Three concepts of power: Foucault,Bourdieu,and Habermas

Abstract

The article is a discussion of the concept of power in three different social theories that are often applied to educational research: the theories of Jürgen Habermas, Pierre Bourdieu, and Michel Foucault. In everyday life, the concept of power is used as if it only had a single connotation: power as possessed by someone (“the powerful”) while exercised over someone else (“the powerless”). In this case, power is considered as a (potentially) repressive force and ascribed to a person, a culture, a state, or a society. Though, power can be comprehended otherwise: as non-possessed and productive. In the paper, the three conceptions of power are presented and discussed in relation to each other and to specific philosophical themes like dualism, reductionism, determinism and autonomy, truth, normativity, and relativism. Finally, the paper shows that the applied power-concept has significant consequences for the way the educational researcher analyzes conflicts, and therefore also for our understanding of the world in which we live.

Introductory remarks

In everyday life, we generally understand power as something possessed by someone while exercised over others. This conceptualization is on the one hand based on the Western idea of the human subject as an autonomous rational agent (the cogito). On the other hand, it is based on the dichotomy between “the powerful” and “the powerless” (individual, culture, state, society etc.). Both are fundamental for the Western theories of the human subject and, thus, in the philosophy of consciousness that constitutes our individual-focused psychology (Cronin, 1996).

Though, this is only one conceptualization of power which has long been questioned by empirical data from sciences such as sociology, anthropology, and archeology. Research in other historical periods and cultures thus shows that power cannot be conceptualized through merely hierarchical and top-down models but must be understood as complex phenomena, which can be distributed, questioned, and come from below:

[…] it is reassuring that the evidence itself in some ways answers the question of whether past iterations of power from below actually exist. Dissent, protest, and uprisings against formal structures of power are rife throughout protohistoric and historic times, and there is evidence for them in prehistory […]: the burned temple, the slain ruler, the abandonment of the autocrat’s capitol city, the despoiling of the palace or temple by arguably internal forces […] Similarly, there is evidence for the structures of explicitly commoner power and power-sharing arrangements: the assembly place, the voting token, the community meetinghouse, the suppression of elite symbols and absence of displays of wealth and power in otherwise politically “complex” societies (Thurston and Fernández-Götz, 2021, p. 14).

Though, as Thurstone and Fernández-Götz as well as other researchers within the field recognize, empirical data does not speak for themselves. They need interpretation. And as such, the development of theories of power serves as tools for understanding and conceptualizing the complexity of what “people actually do” (Gledhill, 2009; Thurston and Fernández-Götz, 2021).

The aim of this article is to discuss the philosophical and analytical implications of the three different conceptualizations of power in the theories of Jürgen Habermas, Pierre Bourdieu, and Michel Foucault. First, the concepts of power in the three theories will be introduced. Second, follows a discussion of different elements in the three approaches; elements that are all related to the concepts of power that the approaches subscribe to. Though the discussions in the article are quite philosophical, it will appear that they have significant impact for the possibilities that are entailed in the theories when used as analytical complexes. Thus, they have significant impact on the results of research and thus for how we understand the world, in which we live.

Hence, different concepts of power that are entailed in the different theories offer different opportunities for analyses and therefore lead to different conclusions. For the social researcher, a reflective choice of the theoretical complex is evident and part of the research process. As it will be illuminated through the article, the concept of power is interdependent with many other elements in the theories. Therefore, the discussion of power is vital.

The article will draw on the literature by the three authors and on analyses of the relations in between the theories: while Habermas vs. Foucault is discussed by Kelly (1994) and Ashenden and Owen (1999), and Bourdieu vs. Foucault is discussed by Cronin (1996), Butler (1999) discusses the theory of Bourdieu in a Foucauldian/poststructuralist perspective. Habermas, Bourdieu, and Foucault are three very comprehensive authorships, and the limited framework of this article means that there are many aspects of the theories that the article is unable to address.

