Abstract
Negotiators often open with assertive offers to anchor discussions in their favor, yet this approach risks offending potential partners and foreclosing negotiations. Across four experiments, we demonstrate that hedged language softens proposals, allowing negotiators to remain assertive while reducing the risk of offending deal partners and preventing their early exit. Experiment 1 established this effect in a transactional sale context without post-deal interaction. Experiment 2 generalized the effect to a setting in which parties have an ongoing relationship and ruled out a confounding effect of message length. Experiment 3 revealed hedging signals flexibility, but this perception alone does not fully explain the effect. Experiment 4 found that hedged offers did not invite more assertive counteroffers and, after accounting for its reduced effect on impasses, led to better overall performance than directly stated ones. Hedging allows negotiators to introduce self-favorable starting points while minimizing offense and missed deal opportunities.
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