Attacks Against Journalists in Brazil: Catalyzing Effects and Resilience During Jair Bolsonaro’s Government

Abstract

Attacks on journalists have become a growing concern in democracies around the world. Past scholarship suggests that such attacks could lead to a chilling effect of journalists self-censoring their reporting. However, there is limited empirical work that substantiates the effects of attacks on journalists. To empirically test the existence of chilling effects, this mixed-methods study uses the conditions of journalism under Jair Bolsonaro’s government in Brazil as an exploratory case study. We investigate how attacks (N = 901) and propaganda messages (N = 518,853) impacted news coverage (N = 20,998) in the first two years of Bolsonaro’s government, based on time series analysis and in-depth interviews with journalists (N = 18). Our results suggest that, despite the increase in government attacks, Brazilian journalists do not exhibit chilling effects; instead, they display what we call catalyzing effects. Our time series results showed that an increase in state propaganda leads to an increase in news coverage. Furthermore, our qualitative data affirms the concept of catalyzing effects. Findings from the interviews suggest that catalyzing effects operate as a form of resilience among journalists. Catalyzing effects do not necessarily manifest as more coverage, but as persistent coverage despite ongoing criticisms and threats (both social and physical). Our findings offer a path forward, highlighting the importance of bringing the discussion about violence and attacks against journalists back to the community of journalists experiencing this hostility. Network support, journalists said, has been crucial, which points to the need for a solidarity infrastructure that supports journalists’ constructive role in society.

Attacks, sometimes violent, against journalists are problematic for democracies worldwide. While Donald Trump fueled an unprecedented number of state-endorsed attacks against the U.S. press, threats to press freedom globally have persisted for decades (Nerone 2012). In Latin America, this trend has been growing since 2002, when then-President Hugo Chávez started what the press described as a “media war” in Venezuela. ¹ Developments in digital technology have exacerbated attacks on journalists, especially with the election of far-right extremists after 2016 (Waisbord 2020). These political actors have used propaganda and attacks to undermine the work of journalists who cast them in a bad light. What remains unanswered is: what are the consequences of these attacks on journalism?

Scholarly literature has suggested that attacks on journalists might lead to a chilling effect. In this study, we define a chilling effect as the idea that journalists may self-censor their reporting because of the fear of potential risks (Kim and Shin 2022). We interrogate this idea by considering a contrasting concept: “catalyzing effect,” occurring when attacks against journalists motivate journalistic reporting instead of curbing it, effectively functioning as the opposite of a chilling effect. We aim to understand how, and to what extent, attacks and propaganda relate to chilling and catalyzing effects. Past studies on chilling effects have not often empirically tested these effects; we therefore apply an empirical, mixed-methods approach, using Jair Bolsonaro’s government in Brazil as an exploratory case. Brazil is a thirty-eighty-year-old democracy with continually guaranteed free speech since transitioning from a military regime in 1985. The Brazilian case can illuminate patterns of interaction between propaganda, attacks, and news coverage that may arise in any democratic country. This study contributes an account of the outcomes of attacks targeting journalists in democracies, analyzes journalists’ lived experiences coping with these attacks, and proposes possible solutions to the problem of attacks on the press.

Then-Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro is a right-wing extremist, frequently called “the tropical Trump” (Weizenmann 2019). Emerging from the nostalgia of military rule in Brazil (Signates 2019), Bolsonaro’s government is known for the denial of the COVID-19 pandemic (Ricard and Medeiros 2020), policies tolerating the deforestation of the Amazon rainforest (Deutsch and Fletcher 2022), and drastic cuts to the funding of science and education (Knobel and Leal 2021). Since Bolsonaro took office on January 1, 2019, attacks against the press were a central strategy of his government, especially through the spread of disinformation from his digital media team, which was affiliated with the presidential office: the so-called “Office of Hatred” (Ozawa et al., 2023). Rhetoric from the Bolsonaro administration encouraged state actors and supporters to attack journalists in Brazil verbally and physically. We investigate how attacks and propaganda impacted news coverage in the first two years of Bolsonaro’s government, using time series analysis and in-depth interviews.

Literature Review

Attacks Against Journalists and Chilling Effects

State-encouraged invocations of attacks against journalists can have lasting and devastating consequences for the prospects of an informed citizenry, effectively producing a chilling effect (Eide 2019; Lashmar 2017). The chilling effect, often referenced in legal contexts, refers to self-censoring because of actual or anticipated backlash (Eide 2019; Mohamed 2020). The concept was first used to explain the deterrence of freedom of expression due to regulations or punishment by libel law, but it has since been adapted to various communication contexts including journalism (Mohamed 2020; Schauer 1978; Townend 2017).

