Abstract
There is a robust debate about innovative ways to improve educational outcomes and governance in public schools located in the poorest townships in South Africa. This article looks at one recent innovation, a new model for providing basic education called ‘collaboration schools’, based on the British academy schools. We seek to understand what these partnerships between philanthropists, government, and parents entail, the specific problems the partners seek to address, the key actors involved, and the power relations that have emerged. Based on interviews with key local actors and a close reading of partnership agreements, the authors argue that although well-intentioned, the experts taking over schools have faced considerable resistance as well as deep structural challenges related to the social and economic decline in black townships. We also point to policy weaknesses linked to unsettled issues of class inequalities and apartheid spatial legacies.
Keywords
Introduction
Since the 1980s, scholars have argued that the private sector should not merely be a donor to public sector schools but that the methods drawn from business can better solve many management problems at schools and yield more efficiency than traditional methods by the public sector. It is argued that governments should only fund but not deliver services – a task best left to the market that should ‘row’ while the state ‘steers’ (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). The most well-known educational public–private partnerships (PPPs) exist in the United States (US) as charter schools and in the United Kingdom (UK) as academies.
In South Africa (SA) the private sector view is that ‘there is a systemic weakness in the government’s present approach because a clear distinction is not made between the state’s responsibilities to finance education and to deliver schooling’ (Namfu, 2020: 44). At a time of deepening distrust in the state, the 2021 Edelman Trust Barometer indicated, ‘that most people now trust businesses more than any other institution, companies cannot afford to miss the opportunity to work towards a more just transition’ (see Duff, https://trialogue.co.za/trends-in-corporate-responsibility/). However, the debate about the role of the private sector and big philanthropy in South Africa has pitted left-wing movements, trade unions, and NGOs against the state and well-intentioned philanthropy who argue that are not trying to privatise education but secure basic human rights of children.
The purpose of this paper is to understand what these school-based partnerships between philanthropists, government, and parents entail, the specific problems the partners seek to address, the key actors involved, and the power relations that have emerged, and possible outcomes and implications for social justice. Based on in-depth interviews with key local role players and a close reading of partnership agreements, the authors argue that although well-intentioned, the experts taking over schools have faced considerable resistance as well as deep structural challenges related to the social and economic decline in black townships. Relying extensively on the views of the role players and their voices, this paper argues that although well-intentioned and not directly profit-driven, too much attention has been devoted to its purported benefits and too little to the likely risks. We suggest a series of critical issues likely to plague the public schools’ partnership (PSP) beyond the pilot phase when the PSP becomes permanent.
The article is important since we point to policy formulation weaknesses linked to unsettled issues of social justice, class inequalities, and the continued neo-apartheid spatial policies that operate at a national scale. More broadly, we argue that South Africa suffers from the syndrome of ‘persistent mismatches between problems, policy framings, and solutions’ (Jasanoff, 2018: 11) and it tends to place the blame or causes of problems in the wrong place. Jasanoff (2018) argues that in ‘a world of staggering, and increasing, inequality, the very words “our common future” can serve as cover for evading responsibility, through business as usual, and by failing to address the maldistribution of wealth and power that got us to the mess we are in’. Far more attention needs to be given to South Africa’s bifurcated social reproduction system which allows the wealthy to opt out of public services and the entrenched socio-spatial inequalities that reinforce it. Decentralisation to township schools cannot resolve systemic problems. 1
For this research, we interviewed two school operating partners at three PSP sites as well as the overall Project Director, who directly accounts to the donors. Moreover, we interviewed school principals, Helen Zille, the Premier of the Province, and a circuit manager. Interviews were conducted in August–December 2018 and follow-up interviews in 2019. In addition, we reviewed the legal contracts between the state and other parties. There were five PSP schools in 2016.