Habermas: Power and ethics

As stated in the introduction, the concept of power to which Western thinking traditionally subscribes to is rooted in dichotomy, conflict, and individual possession (Cronin, 1996). To some extent, this conceptualization of power is maintained by the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, whose understanding of power will be the focal point in the following. ¹

Habermas’ concept of power is not least exposed in his discourse ethics and theory of communicative action (Habermas 1984). In his philosophy, Habermas was on the one hand inspired by Marx and dialectical materialism, ² on the other hand by Immanuel Kant’s deontology (Maus, 2017: p. 75). Kant’s deontology is summarized in his Categorical Imperative, which encourages the individual to act in such a way that the founding principle for action could be made into a universal law of how to treat others.

The premise for this is that the individual is free to choose to act ethically, and Habermas wanted to (re-)formulate a universal ethics with the free human subject as the basic premise. Unlike Kant, Habermas’ discourse ethics is not based on a categorical imperative but on a universal principle of consensus through communicative rationality, where everyone, regardless of status, is able speak and to be heard. The only force is the power of “the better argument”:

In contexts of communicative action, we call someone rational not only if he is able to put forward an assertion and, when criticized, to provide grounds for it by pointing to the appropriate evidence, but also if he is following an established norm and is able, when criticized, to justify his action by explicating the situation in the light of legitimate expectations. We even call someone rational if he makes known a desire or an intention […] and is then able to reassure critics in regard to the revealed experience by drawing practical consequences from it and behaving consistently thereafter (Habermas, 1984, p. 15).

Like Kant, Habermas presupposes the autonomous human subject of Enlightenment. This means, that he considers all human beings as reasonable individuals in possession of a free will. Reason and free will ensure that human beings can choose to act ethically: “Unless all affected can freely accept the consequences and the side effects that the general observance of a controversial norm can be expected to have for the satisfaction of the interests of each individual” (Habermas, 1990, p. 93, original italics).

Habermas therefore emphasized that freedom of power must be fundamental for an ethical dialogue. The purpose is to “neutralize the imbalance of power” and to ensure that everyone has an equal chance. While the ones in charge are responsible for the establishment of a powerless environment, the agents are responsible for abandoning from using power and oppression. It may be evident that Habermas understands power as something that is possessed (by individuals, states, organizations etc.,) and which is potentially corrupting. Power is considered as contrary to reason, and thus a threat to Enlightenment. The Marxist’ inspiration further means that Habermas regards power as something that is attached to class differences, that is, social structures, economy, and upbringing, which makes power even more illegitimate (Habermas, 1973).

Hence, for Habermas, it is not only possible but also appropriate to establish powerless settings, an understanding that later brought him on edge with Foucault, who considered this utopian (Ashenden and Owen, 1999). Habermas accused Foucault of reducing everything to power: “Under the premises of his theory of power, Foucault so levels down the complexity of social modernization that the disturbing paradoxes of this process cannot even become apparent to him” (Habermas 1994, p. 102).

Habermas’ interpretation of Foucault is among others a consequence of Habermas’ conceptualization of power as repression (Ashenden and Owen, 1999). Contrary to Habermas, Foucault considers power as having several forms, including one that attaches to discursive formations through which it produces human subjects, a topic, to which we will return later in this article.

Bourdieu: Symbolic power and habitus

The individualization of power that is found in Habermas’ theory is challenged by the post-Marxists, among others, Pierre Bourdieu, and Michel Foucault (Cronin 1996, p. 55). Here, power is considered as something which can take several forms, and which can appear as possessed, relational, and contextual. As it will appear, Bourdieu and Foucault articulated that in different ways and with different definitions of both contextual and relational aspects.

Bourdieu is the one of the two where the Marxist’ heritage (dialectic materialism) appears most clearly in his theory, albeit here merged with phenomenology and structuralism. His approach, which he named praxeology (Bourdieu, 1977), is designed through and for empirical research of human practice in cultural, material, and societal contexts. This is evident in his definitions of habitus, field, and symbolic power as entangled concepts.

Through his focus on practice, Bourdieu sought to “[…] escape from the realism of the structure […] without falling back into subjectivism […] To do this one has to return to practice […] of the objectified products and the incorporated products of historical practice; of structures and habitus” (Bourdieu 1990, p. 52, original italics). Habitus is defined as follows:

[…] systems of durable transportable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations […] Objectively “regulated” and “regular” without being in any way the product of obedience to rules, they can be collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organizing action of a conductor (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 53).

