Examining the Changes in Intolerance Toward Economic Inequality,Their Predictors,and Political Outcomes

Abstract

Chile's recent history offers an ideal setting for analyzing the changes in people's intolerance of economic inequality. The authors focused on the period between 2016 and 2022, during which the country experienced strong collective action against economic inequality—the so-called “social outburst.” They used data from the Longitudinal Social Study of Chile (Estudio Longitudinal Social de Chile), a nationally representative longitudinal panel survey initiated in 2016 with a baseline sample of 2,927 participants. In 2018, a refreshment sample of 1,500 participants was added to the study. Latent Class Growth Analysis was employed to identify distinct subgroups of Chileans with varying intolerance toward economic inequality over time. Three trajectories were found: high intolerance, ascending intolerance, and descending intolerance. The authors then investigated the factors that were most likely to account for these trends in 2016. Educational attainment and satisfaction with the current constitution were key factors for differentiating these trajectories. Finally, the authors analyzed differences in political attitudes and behaviors between the groups that exhibited different trajectories in 2022, showing that the high intolerance group participated more in collective action and displayed greater interest in politics compared to both the descending and ascending intolerance groups. The results are discussed, highlighting the importance of focusing on changes within individuals in intolerance toward economic inequality.

Keywords

economic inequality Latent Class Growth Analysis political attitudes ideology

The widespread social consequences associated with the current high levels of economic inequality—that is, the gap between the rich and the poor (Jetten et al., 2021)—are vast and frequently cited as primary drivers behind today's environmental, social, and humanitarian crises (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2024). Consequently, economic inequality is increasingly viewed as a significant threat to society, becoming a central concern for policymakers and international institutions (Obama, 2013; United Nations, 2015). High economic inequality has also emerged as a source of political instability, fueling persistent tensions both within and between nations. Numerous studies have identified economic inequality as a key factor behind recent social movements, such as the Yellow Vest movement in France (Jetten et al., 2020) and the “social outburst” in Chile (Somma et al., 2021). Although high levels of economic inequality may be tolerated to greater or lesser degrees for extended periods, latent tensions can reach a breaking point when seemingly minor triggers, such as evidenced by the backlash against rising fuel taxes in France and the subway fare increase in Chile, spark intense manifestations of social unrest (Jetten et al., 2020; Somma et al., 2021). This highlights the importance of examining intolerance toward economic inequality as a predictor of political attitudes and behavior.

While a growing body of literature has explored the relationship between intolerance toward economic inequality and political outcomes (for an overview, see Jetten et al., 2021), most studies have taken a cross-sectional approach, leaving the evolution of these attitudes over time largely unexplored, as well as their potential predictive capacity and the extent to which they can be predicted. Our study addressed this gap by examining trends in intolerance toward economic inequality over six years in the changing and complex context of Chile, using a large nationwide probability sample of adults in urban areas. The first wave of data collection began in 2016 and continued annually until 2022. Given that Chile experienced a significant “social outburst” in late 2019 and early 2020, characterized by both peaceful demonstrations and violent riots and related to intolerance of economic inequality, it is an excellent context for analyzing how intolerance toward inequality evolves and changes over time. The present study therefore addressed three major questions:

What was the evolution of attitudes toward economic inequality in Chile between 2016 and 2022?

Are there predictors that enable us to anticipate the trends in attitudes toward economic inequality in subsequent years?

Do the different trends in the evolution of intolerance toward inequality allow us to predict political attitudes in 2022?

We anticipated that intolerance toward economic inequality might develop differently among various groups of individuals, resulting in distinct trajectories. Therefore, we employed latent class growth analysis to identify distinct subgroups of Chileans with varying intolerance toward economic inequality over time. We then investigated the perception, ideological, attitudinal, and sociodemographic factors that might have shaped these trends in 2016—that is, the predictors. Finally, we anticipated that the trends in intolerance toward economic inequality might predict the political attitudes and behaviors of the Chilean population in 2022. We analyzed differences in political attitudes and behaviors in 2022—that is, the consequences—between the groups that exhibited different trajectories, including redistributive preferences, participation in collective action, trust in institutions, optimist about the new constitution, and general interest in politics.

The Chilean Context

According to the latest data from the World Inequality Database (2024), the richest 10% of Chile's population receives 59% of the total income, while the poorest 50% shares 6.8% of the total income. If we look at the Gini index—that is, the macroeconomic index between 0 (completely equal distribution of resources) and 1 (one person owns all resources)—in the member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2024), Chile ranks sixth, with a Gini index of .45 in 2022, the last one available. Although Chile has historically had Gini indices above .55 (e.g., .57 in 1990; World Bank, 2024), it has recently dropped to levels below .50.

On 18 October 2019, a slight increase in Santiago's metro fare triggered what became known as the “social outburst,” leading to mass protests that quickly expanded beyond the initial student demonstrations. The protesters expressed socio-economic grievances and demanded profound changes to address Chile's structural economic inequalities (Somma et al., 2020). These demands for redistribution were accompanied by calls for structural reforms, prompting an agreement to initiate a constitutional change process (Somma & Donoso, 2022). Although the resulting proposal was rejected in 2022, that same year saw the election of a progressive government led by President Gabriel Boric, reflecting citizens’ aspirations to reduce economic inequalities.

