The role of ‘place’ in understanding the drivers of serious youth violence: An examination of identity,territorialism and community

Abstract

Although violent crime overall appears to have decreased in England and Wales over the past 25 years, some forms of violence including serious youth violence appear to be rising. Drawing upon narratives from young people involved in serious youth violence and other frontline stakeholders collected as part of two studies conducted in the North East of England, this article aims to build upon existing literature linking serious youth violence with individual and structural risk factors. In recognising violence as something which both shapes the psychosocial development of young people, and something which is shaped by the psychosocial context of their lived environment, this article considers the contemporary and historical socio-cultural and geographical factors which underpin young people’s experiences of serious youth violence. In doing so, it illustrates the relevance of place and community – both physical communities and increasingly virtual communities – in shaping young people’s engagement in and/or experiences of serious youth violence.

Keywords

Child criminal exploitation masculinity violence youth gangs youth justice

Introduction

While overall violent crime in England and Wales has decreased over 25 years, some forms, though below pre-pandemic levels, have risen significantly (Office for National Statistics (ONS), 2023b). Serious youth violence (SYV) – defined by the Youth Justice Board as drug, robbery, or violent offences with a gravity score of 5 or more – has seen a growing number of young people involved as victims or perpetrators (HM Government, 2018).¹ For example, as weapon carrying and robbery have increased, so too has the proportion of those responsible who are under the age of 21 (HM Government, 2018). Moreover, while the number of victims of assaults with a sharp object aged 19+ has decreased by 9% since 2012/13, the number of victims who are aged under 16 and 16–18 has increased by 84% and 20%, respectively (Allen et al., 2023). This article draws upon research conducted with young people involved in, or at risk of becoming involved in, SYV and the stakeholders working with these young people in the North East of England. Through their reflections on the drivers of youth violence, it illustrates the relevance of virtual and place-based communities in shaping young people’s engagement in and/or experiences of SYV.

Drivers of serious youth violence

While acknowledging the limitations of statistical data on SYV prevalence and the need to avoid sensationalist narratives, examining existing data and research provides valuable context. Evidence suggests that this is a problem particularly concentrated in metropolitan localities. While incidents of serious violent crime involving a knife or weapon have risen across virtually all police force areas in England and Wales (ONS, 2023b), this appears more intense in areas like London, Manchester, Birmingham and Liverpool (Home Affairs Committee, 2019). For the year ending March 2023 knife enabled offences were found to be highest across the West Midlands, Greater Manchester and Metropolitan police force areas (ONS, 2023b). However, significant variation within these areas (Soppitt et al., 2022) suggests a need for a more nuanced understanding of SYV drivers.

Evidence links SYV to inequality, deprivation and vulnerability. Young people most at risk of SYV, though not always known to police or youth justice, are often engaged with statutory agencies before criminal activity (Association of Directors of Children’s Services, 2019; Soppitt et al., 2022). Poverty and low socio-economic status are well documented as heightening criminogenic behaviours (Ellis, 2016; Farrington, 1998; Wilkinson, 1996) and rising SYV correlates with increasing child poverty in the United Kingdom (Association of Directors of Children’s Services, 2019). Research links early trauma and adverse childhood experiences (ACEs) to increased risk of CCE and SYV (Gray et al., 2021; Hobart, 2018), while school exclusion and youth unemployment are additional pathways to crime (Pritchard and Williams, 2009; Smith, 2019).

Gender is also identified as a key factor. While there is growing concern regarding female involvement in ‘gangs’ and violence (Local Government Association (LGA), 2024), the forms garnering significant government concern are predominantly those involving young men in public settings (HM Government, 2018). Evidence from the UK Millennium Cohort study found that weapon carrying and usage was almost twice as high among young males as compared to females (Villadsen and Fitzsimons, 2023). Much research has been situated within the broader intertwined context of ‘gangs’, drugs, and ‘county lines’ activity – a term depicting how organised crime groups use mobile phone (or similar) ‘lines’ to support the illegal movement of drugs and other goods within/across local areas.

The term ‘gang’ is contested, with little consensus on its definition (Densley, 2013). Legally, the Policing and Crime Act 2009 (s.34) defines gang-related violence as involving a group of at least three people identifiable by one or more characteristics as a group. A more nuanced distinction is drawn by The Children’s Commissioner (2019) between ‘peer groups’, ‘street gangs’ and ‘organised criminal gangs’ (OCGs). The former are recognised as a relatively small and transient social grouping which may or may not describe themselves as a ‘gang’, while street ‘gangs’ encompass a discernible group of young people for whom crime and violence is integral to the group’s identity.² OCGs are more structured and focus on criminal gain. While helpful, overlap exists between these groups particularly when it comes to the exploitation of vulnerable young people (The Children’s Commissioner, 2019).