While there are numerous causes of chilling effects on journalism, attacks toward journalists are most commonly expected to have chilling effects on coverage of sensitive issues like political corruption. This pattern is pronounced in Latin American countries (Fadnes 2019; Hughes and Márquez-Ramírez 2017b), where the harassment and murder of journalists (long connected to corruption and organized crime) have increased (UNESCO 2018). Attacks against journalists are often protected with impunity (Carlsson and Pöyhtäri 2017; Fadnes 2019), even in “nominally democratic and relatively stable societies,” which could create prime conditions for chilling effects on journalists (Torsner 2017: 134) in places like Brazil.

We measure the attacks analyzed in this study according to a list that is annually compiled by the Brazilian Federation of National Journalists (FENAJ). These reports list what FENAJ considered to be attacks in the following categories: detention/imprisonment, censorship, cyberattack, impediment to professional practice, kidnapping/false imprisonment, murder, physical aggression, press discredit, racial slurs/racism, restriction to press freedom by lawsuits, terrorist attack, threats/intimidation, verbal aggression/virtual attack, and violence against union organization. The FENAJ reports claim they are listing cases of “violence against journalists,” but hostility toward the press can take many different forms, and terms such as “attacks” and “violence” are sometimes used interchangeably (Miller, 2021b). We use the term “attacks” throughout this paper because it broadly encompasses the different types of harm, verbal and physical, targeting journalists in Brazil.

Chilling effects from physical and digital threats, harassment, and attacks may manifest in various forms of self-censorship, from framing stories about sensitive issues differently to avoid covering certain topics altogether (Fadnes et al. 2020). Focusing on the conceptualization of chilling effects as producing less coverage (Mohamed 2020), we propose the following hypothesis:

• H1: An increase in attacks against journalists leads to a decrease in news coverage on Jair Bolsonaro.

Past studies on chilling effects are often descriptive or presumptive (e.g., Eide 2019; Tuazon et al. 2017) and do not usually empirically test for chilling effects (Townend 2017), though there are key exceptions. Hughes and Márquez-Ramírez (2017a), for example, studied self-censorship among Mexican journalists with a survey. Closely related to our work, Mazzaro (2021) longitudinally tested the effect of anti-media discourse on attacks against journalists in Venezuela. We build on this knowledge by analyzing news coverage alongside propaganda and attacks. The idea of chilling effects offers a way to articulate the potential danger of attacks on journalists leading to the coercive evaporation of journalism. Yet even in places where journalists experience intense attacks, news coverage does not necessarily abate. We suggest an alternative explanation: catalyzing effects.

Journalistic Resilience and Catalyzing Effects

In contrast to chilling effects, state attacks or threats may motivate persistent coverage as a form of resistance (Tuazon et al. 2017). While journalists may be intimidated into self-censorship, others perceive negative attacks as a sign that they are doing something worthwhile, motivating perseverance (Lischka 2017). Thus, it is possible that attacks against journalists may instigate the reverse of a chilling effect—that is, a “catalyzing effect.”

Catalyzing effects may be motivated by anti-press populist rhetoric, propaganda, and state censorship. For example, in August 2018, hundreds of U.S. newspapers participated in a coordinated editorial campaign (#FreePress campaign) in response to Donald Trump’s anti-press rhetoric (Lawrence and Moon 2021). The newspapers published editorials on the same day, defending journalism against Trump’s framing of the news media as “the enemy of the people” (Whipple and Shermak 2020). Journalists from Novaya Gazeta, Russia’s oldest liberal newspaper, are another example; they launched their European edition to avoid Vladimir Putin’s suppression of press freedom. ² In Colombia, the press came together to investigate Pablo Escobar after the murder of Guillermo Cano, a journalist who exposed Escobar’s drug trafficking activities as a member of the Colombian Congress (Zarate-Valderrama 2016). The union of Colombian journalists was later expanded through Proyecto Nariño (Nariño 2004). Dozens of journalists from Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador are currently in exile, yet continue reporting from abroad. ³

Catalyzing effects suggest a form of resilience among journalists. Resilience refers to a capacity or process to recover from difficulties, and is often observed among journalists, in the form of collective resilience (González de Bustamante and Relly 2021; Houston et al. 2019; Masten 1994). Resilience can help journalists cope with insecurity and threats, as seen through collective resilience efforts such as unions and professional organizations (Barrios and Miller 2021; Nakiwala 2020; Novak and Davidson 2013). Therefore, a plausible alternative to H1 may be that state propaganda and attacks induce a catalyzing effect.

• H2: An increase in attacks against journalists leads to an increase in news coverage of Bolsonaro.

• H3: An increase in propaganda leads to an increase in news coverage of Bolsonaro.

Contentious Press–Government Relations in Brazil

The 2022 Brazilian media ecosystem consists of a vigorous online news sector, many small regional and local media, and big media companies located in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. The largest media conglomerate in the country (and in Latin America) is Globo, which comprises the country’s leading TV network, radio stations, magazines, and newspapers. Globo TV reaches 99.5 percent of potential viewers in Brazil (Globo Network 2022). Globo TV became one of Bolsonaro’s main “enemies” during his administration because of the network’s coverage of governmental crises, including corruption scandals and Bolsonaro’s mismanagement of the COVID-19 pandemic (Nicoletti and Flores 2022). Except for a few Bolsonaro-aligned outlets (e.g., Jovem Pan), ⁴ mainstream media largely aligned with Globo TV’s coverage.

