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Abstract

Measurable regional variations in collectivism have been found across the Chinese mainland, challenging the simple classification of China as a “collectivistic society” in cross-national studies. In previous studies, a small number of distal or proximal ecological factors have been used to explain these regional variations of collectivism. However, there has been little consensus on which ecological factors best predict regional collectivism. In this article, the authors propose the “triple-line framework,” an integrated perspective on regional variations in collectivism. This framework divides China into four regions using three lines—the Hu Huanyong Line, the Great Wall Line, and the Qinling–Huaihe Line—according to their ecological, historical, and social characteristics. A growing body of empirical research is largely consistent with this framework. The authors conclude by discussing the potential for this framework to generate new, testable hypotheses and consider some ways in which this approach to intranational variation could be used by cultural psychologists working in other parts of the world.

Keywords

collectivism ecology herder wheat rice triple-line framework Hu Huanyong Line Great Wall Line Qinling–Huaihe Line

By far the most common way that “culture” is operationalized in cultural psychology research relies on national boundaries. Although this nation-as-culture perspective has taught us much about how culture shapes the mind (Conway et al., 2014; Oyserman, 2017), there are important concerns about whether the unit of analysis might be too large in many cases. Indeed, the last two decades have brought numerous examples of within-country differences across regions (e.g., Knight & Nisbett, 2007; Vandello & Cohen, 1999; Yamawaki, 2012). The subnational or regional level complements our understanding of the interrelation of culture and ecology at the national level, permitting a more fine-grained approach (Conway et al., 2014). This is especially true when a nation is large and internally complex—for example, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Russia, or the United States.

When conducting a regional-level analysis, it is convenient to just use subnational units (e.g., states in the United States, prefectures in Japan, or provinces in China). Such an approach is atheoretical, however, and relies on how the country happens to be subdivided. Whereas some divisions have a long history and may incorporate clear differences in cultural identity—for example, Quebec in Canada or Scotland in the United Kingdom—many other countries are subdivided for pragmatic reasons, such as China. Consider, for example, the Chinese provinces of Tianjin and Hebei, which were forced to merge and separate by the central government, for various administrative reasons, at least four times over the past two centuries (Si, 2014). A better approach in many cases is to use bottom-up criteria based on culturally relevant theory.

In recent years, cultural psychologists have studied a proliferating number of social-ecological factors, such as herding versus farming versus fishing; rice versus wheat farming; voluntary frontier settlement; residential and relational mobility; harshness of climate; and population density (Kitayama et al., 2006; Oishi, 2014; Talhelm et al., 2014; Thomson et al., 2018; Uchida et al., 2019; Uskul et al., 2008; Van De Vliert et al., 2013). This research allows us to compare different social-ecological theories to see which one explains the most variance and leads to the most culturally relevant regional divisions. Although generally each approach has been studied separately, there is no reason beyond simplicity to treat them as mutually exclusive. Most of these theories rely on dichotomies or trichotomies, but a combination of approaches could yield several regions with psychologically relevant cultural distinctions. Explanations of these distinctions would then be more robust because each region would be grounded in several social-ecological factors.

In this article, we apply this general approach to China. China is important because of its size, population, historical longevity, and recent rapid social change. There is mounting evidence of considerable social-ecological variations in several domains. Furthermore, there is a growing database of empirical evidence that can be used to provide initial support for our proposed framework (Ma et al., 2016; Talhelm et al., 2014; Van de Vliert et al., 2013). Many studies in cultural psychology treat “China” as a single entity or grouped with other East Asian societies—indeed, some studies refer to “Asians.” Doing so ignores potentially important within-country cultural variations.

This article aims to summarize the regional variations of Chinese collectivism from the perspective of social ecology, and proposes an integrated theoretical framework to explain these variations. We proceed in four steps: first, we summarize empirical evidence of collectivism variations within China; second, we present the triple-line framework, based on integrating across several social-ecological factors; third, we review the extent to which currently available evidence supports the triple-line framework; and, finally, we propose future directions for research on regional variations of collectivism, both within and beyond China.