Given the competitive and highly volatile nature of ‘gang’ related drug dealing (Coomber and Moyle, 2017; Home Affairs Committee, 2019), county lines has been credited as a key driver of SYV (HM Government, 2018; Smith, 2019). County lines, in which an ‘individual or group takes advantage of an imbalance of power to coerce, control, manipulate or deceive’ (HM Government, 2018: 48) another, is heavily reliant on the exploitation of young people.³ While even those from seemingly stable backgrounds may be targeted (National Crime Agency (NCA), 2018), vulnerabilities significantly increase the risk of exploitation and violence (Moyle, 2019).

The Internet, as a common feature in young peoples’ lives, has amplified risks. In the year ending March 2023, 92.6% of 10–15 year-olds went online daily or almost daily (ONS, 2023a). While not a direct cause of violence, social media is a tool which can escalate tensions and increase exposure to ‘gangs’, CCE and SYV (Irwin-Rogers and Pinkney, 2016). The Youth Endowment Fund (YEF, 2023), for example, found that 43% of surveyed children viewed social media as a major driver of violence. ‘Gangs’ are increasingly utilising social media to promote their activities, attract members and offer identity, belonging and/or protection (Pyrooz et al., 2015; Whittaker et al., 2020). Understanding the socio-historical and cultural contexts of violence must now also include the online spaces young people inhabit, as today’s ‘digital street’ is ‘as meaningful and consequential as the concrete street’ (Irwin-Rogers et al., 2018: 12).

Deindustrialisation and ‘left behind’ communities: Young people in the North East

Although the North East faces diverse challenges, poverty and deindustrialisation have shaped the region’s history. The region’s industrial heritage is important when attempting to understand young people’s engagement in and/or experiences of CCE and SYV. Once an industrial powerhouse with a rich history of skilled and stable male-dominated manual industry like steel works, coalmining and shipbuilding, the demise of post-war capitalism has rapidly altered the region (Nayak, 2003; Telford and Wistow, 2024). A growth of post-manufacturing and service-sector work typically characterised by casualisation, precarity and low pay (Lloyd, 2018; Standing, 2011) has replaced most manual industry. A full in-depth discussion is beyond the constraints of this article; however, the lasting effects of deindustrialisation – for example, deprivation, inequality, poor health and crime – are well documented both within and beyond the North East (see, for example, Linkon, 2018; Shildrick et al., 2012). Despite a plethora of government policy initiatives and soundbites (Shaw and Robinson, 2018) – for example, Northern Powerhouse, Levelling Up, Green Industrial Strategy and the introduction of ‘freeports’ – which have all promised to address economic and social inequalities, these persist. A growing number of areas within post-industrial towns and cities – particularly, though by no means exclusively, across the North of England – are now characterised as “left behind”’ (Telford, 2024; Telford and Wistow, 2024).⁴

Research highlights the enduring social and economic marginalisation of young people in deindustrialised areas like the North East (see, for example, Corrigan, 1976; MacDonald and Marsh, 2000, 2005; MacDonald et al., 2005; MacDonald and Shildrick, 2007, 2013; Nayak, 2003; Shildrick et al., 2012; Winlow and Hall, 2009). The North East and its young inhabitants are not homogeneous, and while the region shares in the experience of deindustrialisation, its impact and recovery varies both between and within cities and towns (see, for example, Mah, 2013). Nonetheless, while the region today is socially and economically fragmented (Robinson, 2002), some young people remain economically and socially marginalised.⁵ Indeed, though today’s youth did not experience deindustrialisation directly, its harmful legacy lingers (Linkon, 2018). Where work once formed the basis of an individual’s identity, community and sense of belonging (Ferns, 2019), research suggests that de-industrial restructuring and the ‘feminisation’ of the labour market (Maguire, 2021) has eroded a sense of collective social importance among some within these communities. Rather, in post-industrial Britain today, youth identities are increasingly shaped by consumption and consumerism (Winlow and Hall, 2009). Neoliberal restructuring and an unrelenting sense of competitive individualisation (Ellis et al., 2017) has, according to some, created a sense of hostility and alienation within some communities (Ellis, 2016).