This is far from the individualism of the Western philosophy of consciousness; habitus “[…] is not a property or a set of properties of an agent considered in isolation but a generative scheme of practices that functions only in relation to an appropriately structured social space” (Cronin 1996: 65). In this case, power plays a certain role: “[…] the relation to what is possible is a relation to power” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 64).

Bourdieu differentiates between material and symbolic power. Material power is foremost economic power, while symbolic power is the form that material power takes when viewed through social categories that represent them as legitimate (Cronin, 1996, p. 65). The symbolic power structures appear in the form of cultural capital. Here, the most important fields are education, art, literature, and politics: “Thus cultural capital accumulated within the specialized fields translates into symbolic capital, the power to impose the legitimate vision of the world, and thereby to reinforce – or to challenge – social divisions” (Cronin, 1996, p. 68).

By distinguishing between economic and cultural capital, it becomes possible for Bourdieu to “map” empirical findings as social positions (strategies, dispositions, taste, etc.), according to the two forms of capital they possess or do not possess (Bourdieu, 2010). It is important to note that Bourdieu is talking about positions and agents and not about individuals, and that his concept of “class” differs from the Marxist’ concept. In Marxism, “class” refers to groups of living people, who act based on common class-specific interests (Cronin 1996, p. 69). Bourdieu’s concepts are analytical constructs that are developed for and through analyses of practice (Cronin, 1996): “[…] the individual habitus in so far as it expresses or reflects the class (or group), could be regarded as a subjective but non-individual system of internalized structures, common schemes of perception, conception, and action, which are the precondition of all objectification and apperception […]” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 60).

Both the concept of habitus and Bourdieu’s distinction between material and symbolic power are closely related to his concept of field. According to Bourdieu, a cultural field is defined by the relations of power among agents who, to varying degrees, possess the field’s valued competences and cultural capital. The power relations at any given time are the result of past struggles for cultural capital and for monopoly over principles of classification and assessment. Hence, Bourdieu conceptualizes power as either individually possessed (“subjective”) or structural (“objective”). This is a concept of power that differs somewhat from Habermas. While Habermas considers power as an (ideological) device possessed by someone and therefore potentially oppressive, Bourdieu considers power as attached to the field and to practice:

[Habitus] is […] a realistic relation to what is possible, founded on and therefore limited by power. This disposition, always marked by its (social) conditions of acquisition and realization, tends to adjust to the objective chances of satisfying need or desire […] and so to become the accomplices of the processes that tend to make the probable a reality (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 65).

While Habermas’ concept of power is explicitly normative, the normativity is less clear in Bourdieu’s theory. Alternatively, Bourdieu’s theoretical concepts are appropriate for empirical analyses of social practice. Cronin notes that Bourdieu’s concept of habitus means that the agent’s responsibility is partially renounced with reference to structural constraints and that “[…] relations of dominations are more deeply entrenched and resistant to change than the critique of ideology would suggest because they are based on bodily schemes that agents, and especially those who are culturally disenfranchised, can reflexively grasp and control only within limits” (Cronin 1996, p. 75). Hence, Bourdieu does not attribute the same degree of autonomy to the agent as Habermas does.

Foucault: Disciplinary power and discourse

Foucault’s conceptualization of power has some similarities with Bourdieu’s, but it also differs in important aspects. Primarily, this is an effect of differences in the epistemological and ontological approach. Where Bourdieu was rooted in the dialectical materialism with its emphasis on practice, Foucault operates with an anti-essentialist ontology with an emphasis on history, language, and discourse.

Throughout his work with the history of the prison (Foucault, 1991), Foucault found that the traditional conceptualization of power was insufficient to explain how the prison arose and developed and what role it played at different times and places (Kelly, 1994, p. 375). This resulted in Foucault’s distinction between two different models of power: the juridical and the disciplinary model (Kelly, 1994, p. 374; Foucault, 1980, p. 105).

The juridical model is characterized by the following: (1) power is possessed (by individuals, a social class, the citizens etc.), (2) power flows from a central source from the top to the bottom (from the juridical system, the economy, the state etc.), and (3) when power is exercised, it is primarily repressive (e.g., as a ban supported by sanctions). In other words, the juridical model is by far equal to the conceptualization of power that lies in the Western philosophy of consciousness as well as in dialectical materialism—and not least in our everyday conceptualization of power.