Individualism and Collectivism

The distinction between individualism and collectivism captures important differences in how the relationship between self and others is constructed, as well as whether the individual or the group is understood as the basic unit of analysis (Cross et al., 2011; Hofstede, 2001; Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2010; Oyserman et al., 2002; Triandis, 1995). People living in individualistic cultural contexts (e.g., the United States and the United Kingdom) tend to pay more attention to the achievement of their own goals and their own uniqueness. They have clear boundaries with others and pursue well-being or life satisfaction by sharing feelings and achieving personal success. In contrast, people living in collectivistic cultural contexts (e.g., China, Japan, and Korea) tend to be more concerned about maintaining harmonious relations with in-group members, and the boundaries between themselves and these others are much less firm. This distinction is reflected in cognition, perception, memory, cultural products, and even brain function (Morling, 2016; Nisbett & Masuda, 2003; Oyserman et al., 2002; Zhu et al., 2007). Many explanations for these differences have been proposed, including cultural heritage (Ma et al., 2016), modernity (Inglehart & Baker, 2000), climato-economic theory (Van de Vliert et al., 2013), the subsistence system (Uskul et al., 2008), the historical risk of infectious disease (Fincher et al., 2008), and geographic and relational mobility (Oishi, 2010).

Variations in individualism and collectivism are most commonly studied across countries but can also be observed across regions (Knight & Nisbett, 2007) or between social classes (Varnum et al., 2011). Given the complexity of China, the observation of regional variations in cultural orientations is unsurprising. These variations have been observed through self-report values (Feng et al., 2017; Van de Vliert et al., 2013), experimental tasks such as symbolic self-inflation (Dong et al., 2019; Luo & Ren, 2018; Ma et al., 2016; Talhelm et al., 2014), cultural products (Hou et al., 2016), and online behaviors (Ren, Xiang, Zhou & Zhu, 2017). A few potential ecological factors have been tested. For example, Talhelm et al. (2014) measured participants in different provinces of China (except Xinjiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia) and found that the percentage of farmland as paddy rice was associated with cognitive task performance consistent with collectivism, using “province” as the unit of analysis. Ma et al. (2016) found that the southern Chinese were more collectivistic than the northern Chinese on the nepotism task and argued that this variation was due to differences in the historical influence of Confucian values. Van de Vliert et al. (2013) surveyed respondents in 15 provinces of China and found medium collectivism levels in provinces with a temperate climate, the highest in less developed provinces with harsh climates, and the lowest in highly developed provinces with harsh climates.

A rapidly proliferating research literature supports the claim that cultural variations are at least partly shaped by proximal or distal ecological factors (Nisbett et al., 2001; Oishi, 2014). Regional differences in some ecological factors within China are at times even larger than between countries, providing more than enough variance. For example, in terms of climate demand, the northernmost province, Heilongjiang, is similar to Germany, whereas the southernmost province, Hainan, is similar to Morocco (Van de Vliert et al., 2013). Furthermore, climate variation has been found to explain psychological differences such as personality; specifically, it has been linked to regional-level personality trait differences in which the southern Chinese score higher than the northern Chinese on the Big Five personality traits of agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, emotional stability, and openness (Wei et al., 2017). Some ecological factors have been shown to predict province-level variation in collectivism, such as climate demand (Van de Vliert et al., 2013), mode of agriculture (Talhelm et al., 2014), and voluntary settlement (Chen, et al., 2016; Chen, et al., 2019; Feng et al., 2017).

We contend that having more factors would contribute to a better understanding of the variations of collectivism among provinces. Moreover, opposing predictions have been made about some ecological factors with regard to collectivism in China. A reanalysis of the collectivism scores from both Van de Vliert et al. (2013) and Talhelm et al. (2014) found that they correlated negatively at the provincial level (−.67). In other words, in mainland China, these two ecological factors predicted collectivism in opposite directions (Xu et al., 2016). To resolve these difficulties, we follow Vandello and Cohen’s (1999) method: instead of using a single factor to predict or explain regional variations in collectivism, we combine several relevant factors to divide the provinces into different regions. We anticipate that these regional groupings of provinces will be characterized by distinguishing cultural features measurable at the individual level.

The Triple-Line Framework

Grounded in the premise that these ecological factors may interact with one another in shaping individualism or collectivism, we propose an integrated ecological framework to explain regional variations of Chinese collectivism. Specifically, we present the triple-line framework of regional differences associated with multiple ecological factors. Each of the three specific lines used in this framework was borrowed from research conducted in geography (Hu, 1935, 1990; Lattimore, 1988; Ren, Liu & Yu, 2017). In the geographical sciences, especially in economic geography, ecological factors are often used to explain regional economic inequality and historical regional conflicts (Lattimore, 1988). The ecological factors among the regions demarcated by these three lines include distinctions between herders, wheat farmers, and rice farmers, but also some other ecological factors such as climate demand, voluntary settlement, and population density.