Chile's history provides an excellent context to analyze how intolerance toward economic inequality may have evolved in recent years and whether these shifts have been consistent across the population, or if distinct subgroups can be identified based on changes in their intolerance toward inequality over time. Since individuals’ attitudes tend to be stable due to internal coherence (Albarracín & Shavitt, 2018; Festinger, 1957), contexts characterized by relative social, political, and economic stability would likely reinforce the stability of attitudes related to these domains, making them less informative for analyzing potential changes. In this sense, the Chilean context offers an ideal setting to analyze the extent to which attitudes toward economic inequality are stable or shifting. Given the high levels of economic inequality in Chile, we expected that, in general, intolerance toward inequality would be high, as most people have an aversion to inequality (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). The central issue concerns whether, within a context of fluctuating economic inequality and persistent demands for the redistribution of wealth, patterns of intolerance have varied and, if so, in what forms and for which segments of the population. From a psychological standpoint, shifts in the sociopolitical and economic landscape may signal changes in public attitudes toward economic inequality, which in turn drive broader social transformations. This attitudinal dynamism likely emerged in the years preceding the “social outburst,” motivating the examination of predictors of intolerance toward inequality, including societal perceptions, ideological orientations, attitudes toward social change, and sociodemographic factors.

Predictors of Changes in Intolerance Toward Economic Inequality

We anticipated that intolerance might evolve differently across various groups of individuals, meaning that distinct trajectories would emerge. If this is so, certain variables may predict the group to which each individual belongs—that is, how intolerance of economic inequality evolves in a distinctive way. We examined four groups of potential predictors.

Perception of Society

We included the perception of economic inequality and social class conflict. Although economic inequality in Chile is particularly severe (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2024), some individuals often lack an accurate perception of the actual level of inequality in their country (Gimpelson & Treisman, 2018). Intolerance toward economic inequality and its perception are conceptually distinct but theoretically intertwined. While perception refers to individuals’ cognitive appraisal of the extent of inequality in society, intolerance reflects a normative and evaluative stance toward it. While the two constructs are closely related, they remain conceptually distinct and cannot be used interchangeably (Schmalor & Heine, 2021). Therefore, the perception of economic inequality may serve as a significant predictor of intolerance toward it. Additionally, the perception of social class conflict could intensify intolerance toward economic inequality by reinforcing the perceived illegitimacy of disparities between the rich and the poor, and the lack of social cohesion (Jetten et al., 2020).

Ideology

Ideologies play a crucial role in justifying and perpetuating group-based hierarchies across cultures (Pratto et al., 2000). Rodriguez-Bailón et al. (2017) found that individuals who endorse ideologies that justify the economic system tend to perceive the current distribution of wealth as fairer. Similarly, people's evaluations of the fairness of economic inequalities in their countries vary according to their ideological beliefs, both in Europe and Latin America (García-Sánchez et al., 2021, 2022). In line with previous research, we expected that individuals who endorsed system-justifying ideologies and group-based hierarchies to a lesser extent would exhibit higher intolerance toward economic inequality (Hadarics et al., 2021; Mijs, 2021). Furthermore, we explored the extent to which these ideologies could predict changes in the trajectories of this intolerance. We argue that ideological orientations may not only account for cross-sectional differences, but also contribute to explaining longitudinal change. For instance, while individuals with stronger system-justifying ideologies may have initially exhibited lower levels of intolerance toward economic inequality, as the Chilean context evolved—from a government that tended to justify inequalities to one that explicitly questioned them—the same ideological disposition may have led these individuals to adjust their views, potentially increasing their intolerance over time.

While a wide range of ideologies can underpin intolerance toward economic inequality (Jost & Hunyady, 2005), this research focuses on five key ideologies: (1) authoritarianism, or the belief that people should adhere to traditions and authorities (Altemeyer, 1998); (2) meritocracy, or the belief that outcomes like income are based on hard work and ability (Jost et al., 2003); (3) egalitarianism, or the belief that all individuals should be equal and deserve equal rights and opportunities (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999); (4) system justification, or the belief that it is fair that those who earn the most should have better educational, health, and pension benefits (Tyler & Blader, 2000); and (5) political ideology, or how people position themselves on the left or right spectrum.

Attitudes Toward Social Change

Given that the primary variable we aimed to predict is dynamic over time—specifically, trajectories of change in intolerance toward economic inequality—we also considered variables related to the perception of change as predictors. Beliefs in social change, which refers to the perception of social structures as malleable and influenced by actors, are significant predictors of various political behaviors and attitudes, such as group efficacy (Jiménez-Moya et al., 2019), support for conservative social movements (González et al., 2022), and support for political change (Abrams & Grant, 2012). Therefore, we included attitudes toward social change as a potential predictor.

Additionally, considering Chile's specific context, we included the degree of satisfaction with the current constitution as a proxy of the need for political changes. Thus, we incorporated two predictors related to change: one more general (beliefs in social change) and one specific to the Chilean context (satisfaction with the current constitution).

Sociodemographic Factors

Finally, we included sociodemographic variables as predictors. Since the impact of economic inequality varies depending on whether a person belongs to more advantaged or disadvantaged sociodemographic groups, we explored whether characteristics such as gender, indigenous origin, subjective social class, and educational attainment may have also shaped the trajectory of intolerance toward economic inequality. In line with previous research that has shown that low-status groups generally tend to reject structural inequalities (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), we expected those from disadvantaged groups to show higher levels of intolerance of inequality, although how this intolerance might evolve over the years was an open question.

Having identified the potential predictors of the trajectories of tolerance toward economic inequality, we now focus on the possible political outcomes that these trajectories may predict.