The disciplinary model relates to a completely different form of power, a generative power, which in many ways can be claimed to be negatively defined in relation to the juridical model. It is thus characterized by the following: (1) power is exercised rather than possessed, that is, it consists of action upon actions, (2) power is analyzed as something that can descend from the bottom and move upwards, that is, it is not conditioned by the sovereign but by discourse, and (3) power is not primarily repressive but productive, that is, it produces the subjects who submitted to their own subjectivity (Kelly, 1994, p. 374).

Foucault developed the disciplinary model since he found that the juridical was insufficient to grasp the myriad of power relations at the micro level of society (Kelly, 1994, p. 375). In practice, juridical and disciplinary power can usually be identified as existing simultaneously. This is, for example, identifiable in modern institutions such as the prison, the school, the hospital, and the army, where oppressive power seems to merge with productive power. It is precisely this amalgamation that makes the subjects their own governors (Foucault, 1991). It was the disciplinary model that interested Foucault, and therefore the one that will be investigated in the following. ³

With the disciplinary model, power is converted from a question of having or not having power to the question of how, in what forms, and with what effects power is exercised. According to the disciplinary model, power is an entirely discursive and productive phenomenon, whose main product is the human subject: “The individual, that is, is not the vis-a-vis of power; it is, I believe, one of its prime effects” (Foucault, 1980, p. 98; original italics).

In this form, power is inextricably linked to knowledge. Not that “knowledge is power”; power and knowledge are still considered as two separate domains, but there is never a field of knowledge without a simultaneously involved field of power (Foucault, 1980). This concurrent correlation and separateness were emphasized by Foucault with the term power/knowledge. Power/knowledge establishes the framework for any given discourse, which means “everything that is said” within a field of knowledge (Foucault, 1980). Power/knowledge produces possibilities in the form of distinctions, definitions, and categorizations. This happens through continuous evaluation, quantification, differentiation, homogenization, and hierarchization of time, space, and bodies (Foucault, 1991).

In order to illustrate disciplinary power, Foucault used the philosopher Jeremy Bentham’s model of the ideal prison, the Panopticon, where a single jailer could oversee all inmates at the same time without being seen himself: “[…] in order to be exercised, this power had to be given the instrument of permanent, exhaustive, omnipresent surveillance, capable of making all visible, as long as it could itself remain invisible” (Foucault, 1991, p. 200). The disciplinary power works by being internalized in the individuals’ bodies. Thus, the soul becomes the prison of the body and we become disciplined to discipline ourselves.

Hence, Foucault’s area of interest was what he termed “the microphysics of power”: the apparatuses, which are integrated in the institutional practices, but whose area of function is situated in between the institutional frames and the bodies with their materiality and forces. In other words, a focus on the regulation of the bodies and the constitution of individuality in what Foucault calls subjectivation:

We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it “excludes,” it “represses,” it “censors,” it “abstracts,” in “masks,” it “conceals.” In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belongs of this production (Foucault, 1991, p. 183).

“Power” is thus a fundamentally different concept in Foucault’s theory than in both Habermas’ and Bourdieu’s theories. In the following, we will take a closer look at the differences and their consequences.

Differences and consequences

The concept of power and the differences and similarities between the approaches, relates to different aspects of the theories such as dualism, materiality and practice, freedom and determinism, truth and power, and normativity and relativism. These aspects will be discussed below.

Dualism

As mentioned, the conceptualization of power inherent in the Western philosophy of consciousness is comparable to what Foucault called the juridical model. Here, power is considered as possessed and potentially oppressive. This understanding of power is on the one hand individualized, on the other it is rooted in a dualistic conceptualization of the relationship between the individual and the system. Although Habermas was inspired by Marxism (dialectical materialism) and thus contextualism, dualism still haunted his philosophy. This can be seen in his distinction between lifeworld and system-world (Habermas, 1987).

Bourdieu for his part strove to overcome dualism with his focus on practice (praxeology). According to Judith Butler with limited success:

The distinction between the objective and subjective domains of practice are offered by Bourdieu in order to illustrate both the necessary convergence of the two domains and their irreducibility to one another. This dualism, however, comes to haunt the very notion of practice that is supposed to render those disparate aims congruent or compatible (Butler 1999, p. 119).

