In recent decades the relationship between competition law and regulation has become a very controversial issue, in particular in respect of the interface between competition rules and sector-specific regulation in liberalized network industries. The article examines the controversial practice of margin squeeze, engaging in a detailed analysis of the relevant US and EU case-law in regulated industries in order to conduct a tentative critical exploration of these respective approaches and to consider whether a reconciliation between such regimes is possible. Moreover, it aims at examining some relevant open issues related to price squeeze, particularly with regard to the concurrent application of competition rules and sector-specific regulation and the risks connected with the coexistence of different sets of rules and also of different competent authorities.
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