Different approach,same focus: How China is shaping the future of its African cooperation through education

Abstract

Aid, trade, and foreign direct investments remain central to burgeoning Africa and China engagements. However, a recent analysis of the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation action plan reveals a steady shift from the material to the nonmaterial spheres. This observation stems from increasing investments in education, including Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classroom projects, scholarships, professionalized training for African media and security personnel, and China's peacekeeping operations. These people-to-people encounters are expected to expand as the Belt and Road Initiatives deepen. Yet, how these educational collaborations connect to China's quest to consolidate its African presence remains undertheorized. Focusing on Ghana's recent emergence as the continent's largest “exporter” of students to China despite its relatively small population, this study explores the significance of China's growing educational investments on future relationships between China and African countries. The research draws on relational productive power framework of knowledge production and argues that China's growing educational investments in Africa comprise state-led efforts to build social capital to shape future engagements with African countries.

Introduction

The increase in African students in China is not by accident, but rather, by design. Billing itself as a fellow third-world nation lacking a colonial legacy in Africa, China is keen to secure the affections of Africa's next generation of leaders, especially given the continent's youth bulge. Moreover, bringing African students to China and familiarizing them with it is seen as a key tactic by Beijing in its efforts to counter negative attitudes towards China which have arisen in the wake of the country's growing economic footprint in Africa (Wabai, 2019). ¹

Since its reemergence in the 1950s, Africa-China cooperation has remained a vibrant and dynamic force in the international and political arena (Adovor Tsikudo, 2021). The engagement evinces robust foreign direct investments, aid, and trade ties. After emerging as the world's second-largest economy behind the United States in 2010, China also became Africa's leading trading partner, aid donor, and principal infrastructure financier. Although China is still an active player on the African continent, plateauing aid pledges (based on 2015, 2018, and 2021 Forum of China-Africa Cooperation [FOCAC] plans) (Cheng et al., 2022) amid increasing investment in educational initiatives have prompted concerns about China's shifting focus from the material to nonmaterial engagements and the potential ramifications of such a switch for future interactions.

To be sure, China has supported African educational initiatives for as long as the relationship has existed. However, efforts in recent decades have intensified as they have diversified. For instance, from 1956 to 1966, China awarded 164 scholarships to African students from 14 countries to attend various Chinese institutions (Anshan, 2018). This number increased to 922 in 1996 after the institutionalization of the Chinese government scholarship scheme (CGS). The scheme granted 1154 scholarships to African students in 2000 (King, 2014). As a result, the number of scholarship beneficiaries rose to 8470 in 2015. Added to this is an increasing number of self-financed African students attending various Chinese universities. Allowing self-financing individuals in Chinese universities resulted directly from the 1978 national reform and opening up. According to Anshan (2018), there were only 721 such students in China in 1995. This number rose to 41,322 in 2015. These educational initiatives complement Confucius Institute (CI) and Confucius classroom programs, created to promote the Chinese language and culture across universities and high schools in Africa (Pan, 2013).

Factors such as the desire of young Africans to learn more about China and its advanced technology precipitate growing African and China educational cooperation (Yuan, 2019). Moreover, Chinese leaders perceive investment in educational projects and programs as a conduit for diplomatic success in Africa. Accordingly, the authorities support such programs with low visa and tuition fees, shoring up Chinese scholarship packages, and flexible immigration policies (Anshan, 2018). These initiatives have bolstered China's appeal and made it a destination of choice for African students.

According to UNESCO, China ranks second with about 50,000 African Students, behind France, which has about 95,000. Haugen (2013) attributes institutional policy support to neoliberal advancement and the Chinese government’s quest to wean universities off state support and orient them toward revenue generation. Anshan (2018) contrasts this proposition by asserting state-led policies as drivers of China's growing global educational importance. Similarly, Pan (2013) postulates developmental statism, whereby the Chinese state pursued a global development agenda, as a theoretical explanation for China's education initiatives to attract international students. These state-inspired efforts dovetail with China's international relations strategy, which in terms of Africa, revolves around FOCAC.