During the transition to adulthood, young people seek belonging and purpose (Best, 2019; Paternoster and Bushway, 2009). While many young people can successfully navigate post-industrial life and find legitimate avenues upon which they can build their identity, for those facing individual and/or structural vulnerabilities, these opportunities are often restricted. Indeed, the dismantling of traditional industries and subsequent reduction of stable employment opportunities has exacerbated the socio-economic marginalisation of many young people today. These young people are left particularly vulnerable to feelings of disenfranchisement and purposelessness, and a deep sense of not ‘mattering’ (Billingham and Irwin-Rogers, 2021, 2022).⁶ A sense of social insignificance does not necessarily guarantee violent behaviours, and where it does, this may equally manifest as violence directed towards the self, however, for some ‘violence can be a means to establish and assert some kind of social magnitude’ (Billingham and Irwin-Rogers, 2021: 1229). For a small minority of young people, then, the ability to maintain respect among peers is only attainable through illegitimate means including criminality, ‘gangs’ and violence.

Of course, violence and youth violence are neither new nor unique to post-industrial regions. However, the contemporary socio-economic landscape in post-industrial Britain, we argue, has intensified the conditions in which violence can manifest. For these young people respect, power and/or reputation, which are in short supply through more legitimate means, are acquired on the street. While many young people may be oblivious to the wider socio-historic context in which violence emerges (Henry and Mullings-Lawrence, 2017), research suggests that many rivalries and ‘gangs’ within the North East are rooted in the history of traditional crime families (Harvey and Hornsby, 2017). Subsequently, as Anderson (1999) observes, building a name and reputation as someone who is ‘willing and able to fight’ is something often learned through socialisation as both a method to gain respect and ‘a means of survival’ (p. 67). As with any other asset that can be gained, lost and/or traded, this currency must be protected at all costs. Ultimately, this becomes the ‘currency of the street’ (Harding, 2020).

Drawing on narratives from young people and stakeholders in the North East, this article explores the socio-cultural and geographical factors shaping youth experiences of SYV. It highlights the significance of place and community – both physical and virtual – in understanding these dynamics.

Methods

This article draws on data from two research projects conducted in the North East of England. The first, ‘study 1’, was conducted in 2020–2022 and funded by the YJB. The second, ‘study 2’, was conducted in 2023, funded by a third-sector organisation supporting young people affected by SYV and exploitation. While distinct in aims, both studies broadly sought to analyse and understand the changing picture of SYV in the region. Both projects adopted a mixed methods approach. Quantitative analysis of existing service monitoring and performance data (aligning to the following themes (a) case management, (b) accommodation, (c) education, training and employment, (d) health, (e) substance misuse, (f) families and (g) finance and benefits and debt) was utilised to help understand the local context, while qualitative semi-structured interviews conducted with young people and frontline stakeholders gave the researchers a deeper insight into the nature and experiences of SYV. Across both studies, 14 young people and 31 frontline stakeholders were interviewed. Young participants included victims and perpetrators (often both) of exploitation and criminal activity, as well as those on the periphery. Stakeholders represented youth justice agencies, police, social care and third-sector organisations.

Study 1 occurred during the global Covid-19 pandemic, necessitating alternative online research methods. The team developed an original digital tool, facilitated by YJS case managers, that engaged young people through a digital whiteboard, with interactions recorded using online software.⁷ Of the 10 young participants 9 identified as male and 1 female. Most identified as white British, with 2 young people identifying as white Eastern European. The analysis of 2300 case files supported this ethnic split with 75% of individuals who offended in the study period self-identifying as white British. When looking specifically at SYV, 69% identified as ‘White British’. Of the 10 young people interviewed, 4 were first time entrants and 6 had previous recordable offences. Four participants were known to YJS for knife/weapon related offending, making this the most common offence type in the sample. 1 participant had committed several SYV offences in the past, including one which carried the maximum gravity offence score.⁸ In study 2, 4 young participants (2 identifying as white Eastern European and 2 as Black African) engaged through interviews. All identified as male and all reported involvement in illegal drug supply, possession and misuse, as well as weapon carrying and serious violence. Where consent was obtained, interviews were audio recorded and transcribed. Comprehensive notes were taken where consent was not provided to record. Transcripts and notes were thematically analysed according to identified key themes.

