We examined the role of conflict monitoring processes in forming metacognitive judgements of confidence while performing base rate tasks. Recently proposed models of dual-process reasoning, as well as research, have shown that conflict detection might represent a link between Type 1 and Type 2 processing. Conflict detection has also been shown to affect metacognitive processes in reasoning tasks. By varying base rate probability and congruence, we generated base rate tasks of four distinct levels of congruence. The results of two experiments showed that participants were slower and less confident in conflict conditions regardless of their response. However, there were two distinct subsets of participants with different levels of sensitivity to conflict which resulted in different patterns of results when using low base rate ratios. In-depth analyses showed that the impact of base rate information in the formation of metacognitive judgements depended on congruence and response type. Base rate information was a more salient cue for metacognitive processes when responding according to base rates compared with responding according to belief. There is evidence that base rate information may serve as a direct cue for metacognition, independent of fluency.
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