Regulators and government bodies in posts, as in other sectors, are involved in related decisions over whether to require access for competitors to the facilities, especially the delivery services, of the historic monopolist, and if so, whether to separate that firm vertically. The paper sets out a framework for thinking about these issues, suggesting that if access is to be mandated, separation should also be considered. It also reviews alternative ways of setting access prices, favouring a combination of cost-based charges with competitively neutral ways of funding net universal service costs.
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