Background to the problems, debates, and framing
In SA, public education is in a dire state with 80% of public schools underperforming Spaull (2019). Calls for the private sector to intervene have been intensifying as ‘schools are mostly dysfunctional. … the life chances of the average South African child are determined not by their ability or the result of hard work and determination, but instead by the colour of their skin, the province of their birth, and the wealth of their parents’ (Spaull, 2019). The Western Cape Education Department (WCED) lists several negative factors in black township schools: ‘gangsterism; personal agency; high learner: teacher ratio, and high in-migration’ of learners from other provinces with learning backlogs (WCED, Annual Report, 2018-19: 93). 2 Township schools struggle with these neighbourhood effects which inevitably affect the functionality and stability of schools and increase absenteeism.
In this context, a new model was touted by a donor alliance. It drew on ideas from the British academy schools through an organisation called ARK. Academy schools arose in the UK when certain schools seen as performing poorly, were closed and then re-opened as new schools under new private sector leadership (Woods et al., 2007). They were initially proposed in 2000 by David Blunkett, (Secretary for Education and Employment), who described them as ‘a radical new approach to break the cycle of failing schools in inner cities’ (in Woods et al., 2007, 239). The UK-based ARK is a good instance of a private player that manages 38 public schools in England and supports curriculum and teacher training.
3
Junemann and Ball (2013: 425) observe that ‘The private, philanthropic and voluntary sectors are now all prominent and significant constituents of new governance in England’. But as Junemann and Ball (2013:423) suggest, The charity Absolute Return for Kids (ARK), which was founded by a group of hedge fund managers … is rapidly expanding its involvement in state education in England (and in the USA, India and Uganda), taking up positions previously reserved for the state and bringing new practices to bear upon education problems. … They involve a deliberate attempt to promote a new set of values and modes of action in public education, enterprise and competitiveness in particular.
Several studies conclude that there is insufficient evidence of the presumed benefits of PPPs and their contribution to reducing poverty and inequalities (Jomo et al., 2016). Whitfield (2010) suggests that PPPs undermine democracy by systematically reducing the responsibility, capability, and power of the state. Sukareih and Tannock (2009, 782) argue that the principal goal of most educational philanthropy is ‘to instil a deep and lasting commitment to free-market principles in the minds, habits, dreams, and ambitions of young people everywhere’. Arnove (2007: 489) argues that ‘These foundations claim to attack the roots causes of the ills of humanity; however, they essentially engage in ameliorative practices to maintain social and economic systems that generate the very inequality and injustices they wish to correct’.
As Woods et al. (2007: 254) argue that academy schools are ‘areas in the public domain (that) are being carved out for enhanced private influence over the symbolic and cultural power to shape educational purposes and practices’.
The ANC government’s policy has been to support the private school sector and semi-private fee-paying public schools (Model C). This, many argue, is the root cause of the problems (Figlio and Stone, 2001). It has allowed ‘the middle class to secure control of the historically white school sector, facilitating a new deracialised middle class who have “opted out” of the public system of schooling’ (Sayed and Soudien, 2005; Sayed, 2016).
A good example of problem framing and solutions is John Kane-Berman, of the Institute of Race Relations (cited in Walker, 2018). He argues that the real division in South Africa is not between public and independent schools but between good schools and bad ones. The key markers of success are … committed, competent principals … devoted, hard-working teachers willing to give their all for the benefit of pupils; strong parental involvement; and … discipline – including punctuality, and rules on school uniforms and hairstyles – and on instilling positive values in pupils.
Following Berman’s voluntarist view, Premier of the Western Cape Helen Zille (2016) who introduced the new model publicly castigated the teachers union for not grasping that: children, and their education, come first… There are far too many role-players, from parents to principals, in education who do not get this. The biggest culprit is the collective known as the South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU, 2018).
The DA view is that, any group of individuals who possess certain defined qualifications, recognised experience, and who are able to produce a viable business plan, will be able to apply to take over the management of a school and to run it as any other state school, while continuing to receive state subsidies. … The DA would encourage the institutions that currently run some of South Africa's private schools, as well as organisations from other countries who have proved their success in this area, to take on this challenge. (DA, 2013: 15).