‘Left behind’ communities? The draw of the illegal economy

When attempting to understand young people’s engagement in and/or experiences of SYV across the North East, the region’s industrial heritage cannot be ignored. The harms of deindustrialisation on communities and the young people living within them are substantial and widely documented. Indeed, while questions relating to the region’s heritage were not part of the interview schedule, 29 of the 31 stakeholders and half of the young people raised issues relating to this during their interviews. As one stakeholder noted,

I think what’s massively changed since Thatcher, was heavy industry in terms of aspiration. If you haven’t got aspiration and hope, what have you got? You’ve got nothing. Our kids now got a career in Starbucks, or Greggs or something. It just doesn’t cut it. Or a call centre, you know. And if they haven’t got the skills and the confidence and the ability to apply themselves to a trade, as a plumber or as a joiner, what’s left? There’s kind of nothing in between. Those kinds of unskilled high paid jobs, such as the mines or something like that, and all of that’s gone and it’s been filled with Starbucks and call centres. (Stakeholder 13)

Although the young people we interviewed had varied aspirations for the future, what unified (n = 14) this group was a desire for money. However, while varied, barriers to legitimate opportunities to make money were common including the stigma of criminal convictions (n = 4), lack of skills and qualifications (n = 7) and insecure immigration status (n = 1). As observed in the wider literature, unable to adapt to new labour market transformations, research suggests that this void is often filled by the pull of criminal entrepreneurism, and the illicit economy which becomes embedded as part of communities (Fraser and Clark, 2021; Nayak, 2003).

All the young men interviewed (n = 13) spoke of their desire to provide for their family. Demonstrating a commitment to traditional masculine ideals, the ability to be a ‘provider’ was seen as a position of authority worthy of respect. Again, this was a further pull for young people into illegitimate economies. As one young person explained,

Cos nowadays, all the teenagers, they’ve got someone big who got a line, they work for him for 3, 4 months, they make money [. . .] Someone else who’s the same age as him, he got maybe 5 pounds from his mom, and he sees his friend, going, putting food on his family’s table, and he . . . he’s taken food from his family’s table. That’s something what people don’t like. You always like to put food on your table, you don’t wanna take. So that’s how people get involved. (Young person 10)

Despite demographic differences between the young people, they all appeared to share a profound sense of marginalisation. In addition to their feelings of being economically marginalised, most spoke of their negative experiences in mainstream education. Others, particularly those from minority ethnic backgrounds, also spoke of previous experiences of hate crime victimisation and bullying. Social exclusion increases young people’s engagement in ‘gang’ activities increases their risk of CCE. Although the young people from the region expressed a deep commitment to their North East identity and a desire to stay in the region, frontline stakeholders felt a growing sense of disenfranchisement among the most marginalised members of this group:

I genuinely think young people are becoming more isolated from their communities and more angry, disillusioned. (Stakeholder 12)

As previously noted, while traditional manual labour was once a unifying feature across the region, youth identities today appear increasingly shaped by consumption and consumerism (Winlow and Hall, 2009). While young people did not always realise they were being criminally exploited, most alluded to this and spoke of the initial lure of designer clothes, money and the ability to provide:

[I] would only join a gang depending on what they are doing. If they are just hanging around the streets and having pointless fights then no, [but] if they are selling [drugs], going out for food, doing stuff, then that’s more justified. (Young Person 11)

Despite initial ‘rewards’, however, young people often spoke on the harmful experiences associated with ‘gangs’ and criminal activities. These included being exploited to sell drugs, the demands of ‘working’ long hours, and witnessing and/or experiencing violence. Yet while most of the young people interviewed experienced things in their lives that many adults will never experience, once entrenched in this lifestyle, most alluded to how concerns for image, individual and collective reputation, and status could create a toxic cycle of harm:

Walking away from conflicts you can ‘lose your image’ which can make you more likely to be targeted for more violence. (Young person 13)

We discuss the importance of identity, status and its links to violence further in the next section.

