persistent normative gap created by divergent regulatory logics and governmental priorities, forthcoming ILO standards on decent platform work may offer a more promising framework. Yet the fundamental challenge extends beyond the concept of decent work alone — what remains most critical is ensuring fair outcomes through strategies that meaningfully expand the scope of personal labour protections.