Framing Rationale for the Iraq War

Abstract

This study examines the initial US rationale given for the Iraq War using agenda-setting and agenda-building approaches and a model for understanding the interaction of public opinion with public policy and mass media agendas. To study these dynamics, the study examines two distinct periods of time, of high and low public support of the war (April–May 2003 and April–May 2004). A content analysis of White House briefings, two major national/international newspapers and a major television network's news coverage examines the key rationale for the Iraq War in mass media and policy agendas. Results show a relationship between the White House and media agendas on central issues of the war – terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and the assembly of a coalition to prosecute the war – during a period of high public support and not during a time of low public support. The model of agenda–opinion congruence may be useful in explaining these interactions in times of war or other national crises.