The role of violence: Identity, status and protection

The importance placed upon identity, status and a desire to ‘matter’ were common themes from the data (n = 12 young people, n = 27 stakeholders). The sentiment that a good reputation was important ‘to get ahead in life’ (Young Person 1) was shared by most of the young people interviewed. Clothes and image were discussed as important symbolic markers for respect and as noted above, often acted as an initial pull factor into CCE and SYV. However, mirroring other research in deindustrialised working-class communities (see, for example, Ellis, 2016; Nayak, 2006), a propensity for violence and the ability to be able to ‘handle yourself’ should the situation arise, also appears vital in obtaining ‘street currency’. As discussed elsewhere (see, for example, Ellis, 2016; Hall, 1997; Winlow, 2014), the hyper-masculine legacy left by the regions industrial heritage means that young people are often ‘taught’ the importance of violence and being able to ‘stand up’ for oneself. Indeed, while more widely discussed in the context of marginalised young working-class males, such socialisation to violence was also evident during the interview with the only young female:

If I was in a situation where I thought I would be stabbed I would stab them first and kill them. I have been brought up to defend myself; if I am hit by others, hit back. I would definitely kill someone if I had to. (Young Person 7)

For some young people, violence is something which they are taught is both pervasive and instrumental; unavoidable and necessary.

Crucially, although as with other metropolitan regions in the United Kingdom, there was a perception that knife and/or weapon carrying was widespread, normalised and on the increase among young people in the North East, such behaviours were often framed around narratives of protection rather than a direct intent to cause harm (see also, Harding, 2020). Not all young people admitted to carrying knives themselves; however, most (n = 7) mentioned friends who had done so. Used as a means of cultivating power and eliciting fear among peers, this was regarded as being particularly important for young people who lacked the physicality to fight. As one young person reasoned,

Because some people, they can fight with hands, some people can’t fight with hands. Some people, they can use their hands, and some people, they can use their knives, they can use their weapons. (Young Person 10)

Yet, as this young person went onto demonstrate, while young people carrying weapons may have no real intent to use it, this is always a distinct possibility during conflicts:

If somebody comes up to you, I first try to fight with hands, if he puts out a knife, what can you do? (Young Person 10)

Across the two studies, frequent references were made to long-standing local conflicts and historical rivalries across the region. While most of these conflicts had moved past their peak, the legacy of family names and the associated reputations they had built carried over into the lives of young working-class people (see also, MacDonald et al., 2005). As one frontline stakeholder explained, for example,

We clearly have some very young people who are linked and either through association or by name to the organised crime families [. . .] I think it’s fair to say that the reputation of those families is still really, really prevalent and effective even at that low level . . . [it gives them an] ‘I’m an untouchable’ sort of attitude. (Stakeholder 17)

While helping to create and compound inter-group tensions and rivalries (see discussions in the next section), the comparatively small size and insular nature of cities and towns across the North East appeared a key factor in the value placed upon status and reputation. Such ‘territorial confinement’ allows [young people] to be a “big fish in a small pond”’ (McLean and Holligan, 2018: 10). Stakeholders saw violence in the region as largely performative, linked to ‘respect and hierarchy’ (Stakeholder 13). Crucially, however, and as discussed elsewhere, young people often alluded to the fragile nature of respect, in which a decline in street capital could leave you vulnerable to attacks from others (Harding, 2014). Subsequently, being known as a ‘big fish’ and someone who could fight – whether with fists or knives – or being surrounded by those who with a reputation for their ability to fight, was seen as instrumental in warding off potential confrontation and a key aspiration among ‘youngers’:

They [youngers] think that they’re like part of a gang [. . .] they think that holding a knife will give them power, that people will be scared. (Young person 2)

Localised violent legacies can contribute towards cultures of silence within such communities and engagement with police is discouraged. Of the young people interviewed, few (n = 3) reported positive attitudes towards the police. Rather, as indicated in the following extract, most young people (n = 11) believed police to be there to control rather than help them:

I don’t like police, cos they’re pigs, they’re dirty. It’s when you get in trouble they get involved in everything, why do they need to get involved in everything? (Young person 3)

When tensions occur between and within ‘gangs’, these matters are often dealt with internally and often with violence. Discussion of peer groups and ‘gangs’ was a theme in all (n = 14) interviews with young people. While neither ‘gangs’ nor criminal exploitation are new issues to the area, the picture of SYV and CCE in the area was perceived to be evolving.