Although Bourdieu considers power as attached to practice, it remains unclear how the relationship between the agent and structure is established. This has fundamental consequences for the concept of habitus: the relationship between what creates habitus and what habitus creates remains unclear (Butler, 1999, p. 117).

Foucault also attempted to overcome the dualism between agent and structure in his theoretical concepts. This was done through a focus on language as a mediator between the two. For Bourdieu, there was such a thing as objective structures (societal, economical etc.,) that are embedded in the agent’s habitus (integration). However, his focus was not the individual but the positions that are (potentially) available for some while not for others. Foucault was more interested in examining the processes of how culturally specific norms (power/knowledge) set a framework (discourse) for knowledge-production and for agents’ possibilities of becoming a subject, that is, for subjectivation:

This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize, and which others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power which makes individuals subjects. There are two meanings of the word “subject”: subject to someone else by control and dependence; and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to (Foucault 1994b, p. 212).

While Bourdieu’s conceptualization of power is related to materialism, Foucault’s anti-essentialism may be considered as a form of anti-materialism that touches on materialism (Olsson, 2006). While Foucault is certainly not a physicalist, it is evident that he regards discourses as a material in the sense that they are real: “For Foucault, both discursive and non-discursive are material” (Olsson, 2006, p. 207). Foucault’s position is thus not anti-realistic, but he insists, that the ways we perceive “reality” is always and evidentially mediated by discourse.

Materiality and practice

Foucault’s concept of discourse can thus to some extend be compared with Bourdieu’s concept of field. But where a field is linked to practices, discourse is linked to language, although without discourse being reducible to language. As pointed by Stephen Ball, there are material elements in discourse: “The materiality of discourse also draws attention to architectures, organizations, practices and subjects and subjectivities (including the author) as manifestations of discourse, and again underlines the misunderstandings involved in reducing discourse to language” (Ball, 2013, p. 21).

Hence, Foucault’s concept of discourse encompasses more than merely language in a narrow sense, and it is possible to consider all cultural products as manifestations of discourse. It is important to add that Foucault analyzed materiality as discourse, that is, focusing on the discursive attribution to materiality, while Bourdieu relates to materiality as practice, that is, focusing on materiality as elements in a field of (symbolic and material) power. As well as Foucault does not reduce materiality to language, Bourdieu does not reduce materiality to practice. The two approaches are neither reductionism nor nominalism. The relationship between materiality, language and practice is, as will appear, more complex than that.

Freedom and determinism

As discussed, Habermas considers the human subject as a rational, autonomous agent in possession of a free will, a conceptualization that can be attributed to his inspiration from Kant. But since Habermas is also inspired by dialectical materialism and therefore emphasizes the dialectical relation between the individual and its context, his concept of the human subject hardly is entirely compatible with the cogito of the philosophy of consciousness.

Though, the dialectical materialist concept of the agent can to a greater extent be identified in Bourdieu’s theory. As Cronin mentions, the consequence of Bourdieu’s concept of habitus is that it allows for a form of personal identity, which is different from Foucault’s subject, who is subject to the disciplinary forms of power: “Thus the concept of the habitus allows for the inner, symbolic dimensions of personal identity. At the same time, while Bourdieu’s agent is not a passive effect of disciplinary power, neither is she or he the sovereign subject of the philosophy of consciousness” (Cronin 1996, p. 73).

It is unclear what degree of agency and free will Foucault’s concept of power allows, and whether the consequence of Foucault’s concepts is that the human subject must be considered as determined by discourse. Then, the individual would so to say be a puppet on discourse’s string. This is one of Habermas’ main objections against Foucault (Habermas, 1994). According to Kelly, Habermas’ critique is a consequence of his misreading of Foucault’s concept of disciplinary power, which Habermas understood as equivalent with juridical power, and therefore eliminating the subject’s autonomy (Kelly, 1994).

However, as mentioned, the two forms of power must be understood as correlatives: “[…] there are now two modes of analyzing power – disciplinary and juridical – which are not necessarily incompatible, though they do compete and conflict; they are in short, correlative” (Kelly, 1994, p. 375). Foucault states that individuals are only subject to disciplinary power insofar as they are free: “It should also be noted that power relations are possible only insofar as the subjects are free” (Foucault, 1994a, p. 292). And since disciplinary power does not eliminate individual autonomy, Foucault’s theory in general does not entail that the individual is determined by discourse: “For Foucault, resistance is inseparable from power – where there is power, there is resistance” (Kelly, 1994, p. 382). However, it is unclear how and where this resistance/counterforce can arise, while the individual always will be embedded in discourse.