Since its inauguration in 2000, FOCAC has been organized triennially, with venues oscillating between China and Africa. The summit provides the organizational and ideational framework for conducting Africa and China political, economic, and sociocultural interactions. FOCAC's action plans of 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018, and 2021 emphasize education, science, culture, and health as critical subfields, thus adding to the repertoire of ongoing economic, political, and peace and security arrangements (Benabdallah, 2020). Analysis reveals an underpinning incremental approach to boost China's support for African educational initiatives by expanding beneficiary countries yearly. This plan is complemented by other Chinese government white papers on foreign aid and Belt and Road Educational Action Plan (Yuan, 2022). As it stands, students from 51 ally African countries can apply for placement and scholarships to study in China.

Historically, several countries have deployed international education as a potent foreign policy instrument. For instance, UK's Rhodes scholarship program was created in 1902 to attract graduate students from British colonies and strengthen interactions with source countries (Haugen, 2013). During the Cold War, communist and capitalist countries alike offered scholarships to students from the so-called developing countries to secure their loyalty. These are soft power ruses, which presume that students with pleasant first-hand experiences of life abroad would admire the host country's political system and, in turn, push politics at home in the direction desired by the country they studied in (Haugen, 2013). Despite its embodied limitations, China's rise, and aggressive involvement in global educational activities, especially those focusing on African countries, have fortified this claim. Consequently, it can be contended that China's soaring African educational investments, including scholarships, CIs and Confucius classroom programs, are instruments of projecting soft power (Adovor Tsikudo, 2021).

In 2019, China's popularity as a destination for African students was underscored when it was announced that with over 6500 students, Ghana has the most African students in China. The number comprises scholarship beneficiaries and self-financing students. This development followed the establishment and operation of CIs at the University of Ghana and the University of Cape Coast. Making the announcement, then-Chinese Ambassador to Ghana, Wang Shiting, touted the milestone as symptomatic of an existing strong bond between the two countries. Similarly, Ghanaian authorities enthusiastically proclaimed its human resource development potential for full participation in a global knowledge-based economy. Despite the optimism, it is unclear what the seeming shift from the material to the material conduits, including people-to-people (p2p) initiatives mean for the future of China and Africa relationships.

Consequently, this paper explores the question of how increasing p2p China and Africa collaborations will impact future engagements and interactions. The paper uses Lina Benabdallah's (2020) relational productive power (RPP) framework of knowledge production to elucidate how these seemingly zero-sum transactions are linked. The paper argues that China's growing investment in African educational cooperation is not necessarily focused on immediate results, but a long-term strategy to build social capital and produce knowledge and narratives about China to shape future interactions with Africa. This argument is advanced in five sections. Following this introduction is Section 2, which discusses and augments soft power with RPP. Section 3 examines how Chinese government initiatives such as CI, Confucius classroom, and scholarship programs for African students operationalize a national strategy. Section 4 assesses how African bodies are socialized in Chinese spaces in Africa and in China. Finally, Section 5 constitutes the discussions and conclusions of the essay.

Bridging the soft power gap through relational networks

Three explanations exist for China's increasing footprint in Africa. The first highlights developmental statism, which interprets China's cooperation with African countries as driven by commercial interests. This proposition assumes that China uses economic resources to support its companies in their overtures overseas while providing information and resources to ameliorate the associated risks. The “going global” policy initiative exemplifies this viewpoint. The second viewpoint takes a soft power approach which asserts image enhancement as a rationale for China's expanding African presence. Nye (2009) theorized soft power as when a country persuades others to want what it wants. This differs from hard or command power, which involves commanding or ordering others to do what you want. In contrast with hard power derived from economic and military resources, soft power hinges on a country's culture, political values, and foreign policies. China, however, does not subscribe to this distinct power dichotomy. Instead, Chinese authorities posit hard and soft power as complementary (Repnikova, 2022). As such, China uses its economic resources to forge a better global image, including courting African countries. Finally, scholars attribute China's growing prominence in Africa to resource insecurity (Adovor Tsikudo, 2020). China's economic boom since the early 1990s made it a net resource importer. Africa possesses strategic energy and oil resources. Africa's importance deepens as China seeks to diversify its supply sources amid increasing turbulence in the Middle East. This view supposes that sustaining China's industrial growth entails promoting resource-for-development/infrastructure arrangements with African countries. This approach underpins soaring interactions between Africa and China. These views are grounded in realist (based on the fact that the world system is chaotic, states pursue their own interests), neorealist (a framework for understanding state behavior based on existing underlying structures), and rationalist (the idea that states is rational actors) ² theories of interstate engagements.