Although material rewards acted as a pull factor into ‘gangs’ and associated criminal activities, ‘gangs’ were also seen as providing both a sense of belonging and protection. Despite this, for those engaged more centrally in ‘gangs’ – particularly those who enjoyed the status, money and clothing associated with such activity – the reality was that this association could also make them a target:

People think joining gangs is a glorious lifestyle, but it’s not; It’s not what you think it is at all. Once in it, you think ‘fucking hell!’ (Young Person 10)

This individual alluded to living in a hyper vigilant state with a survivalist mindset, acutely aware that violence could present itself at any point. Such hyper vigilance had inadvertently resulted in one young person punching an innocent bystander because he had perceived someone walking behind him as a potential threat. Survival narratives (Harding, 2020) were evident when speaking with other young people, even those on the periphery of ‘gang’ and SYV activities. Ultimately, a pressure to maintain the hyper-masculine reputation as ‘hard’ appears at times so strong that young people have little agency or choice about whether to engage in violence:

Young person 8:

‘As obviously I can’t let people walk all over me, innit? So, if I let someone ruin my reputation I’m going to look like an idiot, then everyone’s going to try and do it, so it’s just like, first impressions’

Interviewer:

‘What lengths would you go to, to protect your reputation?’

Young person 8:

‘Any means possible . . . [. . .] if someone’s going to fight me, I’m not going to sit there and not fight back cos I think I’m going to get kicked out of college . . . if I don’t fight back I’d look weak’

Interviewer:

‘Even if that would jeopardise other things in your life?’

Young Person

– ‘Yeah, and I know that that sounds stupid like [. . .] but reputation is the thing that might ruin it [my life]; I would have to act if someone tries to damage my reputation’.

As a powerful means of creating, defining and enforcing spatial boundaries and social relationships (Sack, 1986), in the next section we explore further how such concerns regarding identity and reputation can result in territoriality between individual and groups.

The physical and virtual self: Territorialism and risk

While membership to ‘gangs’ can create a sense of belonging among young people, memberships simultaneously reinforce hierarchies based on ingroup and outgroup status (Tajfel and Turner, 2000). Personal and collective identity in these groups often become intertwined so that individual ‘self-esteem becomes bound up with the fortunes of the group’ (Brown, 2004: 33). This was again evident during interviews with young participants. As one young person alluded, some people were willing to sacrifice their own freedom for the reputation of their ‘gang’:

Well, some people, they do it [join gangs] for the name [. . .] So it has people like that, it has people who go around just for the name. They’re just going to jail just for name. (Young Person 9)

Hyper vigilance and survival narratives were issues raised in relation to threats from outgroup youths or ‘opps’ from other areas. While often lacking the internal structure and organisation to fully meet the legal definition of a gang, these were often linked to geographical postcode areas of cities in which they resided and the rivalries between areas. Young people discussed particular ‘postcode gangs’ and the areas in which they were dominant. For most, this impacted upon their sense of safety and where they felt they could and couldn’t travel in their local area:

Gangs are really vicious they stab anyone for being cheeky especially [postcode area]. It scares me a bit and I won’t go to town on my own. (Young person 6)

Such defensive localism (White, 2013) between young people is not new, and rivalries between postcode areas have been documented in other areas including Manchester (Gray et al., 2021), Bradford and Bristol (Pickering et al., 2012). Crucially, however, while often framed in terms of long-standing rivalries between postcode areas, social media meant many members no longer physically resided within those geographical areas. This was discussed by one frontline stakeholder who explained,

We definitely get the postcode rivalries in the groups we are working with but [. . .] is it just a postcode? Or is there something sitting behind that . . .? Because sometimes, the group might have a name that is linked to a postcode but actually several members of that group aren’t from that postcode. (Stakeholder 19)

The digital presence of these ‘gangs’ served as self-promotion for their group and the (illegal) activities they were often involved in which led to growing affiliations from beyond the immediate locality (see also, Irwin-Rogers et al., 2018). Indeed, the ‘influencer’ power of social media, in which gangs members and their ‘tens of thousands of followers’ become like ‘local celebrities’ (Stakeholder 19) extends the reach of ‘gang’ recruitment and activity, ultimately acting ‘as a pull factor for other youths’ (Stakeholder 2).

The rise of social media enables young people to connect with diverse digital communities, shaping their values and providing a sense of belonging. Yet, despite its growing influence on identity, comparatively little is known about the digital lives of young people and the ways in which it can facilitate – intentionally or otherwise – violence. Young people (n = 14) saw their phone as central to their social world, acknowledging both positive and negative connotations. While online communities were integral to their identity, they noted that social media – particularly certain platforms – could be toxic, with online tensions often spilling into the physical world:

I couldn’t do without a phone and would not know how to live without one, [but] I wouldn’t use snapchat it’s all about drugs guns and causing fights. (Young person 7)

This appears to support the sentiment that young people perceive social media as a major driver of violence (YEF, 2023). Furthermore, mirroring what was seen within the tragic murder of 14-year-old Gordon Gault in Newcastle in 2022 (BBC News, 2023), young people and stakeholders saw social media as a tool through which to organise and facilitate ‘tit-for-tat’ violence between rival ‘gangs’.

