Dual-use research in philosophy: can there be such a thing?

Abstract

The aim of this article is to explore whether and how the concept of dual-use can be applied to philosophical research, as well as its potential for explaining cases of misuse of philosophical theory and for justifying any restrictions on academic freedom. I argue that there are two ways in which philosophical research can be misused: by using its methods for purposes that contradict the general purposes of philosophy, and by using (parts of) a theory against the purposes intended by its author. Philosophical research is dual-use research of concern (DURC) if the theory can be misused without modification, which is the case when a theory is not entirely conclusive. The misuse of philosophical research differs from the misuse in paradigmatic cases of DURC in that its potential to cause harm depends on social conditions. Given these conditions and the lack of relevant research, the risk of harmful misuse of philosophy as of yet does not constitute a sufficient reason to restrict academic freedom in a meaningful way. Instead, researchers should be aware of any potential for misuse, make their arguments as conclusive as possible, and emphasise the aim of their theory. To prevent harmful misuse in the public sphere, scholars should engage in public philosophy and provide an accurate and conclusive account of their research. Institutions should support this.

Introduction

The discourse on dual-use research tends to focus on the life sciences, and occasionally on fields such as data science (see Henderson et al., 2023; Ueno, 2023) or neuroscience (see Voarino, 2014). So far, there hasn’t been any work exploring the possibility of dual-use research in the humanities in general, or in philosophy in particular. On one hand, this is not surprising. The term ‘dual-use research (of concern)’ is usually associated with the risk of bioterrorism or similar threats. Philosophical research seems to have no such potential. But there are three reasons why it is worth exploring the applicability of the concept of dual-use research to philosophical research. First, philosophical ideas may not be of much use in a technical sense, but they do play a role in motivating action and influencing other people. Second, there are many historical examples of philosophical theory being used for opposing purposes or purposes that are not in line with what their author had in mind. Karl Marx’s theory has been used to justify inhumane forms of government. Other Marxist thinkers, such as Antonio Gramsci, are often used by the German New Right (see Kailitz, 2004: 84–93). Plato’s political philosophy can be used to legitimise totalitarian regimes (see Popper, 1992: 104–186). G. W. F. Hegel is an example of a philosopher whose theories are used by both the political left and the political right (see Dallmayr, 1987). Third, the issue of dual-use research is often framed as a dilemma between security and freedom of research (see, e.g. Ehni, 2008; Evans, 2013; Evans et al., 2022; Salloch, 2018). In philosophy, too, there have been both recent and historical debates about alleged restrictions on academic freedom on the grounds that a scholar’s research is perceived to be harmful to certain groups. The alleged restrictions range from protests against the scholar in question, to the cancellation of invitations, to the rejection of manuscripts. The controversy surrounding Peter Singer and his views on people with disabilities, for example, dates back to the 1980s and led him to write an article for The New York Review of Books entitled On Being Silenced in Germany (Singer, 1991). More recently, in October 2021, Kathleen Stock resigned from the University of Sussex following protests against her views on transgender rights and gender identity (Adams, 2021). Stock went on to join the newly established University of Austin, while Singer founded The Journal of Controversial Ideas, both institutions designed to counter the alleged restrictions on academic freedom.

I will not discuss the issue of academic freedom in detail in this article. There are certainly both justified and unjustified restrictions on academic freedom, as well as cases in which academics complain about restrictions on academic freedom that are not really restrictions on academic freedom at all. For the purposes of this article, I am only interested in whether the concept of dual-use can have a place in justifying any measures taken to restrict academic freedom in philosophy. To answer this question, I will first consider the definitions of ‘dual-use research’ and ‘dual-use research of concern’ and their conceptual potential for application to philosophical research (Section ‘Conceptual potential of applying the term “dual-use research (of concern)” to philosophical research’). I will show that in order to apply these terms to philosophical research, we must first understand what it means for philosophical research to be used or misused. I argue that there are two ways one can misuse philosophical research: first, to use it against the general purposes of philosophy, and second, to use it against the particular purposes of the project in question. Philosophical research is dual-use research of concern, if it can easily be misused. In Section ‘Examples of philosophical research that qualify as dual-use research or DURC’, I will examine some examples of philosophical research of concern. Whether the misuse of philosophical research results in harm depends on social conditions, I will argue in Section ‘Social conditions for the misuse of philosophy to result in harm’. In light of these conditions and the findings of the previous sections, I will argue in Section ‘Practical consequences for researchers and institutions’ that, in light of the current state of research, there is not enough ground to justify significant restrictions of academic freedom on account of the dual-use nature of philosophical theory. But more research is needed, and there are still things that individual researchers can do to reduce the risk of misuse.

