The application of framing effects in the field of moral judgement has offered a golden opportunity to assess the reliability of people’s moral judgements and decisions. To date, however, these studies are still scarce and they suffer from multiple methodological issues. Therefore, this study aims to provide further insights into the reliability of moral judgements while fixing these methodological shortcomings. In this study, we employed the classic trolley dilemma moral decision-making paradigm to determine the extent to which moral decisions are susceptible to framing effects. A total of 1,040 participants were included in the study. The data revealed that choices of participants did not significantly differ between the two frames. Equivalence tests confirmed that the associated effect size was very small. Further exploratory analyses revealed an unplanned interaction between the framing effect and the target of the framing manipulation. This result became from marginally statistically significant to insignificant following different sensitivity analyses. The implications and limitations of these findings and directions for future research are discussed.
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