China's African educational initiatives are related to smart power, which combines hard and soft power for mutual benefits, especially a positive image overseas (Repnikova, 2022). Education's role in the global economy is complex. On the one hand, it facilitates how countries pursue modernity and development. On the other hand, the imperative of a knowledge-based economy as a source of economic prosperity underlines the centrality of education in the twenty-first century. Similarly, the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals Four proposes equitable and affordable education for all by 2030 to achieve such a goal (Yuan, 2022). For African countries, meeting this target is vital to achieving competitiveness in a fast-changing world. To this end, expanding educational opportunities through cooperation for current and future generations is crucial. Although not a member of the OECD's development assistance committee, China's contribution to this agenda has made it the single most significant contributor to African human resource development (Benabdallah, 2020).

Scholars perceive China's involvement in African education as an extension of soft power ruses (Repnikova, 2022). In other words, while investment in educational activities and projects such as CIs and various scholarship programs are constitutive of the display of China's economic power, the gains from such initiatives shore up China's image across the continent. The dual benefits associated with educational cooperation as a mechanism of soft power highlight the allegory of the “chicken and egg” dilemma. In other words, does China use its economic resources to rectify its present African image deficit problems or invest in future African human resources as an antidote? This notwithstanding, the current approach exemplifies China's ability to efficiently deploy its smart power tools to optimize its goals. Affection is central to soft power (Adovor Tsikudo, 2021). China's increasing involvement in this arena through engagement with Africa is perceived as a critical conduit. However, how affection is created through education is far less straightforward.

Drawing on Michel Foucault, Benabdallah (2020) proposed RPP as a bridge to this theoretical limitation. For her, China is a different actor whose actions go beyond the remit of Western realism, rationalism, and neorealism theories. Using RPP, she views power as a process rather than a possession. This framing foregrounds the significance of China's nonmaterial investments, especially education and scholarships. RPP emphasizes social relations, networks, norm diffusion, and knowledge production, where power as social capital resides in social ties, networks, and other arrangements. Repnikova (2022) contends that China has historically used other nonmaterial apparatuses, including diplomacy and media but with limited success. Thus, switching to educational collaboration through scholarship programs, CIs, Confucius classrooms, and other professionalized training programs is a move to augment the existing mechanisms. RPP's saliency is in understanding that relations shape power, and powerful actors, at vantage nodes, turn to manipulate their networks. Concerning education, the need for epistemic communities and social capital explicates CGSs, student exchanges, educational tours, and fairs, increasing CIs and Classrooms projects across the continent. These nonmaterial investments offer opportunities for socializing future African leaders and intellectuals on Chinese norms and values into receptive actors. Positive experiences and connections forged through these p2p interactions are critical in creating affection—a missing link in soft power matrix. As illustrated by Benabdallah, state actors and individuals do not possess power by themselves. Instead, their positions, networks, and connections do. Thusly, the nodes and ties that connect individuals in the web of power they influence and are influenced by produce power. Benabdallah posits these nodes as relations and associations that exemplify power not as an instrument but as a set of links, processes, and behaviors.