Conceptual potential of applying the term ‘dual-use research (of concern)’ to philosophical research

Michael Selgelid (2013) differentiates between three different uses of the term ‘dual-use research’:

• • that which can be used for both civilian purposes and military purposes;

• • that which can be used for both good purposes and (any) bad purposes;

• • that which can be used for both good purposes and bad purposes, where the bad purposes involve weapons of mass destruction and could thus have especially severe (negative) consequences (Selgelid, 2013: 2)

Without stretching the analogy too far, it is clear that philosophical research cannot be used to build weapons of mass destruction, and its usefulness for military purposes in general is dubious. However, a more open definition of dual-use research, such as Selgelid’s second one or that of the World Health Organisation (WHO), can potentially be applied to philosophical research. The WHO differentiates between dual-use research and dual-use research of concern (DURC). While dual-use research, according to the WHO, ‘has the potential to produce knowledge, information, methods, products or technologies that could also be intentionally misused to endanger the health of humans [. . .]’ (WHO, 2022: XX; emphasis added), DURC is characterised as research that ‘could easily be misapplied to do harm with no, or only minor, modification’ (WHO, 2022: XX; emphasis added). The discourse on dual-use research focuses mainly on DURC, as the central point of discussion is the appropriate measures to mitigate serious risks (see, e.g. Evans et al., 2022; Salloch, 2018). For the application of both concepts to philosophical research, the following questions need to be answered: (1) What kinds of research products does philosophy generate that could be potential candidates for dual-use or misuse? (2) What does it mean for philosophical research to do harm or to be used for good or bad purposes?

Concerning the first question, the WHO definition offers the following examples of research products: ‘knowledge, information, methods, products and technologies’ (WHO, 2022: XX). Products and technologies are clearly not typical products of philosophical research. It is not clear whether information in the context of philosophical research can be distinguished from knowledge in a way that would be relevant for the purposes of this paper (see Adriaans, 2024). Unlike in other disciplines, in philosophical research there is usually no data that is not at the same time someone’s knowledge. I therefore propose to conflate information with knowledge. This leaves us with methods and knowledge as products of philosophical research that could potentially be misused. For a more detailed analysis, we can further distinguish between knowledge of theories, arguments and concepts, and different methods such as conceptual analysis, logic, hermeneutics, dialectics, phenomenology, etc.

The second question concerns the general relationship between philosophical research and its purposes. Paradigmatic cases of DURC are often of the type where the research itself has a relatively clear purpose or potential uses, thereby giving rise to the possibility of alternative, harmful uses. The best-known case is that of the Dutch researchers who carried out gain-of-function research on the H5N1 virus. When it became clear that the resulting knowledge could be misused for harmful purposes, a debate arose about whether and how the results should be published (see Drenth, 2012).

Philosophical research doesn’t usually contribute to technical knowledge that can help build weapons or the like. The knowledge that is acquired in philosophical research is generally more reflexive and orientational (see Mittelstraß, 1997: 13ff). In Kantian terms, one could say that the aim of philosophy in general is to understand oneself, to know what we ought to do, what can be known and what to hope for (see Kant, 1902b: 21ff). The methods of philosophy, then, have these more general purposes. Individual theories, concepts and arguments, on the other hand, can be said to have individual purposes in addition to these general purposes, such as justifying certain ideas, values, conceptions, or a specific answer to the general questions that philosophy is concerned with. One purpose is defined by the project of philosophy itself, the other one by the author of a theory. In moral philosophy, for example, the general purpose of research is to find out what is right and wrong. The additional purpose of a particular theory in moral philosophy is to argue for a particular conception of what is right and wrong, for example, it is right to treat people fairly, it is wrong to discriminate against people because of their race.

Understanding the term misuse as meaning to use something for the wrong purpose and since there are two ways of describing the purpose of philosophical inquiry – one general and one specific to a particular philosophical project – there are also two ways in which philosophy can be misused: one way is to misuse methods of philosophical inquiry for purposes other than the general purposes of philosophy. If one understands the purposes of philosophy to be something along the lines of wisdom, understanding, enlightenment and so on, then misusing philosophy could mean using philosophical methods with the aim of deception, manipulation, misinformation and so on.