While Brazil has had an endemic problem of attacks against journalists long before the Bolsonaro government, particularly in rural communities (Osinski 2022; Waisbord 2002), Bolsonaro inaugurated a trend of systematic state attacks that was not seen previously. For example, the FENAJ reported thirty-nine attacks against journalists in 2010 (FENAJ 2010). In 2019, the first year of the Bolsonaro government, there were 208 attacks. In 2020, the number of attacks rose to 428 (FENAJ 2019, 2020). These attacks were not only perpetrated directly by the Bolsonaro government, but by his supporters, who might feel encouraged given that Bolsonaro’s direct communication with his audience systematically contained verbal attacks against journalists. These attacks were consistently supported by propaganda spread on social media (Nicoletti and Flores 2022). One way of understanding these attacks is through the concept of mob censorship, defined as a coordinated harassment effort, with the goal of silencing journalists (Waisbord 2020). While prior research has focused on Trump’s right-wing populism in the United States (Waisbord 2020, 2022b), Bolsonaro might have escalated it by institutionalizing the Office of Hatred.

• H4: An increase in propaganda leads to an increase in attacks against journalists.

An ardent admirer of Brazil’s military dictatorship (Daly 2020), Bolsonaro achieved national recognition as an extreme right-wing politician after he was given the opportunity to resign from the military after planning a terrorist campaign to explode bombs across Rio de Janeiro (Azevedo and Robertson 2022; Carvalho 2019). Bolsonaro’s declarations are known for their mixture of authoritarianism, disinformation spread, and verbal attacks (Seibt and Dannenberg 2021), particularly toward journalists.

During the 2018 election, journalists started reporting evidence that Bolsonaro’s political campaign was utilizing disinformation toward his opponents, ⁵ including journalists. But what is the impact of these attacks?

This experience of journalists directly impacts their performance. The journalistic role most pertinent to this study is watchdog journalism, referring to journalists’ inspection of institutions of power, such as governments (Hellmueller and Mellado 2016). Previous research has shown that the performance of the watchdog role is driven by sociopolitical contexts, and it is subject to the quality of a democracy. Not surprisingly, undemocratic political regimes and restriction of press freedom tend to undermine the watchdog role of journalism (Márquez-Ramírez et al. 2020). We propose a research question to explore this issue in-depth.

• RQ1: How do Brazilian journalists perceive their roles and professions under the Bolsonaro administration?

Methods

To understand the impact of state coercion on journalism in Brazil, we conducted a two-step mixed-methods analysis. First, we analyzed the interaction between state-sponsored propaganda, attacks on journalists, and critical news coverage using a time series model. We contextualized these findings with our second step, a series of in-depth interviews with Brazilian journalists about their lived experience reporting on the Bolsonaro administration.

Quantitative Approach: Time Series Modeling

Our quantitative analysis is focused on the first two years of Bolsonaro’s term, from January 1, 2019, to December 31, 2020. To collect propaganda messages from the “Office of Hatred,” we first compiled a list of public accounts on Facebook and Twitter associated with Bolsonaro, members of his family, extreme right-wing politicians, and other affiliates of the “Office of Hatred” (see Supplemental Information file for a list of the accounts). To collect these accounts’ tweets, we used the R package {academictwitteR} (Barrie and Ho 2021). We used CrowdTangle to collect the Facebook posts (CrowdTangle Team 2022). These data were then aggregated into a daily count of Facebook (N = 255,921) and Twitter (N = 262,932) posts.

To build an event time series of state attacks and criticisms targeting journalists, we used the 2019/2020 “Relatórios de Violência contra Jornalistas e Liberdade de Imprensa no Brasil” (“Reports of Violence against Journalists and Freedom of the Press in Brazil”), which are published yearly by Brazil’s National Federation of Journalists (FENAJ 2019, 2020). FENAJ’s detailed archive of state attacks targeting journalists was manually extracted into a spreadsheet and was subsequently aggregated into a daily count of attacks (N = 901).

To account for news coverage, we collected news articles from four prominent news organizations that were critical of the Bolsonaro administration: G1 (the online version of Globo TV), Brasil 24/7 (leftist news portal), CartaCapital (online version of a leftist magazine), and UOL (major web portal with a strong news selection). Our analysis focuses primarily on criticisms toward Bolsonaro, though our collection does take into account variations in editorial ideology, platform (e.g., magazine vs. digital media), and size. (UOL and Globo are the largest outlets in Brazil, whereas Brasil 24/7 and CartaCapital are small, independent organizations.) We selected articles that contained the keywords “Bolsonaro” or “gabinete do ódio” (“office of hatred”) and were published between January 1, 2019, and December 31, 2020. This yielded a total of 20,998 articles, which were then aggregated into a daily count.