These ecological factors have been linked to collectivism. Herders are less collectivistic than farmers (Uskul et al., 2008). Farmers planting wheat are less collectivistic than those planting paddy rice (Talhelm et al., 2014). Regions with historical voluntary frontier settlement are less collectivistic than those that do not have this history (Kitayama et al., 2009). Regions with lower population density are less collectivistic than those with higher population density (Conway et al., 2001; Vandello & Cohen, 1999). Regions with a harsh climate and poor income resources are more collectivistic than those with a milder climate or better resources (Van de Vliert et al., 2013). Water is an important resource related to the subsistence system, especially in China. Rainfall and lakes and rivers are the main water resources for agriculture. In China, Hu (1935, 1990) argued that regions with less than 400 mm of rainfall are not fit for farming; regions with 400–800 mm of rainfall with fewer lakes and rivers are fit for farming wheat; and regions with higher than 800 mm of rainfall and more lakes and rivers are fit for farming paddy rice. These factors blend together to shape regional variation in collectivism within China.

In the triple-line framework, we start by introducing three important “lines.” We then divide the territory of China into four regions using these lines. Lastly, we consider each region’s ecological factors and their anticipated effect on collectivism. Note that, for heuristic purposes, we use straight lines as a convenient way of quickly understanding the placement of the four regions (see Figure 1). In so doing, we follow the practice of the geographers who proposed these lines originally. Of course, these lines usually follow geographical features that are not perfectly straight and, in some cases, pass through areas where their placement will need to be more precisely delineated through future research.

Figure 1.

Triple-Line Framework of variations within-China.

The Three Lines and Their Borders

The Hu Huanyong Line runs roughly from north to south, from Aihui City in Heilongjiang to Tengchong City in Yunnan (Hu, 1935). Unlike the other two lines, which for the most part follow mountains and rivers, the Hu Huanyong Line is an imaginary diagonal division of the Chinese mainland that has considerable demographic, environmental, and political significance (Hu, 1935, 1990). The Great Wall Line is marked by the Great Wall and generally follows a west-to-east trajectory, from Jiayuguan City in Gansu to Qinhuangdao City in Hebei. Lattimore (1988) argued that the Great Wall was built to separate farmers and herders. The Qinling–Huaihe Line is another west-to-east line, marked by the Qinling mountain and Huai river, which runs roughly from Longnan City in Gansu to Yancheng City in Jiangsu (see Figure 1). Farmers north of the line mainly grow wheat, whereas those to the south mainly grow paddy rice.

The Four Regions and Their Provinces

At first glance, one might expect that the Chinese mainland should be divided into six regions according to these three lines. For the regions west of the Hu Huanyong Line, however, the social-ecological conditions are similar, regardless of whether one is north or south of the other two lines. As this western region also has the lowest population, we believe it best to consider it as a whole. Doing so leaves us with four regions overall (see Figure 1). First, the Hu Huanyong Line separates Region I and the other three regions. Second, the Great Wall Line divides Region II and the two remaining regions. Finally, the Qinling–Huaihe Line separates Region III and Region IV. Unlike provinces, which are often used to explain within-China variations on psychological outcomes, these four regions differ primarily in a few important ecological factors. Herder–wheat–rice subsistence is the core ecological factor, supplemented by population density and settlement history. Each region is composed of several provinces, as follows:

Region I lies west of the Hu Huanyong Line and includes Xinjiang, Tibet, Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia (most), and Inner Mongolia (most).

Region II lies east of the Hu Huanyong Line and north of the Great Wall Line and includes Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, and the northern part of Hebei.

Region III lies east of the Hu Huanyong Line, south of the Great Wall Line, and north of the Qinling–Huaihe Line, and includes Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Shanxi, Shaanxi, Henan, and northern Jiangsu.

Region IV lies east of the Hu Huanyong Line and south of the Qinling–Huaihe Line, and includes southern Jiangsu, Anhui, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Sichuan, Chongqing, Taiwan, Guizhou, and Yunnan.

Note that although all of the provinces are classified into different regions, the division of regions in the triple-line framework is based on natural and social ecology, which is inconsistent with both current and historical administrative divisions. China’s administrative boundaries have two main characteristics: one is “following the shape of the mountains and rivers”; the other is “indented,” unrelated to natural features but also not traveling in a straight or curved line (Han, 2015). As a result, in the spatial distribution of the ecological environment there will be inconsistencies with administrative divisions. For example, Jiangsu Province (shown in Figure 1) is divided into northern Jiangsu and southern Jiangsu by the Qinling–Huaihe Line. While much of Jiangsu Province belongs to Region IV, placing the whole province in this region would ignore important intra-provincial variations.