Political Outcomes

As previously noted, Chile's political context in 2022—the final year of data collection for this study—was marked by considerable turbulence: strong demands for redistributive policies, large-scale social movements, and a constitutional referendum. Given the number of socio-economic demands aimed at alleviating the severe economic inequality in Chile during the “social outburst” (Somma et al., 2021), we anticipated that intolerance toward economic inequality might predict the political attitudes and behaviors of the Chilean population in 2022. Specifically, we explored whether groups showing different trajectories of change in intolerance toward economic inequality over the previous years differed in their attitudes and behaviors regarding redistributive preferences, participation in collective action, trust in institutions, optimist with the new constitution, and general interest in politics. Based on previous literature (e.g., García-Castro et al., 2020), we expected that higher levels of intolerance toward economic inequality would predict more positive attitudes toward redistribution, increased participation in collective action, decreased trust in institutions, greater optimism about the new constitution, and a higher general interest in politics. Nevertheless, the ways in which different trajectories of intolerance toward economic inequality are associated with these political outcomes is an exploratory question that we will address in the current study.

The Study

In the current study, we aimed to examine the evolution of intolerance toward economic inequality in Chile between 2016 and 2022. Characterized by large-scale collective action and significant political changes, the period was notably marked by the “social outburst” at the end of 2019 and beginning of 2020. Moreover, it is worth pointing out that this period included a sharp rise in economic inequality from 2015 to 2019, followed by a decrease to 2015 baseline levels from 2020 to 2022.

We used latent class growth analysis to identify different trajectories of intolerance toward economic inequality among Chilean subgroups over this period. We then explored whether the perceptions of society, ideology, social change attitudes, beliefs in change, and sociodemographic variables measured in 2016 could predict these trajectories of intolerance in subsequent years. Finally, we assessed whether the individuals belonging to different latent classes differed in their attitudes toward redistributive preferences, participation in collective action, trust in institutions, optimism with the new constitution, and general interest in politics in 2022.

Method

Participants and Sampling

We used data from the Longitudinal Social Study of Chile (Estudio Longitudinal Social de Chile), a longitudinal survey conducted by the Center for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies (2024). This survey was launched in 2016 and collects data annually through face-to-face structured interviews conducted over approximately four months. The only year that data was not collected was during 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The participants comprise a representative probability-based sample of Chilean adults aged 18 to 75, residing in private dwellings in the urban areas of 40 cities (the sampling is stratified by the size of the cities). The representativeness of the sample is approximately 70% of the total population of the country, meaning that it represents around 13 million Chileans.

Our analyses draw on all available years of data, encompassing six waves in total: 2016–2019 and 2021–2022. The baseline sample (T1, 2016) included 2,927 participants (M_age = 46.09, SD = 15.29; 39.7% male, 60.3% female). Given the problems of attrition, a refreshment sample was incorporated in 2018 with 1,519 new participants. The last wave (T6, 2022) included 2,730 participants (M_age = 51.50, SD = 15.19; 36.2% male, 63.8% female).

Measures

For all the reported measures, higher scores indicate stronger or greater levels of the variable being assessed.¹

Main Variable

Intolerance Toward Economic Inequality

The participants reported to what extent they agreed with the statement “In Chile, differences in income are too high” using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree).

Predictors

We included perception, ideological, attitudinal, and sociodemographic predictors from the first wave (2016).

Perceived Economic Inequality

This variable was operationalized by asking the respondents to estimate the earnings per month, after tax, health, welfare, and other deductions (net income), for the manager of a large national company and for an unskilled factory worker in Chile. Then, we calculated the ratio between these two estimations and log-transformed it (García-Sánchez et al., 2019).

Perceived Social Class Conflict

This was measured with two items—for example, “How much conflict would you say currently exists between businessmen and workers/people from the upper class and people from the lower class?” (1 = no conflict to 5 = a lot of conflict; ρ = .48, p < .001; Pruitt & Sung, 2013).²

Authoritarianism

Authoritarianism was measured using four items—for example, “What our country really needs instead of more civil rights is a good stiff dose of law and order” (1 = totally disagree to 5 = totally agree; α = .80; Altemeyer, 1998).

Meritocracy

We measured meritocracy using two items adapted from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP Research Group, 2017)—for example, “In Chile, people are compensated for their efforts” (1 = totally disagree to 5 = totally agree; ρ = .70, p < .001).

Egalitarianism

We measured egalitarianism using two items of the Social Dominance Orientation scale—for example, “We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed” (1 = totally disagree to 5 = totally agree; ρ = .60, p < .001; Pratto et al., 2013).

System Justification

System justification was measured using three items—for example, “It is fair that people with high incomes have larger pensions than people with lower incomes” (1 = totally disagree to 5 = totally agree; α = .83; Tyler & Blader, 2000).

Political Ideology

We measured political ideology using a single item in which the participants were asked to place themselves on a political spectrum from 0 = left to 10 = right (Kroh, 2007).

Attitudes Toward Social Change

Attitudes toward social change were measured using a single item: “I think social change is possible” (1 = totally disagree to 5 = totally agree; González et al., 2022).

Satisfaction with Current Constitution

Two items were used to measure satisfaction with the current constitution—for example “How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the current constitution?” (reversed; 1 = very dissatisfied to 5 = very satisfied; ρ = .38, p < .001; Centro de Estudios de Conflicto y Cohesión Social, 2024).