The other way is to misuse aspects of a particular theory for a purpose other than the one intended by the author. If the purpose of a particular philosophical project is twofold – to find an answer to a philosophical question, and to further the general purpose of philosophy itself – then misuse can mean either using the theories, concepts and arguments developed for a different answer to the question, or for a purpose that is incompatible with the general purpose of philosophy, for example for deception, manipulation or misinformation.

From now on I will refer to the two types of misuse as general misuse and particular misuse, respectively. General misuse can apply to general methods of philosophy and parts of particular research projects, whereas particular misuse can only apply to particular research projects. ¹

But there is another difficulty: The definition of dual-use research does not simply require that a product of research be used for a different purpose, but for a bad purpose (Selgelid, 2013) or to ‘do harm’ or ‘endanger the health of humans’ (WHO, 2022: XX). In philosophy, particularly in the case of moral philosophy, the research in question is often about what is good and what is bad. So we need to ask ourselves: by what standard do we define good and bad purposes? Is the standard somehow dependent on the theory in question?

If we define them by the standards of the theory itself, then a theory is used for a good purpose iff it is used for the purpose for which it was intended, and a theory is used for a bad purpose iff it is used for a purpose other than the one for which it was intended. But this would imply that the misuse of a theory that we consider bad by some external standard (e.g. race theory for the purpose of justifying racism) for a good (by some external standard) purpose is the problem, not the theory itself. Imagine this: I take Immanuel Kant’s theory of racial differences in human beings, the purpose of which was to show how white people are superior to people of colour, and thus, for example, to justify slavery. I borrow certain concepts from this theory and use them – contrary to Kant’s assumed intention ² – to show that white people are not in fact superior and that slavery is wrong. To call this a morally problematic misuse of Kant’s theory seems counterintuitive.

It seems to me, therefore, that two criteria must be present in order to speak, in a relevant sense, of a theory being misused: It must be used for a purpose other than the one intended, and that purpose must be bad, as determined by some external standard. Misuse of the kind we are interested in in this article would thus only ever be possible for theories that have values similar to the external standard, and are thus intended for a good purpose. Of course, this leaves open the question of which external standard should be applied. But the same is the case when it comes to misuse of scientific research. It’s a moral issue that needs to be examined ethically like any other moral issue.

Dual-use research in philosophy can thus be defined as research that can be misused in the way described above. Dual-use research of concern can be defined as research that can easily be misused in the way described above, without or with minor modification.

In the following section we will explore what this might look like in the case of philosophical research by looking at some examples, before looking at how philosophical research can lead to harm in Section ‘Social conditions for the misuse of philosophy to result in harm’.

Examples of philosophical research that qualify as dual-use research or DURC

As we have seen, there are two types of misuse of philosophical research: general and particular. General misuse occurs when the methods of philosophy are used for purposes that are not consistent with the general purposes of philosophy. This kind of misuse of philosophy is about as old as philosophy itself, beginning with the sophists of ancient Greece, who taught rhetoric as a method of winning arguments rather than as a method of finding truth (see Taylor and Lee, 2024). To some extent we can see this tradition continuing in parliamentary style debate in educational institutions. In public debate, it is sometimes seen that the position of an opponent is misrepresented in order to discredit them. Much has been said and written, though less so in academic contexts, about Jordan Peterson’s misrepresentation of philosophy, especially what he calls ‘postmodern neo-Marxism’, including criticisms of his misrepresentation of both Marxism and postmodernism (see, e.g. Fluss and Miller, 2019; Haider, 2018; Raatikainen, 2022; Wynn, 2018).

Eckstrand (2016), in a post for the APA blog, describes how right-wing bloggers often cite philosophical references, but how 'while the philosophers’ ideas are summarised moderately well, there are significant qualifications that each philosopher gives to their ideas being left out’ (Eckstrand, 2016). He cites an example (which is no longer accessible) in which conclusions are drawn from the reception of Nietzsche’s dislike of modernity that, according to Eckstrand, are not in line with what Nietzsche thought was needed for the future (a new way of philosophising rather than a return to the past).

In general, there is a lot of potential for the misuse of argumentative methods for the purpose of intimidating opponents. Whether some methods have a particularly high potential for misuse and qualify as DURC would need to be examined in more detail.