Framing power this way justifies China's nonmaterial investments in Africa. It is undeniable that material engagements, including loans, infrastructures, and natural resource extraction, have seared China's status on the continent as a prominent development actor. The 2021 Afrobarometer report indicates that such initiatives have inspired most Africans to view China positively. However, China's global activities are also characterized by governance, environmental, labor, and racism concerns. Relational capabilities and p2p initiatives represent plausible antidotes to these negative impressions. Li (2022) argued that China's African p2p initiatives seek to connect China to Africans, create affection, and build a better image. Such connections are crucial in ensuring China's overseas success, including Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) implementation. The digital silk road initiative started in 2015, two years after the BRI, explicates this assertion. Thus, it can be concluded that expanding BRI will result in more countries deepening their educational engagements with China. This logically underwrites the increasing educational collaborations with Africa, including Ghana which now has the highest number of African students in China

Confucius Institutes and how they operate

After a successful reform in 1978, China realized the need to woo international investors and boost its status. However, Chinese authorities soon discovered a limited global understanding of its culture, history, and language (Pan, 2013). In addition, a global status aspiration prompted the government to establish the Chinese language council international (Hanban) to administer and support Chinese language programs abroad (Repnikova, 2022). Hanban was nestled within the Ministry of Education and has over the years dispatched teachers overseas to teach Chinese, established radio and television stations, and promoted internet-based Chinese distance education programs. These activities churned mixed dividends prompting Hanban to start the CI program in 2004—with the first site in Seoul, South Korea.

For Chinese officials, CIs are mechanisms for promoting the Chinese language and culture by creating spaces outside China to learn Chinese history, language, and people. The program has since expanded to other countries and regions. Presently, there are about 541 CIs and 1170 Confucian classroom in 162 countries. Despite their rapid expansions, CIs were embroiled in controversies that have resulted in some closures. Primarily, Western countries such as the US perceived the program as academic malware, trojan horses, and peripheral propaganda branches of the Chinese party-state. Additionally, they were accused of interference in course offerings, instructions, and funding at US higher education. In 2017, these accusations culminated in closures across the United States, Canada, Europe, and Australia (Repnikova, 2022). In attempts to decouple and depoliticize the agency, China's authorities formed the Chinese International Education Foundation—a designated NGO of charitable organizations and universities to manage the program. Consequently, Hanban was reconstituted into a culture and language learning agency to support CI operations.

Although CIs in other regions were closing, African countries were experiencing a steady rise in numbers. Reports by Xinhua ³ indicate that there are currently 61 CIs and 48 CCRs spread across 45 countries on the continent. CIs were part of the Chinese cultural diplomatic outreach intended to foster soft power through positive images of China by investing in language and cultural education programs for young Africans. They are designed to mimic the operation of other countries’ cultural agencies, such as the Alliance Francais, British Council, and Cervantes Institute. CI is a central tenet for relational networking to boost Chinese future influence and power.

CIs are joint creations between African universities and Hanban. African universities’ proposals are appraised by Hanban for feasibility; once deemed practicable, the marriage is contracted. At the onset, Hanban provides seed money of $50,000–$150,000 to begin operation. The amount is adjusted based on context and socioeconomic conditions. Other cost-sharing arrangements and collaborations involve management, staffing, and office space. CIs are managed by local and Chinese directors who make joint decisions. Their operations are subject to a board of directors’ oversight, with whom they report and plan activities and curriculum. This alliance is, however, not without issues, stemming mostly from the unequal contributions and Hanban's unbridled influence. Li (2022) documents quarrel between CI directors in some Eastern African universities. This notwithstanding, both sides acknowledge the centrality of collaboration. According to Li, one deputy Chinese director noted that “that if they [local directors] are involved too much, we cannot carry out our activities; if they are too little, it won't work.” There are also reported cases of when local and Chinese staff report to work. Similarly, issues of communication and coordination are frequent sources of tension. Despite these challenges and friction, African CIs continue to thrive with increasing enrolments and no known closures.