Region I: Herding Subsistence Combined With Harsh Environment

The differences between Region I and the other regions were first proposed by Hu Huanyong, mainly based on the distribution of the population in 1935. East of the Hu Huanyong Line, just over one-third of China’s land housed almost 94% of the population. In striking contrast, west of this line—in Region I—a mere 6% of the citizens shared a vast and varied terrain covering nearly two-thirds of the nation’s land (Hu, 1935). Furthermore, this lopsided population distribution has persisted to the present day, despite the vast socioeconomic changes during the intervening years (Sun & Ryder, 2016), as reflected in China’s demographic census of 2010 (see Qi et al., 2015). The natural ecological differences west and east of the Hu Huanyong Line have been linked to this population imbalance (Ren, Liu, & Yu, 2017).

Region I includes provinces on the west side of this line, which were historically inhabited by Mongolians, Uyghurs, and Tibetans. In contrast to the regions on the eastern side of the line, Region I mostly consists of mountains, deserts, and upland grasslands. With less than 400 mm of rainfall per year, neither wheat nor rice can be grown (see Table 1). People living in this region mainly depend on a herding and grazing subsistence system (Barfield, 1989; Lattimore, 1988; Wang, 1992). Although the Great Wall Line and the Qinling–Huaihe Line also extend into Region I, these two lines do not indicate much variation west of the Hu Huanyong Line (indicated by dotted lines in Figure 1), as the whole of Region I has a similar subsistence system. Herders move about frequently, with more opportunities to make exchanges with strangers. They have developed self-reliance in solving problems in daily life, which fosters more independence compared with farmers (Lattimore, 1988; Uskul et al., 2008).

Hu (1935, 1990) argued that the ecological changes demarcated by this line have led to the unbalanced distribution in population observed in China. The implications for collectivism are not immediately clear, however. On the one hand, the lower population density in Region I should contribute to lower collectivism among people living there compared to those in the other regions. On the other hand, the harsh climate of Region I should promote collectivism, especially in-group favoritism and out-group exclusion (Van de Vliert et al., 2013). The relationship between a harsh climate and collectivism is not clear, however. At least within China, this link has been supported only by self-reported beliefs, not by other social-orientation measurements such as self-inflation tasks (Talhelm et al., 2014). Moreover, the association between climate and collectivism might be moderated by other factors, such as relational mobility (Thomson et al., 2018). Compared with farmers, herders usually move about more frequently and perceive more mobility. The latter may minimize the climate’s positive effect on collectivism. Overall, combining these ecological factors while acknowledging the predominant importance of herder subsistence predicts that the inhabitants of Region I are the least collectivistic in China.

Region II: Wheat Farming and Voluntary Frontier Settlement

The second division is the Great Wall Line, which follows the path of the Great Wall of China. The construction of the Great Wall during the Warring States Period (475–221 bce) and the Qin Dynasty (221–206 bce), and its occasional reconstruction until the collapse of the Ming Dynasty in 1644 ce, was aimed at defending China from foreign invasion—the areas adjacent to the Great Wall Line have long been the site of war and conflict throughout Chinese history, particularly between nomadic peoples (such as the Huns, Turks, and Mongols) and farming peoples (the Han). Some scholars have argued that the frequent conflict along this frontier was due to the difference in the ecological environment north and south of the Great Wall Line (Barfield, 1989; Lattimore, 1988; Wang, 1992). At times when the weather got colder and grazing conditions worsened in the grassland area to the north of the Great Wall Line, nomads were more likely to attack the farming people to the south (Xu, 1998; Zu, 1972).

For many centuries, most of the inhabitants of Region II have been farmers planting wheat. However, as there are plenty of forests and mountains, they usually considered hunting for animals as their main source of food, resulting in a mixed herding and farming subsistence system. We therefore predict that the inhabitants of Region II are more collectivistic than those in Region I but less collectivistic than those in regions where the population comprised farmers only. Historically, the population density in Region II has been lower than in Regions III and IV, which also contributes to lower levels of collectivism. Even today, the population density in this area is lower than in Regions III and IV.