According to Olsson, the answer might be to review the concepts of determinism and causality. We tend to understand determinism as linear causality, which means correlation between one cause and one effect. Perhaps one must rather understand Foucault’s disciplinary power as a determinism, where the individual is continuously faced with several possibilities for subjectivation. The link between freedom and determinism in Foucault’s theory can probably best be understood as a complex system, where opportunities continuously arise, transform, disappear, and intra- and interact with the assessment- and sanctioning systems of the context (Olsson, 2006):

Causation in Foucault’s view, however, is conceived of systematically, in terms of a model of holism-particularism, or interactions in open systems, effectively unpredictable, in that the full range of possible combinations or effects cannot be specified in advance. Complex systems, moreover, are contingent and dynamic, whereby the structure of the system is continuously transformed through the interaction of the elements, which in turn are not explainable in reference to any external principle, origin of foundation

(Olsson, 2006, p. 199).

However, this is different from our traditional understanding of free will (Olsson, 2006, p. 203). Olsson notes that Foucault himself referred to a game as a metaphor for the relationship between freedom and limitation, that is, between freedom and determinism. In the game one is both free and limited, which is equivalent with how Foucault generally understands the human subject (Olsson, 2006, p. 205).

Truth and power

The relationship between power and truth is to a considerable extent an ideological question for both Habermas and Bourdieu. Habermas on the one hand criticized positivism for masking research as objective and thus proclaiming itself as value-free (Habermas, 1968). Bourdieu on the other hand emphasized that everything that is presented as the truth is infiltrated by symbolic as well as economic power. Thus, in both theories, one finds a distinction between power and truth, which also indicates that the Truth must be out there and that it (perhaps only in theory) is possible to reach it through research.

This was not the case for Foucault. Foucault’s concept of power/knowledge as a coherent complex emphasizes that “reality” cannot be understood outside of discourse, and that no knowledge is free of (juridical and disciplinary) power. For Foucault, science and philosophy are therefore not a manifestation of the Truth but a product of power/knowledge: “Truth is always viewed through a historically contingent lens and is never vouchsafe” (Olsson, 2006, p. 208).

Habermas considered this a very problematic position: “The discourses of the science, and in general the discourses in which knowledge is shaped and transmitted, lose their privileged status; together with other discursive practices, they form power complexes that offer a domain of objects sui generis” (Habermas, 1994, p. 81-82). According to Habermas, human reason has a privileged position. According to Kelly, Habermas particularly opposed what he understood as Foucault’s linking of truth, right, and power: “What Habermas objects to is the sense in which these three axes – and especially the relationship between truth and power and between right and power – are inseparable in (discursive) practice, though analytically distinguishable” (Kelly, 1994, p. 378).

For Habermas, the distinction between the domains is necessary to establish an ethical principle as well as a democratic rule of law and justice. As already mentioned, it seems as if the dispute between Foucault and Habermas not only relates to the concept of “power” but also that it stems from their difference in research foci as well as in their difference in ontological and epistemological positions. This also relates to the question of normativity and ethics.

Normativity and relativism

Habermas is targeting the lack of normativity in that he found in Foucault’s theoretical complex as well as he accuses Foucault of establishing “an ontology of power” (Habermas, 1994, p. 102). Habermas thus criticizes Foucault’s theoretical contribution for not only turning power into the universal explanatory force but also for being a-normative to such an extent that it is approaching relativism.

Relativism can be found in several forms: firstly, as epistemological, and ontological relativism, which means that one understands the world as relative to the individual’s cognition and/or to discourse, and, secondly as moral relativism, which means that there are no norms for distinguishing between good and evil. The two forms are interrelated, and both forms may be a consequence of an anti-essentialist ontology such as the one to which Foucault subscribes. Habermas accused Foucault of both and clearly regarded moral relativism as the most problematic (Habermas, 1994).

