Abstract
The target articles and commentaries reveal considerable support for the view that the term “emotion” names neither a natural kind nor a coherent psychological category. This brief response revisits a couple of historical points about the meanings of “emotion,” as well as the ancient debate between Stoicism and Christianity.
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