Region II is also characterized by voluntary frontier settlement during the 19th and 20th centuries. Starting in 1840, the government encouraged residents in Region III to settle in Region II to create a bulwark against potential invasion by Russia or Japan. Accelerating this process, several million residents of famine-stricken areas of Region III voluntarily settled in Region II between 1880 and 1940 (Gottschang & Lary, 2000; Ho, 1959). As a result, today most inhabitants of Region II are Han Chinese. This movement is very similar to the settlement histories of the western United States and Hokkaido in Japan. The voluntary frontier settlement hypothesis holds that individualism is fostered through self-selection for migration, followed by the need to adapt to a more severe environment (Kitayama et al., 2006, 2009). Moreover, as most of the inhabitants of Region II can trace their family history back to Region III, self-selection would have had the dual effect of lowering collectivism in the former while raising it in the latter, thus widening the gap between the two regions. Taken together, we expect the inhabitants of Region II to fit between Regions I and III in terms of collectivism.

Region III: Wheat Farming

Region III is located between the Great Wall Line and the Qinling–Huaihe Line and is considered the birthplace of Chinese civilization, with a history of agriculture spanning thousands of years. People in Region III planted millet and then wheat and corn due to a relative lack of lakes and rivers combined with 400–800 mm of rainfall per year. Compared with the herders of Region I, farming practices tend to promote collectivism. With stable communities and labor exchange, people were part of acquaintance-based social networks. However, as the need for cooperation is lower in wheat-farming compared to rice-farming contexts (Talhelm & Oishi, 2018), we predict that the inhabitants of Region III are less collectivistic than those of Region IV. When compared with Region II, the higher population density of Region III should lead to more collectivism as the opportunity for closer and more frequent interactions with acquaintances is increased. The absence of a history of voluntary frontier settlement in Region III should further predict more collectivism compared with Region II.

Region IV: Rice Farming

Region IV, located south of the Qinling–Huaihe Line, has more than 800 mm of rainfall per year, resulting in a large number of rivers and lakes. In this region, peasants mainly plant paddy rice. Some scholars have argued that the cultivation of paddy rice forces farmers to cooperate more frequently and more intensely compared with those planting wheat, leading to more collectivism (Dong et al., 2019). The population density in Region IV is the highest in China. Taken together, these ecological factors suggest that the inhabitants of Region IV are the most collectivistic in China. Confucianism may also play an important role in this region. Nisbett and his colleagues (2001) has argued that a Confucian influence, with its emphases on filial piety and group harmony, may help explain why several East Asian cultural groups tend to embrace collectivism. Here, we contend that Confucianism has a stronger role in China’s central regions compared with its peripheral regions, leading to higher levels of collectivism in its central regions. Although Confucian culture originated in Region III, Region IV has been the economic and cultural center of China since the Song Dynasty began in 969 ce (Ma et al., 2016). Taking these factors into consideration, we anticipate the highest levels of collectivism in Region IV.

In summary, we believe that the regional variations in Chinese collectivism can be largely understood through reference to the four regions, with small intra-regional variations and relatively large interregional variations. Specifically, the triple-line framework predicts that the collectivism ranking, from low to high, should be I < II < III < IV. A number of ecological variables, in some cases supplemented by historical shifts, combine to shape these interregional variations.

Evidence Supporting the Triple-Line Framework

Although there are some studies on Chinese regional variations in collectivism, none of them have been analyzed according to the triple-line framework. We summarize these studies below, emphasizing the degree of fit between the findings and the theory.

Evidence for collectivism differences between Region I and the other regions has mainly come from studies comparing Uyghur, Tibetan, and Mongolian ethnic groups with Han groups. Ren et al. (2014) found that Uyghur Chinese exhibited both high individualism and high collectivism in self-report questionnaires, attribution, relational mobility, social engaging/disengaging emotions, and other tasks compared with Han Chinese. Mamat et al. (2014, Study 2) found that Uyghur Chinese were lower in relational self than Han Chinese using a self-reference paradigm task. Uyghur and Han differences in construal of the relational self supported our hypothesis based on the Hu Huanyong Line. Second, examining another minority in Region I, Mongolian Chinese were found to be less collectivistic than Han Chinese (Qishisan, He, Li, et al., 2017). Another study also found that Mongolian Chinese were more individualistic on self-report values, scored higher in symbolic self-inflation, and were less willing to use common names when naming their children compared with Han Chinese (Stojcic et al., 2020). This difference between Mongolian Chinese and Han Chinese also fits with our hypothesis of lower collectivism in Region I compared to the other three regions.