Sociodemographic Characteristics

We included age, gender (1 = male, 2 = female), indigenous origin (0 = no, 1 = yes), subjective social class (0 = the lowest to 10 = the highest; Adler et al., 2000), and educational attainment (1 = no education to 10 = postgraduate studies; Centro de Estudios de Conflicto y Cohesión Social, 2024).

Political Outcomes

We included political attitudes and behavior as outcomes from the last wave (2022).

Attitudes Toward Redistribution

We measured attitudes toward redistribution using a single item adapted from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP Research Group, 2017): “Would you be willing to pay more taxes if they were used to give more to those who have less?” (1 = totally disagree to 5 = totally agree).

Trust in Institutions

We asked the participants how much they trusted certain institutions (e.g., the government, 13 items; 1 = not at all to 5 = a lot; α = .84; Newton & Norris, 2000).

Optimism About the New Constitution

We measured this using five items—for example, “The new constitution will reduce inequalities in health and education in Chile” (1 = totally disagree to 5 = totally agree; α = .68; Centro de Estudios de Conflicto y Cohesión Social, 2024).

Participation in Collective Action

We asked the participants the following question: “During the last 12 months, how often have you signed a letter or petition supporting a cause?” (five items; 1 = never to 5 = very often; α = .71; following Klandermans & Staggenborg, 2002).

Political Interest

Political interest was measured using three items—for example, “How interested are you in politics?” (1 = not interested to 5 = very interested; α = .80; following Stimson, 2004).

Results

Tables with the means, standard deviations, and correlations of the predictors (Table S1) and outcomes (Table S3), and with the distribution of age, gender, and indigenous origin by latent class (Table S2) can be found in the supplementary material.³

Analytical Approach

We conducted Latent Class Growth Analyses using the lcmm packages in R (Proust-Lima et al., 2017) to identify possible profiles of change in relation to intolerance of economic inequality from 2016 to 2022. Latent Class Growth Analysis groups individuals according to their pattern of responses on a given construct over time (Muthén & Muthén, 2000). If we assume that the population is made up of a finite number of latent classes with a specific trajectory over time (Nguena Nguefack et al., 2020), we can identify distinct trends in changes in intolerance of inequality over the years with this analytical strategy.

We first estimated a model with a one-class trajectory for intolerance to economic inequality. We then estimated models of two to five classes in order to compare them and determine the model that best fit our data. To obtain start values for the models with more than one latent class, we used the one-class solution as the baseline. We used an automatic grid search to run the estimation function for a maximum of 100 iterations and find the parameters that maximized the model's likelihood (Proust-Lima et al., 2017).

We estimated the models using fixed effects in line with the assumption that individuals within their classes follow similar trajectories (Muthén & Muthén, 2000). Given the 2019–2020 “social outburst”—which may have constituted a turning point in attitudes toward inequality—we estimated both linear and quadratic trajectories in all models to capture potential curvilinear as well as linear change within each latent class.

Model Selection

To choose the most suitable model, we used the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)—whose parameters reveal a better fit the lower they are (see Muthén, 2004)—and the entropy—whose parameter indicates a more precise separation of the participants into latent classes. The higher the entropy value, which ranges from 0 to 1, the more accurately the model separates the participants into different classes, with .5 being considered the minimum value for adequate separation (Sinha et al., 2020).

As shown in Figure 1, the BIC and AIC values decrease as more classes are included, until the model with three latent classes is reached. Then, when a fourth class is included, the fit indicators increase to values similar to the two latent class models. Furthermore, the entropy was highest in the three-class solution, although similar to that of the two-class model and with a sharp drop in the four-class model. Therefore, these results suggest that the three-class solution is the model that provides the better fit to the data (BIC = 46,235.14; AIC = 46,158.36) and better discriminates between latent growth classes (entropy = .79).

Figure 1.

The BIC, AIC, and entropy for one-to-five-class latent class growth models in inequality intolerance.

To supplement the model selection based on the AIC, BIC, and entropy, we conducted a robustness check using likelihood ratio tests comparing the models with k versus k − 1 latent classes (Nylund et al., 2007). The two-class model showed a significant improvement over the one-class model (ΔLL = 590.30, p < .001) and, in turn, the three-class model significantly improved on the two-class model (ΔLL = 432.84, p < .001). In contrast, the four-class model did not improve the fit (ΔLL = −432.84, p = 1.00). These findings support the selection of the three-class model as the optimal solution.

Class Trajectories

Figure 2 depicts the trajectories for the three latent classes and Table 1 shows the parameter estimates for the three-class solution. Class 1 comprises the majority of the sample (88.2%) and is characterized by consistently high intolerance toward inequality across the seven years, leading us to label it the high intolerance class. This class shows the highest intercept (4.24). Both the linear trajectory (s = 0.15, SE = 0.20, p < .001) and the quadratic trend (q = –0.02, SE < 0.01, p < .001) are significant, indicating that intolerance increased over time until reaching a turning point in 2019—the year of the “social outburst”—after which it began to decline.

Figure 2.

Latent class growth trajectories of intolerance to inequality between 2016 and 2022.

Table 1.

Parameter estimates of the three-class model of intolerance toward economic inequality.