Given our analysis’ time frame, we included COVID-19 cases as an exogenous control because the pandemic affected every variable in this study: volume of news coverage (Wirz et al. 2021), propaganda spread by the Office of Hatred (Ricard and Medeiros 2020), and attacks against journalists (Nicoletti and Flores 2022). We did so by collecting the daily number of COVID-19 cases in Brazil reported between January 1, 2019, and December 31, 2020 (Dong et al. 2020).

We then ran a vector autoregression (VAR) model to understand the temporal relationships between the variables. To ensure a properly fitted model, we employed several steps to prepare the data. First, we decomposed seasonal trends in the news and propaganda time series using the {forecast} package in R (Hyndman and Khandakar 2008). Next, we tested each time series for non-stationarity. Using the Phillips–Perron test (Kočenda and Černý 2015), we determined that one time series was non-stationary: the COVID-19 control (p = .1). In accordance with VAR modeling, we first-differenced this time series to make it stationary. Finally, we identified the optimal lag structure of our VAR model using Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC), which is best suited for producing parsimonious models (Korobilis 2008); we determined that the ideal model has a lag of 3 (BIC = 9,453.68).

The interpretation of the partial results of a VAR model can be challenging (Benati and Surico 2009); therefore, we applied Granger causality tests and impulse response functions (IRFs) to assess our findings (Soroka 2002). It is important to state that Granger causality is not a test of causality, but rather of temporal dependency (Shojaie and Fox 2022): it shows whether information about one variable can be used to predict another variable in the model at a later time. This longitudinal modeling has become popular in the field of mass communication as more granular levels of data become accessible via digitized data (Lukito, 2020; Wells et al. 2019).

Qualitative Approach: Interviews

Following this quantitative modeling, we conducted semi-structured interviews which we then analyzed qualitatively using a grounded theory approach, which is uniquely appropriate for identifying novel processes (Walker and Myrick 2006). The use of qualitative methods helped us to ground and properly contextualize our quantitative findings.

Using the FENAJ reports from 2019 to 2021, we compiled a list of journalists who were victims of attacks. We solicited voluntary participation from the journalists by emailing them. In total, eighteen journalists agreed to speak with us for thirty to sixty minutes. Interviewees included eleven men and seven women, with ages ranging from twenty-three to sixty-seven years old. We used pseudonyms to guarantee anonymity. Table A1 in the Supplemental Information file lists the interviewees’ pseudonyms, the size of the news organization in which they were working when they were a victim of attack, and the number of years they have worked as a journalist.

A member of our research team is a native Portuguese speaker and conducted the interviews in Portuguese. During the interview, the interviewer asked questions about their past and ongoing experiences as journalists, their experiences with state or state-encouraged attacks, and what motivates them to continue reporting. This interview protocol was IRB-approved. Following these interviews, the interviewer translated and transcribed each interview, organizing these transcriptions with their field notes. The interviewer then wrote memos based on the field notes and transcriptions.

As suggested by a grounded theory approach (Walker and Myrick 2006), the interviewer used open coding to code the transcriptions and memos. Then, the research team collaboratively established four axial codes by synthesizing related open codes. After establishing the four themes from this axial coding, the team organized the themes through selective coding to develop a synthesized theory of catalyzing effect for journalists.

Results

Time Series Modeling

To analyze the content and event data, we constructed daily counts of attacks targeting journalists, propaganda messages from the Office of Hatred, and news articles. Then we used a time series model (Lütkepohl 2013) to analyze the temporal relationships between attacks, propaganda, and the news articles (all variables are treated as endogenous). We also included COVID-19 cases as an exogenous control.

The vector auto-regression model, VAR(3), and Granger causality test show no directional relationship between attacks against journalists and news coverage (χ² = 0.55, p = .65). An increase in attacks against journalists does not lead to a decrease or increase in news coverage. Thus, we found no support for H1 (an increase in attacks against journalists leads to a decrease in news coverage) and no support for H2 (an increase in attacks against journalists leads to an increase in news coverage). At the same time, the reverse direction predicted in H1 and H2 holds true. An increase in news coverage is positively associated with a greater likelihood of attacks (χ² = 9.95, p < .001). In other words, an increase in news coverage precedes more attacks on journalists.

We found a temporal and unidirectional relationship between propaganda and news coverage. Propaganda Granger causes news coverage. In other words, an increase in propaganda tends to lead an increase in news coverage (χ² = 11.10, p < .001), supporting H3. The reverse does not hold true. News coverage does not Granger cause propaganda (χ² = 2.04, p = .11). Finally, we found a temporal and unidirectional relationship between propaganda and attacks. An increase in propaganda is positively associated with a greater number of attacks (χ² = 9.21, p < .001). In other words, an increase in propaganda tends to lead to more attacks on journalists. The reverse does not hold true. Attacks against journalists does not Granger cause propaganda (χ² = 1.30, p = .27). Thus, our results support H4: An increase in propaganda leads to an increase in attacks against journalists. Table A2 in the Supplemental Information file shows a summary of the results. We employed IRFs to further explore the relationship between attacks, news coverage, and propaganda (see Figure A1 in the Supplemental Information file).