Along the same lines, DG Murray Trust believes that schools fail because of poor ‘school governance, leadership and management, as well as teacher motivation and support’ – certain human-based school-based factors. They wrongly attribute this argument to Debra Shepherd who, in fact, argued that ‘it needs to be borne in mind that social contexts are
Helen Zille, inspired by her trip to visit UK academy schools, explained that the National Treasury and donors provided the impetus for the new model: We had to find a way … by seeking third-party funding tied to processes of improving school governance and management for public schools… At the same time as we were considering these options…, the National Treasury had convened a meeting, together with some donors, to explore the possibilities of trying out new models of provision of basic education… As a result, a group of funders approached us to explore the idea of piloting public school partnerships, which are known as Collaboration Schools in the Western Cape (Interview with Premier of the Western Cape, 2018, my italics).
Zille (2016) insisted that ‘The Academy School model in the UK has shown what is possible. ‘We must try to emulate this through the Collaboration School model we are piloting in the Western Cape’. The key donor for the new model, DG Murray Trust publically lambasted an NGO called ‘Equal Education’: ‘Equal Education is being indifferent to the views of the parents who have voted overwhelmingly to participate in the experiment of Public School Partnerships’ (Cape Times, 2 November 2017). In her 2017 budget speech, Debbie Schäfer, noted, ‘It is thus quite astonishing that some critics who bemoan the inequalities in education, which we agree still exist, continue to oppose this project, which is precisely aimed at addressing those inequalities’. There has been a ‘populist’ media push to win parents to the private sector-driven model what is called ‘parent power’. Debbie Schäfer, noted, Parents have exercised their voice increasingly with a record number of parents attending meetings and standing for governing body positions. The processes we have undergone at this school have enabled parents to assert greater control over the schools, understand what quality education looks like, and empowered them to expect more from their schools (Schäfer, 2017).
But as Jasanoff (2018: 12) argues ‘It is an article of faith in public policy that the quality of solutions to perceived social problems depends on the adequacy of the questions. If a problem is framed too narrowly, too broadly, or simply in the wrong terms, then the solution will suffer from the same defects’. With this one-sided framing of the problem, in early 2016, the Western Cape Education Department (WCED) announced a 3-year pilot public–private partnership at five of the poorest government schools in Cape Town’s black townships. Called the ‘Collaboration Schools Pilot Project’ these arrangements became institutionalised after the Pilot phase was deemed a success and the Western Cape Provincial School Education Amendment Act 4 of 2018 was passed. They are now permanent features of the education landscape and termed Public Schools Partnership (PSP).
Education official, Schäfer (2017) noted, ‘Once shown to be effective, the model may be scaled up to support 10 to 15% of the Province’s public schools’ – an ambitious target of 215 schools. The hope is that demonstrable success will as The Economist (2011) points out, provide an ‘opportunity – to redesign government… at stake is the “design of the state” in favour of more neoliberal models’.
What the new model promises and entails and the key role players
DG Murray Trust, 4 the lead funder wanted ‘to give children in the poorest and worst-performing schools the same opportunity as any child in the best public schools by bringing new (non-profit) management and teaching expertise into the public system’. The ‘Donor’ is a group of individual private foundations that have established a collaborative non-profit funding entity through which the support will be channelled (MOU, 2015: 3). The donor also commits to developing a ‘project plan with the WCED, that should detail-quite specifically-how the donation should be used within the project’ (MOU, 2015: 4).