				95% CI
Class		Estimate	SE	LB	UB	Wald test	p
1. Ascending intolerance	i	2.42	0.20	2.22	2.62	12.01	< .001
(6.6%)	s	0.27	0.14	< 0.01	0.53	1.99	.046
	q	0.01	0.02	−0.02	0.04	0.38	.703
2. High intolerance	i	4.24	0.03	4.17	4.30	123.41	< .001
(88.2%)	s	0.15	0.20	0.11	0.18	7.03	< .001
	q	−0.02	< 0.01	−0.03	−0.02	−7.52	< .001
3. Descending intolerance	i	3.84	0.16	3.53	4.15	23.52	< .001
(5.2%)	s	0.43	0.11	0.20	0.65	3.75	< .001
	q	−0.12	0.02	−0.15	−0.08	−6.96	< .001

Note. CI = confidence interval; i = intercept; s = slope; q = quadratic; LB = lower bound; UB = upper bound.

By contrast, Class 2 comprised 6.6% of the sample and had the lowest intercept in 2016 (2.42), indicating low intolerance toward economic inequality at that time. However, this class exhibited a significant linear increase in intolerance (s = 0.27, SE = 0.14, p = .046), leading us to label it the ascending intolerance class. The quadratic trend was not significant (q = 0.01, SE = 0.02, p = .703).

Finally, Class 3 comprised 5.2% of the sample. Although their level of intolerance toward economic inequality was initially similar to that of the high intolerance class and exhibited a positive linear trend (s = 0.43, SE = 0.11, p < 0.001), it then followed a pronounced and significant negative curvilinear trend (q = −0.12, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001), leading to a sharp decline in intolerance toward inequality after 2017. Given this trend, we have labeled this class descending intolerance.

Predictors of Class Trajectories

Given that we had three class trajectories, we ran two multinominal log-linear models using the nneet package in R (Venables & Ripley, 2002). In the first, we used high intolerance latent class as the reference to predict the differences between (1) high latent class versus ascending latent class and (2) high latent class versus descending latent class. In the second model, we used descending latent class as a reference to predict the differences between (3) descending latent class versus ascending latent class.

Individuals who increased their intolerance toward economic inequality (i.e., ascending intolerance latent class), compared to those who consistently showed high intolerance over the years (i.e., high intolerance latent class), perceived lower economic inequality (b = −0.19, SE = 0.08, OR = 0.82, p = .020); showed lower egalitarianism (b = −0.49, SE = 0.19, OR = 0.62, p = .012), higher system justification (b = 0.34, SE = 0.15, OR = 1.40, p = .024), and less satisfaction with the current constitution (b = −0.34, SE = 0.10, OR = 0.71, p < .001); and had lower educational attainment (b = −0.14, SE = 0.07, OR = 1.16, p = .039) (see Table 2).

Table 2.

Multinomial logistic regression predicting the likelihood of belonging to the ascending (versus high) latent class as a function of perception, ideological, attitudinal, and sociodemographic predictors.

	Ascending intolerance (versus high intolerance)
			95% CI			95% CI
Predictors	b	SE	LB	UB	OR (B)	LB	UB	p
Perceived economic inequality	−0.19	0.08	−0.35	−0.03	0.82	0.70	0.97	.020
Perceived social class conflict	−0.25	0.14	−0.53	0.03	0.78	0.59	1.03	.085
Authoritarianism	0.09	0.19	−0.29	0.46	1.09	0.75	1.59	.642
Meritocracy	−0.22	0.14	−0.50	0.06	0.80	0.61	1.06	.125
Egalitarianism	−0.49	0.19	−0.86	−0.11	0.62	0.42	0.90	.012
System justification	0.34	0.15	0.04	0.63	1.40	1.04	1.88	.024
Political ideology	−0.01	0.05	−0.10	0.10	1.00	0.90	1.11	.991
Social change	−0.23	0.15	−0.53	0.06	0.79	0.59	1.07	.125
Satisfaction with constitution	−0.34	0.10	−0.54	−0.14	0.71	0.58	0.87	< .001
Age	−0.01	0.01	−0.03	0.01	0.99	0.97	1.00	.149
Gender	0.24	0.26	−0.27	0.75	1.27	0.76	2.11	.356
Indigenous origin	< 0.01	0.01	−0.01	0.01	1.00	0.99	1.01	.458
Subjective social class	0.03	0.08	−0.13	0.20	1.03	0.88	1.22	.691
Educational attainment	−0.14	0.07	−0.27	−0.01	0.87	0.77	0.99	.035

Note. The results in bold reflect the significant findings. CI = confidence interval; LB = lower bound; UB = upper bound.

On the other hand, individuals whose intolerance toward economic inequality decreased (i.e., descending intolerance latent class), compared to those who had consistently shown high intolerance over the years (i.e., high intolerance latent class), positioned themselves further to the right on the political spectrum (b = 0.13, SE = 0.06, OR = 1.14, p = .027) and had a lower level of educational attainment (b = −0.16, SE = 0.08, OR = 0.86, p = .044) (Table 3). Finally, individuals whose intolerance toward economic inequality increased (i.e., ascending intolerance latent class), compared to those whose intolerance decreased (i.e., descending intolerance latent class), showed lower perception of social class conflict (b = −0.51, SE = 0.23, OR = 0.60, p = .026) and less satisfaction with the current constitution (b = −0.54, SE = 0.16, OR = 0.58, p < .001) (Table 4).

Table 3.

Multinomial logistic regression predicting the likelihood of belonging to the descending (versus high) latent class as a function of perception, ideological, attitudinal, and sociodemographic predictors.