However, Habermas overlooked that Foucault’s project, though it was intending at being a-normative, didn’t necessarily mean that it was aiming at relativism. It simply had a different focus: “[…] in the case of ethics, Foucault does not focus on moral-juridical codes, but on how we problematize our behavior as ethical before we articulate the codes, and then how we conduct ourselves to the codes once they have been articulated” (Kelly, 1994, p. 375). Likewise, Olsson emphasizes that Foucault is not a postmodern relativist: “And just as Foucault does not maintain an ‘anything goes’ stance in science, neither does he […] in ethics or politics” (Olsson, 2006, p. 208).

Thus, Foucault cannot be accused as merely claiming for relativism, but that he with his concept of disciplinary power strove to investigate the historical, political, and discursive foundations of morality rather than, like Habermas, to define principles for ethics. Though, the dispute with Habermas may well have been the reason for Foucault to take up ethics in the last part of his career (Foucault, 1994b).

Discussion: Three concepts of power in educational research

The analysis of power concepts in this article is not merely a philosophical exercise. Whether power is posited as possessed or non-possessed has a significant impact on the social (educational) scientist’s analyses, and therefore also for the understanding of the world, in which we live. A concept of power as possessed will shape the analysis in one way, while a non-possessed concept of power will shape it in another. Thus, it is significant for what can be analyzed and for the types of conclusions that can be drawn. A concept of power as possessed will inevitably place the responsibility in individuals, groups, or entities (e.g., “the society”). An example can be found in the educational research that is inspired by Habermas. Many examples from the educational field can be found in Young (1992) as well as in Murphy and Fleming (2009), among others Englund (2009), who discuss the role of the teacher:

The role of the teacher is crucial since he/she (usually) has both the real authority (in terms of necessary knowledge and perspectives) to determine the discursive conditions for dealing with the problem in question, and the formal authority to do so, which can always be misused […] Creating a discursive situation in the classroom and having intuition about whether this situation is at hand are mainly a matter of the teacher’s judgement […] (Englund, 2009, pp. 24-25).

In this quotation, it is quite evident how an analysis based on Habermas’ concept of power as possessed and potentially corrupting will focus on the act of communication and how to create an educational setting which minimizes acts of power.

An analysis based on Bourdieu’s concepts will focus differently. A particular focus for Bourdieu was how education is part of the reproduction of social structures (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990). There are multiple examples of how Bourdieu’s concepts have been used for analyses within the educational field worldwide, both from Bourdieu’s own hand and from other researchers, who have found his concepts useful. An example is the way the concept of field has been used to conceptualize relations among higher education (HE) and further education (FE) in England:

The concept of field thus provides a means of focusing attention on the construction of power within and between fields. It helps to problematize the positioning of HE in FE in relation to the HE field, and to raise questions about the strengths and limitations of seeking to create one broad field of tertiary education. For whilst there may be some advantages, using the concept of field helps to show that it cannot simply be read off that the construction of one tertiary field will reduce inequalities, or contribute to social mobility […] Bourdieu’s tools direct attention onto competitive strategy and an analysis of that aspect of practice (Bathmaker, 2015, p. 73).

In this quotation, it is evident that power in a Bordieuan perspective is considered as complex phenomena, which have several aspects and foremost is attached to social structures and practice instead of individuals.

Like Bourdieu’s concepts, different elements of Foucault’s theories are widely applied to educational research in different forms. This can, among others, be found in poststructuralist and social constructionist analyses. An example which also discusses the difference between analyses based on a concept of power as possessed and non-possessed can be found in a study concerning bullying in schools (Søndergaard and Hansen, 2018).

The individualized approach, which was common until recently, was focusing on identifying “the bullied” and “the bully” in person. The aim was to make it possible to act through different forms of punishment and exclusion of the bully. In this case, power is considered as something that the bully has and exercises over the bullied, who is a powerless victim. Through identifying and punishing the bully, the system (the school, teachers, parents, etc.,) uses its power to punish and discipline the bullies: “The instruction to look for a child with an aggressive personality within a school class to reveal the presence of a true bully may for some adults in school have seemed pleasantly direct in its call for action […] one of the suggested sanctions is to move the bully to a different class during some periods […]” (Søndergaard and Hansen, 2018, pp. 321-322). This is an individualized way of looking at power among the students, which has a tendency of becoming stuck in an executioner/victim dichotomy that eliminates further investigation and development.