One piece of potential counterevidence ought to be acknowledged. Comparing Uyghur and Han Chinese, Mamat et al. (2014, Studies 3 and 4) found that the former scored higher for collective self in a group-referent task. The researchers attributed this finding to Muslim beliefs motivating the Uyghur Chinese to embrace solidarity with fellow Uyghurs, who share the same religion, more so than the predominantly atheist Han Chinese. More research will need to be done to compare Uyghur and Han Chinese; however, if this finding proves robust, it will suggest that the triple-line framework may not be sufficient to explain regional variations in collectivism when considering ethnocultural or religious minorities in those regions.

These studies assume that different groups adopt different strategies to deal with their relations with in-groups and out-groups in social interactions due to their different religious beliefs, languages, and other factors, rather than focusing on ecological factors (Mamat et al., 2014; Qishisan et al., 2017; Ren et al., 2014). In fact, the two are not contradictory. Natural ecology is a distal cause, and the survival mode along with social norms related to human activities (including beliefs and languages) may be specifically adaptive skills developed on this basis, further promoting variations between different ethnic groups. In addition, increasing numbers of Han Chinese are now living west of the Hu Huanyong Line. Future research should test whether these people have lower levels of collectivism compared with those in the other regions, which we would predict based on the social-ecological conditions of Region I combined with the voluntary settlement that has led to these intranational migrations.

There is not much direct evidence for the distinction between Region II and Regions III and IV. Nonetheless, two indicators related to collectivism suggest that Region II is less collectivistic. Higher rates of divorce and residential mobility have been associated with individualism in a number of societies (Hou et al., 2016; Oishi, 2014; Vandello & Cohen, 1999). The divorce rate of Region II is similar to that of Beijing and Shanghai, which is higher than other provinces (National Bureau of Statistics, 2018). The internal migration rate of the residents of Region II is also higher than that in Regions III and IV (National Bureau of Statistics, 2010). Bai and Ren (in press) found that people in Region II show less in-group favoritism and are more likely to select a unique first name for their children compared with people in Region III.

The collectivistic differences between Regions III and IV are also supported directly or indirectly by a few empirical studies. Talhelm et al. (2014) found that collectivism was lower in Regions II and III (where wheat and soy beans are grown) than in Region IV (where paddy rice is grown). Instead of comparing people living on each side of the Qinling–Huaihe Line, the authors focused on the percentage of paddy rice planted. Nonetheless, the regions divided by these two methods show a striking overlap. Ma et al. (2016) divided the participants in their study into southerners and northerners in strict accordance with the Qinling–Huaihe Line, and only analyzed the Han people. They found that the collectivism of Region IV was higher than that of Regions II and III, indicating that inhabitants in Region IV are more collectivistic than other regions. Dong et al. (2019) studied an area in Ningxia’s Yellow River delta where paddy rice was historically grown, despite being surrounded by pastoral and wheat-farming areas, and found higher rates of collectivism just in the rice-farming areas compared to adjacent areas.

At this point, we should pause to consider the climato-economic hypothesis of collectivism, as this approach does not support our framework (Van de Vliert et al., 2013). Specifically, the climato-economic hypothesis would predict higher levels of collectivism for Regions I and II, compared to Regions III and IV, based on the higher climate demands of the former (i.e., deviation from 22 °) and higher income levels in the latter. Perhaps in this case, climate and economics were overridden by other social-ecological factors. Climate demands are more fundamental and hence more distal, meaning that the effects could be altered by intermediate variables such as the subsistence system or settlement history. For example, Van de Vliert (2020) found that a higher latitude led to more in-group–out-group differentiation, an effect mediated by subsistence systems and parasitic diseases. In the case of China, the impact of a harsh climate on collectivism may be offset or reversed in Region I by the subsistence system (herding) and in Region II by the history of voluntary frontier settlement.

Overall, there is empirical evidence to support the triple-line framework as an explanation of variations in collectivism within China. However, further clarification and a caveat is needed. The triple-line framework focuses on variations in collectivism across the inhabitants of four regions. Here, “inhabitants” refer to those who have lived in a given region for at least several generations; at an absolute minimum, these inhabitants were born in a given region and grew up there. These ecological factors will exert their effect on human behavior over the long term. Historically, Chinese people had a strong tendency to live in one place. During the last four decades, hundreds of millions of people have begun to migrate internally to work (Yan, 2015). We believe that the triple-line framework applies primarily to long-term inhabitants rather than recent migrants. Nonetheless, the impact on migrants, especially those who move between regions, would be an important direction for future research.