	Descending intolerance (versus high intolerance)
			95% CI			95% CI
Predictors	b	SE	LB	UB	OR (B)	LB	UB	p
Perceived economic inequality	−0.16	0.10	−0.36	0.03	0.85	0.70	1.03	.104
Perceived social class conflict	0.26	0.19	−0.10	0.63	1.30	0.90	1.87	.159
Authoritarianism	0.46	0.24	−0.01	0.93	1.58	0.99	2.53	.056
Meritocracy	−0.01	0.15	−0.30	0.29	0.99	0.74	1.34	.966
Egalitarianism	−0.37	0.24	−0.85	0.10	0.69	0.43	1.11	.126
System justification	0.12	0.18	−0.23	0.48	1.13	0.79	1.61	.496
Political ideology	0.13	0.06	0.01	0.25	1.14	1.01	1.28	.027
Social change	0.08	0.20	−0.31	0.47	1.08	0.73	1.60	.690
Satisfaction with constitution	0.20	0.14	−0.07	0.47	1.22	0.94	1.60	.141
Age	0.01	0.01	−0.02	0.03	1.01	0.98	1.03	.625
Gender	0.44	0.31	−0.17	1.06	1.56	0.85	2.87	.154
Indigenous origin	0.01	0.01	−0.02	0.03	1.01	0.98	1.03	.700
Subjective social class	−0.03	0.10	−0.22	0.16	0.97	0.80	1.18	.783
Educational attainment	−0.16	0.08	−0.31	−0.01	0.86	0.73	1.00	.044

Note. The results in bold reflect the significant findings. CI = confidence interval; LB = lower bound; UB = upper bound.

Table 4.

Multinomial logistic regression predicting the likelihood of belonging to the ascending (versus descending) latent class as a function of perception, ideological, attitudinal, and sociodemographic predictors.

	Ascending intolerance (versus descending intolerance)
			95% CI			95% CI
Predictors	b	SE	LB	UB	OR (B)	LB	UB	p
Perceived economic inequality	−0.03	0.12	−0.27	0.21	0.97	0.76	1.24	.804
Perceived social class conflict	−0.51	0.23	−0.96	−0.06	0.60	0.38	0.94	.026
Authoritarianism	−0.37	0.30	−0.96	0.22	0.69	0.38	1.24	.219
Meritocracy	−0.21	0.20	−0.61	0.18	0.81	0.54	1.20	.293
Egalitarianism	−0.11	0.30	−0.69	0.47	0.89	0.50	1.61	.709
System justification	0.22	0.23	−0.23	0.66	1.24	0.80	1.93	.341
Political ideology	−0.13	0.08	−0.28	0.02	0.88	0.75	1.02	.087
Social change	−0.31	0.24	−0.78	0.16	0.73	0.46	1.18	.200
Satisfaction with constitution	−0.54	0.16	−0.87	−0.22	0.58	0.42	0.80	< .001
Age	−0.02	0.01	−0.04	0.01	0.98	0.96	1.01	.181
Gender	−0.20	0.39	−0.98	0.57	0.81	0.38	1.77	.604
Indigenous origin	< 0.01	0.02	−0.03	0.02	1.00	0.97	1.03	.925
Subjective social class	0.06	0.13	−0.19	0.31	1.06	0.83	1.36	.630
Educational attainment	0.02	0.10	−0.18	0.21	1.02	0.84	1.24	.854

Note. The results in bold reflect the significant findings. CI = confidence interval; LB = lower bound; UB = upper bound.

Political Outcomes

Finally, we examined whether the three classes differed in outcomes by using class membership as a factor to predict political attitudes in 2022 (the final wave of the study), conducting analyses of variance. Although we did not find significant differences between the latent classes with regard to attitudes toward redistribution, F(2, 984) = 0.24, p = .784, there were significant differences in trust in institutions, F(2, 2727) = 6.55, p = .001; optimism with the new constitution, F(2, 1651) = 5.61, p = .004; participation in collective action, F(2, 2727) = 7.94, p < .001; and political interest, F(2, 2727) = 23.58, p < .001.

As shown in Figure 3, post-hoc Bonferroni tests indicated that individuals in the high intolerance latent class were significantly more trusting of institutions (M = 2.39, SD = 0.66) than those in the descending intolerance latent class (M = 2.22, SD = 0.64, p = .003), and marginally more so than those in the ascending intolerance latent class (M = 2.30, SD = 0.64, p = .079). Members of the high intolerance latent class were also significantly more optimistic about constitutional change (M = 2.97, SD = 0.69) compared to the descending intolerance latent class (M = 2.76, SD = 0.65, p = .007). Regarding participation in collective action, the high intolerance latent class reported significantly higher involvement (M = 1.31, SD = 0.52) than both the descending (M = 1.20, SD = 0.43, p = .001) and ascending intolerance latent classes (M = 1.20, SD = 0.38, p < .001). Finally, political interest was higher in the high intolerance latent class (M = 2.50, SD = 1.00) than both the descending (M = 2.12, SD = 0.86, p < .001) and ascending intolerance latent classes (M = 2.11, SD = 0.84, p < .001).

Figure 3.

Differences between latent growth classes in trust in institutions (1a), optimism with the new constitution (1b), participation in collective action (1c), and political interest (1d).

General Discussion

Our aim was to analyze the evolution of attitudes toward intolerance to economic inequality in Chile over recent years, with a focus on identifying groups that follow distinct trajectories. Our results show that attitudes toward economic inequality are dynamic, as individuals change their level of intolerance toward economic inequality over the years. However, these changes do not occur uniformly across all individuals, as we identified three groups with distinct trajectories.