Ultimately, then, social media and online ‘gang’ membership demonstrate a sense of territorialism that transcends physical geographical boundaries. Indeed, for many young people today, the online world and the communities in which they inhabit are as meaningful and influential as the geographical communities that exist within their physical lives (Irwin-Rogers et al., 2018). Frontline stakeholders expressed feeling that some young ‘gang’ members had become emboldened by social media. In other words, social media enables young people a platform through which they can personify the ‘digital hard man’, even if this persona is not reflected in the real world.

Although the online risks were not fully understood by all frontline stakeholders, young people talked of ways in which they attempted to mitigate their own risks. Some young people – particularly those more closely associated with ‘gangs’ – talked about the physical restrictions they felt. As someone with prior involvement with a well-established ‘gang’ in the region who had been both a victim and ‘perpetrator’ of SYV explained,

There are certain places you don’t wanna go. It’s not like you’re scared, it’s not like that or something, but you go in their place, that’s where they chill, that’s where you’re gonna see 40 of them [. . .] I’m not gonna go beefing with them. (Young person 10)

Other young people, including those on the periphery of CCE and SYV, discussed how they had removed themselves from certain online platforms to ‘keep away from the “drama”’ (young person 5). Problematically, however, while removing themselves from the physical spaces in which violence manifests was seen to alleviate immediate risk of harm, trying to remove themselves entirely from virtual communities appears more difficult. One young person, for example, who had been moved from another area of the country as part of safeguarding efforts following CCE and ‘gang’ related activity, was ultimately ‘tracked’ through his digital profile. Despite the move promising a ‘new start’, his online status followed, and he subsequently found himself re-engaged in ‘gang’ activities including SYV.

For most of the young people interviewed (n = 9), then, both the physical and social world in which they lived had become very insular. Indeed, in addition to limiting spatial mobility, defensive territoriality has a significant detrimental impact on young people’s social mobility, reducing opportunities for education, employment and relationships (Pickering et al., 2012). Again, this was epitomised by one frontline stakeholder who reasoned:

If it’s not happening [here] it doesn’t exist – their world is where they live. Being from [town] is an important part of their identity . . . It can limit employment opportunities because they don’t want to leave, even to work. (Stakeholder 10)

Through a process of ‘self-exclusion’ (Henry and Mullings-Lawrence, 2017) territoriality appears to reinforce many of the structural conditions that made violence seem the only viable means to matter (Billingham and Irwin-Rogers, 2021).

Discussion

Although limited in number, due to the hard-to-reach nature of young people involved in CCE and SYV, this article draws upon the important narratives of such young people living in the North East of England. This is further supported by the voices of key stakeholders working with this vulnerable population who have a unique insight into their complex lives. In doing so, this article builds upon and unites existing literature linking SYV with individual and structural risk factors with literature examining the impact of deindustrialisation on young people in the North East. It demonstrates the importance of understanding the wider socio-historical, cultural and local contexts in which violence arises, and the central role that place and community – both in a physical and virtual sense – play in shaping young people’s engagement in and/or experiences of SYV.

Indeed, when attempting to understand young peoples’ experiences of SYV across the North East, the region’s industrial heritage cannot be ignored. As detailed in wider literature, deindustrialisation and economic restructuring has fundamentally altered the nature of work available in post-industrial regions (Standing, 2011). Where once work formed the basis of an individual’s identity and their sense of belonging, young people today – particularly those from ‘left behind’ communities – are increasingly economically marginalised and excluded from the contemporary labour market (MacDonald et al., 2005). Without the necessary skills and qualifications, and with ever-growing competition for casualised, low paid service-sector work (Lloyd, 2018), marginalised young people are at a greater risk of becoming part of a ‘sub-precariat’ – ‘a subset within the systemic experience of precarity, who face permanent exclusion from even the most precarious forms of employment’ (Soppitt et al., 2021: 475).