What is needed now is a representative and geographically diverse sample of the whole nation in order to directly evaluate the framework. In designing such research, two important details should be noted. First, what is the most appropriate unit of analysis? China is subdivided into provinces, which in turn are subdivided into city-level regions, which are further subdivided into county-level subregions (Dong et al., 2019; Zhu et al., 2019). Second, what is the best way to quantify the ecological indicators in the four ecological regions described by the triple-line framework? We shall consider each question in turn.

Let us first briefly consider the structure of the Chinese state. In most cases, China has three levels of administration below that of the national government. There are more than 2,000 counties at the lowest level, which belong to over 300 cities at the middle level, which belong to 31 provinces (excluding Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan) at the upper level. The most common practice in regional comparison studies is to use the highest available subnational level—such as provinces in China, states in the United States, or prefectures in Japan—as units of analysis. Compared with the United States or Japan, however, there are three problems with analyzing Chinese data at the provincial level. First, the United States has 50 states and Japan 47 prefectures, whereas Mainland China has only 31 provincial-level regions, which makes it harder to explore variations at the highest subnational level. Second, the area under the jurisdiction of a given Chinese province has often changed over time, which makes it difficult to link historical data to present-day surveys. Third, the division of China’s provinces is not based on ecological factors. In some provinces, the within-province ecological differences are large and should not be overlooked. Some scholars have tried to use city-level data to test the relationship between ecological factors and psychological outcomes (Wei et al., 2017).

For the triple-line framework, we believe that the best approach is to balance feasibility and representativeness. Ideally, one would evaluate the triple-line framework at the city level if possible to ensure that a sufficient number of cities are included in each region. With over 300 cities in China, however, this approach may not be feasible; we therefore favor an alternative approach. First, one should start by exploring ecological factors and collectivism at the provincial level. Then, for those provinces divided into different regions by one of the three lines, a sample from the two subdivisions should be added. For example, Jiangsu Province is divided into north Jiangsu and south Jiangsu by the Qinling–Huaihe Line, so that the former belongs to Region III whereas the latter belongs to Region IV. We would therefore recommend including a sample from both the north and south of Jiangsu.

There are also problems with how best to quantify ecological indicators. In many of the studies reviewed, indicators such as gross domestic product per capita were reported at the provincial level. For some provinces, especially in Region I, it is difficult to find these ecological indicators at the city or county level. A feasible solution to this problem would be to select cities or counties where these ecological indicators are available and then collect inhabitants’ collectivism to test the triple-line framework. A second possibility would be to quantify some ecological factors approximately—for example, whether a particular place was occupied by the Japanese during World War II has been used as an indicator of historical threat in China (Chua et al., 2019). Regardless of the specific approach taken, we anticipate that future research in this direction would help to clarify and extend the claims of the triple-line framework.

Future Directions

The triple-line framework provides an integrative approach to regional variations in Chinese collectivism. Moreover, we contend that the theory is generative, pointing to many new hypotheses that await empirical evaluation. In order to confirm or falsify this framework, however, much more research needs to be done.

First, the triple-line framework may inspire, motivate, or facilitate empirical studies to examine its validity and enrich our understanding of regional variations of collectivism within China. A national representative sample would be ideal in order to test the framework by comparing the predictive success of its hypotheses with competing approaches. Moreover, some comparisons have yet to be carried out. For example, the impact of historical voluntary frontier settlement warrants examination through comparison of Regions II and III, which has yet to be done. Furthermore, the robustness of the key hypotheses of the triple-line framework could be evaluated by comparing adjacent cities or counties on opposite sides of the three lines. Doing so would aid in controlling some potential confounding factors, such as economic development, mobility, or population density.

Second, if supported, the triple-line framework could positively influence cultural psychology beyond improving understanding of regional differences in China specifically. Our approach could be used as a model of how to think about the cultural groups we study, shifting away from sole reliance on national boundaries and suggesting that other large countries, such as the United States, Russia, or Brazil, might be studied in a similar way. Cultural psychologists would have the tools to think much more carefully about what we mean when we talk about the “Chinese sample” (or indeed the “Russian sample” or the “Brazilian sample”) in a study.

Third, we hope that the triple-line framework will motivate many testable hypotheses, including in domains that go beyond the self-construal and cognitive studies common to this field. For example, there are now millions of Chinese who have migrated to other cultural contexts, especially to western developed nations embracing individualistic values, along with many of their descendants. Would Chinese migrants from different regions differ in terms of their acculturation process and its psychological consequences? Are Chinese migrants from regions with less collectivism better equipped to adapt to individualistic cultural contexts? Studies of Chinese migrants conducted in countries such as the United States, Canada, or Australia might be nuanced by paying increased attention to their region of origin.