Socializing African bodies through scholarships, CIs, and classrooms

In a packed auditorium of university dons, parents, and students, at the University of Ghana Campus to celebrate a CI event, Shiting Wang, China's Ambassador announced that with 6500 students, Ghana is the African country with the largest number of students studying at Chinese institutions. This statement elicited applause, but Mr Wang proceeded to underline the centrality of CGSs and policies in achieving the current milestone. For him, the achievement underlines the importance of China and Ghana ties. As the epigram indicates, this is neither new nor an accident. It is an orchestrated and state-choreographed plan to create public spectacles using economic, political, and cultural resources to socialize a future generation.

China's socialization process occurs in twofold. First, through scholarships offered by the Chinese government, companies, and provincial governments. Secondly, through CI and Classroom experiences. In the former, the Chinese government through its embassies works with African governments to award African students scholarships to study in various Chinese institutions. Contrary to other development actors, China's education strategies in Africa are inclusive and focus on building African capacity (Benabdallah, 2020). At the CI event recounted above, Ambassador Wang underlined this by stating: “China is still one of the largest countries providing human resource training and capacity building support to Ghana, with 1000 scholarships for both short-term and long-term training.” Beyond supporting all levels of education, Chinese scholarships are offered for postgraduate programs including disciplines such as engineering, arts and language, business, and management (Yuan, 2022). In contrast to self-financing students, Chinese scholarship recipients are treated differently; they are provided stipends, medical insurance, free tuition, and plane tickets to visit their home countries while being full-time students. However, beneficiaries are expected to return home after their studies to serve their countries. Host universities/institutions are empowered to ensure full compliance.

Haugen's (2013) study of the experiences of African students in China highlights how scholarship beneficiaries tend to hold positive views of China than their self-financing counterparts. Although scholarship awardees benefit from organized tours and limited harassment from Chinese law enforcement authorities, their self-financing counterparts contend with harsh treatments and discriminations. The latter survive on personal savings acquired by exporting goods back home or working for compatriots domiciled in China. These groups often have delayed progress toward graduation resulting in visa overstays and subsequent law enforcement harassments. According to Haugen, such scenarios result in grim views of China by self-financing students. On the contrary, most scholarship beneficiaries return to their home countries and serve in various capacities including being ambassadors, professors, civil, and public servants. These categories of people are more enthusiastic about China, hence, more likely to defend China in their home countries.

The second conduits of socialization occur in Africa through the CIs and Classroom programs. Although local African institutions provide most CIs and Classrooms, the curriculum is determined and developed by Hanban. As suggested by Li (2022), these centers are a physical extension of everything China. Metaphorically, entering such spaces is like entering China. You have to learn to speak Mandarin, learn Chinese culture, and history. The faces of the centers, saved for a few, are mostly Chinese. The teachers are Chinese, paid by Chinese institutions, etc. Studies by Benabdallah (2020) and Repnikova (2022) suggest that Hanban's hold on the academic curriculum determined the kind of knowledge that is produced in the various CIs and Classrooms across the continent. For instance, students in the above studies intone that they learn about Taiwan being part of China with a unified history. Without further exposure, such understanding becomes the norm students are imbued with and continue to produce over time. China uses these ruses deliberately to control the knowledge produced about China.

Socialization is a performative process. The extent to which this process goes depends on intentions and resources. As the foregoing demonstrates, China has since the 1970s discovered the need to promote and project itself to gain visibility. The establishment of Hanban pioneered this vision. Anchored by state resources and a mandate to create a positive image abroad, Hanban has aggressively pursued various soft power instruments, including media platforms, CIs, and classroom projects. Although chastised by the West leading to closures, the spread of CI and Classroom programs in Africa has been a boon in producing knowledge of Chinese culture, history, and language. The success of this may not be immediate but judging from the enthusiasm the program has generated in Africa, characterized by Ghana's recent success story, it would not take long before the impacts start to manifest.

