Intelligence services are under an enormous pressure. They have to deal with unusual threats that exhibit unprecedented behavior and often provoke unexpected and disproportionate impacts. They are increasingly ill prepared to meet new and emerging challenges largely because traditional methods are becoming less and less reliable, especially against asymmetric threats. This paper presents a postnormal times (PNT) perspective on intelligence, and argues that intelligence services must do more to cope with radically new hazards without understanding the characteristics and nature of postnormal change. It is necessary to appreciate how contradictions and complexity lead to chaotic behavior in any given situation, and come to terms with evolving levels of uncertainty and ignorance. PNT requires us to rethink the basic axioms of intelligence strategies and tactics.
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