Regulation has always been “political” to some degree, born of politics and subject to political forces, both good and bad. The more intractable question might be whether regulation as we know it is sustainable, given signs of institutional weakness. In this context, regulators need to either sustain their institution or concede to alternative institutional forms and conceptions of the public interest.
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