Interview Findings

The results reported above are based on volume of propaganda, attacks (violent or not), and news coverage. Since these measures do not account for the complexity of the lived experience of journalists in Brazil, we interviewed eighteen journalists who experienced attacks during the Bolsonaro government. We categorized our qualitative findings in four themes that respond to RQ1: How do Brazilian journalists perceive their roles and professions under the Bolsonaro administration? These themes include: (a) structural constraints on press freedom, (b) a rising “us versus them” mentality, (c) journalists’ persistence in response to attacks, and (d) solidarity infrastructure to support journalists under attack.

Theme 1: Structural Constraints on Press Freedom

A category that emerged from our interviews is the constraints of structures that influenced the work of journalists before the Bolsonaro government. These structures refer to the organization of the Brazilian media ecosystem and attempts by the Executive and Judicial branches of the government to exert power and control the press.

Our interviewees pointed out the troubling fact that politicians and rich families own most of the media companies in Brazil. Gabriel highlighted the concentration of political, economic, and media power, noting that “political power is very close to media ownership.” He said, “there is traditionally a certain promiscuity between media ownership in Brazil and economic power.” Several interviewees echoed this sentiment regarding the close connection between politicians and media owners.

In practical terms, the influence of media owners is noticeable in the editorial decisions of the outlet, which determines what topics journalists are allowed to cover. In other words, media owners function as strong gatekeepers whose political interests guide what the news outlet reports. Antônio summarized the power of the media owner succinctly: “Who censors, before the state, is the owner.” As Francisco described, “Generally, this editorial line is heavily influenced by politics and people in politics, whether these people are holding a government office or not.” In other words, the political interests of media owners heavily influence the editorial lines of their companies. Politicians who are connected to these media owners also influence these editorial lines, even when these politicians are not holding office.

Another element that induces a chilling effect is the legal system—specifically, journalists’ vulnerability to lawsuits. When journalists and news outlets do not have the financial resources to defend themselves, interviewees explained that such lawsuits can systematically discourage them from covering lawsuit-prone topics (thereby inducing a chilling effect). As Carla pointed out, “In addition to the executive branch, you have the judicial system very strongly threatening journalists, constraining journalists through money.” These risks are institutionally accounted for in news organizations, as Carla explains: “Companies have their legal departments more attentive [to lawsuits].” “Should we really publish this here?”

Our interviewees noted that while every government has tried to influence the practice of journalism in Brazil, the criticism against the press was especially strong under the Bolsonaro administration. As Carolina described: “Previous governments, even the Lula government, which is seen as progressive, also made statements against the press, blamed the press and such. But not on the level that is happening now.” This quote highlights how presidents aligned with the Workers’ Party also had contentious relationships with the press. However, this is used as a foil to highlight what “is happening now” in terms of escalating attacks under the Bolsonaro regime.

Theme 2: A Rising “Us Versus Them” Mentality

The most notable trend in our interviews was a unanimous perception among all our interviewees that the attacks against journalists are currently worse than ever. Journalists observed that Bolsonaro inflamed his supporters against the press, who, in turn, were often responsible for attacks. As a result, our interviewees frequently used “us versus them” narratives to describe their relationship with the Bolsonaro government. This conceptualization suggests that these journalists saw themselves as a united group resisting attacks and criticisms by Bolsonaro and his supporters, and defending their profession’s value to Brazil. Rafaela gave a particularly clarifying testimonial, referring to a crisis during the 2018 election when a press bus was shot at. ⁶ It is worth noting that journalists from a variety of different countries, all covering the election, were inside the bus. ⁷ Rafaela noted:

There is no comparison between the environment we live in today with whatever we lived before these past five years. During the 2018 election, the environment was already very hostile, so much so that a press bus of the Lula rally was shot. But I personally had never experienced events of threats to my physical integrity, my life.

Interviewees noted that the amount of hatred that Bolsonaro supporters have toward the press was surprising, even for the journalists. Among many different aggressive acts, journalists reported suffering physical and verbal assault, doxxing, online harassment, death threats, and efforts to discredit the press. These attacks came mainly from Bolsonaro supporters or members of his government. Vinícius pointed out that these supporters who are full of hatred include ordinary people, not militants who could be easily recognized. Vinícius was attacked when covering a pro-Bolsonaro demonstration by,

a woman in her 50s, 60s. [ . . . ] The image of a housewife, mother or grandmother. [ . . . ] She could be seen as a person who leads an ordinary life, not a militant. [ . . . ] This woman screamed at me: “Garbage! Get out of here!” With such hatred [ . . . ] It made me reflect a lot. I thought: “where does this woman’s hatred come from?”