The model promises to deploy private sector experts to ‘turn around’ dysfunctional schools or the very least incrementally place them on an upward trajectory. A Public School Partnership (PSP) is defined in a WCED brochure addressed to parents as; A new type of public school, partnered with an experienced non-profit school support organisation (called an “operating partner” and where) …the school and operating partner (is) part of the public education system. . ..the operating partners will constitute the majority of their governing body… Additional resources will be made available to the school via donor funding, which may pay for goods and services such as educational aids, scholastic materials, extra books, extra-curricular activities and funding for additional staff such as teaching assistants (and) also aim to develop learners outside of the classroom, by introducing new sporting activities or cultural clubs and societies for learners to join. (https://wcedonline.westerncape.gov.za/documents/CollaborationSchools/CollaborationSchools-InfoForParents.pdf
Three fundamental points emerge in this communication to parents: firstly, parents have ceded power to an NGO 5 ; secondly, these NGO’s are by law part of the public system; and thirdly substantial amounts of cash are promised to the schools to acquire resources.
The PSP model is complex with the school operating partners (SOPs) – paid by the donor – as the implementer playing a critical role. SOPs ‘will provide additional support to the school’s principal and teachers through tailored training and development programmes’ (https://wcedonline.westerncape.gov.za/documents/CollaborationSchools/CollaborationSchools-InfoForParents.pdf
According to the overall project director (PD) the roll-out process starts when, The WCED gives us a list of schools … and then there is a deep… consultative process with the School Governing Body; there’s a parents’ meeting for people to vote, and then a matching exercise happens to see if this operator and this school can actually work. So, it’s quite consultative (Interview with SOP; 6 September 2018).
The parents at individual schools have to vote to become a collaboration school. Finally, the WCED must accept ‘the donation, on behalf of the school, on the terms and conditions set out in the project plan’ (MOU, 2015: 5).
Feldman (2020) pointed out that ‘in the 2017/2018 financial year the funders committed over R75 million to the project ($4 million). Of that amount, R31.8 million flowed directly into the schools and R37.8 million was given to the non-profit partners, that is, the SOPs’.
The UK-based ARK plays a key role in promoting, designing the model and its content; in the UK, the US, and now in the Western Cape, South Africa, PPP policies are changing the nature of the conversation about what’s possible for children from poor communities. Mistakes will be made. But to not do anything could be the biggest mistake of all. Every child has the right to quality education. (https://arkonline.org/blog/when-schools-fail-taking-radical-steps-improve-education, accessed 3 July 2018).
The UK education support consultant, ARK, works closely with the programme director. Their responsibility is to ‘capacitate the school operators to do this on their own’ (Interview PD, 6 September, 2018). This is anomalous since it is assumed that the SOPs are already experts.
The SOP is the main implementor and reports to the project director (Interview Programme Director, 6 September 2018). The SOP stressed, ‘we’re accountable to the donors mostly because the money that keeps our team going comes from the donors’ (Interview SOP 2, 23 Aug 2018). The SOPs are educational NGOS such as Common Good Foundation; Mellon Educate; 2 Oceans Education Foundation; School Turnaround Foundation; and Acorn Education.
Given this context, what are the modalities or pathways to be considered for enhancing results and ‘empowering governing bodies, school management and educators to develop structures, systems, cultures and capacities necessary to deliver quality education’ (WCED, 2015, 4). The donor provides the project plan in broad categories for possible interventions (SLA, 2015, Annexure A, 11-13). But the donor wants tangible, measurable results. This is also reinforced by the PD: We’ve sort of got rough targets for the different years… linked to the broader funder group goals for the level of improvement that we’re expecting to see for the amount of funding that’s being invested… we have… strict… performance management systems that we’ve put in place to monitor (Interview PD, 6 September 2018).
Having a more direct chain of command and more performance assessments speaks to the top-down nature of the ‘partnership’ but this is seen as an advantage in ‘getting the job done’. According to the PD, the fact that ‘the SOP makes up 50% of the SGB, makes them accountable for outcomes (Interview, PD, 6 September 2018).
For the SOP to rectify shortcomings in learner education, the model also allows for ‘flexibility in the delivery of the curriculum at the school provided it is not inferior to the standard as prescribed by the National Curriculum Statement Grades R-12’ (SLA, 2015, 3).