Discussions and conclusions

Although a latecomer in the global political and economic arena, China's well-designed strategies and relentless pursuit of visibility are now apparent. Economically, China toppled Japan and Germany to become the world's largest economy behind the United States. This followed its 2001 WTO membership and the previous unprecedented economic booms that made it the "world's factory". Since then, China's leadership has pragmatically shown the world that they are a force to reckon with. Elements of this posturing were revealed in organizing the 2008 Olympic Games. The games’ ceremonies captivated the world and showed China's might and capability. In the terms of expenditure and spectacle, the 2008 Olympics tops all the previous tournament and remains the most expensive and elaborate in the history of the Olympics, despite its social cost of displacements, labor unrest, and dispossessions. Additionally, China's contributions to the United Nations peacekeeping program have bolstered its status in the comity of nation.

Yet, China's rapid rise has also given many a pulse. The West for instance has described China's activities in Africa as neocolonial, illiberal, and propellant for rogue/pariah regimes. Added to these are criticism of poor labor management in Chinese firms, and lack of commitment to environmental protection and the Equator Principles ⁴ by its construction firms. Although Chinese officials have denied these claims, they have gone one step higher by pragmatically seeking to control the narrative. The Chinese propaganda strides began with expanding the global Chinese TV network into Africa to broadcast and popularize China to African audiences (Benabdallah, 2020). At the 2012 launch in Nairobi, the Chinese president urged the media outlet to “tell the Chinese story well.” The media outfit has expanded to other countries and even ventured into niches such as sports broadcasting and sponsorships. For instance, Startime, a subsidiary of network now sponsors Ghana's national football league and broadcasts live matches. Despite these forays, China's media still lag behind its Western counterparts such as CNN and BBC.

China's relentless effort at telling its story right has taken a new twist with the remarkable investments in educational initiatives over the past two decades. Anchored by the FOCAC, a p2p strategy based on connecting Africans to Chinese culture and value has now intensified. This initiative has different dimensions, including direct recruitment and training of African media and security personnel. Such people are sponsored on short-term trips to China, to as it were, build capacity in Africa to tell the Chinese story better. Collaborators in Lina Benabdallah's work remained ambivalent about this approach with some claiming that despite their trip to China, they are not obliged to tell only positive stories about China. To a large extent, this is one of the challenges of soft power. You can take a horse to the river but cannot force it to drink water. Similarly, long-term training programs have been enacted to sponsor future generations through scholarship packages. Regarding soft power, studies show that scholarship recipients mostly hold favorable views of China contrary to self-financing students.

Satisfaction is crucial for social capital, class identity, and network formation, including old-school and alumni associations. Presumably, China craves to forge this sort of community with its increasing educational cooperation with African countries—a group of experts who speak Mandarin and understand Chinese culture and values. These experts serve as bridges linking the two sides. This is imperative for the future of China-Africa relations as these scholars and elites, mostly drawn from the public sector, ascend the public service ladder. They become nodes for projecting Chinese ideas and, thus, more receptive to Chinese policies. Such expert communities and their role in politics resonate with Foucault's assessment of intertwined power and epistemic communities. For him, power is:

exercised through networks and individuals and do not simply circulate in those networks; they [individuals] are in a position to both submit to and exercise this power. They are never the inert or consenting targets of power; they are always its relays. In other words, power passes through individuals. It is not applied to them…the individual is a relay: power passes through the individuals it has constituted (Foucault, 2003, 29–30 cited in Benabdallah, 2020, 47).

This Foucauldian assessment is salient to the RPP discussed earlier and indicates that state elites and other individual actors do not have nor possess power. They are merely nodes/ties that connect individuals in the network of power that they influence and are influenced by. These nodes are relations and connections that help us understand soft power not as mere instruments but as assets, relationships, and processes that enhance one's image. From all indications, China approaches the intangible elements of power with tact, grit, and purpose to rectify its African image problem. Liu Haifang, a Chinese professor, could not be much clearer in postulating that “the benefit is image, image-building among Africans. If there is a better image of the Chinese government and its support of education among youth, then young people can come to work for Chinese companies and spread good messages to their community” (quoted by Allision, 2015). Haugen’s work highlights some of these outcomes and suggests progress as plans and programs intensify.