Theme 3: Journalists’ Persistence in Response to Attacks

Although journalists described a shared experience of fear-induced stress due to attacks, journalists also stated that they were unwilling to self-censor in response to these attacks. Doing so, they explained, would be a betrayal of their professional duty to report truthfully and persistently. Instead of shirking from critical reporting due to attacks, journalists described themselves as emboldened and determined.

Journalists characterized themselves as feeling “fear,” “worry,” “afraid of being recognized,” “discouraged,” “depressed,” and identified the intent of attacks on journalists as aiming to “destabilize you psychologically.” The toll on their families was also pronounced. Carlos shared, “I have a twelve-year-old son. It didn’t take long for my son to send a message: ‘Dad, are you fighting?’” José noted, “My family at the time was very worried.”

At the same time, journalists spoke vehemently and consistently against self-censorship, characterizing it as a “disease of journalism” and describing their self-vigilance against allowing insidious self-censorship to infuse their work. Gabriel said: “I monitor myself a lot to make sure that it doesn’t happen. I try to be aware of that. When I feel like I’m not willing to face something because of this fear, I fight it and try not to let it happen.” Rather than framing the possibility of stepping back in terms of protecting or repairing their own mental health, journalists viewed self-censorship as aligned with what Bolsonaro supporters would want—and therefore an unacceptable outcome: “That’s exactly what they want, for journalists to be afraid, to be cornered. All these attacks are for this to happen,” said Camila. She expanded,

I think the day I think, hey, I’m not going to write about this, it’s a certificate of defeat. [ . . . ] I won’t write about it out of fear because I might suffer some kind of reprisal [ . . . ] It’s a certificate of defeat, which is exactly what they want. It doesn’t mean I’m not afraid. We know what these people are capable of. We know that there is a climate of growing violence in the country. But I think that, more than ever, we have to be very firm, very strong.

Aligned with this view, multiple journalists used the word gás (“fuel”) to articulate their reaction to attacks, which catalyzed coverage rather than chilling it. For instance, Gabriela said that being physically attacked made her initially depressed. However, the work and resilience of other women journalists inspired her and gave her “fuel” to go back to work. Otávio explained that the criticism from Bolsonaro supporters sometimes boosted his wish to tell a story: “Sometimes this even gives more fuel. We want to tell the stories that others don't want us to tell.”

Alongside this persistence and determination, journalists remained keenly aware of the risks they were taking by continuing to report in a critical and truthful manner. Motivating their decision to continue to report was a commitment to social change. For example, Roberto explained,

Unfortunately we take risks. But the journalist cannot back down [ . . . ] We have to keep doing our work, that’s the only way we'll be able to change something. [ . . . ] It cannot shake us; it has to be fuel. (Emphasis added)

Gabriela expanded her metaphor on “fuel” and characterized attacks as catalyzing coverage in the form of “a revolt that we end up pushing for action [ . . . ] We are trying to make these experiences [ . . . ] which unfortunately happen in our lives, and try to use it as a combustion.”

Despite the psychological toll, which impacts daily activities like shopping, managing family concerns, and depression, journalists consistently positioned their duty to persist as professionals, with stakes beyond any individual’s pain or fear. As Carolina said,

I think that all professional journalists are committed to doing this work, which is to fight for the right to question an elected representative, who has a duty to be accountable to those who elected him. That’s what I did, and I think that’s what every professional journalist wants to do.

This sense of solidarity with fellow professional journalists and the profession of journalism was consistent with journalists’ calls for change through supportive infrastructure to resist and persist in the face of political attacks—together.

Theme 4: Solidarity Infrastructure to Support Journalists Under Attack

Government regulation and protection were often invoked as a vital approach to helping journalists under attack; this provides limited recourse when it is the government that is perpetrating the attacks. Journalists called upon their news outlets and editorial leadership to develop and support solidarity efforts through which journalists would not experience the ramifications of attacks alone. This is an unmet need for some and a welcome reality for others, as Gabriela noted “My editors were insensitive to me. They didn’t show solidarity with me,” while Camila said,

Having support, having a back-up from the outlets where we work [ . . . ] which fortunately was what I had. I didn’t feel helpless, I felt supported to keep going strong [and] doing what I think I have to do.

Francisco added that media companies are often ill-prepared for political attacks, despite their frequency: “What discourages me is the lack of support from a media company that is not prepared for this type of situation.”

Network support in the form of organizations like Abraji (Brazilian Association of Investigative Journalism) and unions offered mutual support. Focused on the grassroots level rather than top-down remedies, Gabriela reflected, “All we can do is support each other.” Others called for multiple organizations serving journalists to “talk, unite.” Finding strength in the collective to counter feelings of isolation and fear was a primary strategy that interviewees identified as a way to persist in doing journalism amidst hostile conditions.

