In reply to the commentaries of Clay-Warner (2014), Gendolla (2014), Nesse (2014), Shweder (2014), and Zachar (2014), I repeat the essential features of appraisal theories of the second flavor: They take emotional components (and not specific emotions) as the phenomenon to be explained, and they strive for a multilevel mechanistic explanation that leaves room for complex and dynamical processes or mechanisms. Every mechanistic explanation starts with an accurate description of regularities between inputs and outputs. Regularities do not preclude context-dependent variety, because there is no limit to the number of input factors that can influence the output, and back.
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BroschT.SanderD. (2013). Comment: The appraising brain: Towards a neuro-cognitive model of appraisal processes in emotions. Emotion Review, 5, 163–168.
SchererK. R. (2009). Emotions are emergent processes: They require a dynamic computational architecture. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: B, 364, 3459–3474.
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ShwederR. A. (2014). Comment: The tower of appraisals: Trying to make sense of the one big thing. Emotion Review, 6, 322–324.
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ZacharP. (2014). Comment: Five uses of philosophy in scientific theories of emotion, Emotion Review, 6, 324–326.