It is, of course, important that we avoid pathologising entire communities in the North East or drawing generalisations regarding all young people within post-industrial regions. Indeed, as noted, some communities and young people have adapted well to the changing economic landscape (Mah, 2013; Winlow and Hall, 2009). Yet for those ‘left-behind’ communities unable to do so, research suggests that criminal entrepreneurism and the illicit economy can become entrenched (Fraser and Clark, 2021; Nayak, 2003). While it can be difficult to perceive young people’s actions as anything other than ‘senseless’, violence in the lives of this minority plays a meaningful role. Violence is something which is shaped by the psychosocial context of young people’s lived environments – that is to say, the interplay between the internal psychological and external social variables which form their lived experience (see for example, Gadd and Jefferson, 2007) – and something which continues to shape their psychosocial development. Exposure to violence and a need to matter shapes young peoples’ identities, their sense of self and place in the world, and determines the options that are available to them. A propensity for violence must be recognised as providing the respect and status that, due to significant economic transformation, is often restricted through more legitimate means. Yet at the same time, as we have shown, a pressure to maintain reputations can limit a young person’s agency about how or whether to engage in violence. While involvement in ‘gangs’, crime and violence might initially help young people gain ‘street currency’ within their local area, ultimately it only serves to shrink the world in which they exist through further social exclusion.

The findings presented further show the increased blurring of virtual and physical groupings and on and offline relationships. Indeed, for young people virtual communities become as meaningful as the relationships and interactions that take place in the physical world. As alluded to in this article, and as witnessed in the murder of Gordon Gault, social media, though not a direct cause of violence, is a tool which can exacerbate tensions online and lead to violence within physical communities. Indeed, the self-promotion of ‘gangs’ and the respect, notoriety and ‘protection’ offered from this can lead young people to aspire to be part of these groups (Irwin-Rogers and Pinkney, 2016; Irwin-Rogers et al., 2018). Yet, with interventions largely grounded in the physical world and geographical environment of the young people, more understanding is urgently needed about the digital lives of young people, it’s connections to CCE and SYV, and how risks in this virtual space can be mitigated.

The data presented here originate from studies conducted in the North East of the United Kingdom. However, the findings have wider relevance. Intensified neoliberalism, austerity and the subsequent emergence of a ‘cost of living crisis’ appears to be exacerbating the number young people who are socially and economically marginalised across areas within and beyond the region (Youth Select Committee, 2024). Indeed, evidence shows a rising number of young people growing up in low-income households (Barnardo’s, 2022) and a growing number of young people are reporting significant concern about the contemporary and future employment opportunities open to them (Youth Select Committee, 2024). Subsequently, while as demonstrated above, experiences of youth marginalisation are intensified in high-deprivation areas, this suggests rising numbers of young people are at an increased risk of experiencing a crisis of identity and place and a deep sense of ontological insecurity (Billingham and Irwin-Rogers, 2022). For some young people, then, the possibility of making money from crime becomes a viable option where once it would not have been. Indeed, as Billingham and Irwin-Rogers (2022) caution, while such structural factors do not remove autonomy and moral responsibility for individual actions, they influence the choices available to marginalised young people and exacerbate their risk of exploitation, harm and/or engagement in criminal activities including violence. Any attempts to address CCE and SYV, we argue, must take account of and address the wider structural barriers which compound the problem.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the organisations who funded this research, the wider practitioners who took part in this research and the young people who kindly gave up their time to share their stories and experiences.

Author Contributions

All authors contributed equally to the conceptualisation, writing and editing of the manuscript. Dr Rebecca Oswald and Professor Sarah Soppitt were primarily responsible for data collection in the first study, while all authors were involved in the design and data collection of the second study. All authors have read and approved the final version of the manuscript.

Data Availability Statement

Due to the sensitive nature of the interview data and confidentiality agreements with participants, the data are not publicly available.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Ethical Approval and Informed Consent Statement

The studies involved in this paper were approved by the Institutional Review Board of Northumbria University (approval numbers 29306 and 2940). All participants provided written informed consent prior to their participation in the study.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article: The two studies involved in this paper were conducted as part of contract research projects funded by organisations that cannot be named due to confidentiality agreements.

ORCID iD

Samantha Walker

Sarah Soppitt

Notes

Author biographies

Samantha Walker is an assistant professor in criminology whose work looks at interpersonal and systemic forms of violence in a variety of contexts. Her work is particularly focused on understanding the meanings and impacts of violence on individuals and communities.

Rebecca Oswald is an assistant professor in criminology whose research lies in the areas of youth crime and justice, with a particular focus on desistance narratives and interventions that can help young people stop offending.

Sarah Soppitt is a professor of criminology whose research has largely focused on the role and value of interventions to promote desistance, with a particular focus on young people.

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