While journalists located power in collective mutual support networks, they also called for bigger picture changes at the level of media infrastructure within Brazilian society. Specifically, Otávio said, “We have to build a society in which there is more respect for the work of journalists,” which other journalists echoed. In terms of how to build this respect, a journalist said it must begin with recognition from government officials that the press is “essential.” Carla noted that journalism, and other societal institutions, must “understand what democracy is all about. Democracy is not listening to all sides. Are we going to listen to the flat earth society?” This remark was in tension with other journalists who saw a need for journalism to act as a “welcoming movement,” though. Economic conditions must be hospitable to journalism, as well, Antônio remarked, since otherwise “there is no way to do free journalism.” Unless companies “remember the social role that journalism has,” Francisco anticipated that major news outlets would continue to lack credibility in the eyes of their audiences and continue to blend with “fake news” and lack a “reliable place on the internet.” Returning to the matter of government, Carolina noted that a government that works against freedom of expression must be remedied “enforcing the rules” and “actually inspecting and punishing those who transgress.” Reiterating these thoughts, Camila said, “We need governments that actually respect the constitution, that respect people’s rights.” None of the journalists interviewed called for a singular solution to the problem of attacks on journalists, and instead saw it as a holistic issue, that would require a structural set of changes at multiple dimensions of societal institutions, norms, and alignment between Constitutional values and pragmatic enforcement.

Discussion and Conclusion

Using a time series analysis as well as qualitative interviews, our study has closely examined how attacks on journalists may impact political reporting. Our results suggest that, despite the increase in government attacks (both verbal and physical), Brazilian journalists we interviewed exhibited catalyzing effects, although the fear of lawsuits occasionally induced chilling effects. These findings showcase the resilience of Brazilian journalists during a time of political animosity that has no precedent since the democratization of the country.

Quantitatively, our approach empirically tested chilling and catalyzing effects. Our time series results showed that an increase in state propaganda leads to an increase in news coverage. One potential explanation for this is that news coverage increases as a correction to propaganda messages. More specifically, when Bolsonaro pushed his disinformation-laden propaganda, journalists might feel committed to reporting accurate information (Recuero et al. 2022). Such findings would be aligned with our conceptualization of catalyzing effects.

In our time series model, we found that attacks against journalists did not increase or decrease news coverage. This null finding should not be disregarded, as it may obfuscate a more complicated portrayal of chilling and catalyzing effect. Our qualitative results suggest as much, suggesting that catalyzing effects may not be so easily revealed by an increase in coverage.

Themes derived from our qualitative interview data suggested that catalyzing effects operate through a form of resilience (Barrios and Miller 2021). In other words, catalyzing effects do not manifest as more coverage, but as persistent coverage despite ongoing criticisms and threats (social and physical). This finding is consistent with previous research that found journalistic resilience in the face of systematic attacks (González de Bustamante and Relly 2021). Instead of collectively backing down in response to politicians’ attacks, Brazilian journalists responded by standing together and continuing to report.

Our qualitative findings expanded on this conceptualization, highlighting that journalists sustained their work amidst systematic attacks. Although journalists described fear when conducting their work, they were not willing to self-censor—and therefore did not display chilling effects. This resilience is perhaps even more impressive considering the broader political and economic factors that could chill journalistic coverage in Brazil. Our qualitative interviews highlight how much journalists are impacted by Brazilian media owners and their political relationships and interests. Although major organizations like Globo and Folha de São Paulo have openly positioned themselves against Bolsonaro, such outlets have neoliberal tendencies and have supported right-wing governments numerous times, including during the military dictatorship. In this sense, our interviews reveal that chilling effects could be more the result of the political position of the newspaper owners than of attacks by specific rulers who eventually are in power. Future studies should further elaborate these results. Simultaneously, our findings on catalyzing effects reflected the detached nature of the watchdog role of journalism in Latin America. Previous literature suggested that journalism in Latin America tends to have a detached orientation, by mostly covering external investigations and judiciary processes—while an interventionist watchdog role would involve journalists openly questioning and manifesting conflict (Márquez-Ramírez et al. 2020). The detached orientation of the watchdog role helps to explain why our findings on catalyzing effects are mostly related to persistence and resilience, instead of increased coverage.

Perhaps the most important contribution of this study is that our qualitative findings make a path forward. Our interviews highlighted the importance of bringing the discussion about attacks against journalists back to the community. The notion of network support was prevalent, and it pointed to the imperative need for a solidarity infrastructure so that journalism can be a constructive force in society (Aitamurto and Varma 2018; Hughes and Márquez-Ramírez 2017a). Previous research suggested that journalistic networks supporting collective security are important in Latin American contexts, where a weak rule of law makes these professionals more vulnerable to threats. We seek to contribute empirical assessments of how journalists indeed use support networks to cope with a challenging environment (Hughes et al. 2021). These findings confirmed research pointing out the need for journalism initiatives and safety coalitions to protect journalists and press freedom (Hughes et al. 2021; Waisbord 2022a).