The first group comprises the majority of the sample (88%) and consistently demonstrated high levels of intolerance toward economic inequality throughout the entire period, although with some fluctuation. The longitudinal effect followed a curvilinear pattern, forming a concave line with peak intolerance in 2019. It is remarkable that this trend parallels the curvilinear trajectory of economic inequality as objectively measured by the Gini index (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2024). Although our research cannot establish a direct connection between objective economic inequality and intolerance toward it, this result suggests that when inequality increased, intolerance toward economic inequality also increased among a large majority of Chileans. This result aligns with analyses that have identified concerns about high economic inequality as one of the main drivers of the “social outburst” (Somma et al., 2021). Interestingly, the peak in intolerance toward inequality in 2019 was relatively small for this group, as they had already been exhibiting high levels of intolerance since at least 2016. Analyses of Chile's political changes in recent years suggest that dissatisfaction with the country's socio-economic conditions extends far back before the “social outburst” (Somma & Donoso, 2023). During the outburst, even the Minister of Social Development and Family admitted that: “We didn’t see that the anger was accumulating and had a foundation” (Rodríguez, 2019). Therefore, our results showing the high levels of intolerance toward economic inequality by this majority group three years before the “social outburst” are consistent with previous literature. In this context, where objective economic inequality shaped individuals’ perceptions, it becomes clearer how even a minor increase in metro fares could, among other contextual factors (e.g., normative influence; Gonzalez, 2024), fuel mass protests, resulting in over 20 deaths and thousands of injuries among civilians and security forces, and ultimately prompting a reconsideration of the country's political economy. Critically, the decline in intolerance toward inequality from 2019 to 2022 for this group was also minimal, with intolerance levels remaining quite high.

The second and third groups were smaller than the high intolerance group (comprising 6.6% and 5.2% of the sample, respectively), yet they still represent a significant number of Chileans—approximately 850,000 and 676,000 individuals, respectively. For these two groups, the level of intolerance toward inequality underwent critical changes, shifting from one extreme to the other, albeit in opposite directions. The second group, which we call the ascending intolerance group, initially exhibited low intolerance toward inequality in 2016, which gradually increased until 2022, reaching levels comparable to the high intolerance group. This upward trajectory suggests a growing awareness of or sensitivity to economic disparities among these individuals. In contrast, the third group—the descending intolerance group—initially showed high levels of intolerance toward economic inequality in 2016. Over time, however, this intolerance decreased, initiating a sharp decline between 2018 and 2019, and ultimately resulting in low intolerance toward (i.e., tolerance of) inequality by 2022. This downward pattern might reflect processes such as adaptation, the normalization of inequality, or the reactive effect of the increased redistributive demands from the rest of the population (i.e., the high and ascending intolerance groups). These results show that, for a portion of the population, intolerance toward inequality is more unstable and can vary dramatically over a period of just a few years. In contrast to the high intolerance group, the ascending and descending trajectories cannot be interpreted as direct reflections of current economic inequality since their patterns diverge from the Gini index. These findings suggest that psychosocial factors may provide a more compelling explanation for the distinct trajectories than objective inequality alone. Indeed, our results show that psychosocial factors measured in 2016 predicted which individuals were more likely to follow the different trajectories.

Both the ascending and descending groups share a lower level of educational attainment compared to the high intolerance group, which suggests that low levels of educational attainment predict greater instability in intolerance toward inequality, whether this leads to an increase or a decrease. Our findings contrast with previous studies conducted in the USA and the United Kingdom, which found that higher educational attainment was associated with greater tolerance of economic inequality (Bullock, 2021; Gingrich, 2019). Indeed, in cross-country studies, the relationship between educational attainment and tolerance toward economic inequality appears to be less robust (Roex et al., 2019). In this context, our results indicate that in a country like Chile, characterized by extreme economic inequality and significant political tension, individuals with higher levels of education tend to maintain higher levels of intolerance toward economic inequality over time.

By contrast, our results suggest that individuals with lower levels of educational attainment may exhibit less stability in their intolerance toward economic inequality. Contextual circumstances within the country could explain these changes. The ascending intolerance group was particularly dissatisfied with the current constitution in 2016, with significantly lower satisfaction compared to both the high and descending groups. However, this dissatisfaction may not have been directly attributed to economic inequality itself. The lack of perceived economic inequality, coupled with ideologies that justify inequalities (anti-egalitarianism and system justification), when compared to the high intolerance group and the lack of perceived social class conflict when compared to the descending group seem to support this idea and explain why this group initially exhibited low intolerance toward (i.e., tolerance of) economic inequality. The grievances that led to the “social outburst” may have made the levels of economic inequality and social class conflict more salient, prompting them to reassess the beliefs that had previously legitimized these inequalities. These findings are consistent with prior research that has found that differences in factors such as perception of economic inequality and ideology predict variations in tolerance toward economic inequality (Brown-Iannuzzi et al., 2017; García-Castro et al., 2020; García-Sánchez et al., 2019). Our study contributes to this line of research by demonstrating that these changes can occur not only between groups but also within individuals over time. Future research should continue to analyze the relationship between these factors and intolerance toward inequality on a year-to-year basis to better understand this development.