The dynamics of the model in practice
How do various role players cohere as partners? The SLA commits the SOP to work collaboratively with all parties (SLA, 2015: 2-4). The most important function is to achieve ‘increased performance of the school’ (SLA, 2015: 4). According to the SLA, it is also the principal’s responsibility to ‘implement the interventions contained in’ these intervention plans (SLA, 2015, 5) with the SOP. The SOP clarified that while they do not necessarily hold teachers accountable, they hold the principal accountable who in turn holds the teachers accountable: The principal remains the manager of the school, so the principal has to hold everyone else in that school accountable. We (are) in the unique position now where all three of our schools will have SGB principals… Their (the principals’) line manager is our head of education (Interview SOP 1, 3 Sept, 2018).
The specifics of performance targets for each school were set out in Annexure B (SLA, 2015: 4).
But the principals are often seen as part of the ‘problem’ since they are deemed to be captured by teachers’ unions. One principal said, ‘I have weekly check-ins with the SOP… so they know exactly what the issues are if there are any issues… for a certain period (Interview with Principal 2, 7 Sept, 2018). Another commented, My key accountability is … to the SOP, and the WCED, and then to my staff and to the governing body. One of my concerns is that when the SOP meets with the WCED around whatever at the top level, the principals should be there as well. But at the moment the SOP is dealing with the WCED and the donors (Interview with Principal 1, 3 Sept 2018).
The day-to-day work of the SOP is extensive. Once the SOP is appointed, it is accountable for improvements in performance measures: ‘We track teacher attendance; we track learner attendance; we have school management systems that we’ve implemented in schools… with a lot of data’. (Interview with SOP 1).
School operators highlighted the many kinds of support needed to achieve improved learner results: It’s working into the finances, bringing accountability and proper procedures, putting those in place. Getting the SGB up and running. Making sure that the SGB actually are meeting and that things are being passed through the SGB, people are being held to account, that meetings are being minuted, that there are proper HR policies in place, that the right teachers are being hired… that we’ve got qualified people in the right roles. Making sure that teachers are performance managed, making sure that everyone is paid on time... Mentorship and coaching of the head, teacher development and coaching…. (Interview with SOP 2)
But the SOP 2 warned; ‘it often takes time to see significant improvements in learner outcomes’. And, ‘Some PSP schools have gone through several operating partners in the short period of the project’s existence because conflicts arose - a very disruptive reality’ (Interviews with Principals, 2018). As one principal frankly noted, There are challenges all the time. Because it’s not an established process, and with a new operating partner comes new challenges, so for example the SOPs themselves do not have the experience of this project, everybody’s learning (Interview SOP 2, 3 Sept, 2018).
SOP 2 identified the following as successes: We have a payroll running smoothly- that’s a system that we put in place-, HR- there’s now a process that needs to be gone through-, finance- we’ve put policies and processes in place-, the SGB… rhythms of the SGB, that’s been put in place (Interview SOP 1, 23 Aug 2018).
For the SOP many frustrations arise. For example: Given the limitations of our team, can we be ordering toilet paper in all schools?… What can we do, given the budget and given the capacity of our team? We can’t do everything, so what is the offering that we can give, given that they are scaling us up so quickly and we are having to take on new schools? (Interview with SOP 1, 23 Aug 2018).
The circuit manager (we interviewed) noted, I know that there are higher level of agreements in place between the head of education, the funders, the donors… I can’t speak to it because it’s beyond my pay grade… All I know is that the collaboration partner at the school… sign(s) agreements in terms of deliverables over a 5-year period. I can’t tell you what those agreements are, I can’t tell you what the nature of it is in terms of actuals.
In addition, the circuit manager said that reports to the WCED’s head office that the SOP completes bypass him (Interview with Circuit Manager, 2018). There seems to be a problem with the sharing of information. Moreover, when there is a changeover of SOPs, the principals are not given any information about this. The SOPs also share this complaint arguably related to ‘managerialism’; reports go over the heads of principals, and the principal is denied access to the PSP’s contractual agreements.