Our study also shed light on how authoritarian state actors operate their attacks against journalism. These findings have important implications for journalists, scholars, activists, and anyone committed to sustaining democracy, since understanding a problem is a necessary step toward a solution. Both our quantitative and qualitative results show that state propaganda leads to attacks against journalists. Bolsonaro legitimized an anti-press discourse and blessed the attacks against journalists since the beginning of his government. This result confirms previous findings that political discourse legitimizes non-state attacks targeting journalists, while this result also adds evidence that was previously lacking related to the lived experiences of journalists who were victims of attacks (Mazzaro 2021). We found evidence that the president’s attitude against the press had a real-life impact on the rise of attacks against journalists. Our interviewees reported attacks that Bolsonaro directly endorsed—or did not intervene to avoid. These results contribute to the current literature on mob censorship with empirical evidence about national particularities of mob censorship and its consequences for journalists, information which was not widely available before (Waisbord 2020).

Bolsonaro’s goal of silencing journalists through attacks does not seem to work. Instead, they are not backing down, suggesting that there is a wider scholarly misunderstanding of journalists’ reactions to attacks. However, one limitation from our study is that there are many factors that could boost or curb press coverage of a president. Future studies should test more causal relationships among these different variables. Another limitation from our study was focusing solely on Brazil as an exploratory case study. Brazil is one of the largest democracies in the world and has a major influence in South America. We argue that the patterns found in our study may emerge in any country with constitutionally protected press freedom. In this sense, we contribute to a wide literature that has investigated the impact of attacks on journalists in countries outside of Latin America, such as the United States (Carlson et al. 2021; Miller 2021a), Sweden (Löfgren Nilsson and Örnebring 2016), India (Bhat and Chadha 2022), and other democratic settings internationally (Fadnes et al. 2020; Hamada 2022; Posetti 2018).

Nonetheless, future studies should investigate whether the same catalyzing effects occur in different political contexts, by applying in other countries the methods used here. Previous research has already pointed out the importance of context when analyzing journalists’ reaction to attacks. For instance, coping strategies may be selected due to “local institutional configurations, employer capacities, professional norms and occupational solidarity” (Hughes et al. 2021: 987). Journalists can engage not only in adaptive coping strategies, but also maladaptive (Iesue et al. 2021). Similarly, research suggested that the effect of attacks depends on the contextual setting of societal and political press allies (Salazar 2019), besides economic and safety conditions (González Macías et al. 2021). Importantly, gender is a relevant risk factor for female journalists, and past studies have shown that the lack of support from news companies affects women’s resilience strategies (Barão da Silva et al. 2022). While we found considerably optimistic results in the analysis of the contemporary Brazilian case, there are reports of strong chilling effects in countries such as Venezuela (Pain and Korin 2021) and Mexico (Dorff et al. 2022). Furthermore, catalyzing effects and chilling effects are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Thus, we stress the importance of taking context into account in future studies of catalyzing effects.

Another limitation of this study was not analyzing the content present in our news media data, but solely its volume. Our interviews supported the findings from our time series analysis of news coverage, but future studies could benefit from directly analyzing the news articles. This could bring insight into how catalyzing effects play out within journalistic pieces. It should be also noted that the journalists interviewed in this paper are not a representative sample of Brazilian journalists. Therefore, the findings reported here may not be generalizable to all journalists in Brazil, although those are supported by quantitative analysis.

Our interviews showed that the structure that could lead to possible chilling effects in Brazil is not restricted to the Bolsonaro government, which brings up the question of whether the problem of attacks against Brazilian journalists will recede after Bolsonaro. Even if he is not in power, extreme-right populism is a political phenomenon that will likely endure in the foreseeable future. Bolsonarism seems to be a strong political force in Brazil, just like Trumpism remains prevalent in the United States after Donald Trump. Thus, future studies should explore if the effects of attacks against journalists will be the same beyond party lines. Also, future studies should investigate other structural elements involved in possible chilling or catalyzing effects. For instance, research found that internal attacks in newsrooms have a strong impact on journalists’ perceived autonomy in Colombia (Garces-Prettel et al. 2020). Finally, although this study empirically tested chilling/catalyzing effects by counting the number of articles about Bolsonaro and interviewing journalists, it is worth noting that this is one way of measuring such effects among many others. Future studies could consider other phenomena such as whether and how many journalists have left the industry due to various attacks.

Supplemental Material

sj-docx-1-hij-10.1177_19401612231182618 – Supplemental material for Attacks Against Journalists in Brazil: Catalyzing Effects and Resilience During Jair Bolsonaro’s Government

Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-hij-10.1177_19401612231182618 for Attacks Against Journalists in Brazil: Catalyzing Effects and Resilience During Jair Bolsonaro’s Government by Joao V. S. Ozawa, Josephine Lukito, Taeyoung Lee, Anita Varma and Rosental Alves in The International Journal of Press/Politics