The results are particularly notable for showing how certain variables predict divergent trajectories, despite similar initial intolerance toward inequality. Of particular interest is examining the predictors distinguishing the high versus descending intolerance groups to understand which factors explain why some individuals with high intolerance in 2016 experienced a drastic decline over time, while others maintained high levels, even showing a slight increase. Our analysis shows that individuals with lower levels of educational attainment, as previously discussed, and a right-wing political orientation were more likely to follow the descending than the high intolerance trajectory. The fact that political orientation predicted this trajectory, even when controlling for ideology, suggests that this effect might be driven more by identification with a political orientation than by ideological content—that is, symbolic instead of operational components (Brandt et al., 2019). Following the “social outburst,” the right-wing government at the time adopted a strong rhetoric that framed the situation as a conflict between the government and the demonstrators—for example, “Chile was waging war against a powerful, criminal, and relentless foe” (Somma et al., 2020, p. 497). Some individuals who identified with the government's political orientation may have distanced themselves from the grievances against economic inequality, thereby reducing their intolerance as a symbolic gesture of alignment with their political group. However, this rationale remains speculative and further research is needed to clarify which components of political orientation might predict changes in tolerance toward economic inequality within individuals.

Finally, we explored whether the different trajectories of intolerance toward economic inequality could predict political attitudes and behaviors in 2022, the last wave of the study. Our findings underscore the importance of considering previous levels of intolerance toward economic inequality when predicting political outcomes. Indeed, the high intolerance group exhibited the greatest differences compared to the descending group, which is unsurprising given that, by 2022, their trajectories had diverged most sharply in terms of intolerance toward economic inequality. More importantly, differences were also observed with the ascending group, even though they shared a similar level of intolerance toward economic inequality at that time. It was their differing trajectories over the preceding six years that allowed us to predict the differences in participation in collective action and political interest. The fact that the group of individuals who had historically shown higher levels of intolerance toward inequality displayed greater participation in collective action and showed higher political interest—compared to those who had tolerated inequality in the past and only recently exhibited high levels of intolerance—suggests that the persistence of attitudes toward inequality contributes to consolidating political behaviors and attitudes. These results again highlight the importance of focusing on changes in intolerance toward economic inequality rather than relying solely on intolerance at a single point in time. Future research could build on these findings by exploring, for example, how changes over time in attitudes toward specific issues such as economic inequality may help explain shifts in political attitudes. This would require taking into account individuals’ initial political views and examining whether different paths of change in issue-related attitudes lead to different political outcomes later on.

Although the current research advances our understanding of the evolution of intolerance toward economic inequality in a country characterized by severe levels of economic disparity, it also has some limitations that we must acknowledge. First, our analysis only covers six years of changes, measured annually, which limits the inferences we can draw from these results to this specific time window. Future research should encompass broader time frames and more frequent measurements to capture a more nuanced understanding of these changes. Second, since we conducted these analyses using secondary data, we were constrained by the measures available. Some of these measures, including our main variable, may exhibit relatively high measurement error, as they were collected using single-item assessments. Future research could address this limitation by employing more reliable scales. Third, although the sample was a representative probability-based sample, it only covered urban areas. While it is true that the urban population accounts for the majority of the Chilean population, rural areas were not represented. Given that people in these areas may exhibit different patterns in how their attitudes toward inequality change, it would be desirable for future research to investigate this minority population. Finally, our results focus on the evolution of intolerance toward economic inequality within a single country, which restricts the generalizability of our findings. While conducting research about economic inequality contextualized within specific historical circumstances is a valid approach (Gobel & Carvacho, 2024), this inevitably limits the applicability of our results to other contexts. Extending this line of research to other countries would provide a more comprehensive understanding of these processes.

Concluding Thoughts

Economic inequality remains one of the most pressing challenges of our time. Understanding how intolerance toward high levels of inequality evolves is critical for predicting the political behaviors aimed at addressing it. In this study, we focused on the Chilean context from 2016 to 2022, demonstrating that intolerance toward inequality can change within individuals and follow different trajectories: high, ascending, and descending intolerance. These trajectories can be predicted by variables such as educational attainment and satisfaction with the current constitution, and they have distinct consequences for political attitudes and behaviors, including participation in collective action and interest in politics. Our results highlight the need to consider the evolution of attitudes toward inequality, rather than focusing on attitudes at specific points in time, in order to more accurately predict political attitudes and behaviors.

Supplemental Material

sj-docx-1-pac-10.1177_18344909261421378 - Supplemental material for Examining the Changes in Intolerance Toward Economic Inequality, Their Predictors, and Political Outcomes

Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-pac-10.1177_18344909261421378 for Examining the Changes in Intolerance Toward Economic Inequality, Their Predictors, and Political Outcomes by Ángel Sánchez-Rodríguez, Gloria Jiménez-Moya and Roberto González in Journal of Pacific Rim Psychology

Footnotes

Acknowledgments

This research was supported by the Center for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies (COES).

ORCID iD

Ángel Sánchez-Rodríguez

Ethics Statement

The study was conducted in accordance with the ethical guidelines of the American Psychological Association and was approved by the Scientific Ethical Committee on Social Sciences, Arts, and Humanities of the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile (ID 160129004).

Funding

This research was funded by a José Castillejo Grant (CAS22/00377) from the State Mobility Sub-program of the State Plan for Scientific, Technical and Innovation Research 2021–2023, Ministry of Universities and by Grant PID2023-151771NA-100 funded by MICIU/AEI/10.13039/501100011033. The authors acknowledge support fromthe Centre for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies (COES).

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Data Availability

The data supporting the findings was obtained from the following publicly available resource: Estudio Longitudinal Social de Chile at

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

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