Inspired by Foucault’s power concept, Søndergaard and Hansen (2018) suggest a different approach: to look for the shifting positions in class. In that case, the researchers found that it was impossible to identify certain individuals as “the bully-type” or the “bullied type.” Instead, they found “[…] children shifting between different positions both over time and in different situations […] that aggression that develops in one set of circumstances can dissipate in other contexts, and how weakness can characterize in certain relationships but not in others […]” (Søndergaard and Hansen, 2018, p. 321).

It is evident that power is here considered as non-possessed and emerging among the students: “Identifying these processes […] requires us to recognize bullying and extreme exclusion as phenomena that emerge through messy and complicated social processes, but which are subjective experiences for those involved” (Søndergaard and Hansen, 2018, p. 333). The question of power then becomes analyses of the possibilities for subjectivation that is established within the frames of discourse, history, norms, and culture. Here, it is not relevant to place responsibility for what happens in one or some individual(s). Responsibility becomes a contextual issue.

As the examples show, the concepts of power in the three theories have significant implication on the analytical potentials for (educational) research. Thus, the concepts of power also have significant implications for the conclusions that can be drawn based on the analyses.

Concluding remarks

The article shows how the term “power” is used in three different ways and for three different purposes in the three theoretical approaches discussed. For Habermas, power is regarded as possessed and potentially oppressive and is thus a political and ethical issue. In his theory, “power” is used as a term for what potentially counteract his discourse ethics and something, which must be kept out of a free and ethical conversation.

For Habermas, power is an antagonist to reason. Therefore, Habermas challenges Foucault’s linking of power and knowledge: For Habermas, the universal (powerless) truth is possible; for Foucault, truth is historically contingent and entwined with power. While Habermas’ mission is universalistic in terms of establishing a framework for ethics, Foucault’s mission is historical (genealogical) in terms of identifying the subtle mechanisms that set the framework for how we construct ourselves as subjects, the processes of subjectivation.

Bourdieu’s concept of power is formulated within the framework of dialectical materialism’s conceptualization of practice as a way of escaping the dichotomy between the “subjective” (individual) and the “objective” (structural). Practice is considered as situated, potentially conflictual, and in constantly development and transformation. Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic power conceptualizes the subtle ways in which social structures are integrated in the agents in the form of habitus. Habitus is bridging between agent and structure, a concept which is designed for analyzing social positions and agents’ strategies without individualization. Since the purpose is to identify underlying mechanisms for difference between social positions in order to make a change, Bourdieu’s concept of power can be said to have a political and ideological toning, which follows his Marxist inheritance.

As the example shows, the concept of power to which a given theory subscribes will evidentially have an impact for the researcher’s focus and for the frame, within which the conclusions can be drawn. Traditionally, we consider the individual as rational and in possession of a free will, that is, in accordance with the cogito of the philosophy of consciousness. In that case, “power” becomes a question of individual responsibility and the human subjects are the ones to blame. Despite Habermas’ inspiration from dialectical materialism, his theory entails a concept of power as possessed (by the state, the individual, etc.,) which is not far from the cogito.

This is different from Bourdieu’s concept of power, which on the one hand has more nuances and comes in different forms, on the other hand is tied to practice and not to individuals nor to structure. Bourdieu’s concepts of power (and habitus) mediate the “subjective” and the “objective,” which makes the theory suitable for analyses of agent’s choice and strategies and the social positions that they can possess. Bourdieu’s concept of power can be used to analyze the ways agent’s choices and dispositions for their lives are tied to certain culturally specific connotations that frame their possibilities.

Habermas’ concept of power can be used to identify the power that some individuals or states possess and how they use it to eliminate others. The aim is to create a setting, where no one are suppressed, and everyone can act and speak freely. The aim is explicitly normative.

Foucault’s concept of disciplinary power can be used to identify the subtle power-mechanisms that are at stake in discourse and how they are tied to long forgotten ideas, which have been transformed over time though still produce human subjects. And, as exemplified in this article, also to change perspective from power as something that someone has and others do not have into something, which is floating in between the agents in the context.

In any case, the different theories and their different concepts of power opens for different analyses which means that the theory must be chosen with this in mind. While it opens some doors for analysis, it at the same time closes others. “Power” is not just one but several significantly different phenomena.