Progress or uncertainty?
The measures of the model’s success tend to be narrow. SOP representatives whom we interviewed explained that success ultimately was measured by pupil performance in two subjects thereby neglecting other subjects. Quantitative measurement is used to evaluate progress although anecdotal evidence is often used. Measuring a few key variables, especially summative tests are central. The WCED singled out success at Langa High (not part of this study). In 2018 when 78% passed, only 50 students at Langa wrote the NSC but in 2021 when 121 wrote, the pass rate slipped back down to 61%. It was very similar to Ikamvalethu, a neighbouring high school (https://schoolsdigest.co.za/listings/ikamvalethu-secondary-school/).
The WCED mid-term review highlighted ‘significant improvements, particularly in the systemic assessments of almost all the pilot schools in 2018’ (WCED, 2019 Annual Report, 2018-2019). In 2020 it again claimed that ‘progress is noted in several areas’: Extended school days in some schools; Parents have taken decisive steps to demand quality education for their children; School Operating Partners are freeing the school management team from administrative tasks, for focus on instructional leadership and teacher development’ (WCED, 2020, Standing Committee on Education, Minutes 1 September 2020).
SOPs themselves are ‘closely monitored’ by the PD. We are closely monitored on results… We track teacher attendance, we track learner attendance-we have school management systems that we’ve implemented in schools… with a lot of data. (Interview with PD, 3 Sept 2018).
According to the Project Director, In March, the focus is on the systemics from the previous year, then toward May/June we do a mid-year review, July we’ll be looking towards the following year and sort of talk about where the learners are based on their June results, and then at the end of the year we’re planning ahead for the following year (Interview PD, 6 September 2018).
But the single-minded focus on a few measurements could lead to tunnel vision and gaming the system’s indicators (Pollitt, 2000). WCED chose the ‘worst’ performers for the pilot meaning that it should be relatively easy to show some quantitative progress, but sustaining and institutionalising success over several years is another matter. But its 2020 Annual Report, DGMT (2020, 56) remained optimistic; ‘PSP was beginning to see some traction in newly-established primary schools and in high schools where teacher commitment was strong’. But the WCED has 1438 public schools; by September 2020, only 12 schools were in PSP – far fewer than the 10% projected in 2015 (WCG, 2020). Scaling up, ‘turning around’, and making the partnership permanent are proving to be more complex than projected with funding drying up. In 2021, the WCED noted The Collaboration Schools model is continuing to add value and will be expanded with the potential inclusion of an additional two schools in the 2021/22 financial year. This is dependent on the financial support of collaboration partners. (WCED, 2021, APP, 2021-2024: 43).
Advocating partnerships and celebrating the ‘blurring of boundaries’ while driving back the admittedly flawed democratically elected and controlled state is a one-sided view if the need for a capable state is not factored in.
Power relations and challenges
We list four critical challenges. First, donors provide funds but can withdraw funding by ‘giving 6 months’ notice. This ‘asymmetrical’ top-down power relation and donor/SOP surveillance might inspire insecurity, covert resistance, apparent compliance, and fear among teachers and principals. Freely exchanging views and ideas for solutions among putative ‘partners’ is unlikely in these wholly unequal relationships. A principal at one school shared his view of the process and the position of poor parents. (At) our school, the teachers were not for collaboration, but the parents were for collaboration… With the last one (general parent meeting), we felt that as the staff, we should end collaboration, but when we went to the parents, then they said no. They said, we want our school to collaborate for the sake of our learners because we are unemployed, we are poor, we can’t afford… our learners cannot afford some of the things that are there in some of the schools in the affluent areas. So for that (reason) they said they need collaboration schools… (Interview Principal 3, 7 Sept 2018).