Fourth, multiple facets and measurements of collectivism should be combined to test the triple-line framework. Collectivism is a broad concept that includes many loosely connected facets (Oyserman et al., 2002; Smith, 2017; Triandis, 1995; Vignoles, Owe, Becker & Smith, 2016). Even the same facet, such as harmony, could be measured using different self-report scales, non-self-report tasks, or cultural products. Different facets or different tools may not be consistent with one another in some conditions (Huang et al., 2016; Kitayama et al., 2009; Kitayama & Uskul, 2011; Morling, 2016; Na et al., 2010). For example, Van de Vliert et al. (2013) used a self-report questionnaire which was selected from different established questionnaires, whereas Talhelm et al.’s (2014) and Ma et al.’s (2016) studies adopted non-self-report tasks such as nepotism vignettes and triad and sociogram tasks. The inconsistency between them may be partly driven by different measurement techniques or attention to different facets of collectivism. Broadening the tools used to assess collectivism should be encouraged in studies of the different regions (Ren et al., 2016). Doing so would help determine whether particular facets of collectivism differ in terms of how well they are explained by the triple-line framework.

Fifth, besides the natural ecological environment, do the social-ecological consequences of human activities also affect regional variations in collectivism? China has unique advantages that facilitate research exploring the relationship between ecological and environmental factors. In terms of geography and space, China has a rich ecological environment, comparable only to a few other countries, such as Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, Russia, and the United States. Furthermore, due to China’s rich historical data, the influence of social and ecological factors such as wars and natural disasters can be examined over a long time scale—including China’s unprecedented modernization process over the past 40 years (Sun & Ryder, 2016), which is potentially comparable to the Renaissance or the Industrial Revolution in Britain (Xie, 2011). Whether these changes will also affect regional variations of collectivism is worthy of further study.

Lastly, are there regional variations in other psychological variables? Recent research has identified regional differences in tightness versus looseness and its effect on outcomes in China (Chua et al., 2019). This work did not explore the relationship between the natural environments and tightness and looseness, however. Might these differences also be explicable using the triple-line framework? Research has demonstrated that ecological factors are associated with tightness and looseness in both cross-national comparison and within-state comparison in the United States (Gelfand et al., 2011; Harrington & Gelfand, 2014). It is reasonable to hypothesize regional variations in tightness and looseness between different regions, and these hypotheses ought to be tested. Furthermore, studies have also shown a correlation between individualism or collectivism and the Big Five personality traits at the national level. For example, countries with high individualism also score higher on extroversion (Hofstede & McCrae, 2004). Future research could examine the full range of potential psychological variations among the four regions described by the triple-line framework.

In summary, regional variations of collectivism within Mainland China have been identified in a number of studies. This review has analyzed regional variations of Chinese collectivism and proposed the triple-line framework as a single integrative approach to explain regional variations in collectivism from an ecological perspective. These regional differences do not take away from other pertinent variations shaped by other demographic factors (e.g., urban, rural, rich, poor, or Han minority). This framework should not only motivate scholars to explore the impact of social ecology on shaping the cultural psychology of the Chinese people, but also encourage exploration of regional cultural variations in other parts of the world.

Table 1.

Ecological Factor Differences Among the Four Regions.

	Region I	Region II	Region III	Region IV
Collectivism	Lowest	Lower	Higher	Highest
Climate	Harsh	Harsh	Comfortable	Comfortable
Water	Less	Enough	Less	Enough
Rainfall	<400 mm	400–800 mm	400–800 mm	>800 mm
Subsistence system	Herder	Wheat or herder/wheat-blended	Wheat	Rice
Voluntary settlement	No	Yes	No	No
Population density	Low	Low	High	High

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This paper was funded by National Social Science Fund of China project (Grant Number: 20BSH142).

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An Integrated Ecological Approach to Mapping Variations in Collectivism Within China: Introducing the Triple-Line Framework

Abstract

Keywords

Individualism and Collectivism

The Triple-Line Framework

The Three Lines and Their Borders

The Four Regions and Their Provinces

Region I: Herding Subsistence Combined With Harsh Environment

Region II: Wheat Farming and Voluntary Frontier Settlement

Region III: Wheat Farming

Region IV: Rice Farming

Evidence Supporting the Triple-Line Framework

Future Directions

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

Funding

References