Secondly, SOPs say they were rushed into the process without enough time to understand the specific schools and the local context. They were also ‘inducted’ into adopting the ARK’s methodology from the UK. To add to this a few SOPs also had to manage several schools at the same time, and they seem to be unprepared to take on additional schools. SOP 2 noted, We were approached to do it and it was a lot quicker than (expected)… I think we thought we’d have a year to do a proper audit in the schools and a slower onramp, but it all just happened … and I think they are pushing for us to have two more schools next year (Interview SOP 2, September 2018).
The SOP has limited human resources. Given the limitations of our team, can we be ordering toilet paper in all schools?… What can we do, given the budget and given the capacity of our team? We can’t do everything, so what is the offering that we can give, given that they are scaling us up so quickly and we are having to take on new schools? (Interview with SOP 1, 23 Aug 2018).
Thirdly, given the unique combinations of people and issues at different schools, SOP 2 frankly admitted that parties involved do not always have the answers: ‘We are developing… we like to say… ‘we are building the plane as we fly it’. According to SOP 2, ‘We just sometimes get left out of loops. We often have to make sense of “broken” or partial information as school staff “hide things from us”’. … we are getting a lot of our information through the school and that’s going to be broken information and they (the schools) often try and hide things from us, whereas if we were getting it straight from the WCED and we had all the right logins to be able to check what the WCED has seen, then we (have)… almost more of an authority given by the WCED…
However, the SOP is ‘held accountable by the WCED for increased performance of the school’ (SLA, 2015: p4). It is unclear what should happen when parties fail to meet these targets.
Fourthly, major constraints have emerged to scaling up, not least the limits of donor finances and the challenge of identifying and capacitating high-quality school operators. Even at a small scale (12 schools), the project director admitted the ‘PSP has struggled to find effective operators’ (Namfu, 2020, 46).
Conclusions
The few collaboration schools currently funded (less than 1% in the Western Cape) and prospects of reversals as funding dries up and social movement opposition means that collaboration schools as an alternative government-driven transformation are unlikely. In the end, the well-intentioned effort to show what wealthy donors can do for the poor in townships needs rethinking. The relational and causal link between the privatised suburbs and poorly performing public schools in townships needs to be explored. While to a certain extent, it appears as if the problem lies at the scale of the individual ‘underperforming’ schools, this could obscure the systems and structures responsible for this underperformance. ‘But focusing on fixing (poor) schools alone, without thinking about the systems of which they are a part, will not go very far’ (Isaacs, 2020). Hunter (2018) sees collaboration schools as largely symbolic within the emergence of a hegemonic project to further entrench marketised social relations: ‘Collaboration schools are the newest form of marketization of education and (are) largely symbolic … to advertise for the marketization of schools in general’.
Contrary to the optimistic certainties of donor-driven ‘democracy’ (see Crouch, 2016), our findings show that the PSP is itself a muddling-through process wracked with major uncertainties within and beyond the school. Schools might show episodic progress based on narrow indicators but will likely revert to the former way of operating once the external intervention ceases and the weight of negative structural factors embedded in township life reduces the momentum for change. We, therefore, suggest that it is too soon to suggest as Feldman (2020, 16) does that ‘partnership agreements with non-state actors in education will most likely become an accepted mode of delivering education to schools in areas of poverty’.
Moreover, we need to critically engage about the overall policy that allows for separate systems of social reproduction (health, education, transport, housing space) and policies that decentralise school governance seeking to responsibilise impoverished groups that are forced to govern their constructed scarcities and participate in their own oppression.
South Africa, not only has one of the most unequal education systems in the world with 85% of 13 million students condemned to attend poorly funded dysfunctional public schools (Spaull, 2013) but the solutions often do little to change the trajectory of failure and inequality.
Footnotes
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the University of the Western Cape, UDG; ED0200026.
Data Availability Statement
The data that support the findings of this study are available from the first author, [TG], upon reasonable request.