Regarding the misuse of particular research projects, what characteristics must a philosophical theory have in order to qualify as DURC? For a theory that is completely conclusive, its (particular) misuse will probably always involve some form of misrepresentation, because in a conclusive theory the premises are linked to the conclusion in a way that does not allow different conclusions to be drawn and thus used for different purposes. However the WHO definition of DURC calls for a product of research that ‘could easily be misapplied to do harm with no, or only minor, modification’ (WHO, 2022: XX; emphasis added). Such a theory is one that has a lack of specificity or a similar deficiency built into it. A good example of this is Peter Singer’s practical ethics. According to Singer (2011: 67), his principle of equal consideration of preferences is intended to elevate the moral status of nonhuman animals by showing that they don’t differ in any morally relevant sense from humans with certain disabilities. Peter Singer makes this comment in response to the claim that a clear line between species is needed to avoid ‘sliding into a moral abyss’ (Singer, 2011: 66), where at first intellectually disabled people and later social misfits or ‘anyone we do not like [is classified] as sub-human’ and eliminated. (Singer, 2011: 67)

Singer finds this concern ‘excessively pessimistic’ and goes on to suggest that ‘we should not be deterred from trying to rectify this situation [where the interests of billions of sentient creatures are ignored] by the mere possibility that the principles on which we base this attempt will be misused by evil people for their own ends’ (Singer, 2011: 67). As a precaution, Singer suggests that ‘we should heighten our vigilance against such misuse’.

This is about as clear as it gets in terms of dual-use for philosophical theory. The author himself states that his theory is intended for a specific purpose (which he considers to be good), but also sees the possibility of it being misused for a bad purpose. The reason why Singer feels the need to emphasise his aim is precisely because he understands that his arguments can be used in a different way. This has a lot to do with the fact that his theory is utilitarian. In utilitarianism, the only thing that is absolutely good is the overall maximisation of utility. Any intermediate end can only be good relative to other ends and must be weighed against them. This also means that there are no absolute moral statuses, and that in a world of limited resources, raising the relative moral status of one group may very well result in lowering the relative status of another group.

Since the dual-use nature of Peter Singer’s ethical theory is closely related to the fact that it is a version of utilitarianism, one might think that a Kantian ethics of absolute duties has no room for dual-use problems. But we need only return to the example above to see that this is not so. Kant’s theory of race (see Kant, 1902a), in which he establishes a hierarchical order between people of different races in terms of, among other things, their intellect and capacity for agency, is at odds with his universalist morality. Leaving aside a change of heart in later years (see Kleingeld, 2007), it is not clear at all, whether his theory of race should just be ignored when applying this moral theory (Hill and Boxill, 2000; Louden, 2000), or whether his moral theory is to be understood as less universalist than it claims to be (Mills, 2005). One could either refer to Kant, including his theory of race, and argue that the categorical imperative only applies to white people, or one could take the categorical imperative and Kant’s whole moral theory at face value and understand it to apply to all people. So Kant’s theory could be used to justify very different ways of treating people.

Another well-known criticism of Kant’s moral theory is the problem of relevant description, perhaps most famously formulated by Anscombe (1958), who claims that Kant’s ‘rule about universalisable maxims is useless without stipulations as to what shall count as a relevant description of an action with a view to constructing a maxim about it’. Lohmar (2022) argues that the problem of relevant description leads to cases where an action can be described under such different maxims that the action is both allowed and not allowed under the categorical imperative. I will take this as evidence that both consequentialist and deontological moral theories can potentially be theories that qualify as DURC, by which I mean that they can, as a whole or in part, be used, without or with only minor modification or misrepresentation, for purposes other than those intended by the author.

Social conditions for the misuse of philosophy to result in harm

Now that we have established the ways in which philosophical, and especially ethical, theory can be misused, we need to consider how this misuse can lead to harm or danger to human health. Terrorists, one might be inclined to say, don’t need justification for their ends, they need means. But it is also difficult to deny that moral judgements play a role in motivating action (see Rosati, 2016). Since moral judgements and their justification are the subject of (moral) philosophy, it can be said that products of philosophical research play a role in facilitating action. I don’t think that this is unique to moral philosophy, though, as other branches of philosophy play a role in forming our beliefs about the world, which in turn also influence our actions. But in moral philosophy the connection with action is the most direct and obvious, which is why I have restricted myself to examples from moral philosophy.

The power of ethical theory becomes even more apparent when we leave the realm of individual action and look at the level of society. Quoting Victor Hugo: ‘On résiste à l’invasion des armées; on ne résiste pas à l’invasion des idées’ (Hugo, 1910: 554). Ideas can be more powerful than weapons because they can contribute to fundamental societal transformations, at least under certain conditions. And even terrorists typically don’t act on their own. On the contrary, they are usually part of a network of extremists that heavily rely on ideology for motivation (see Carson and Turner, 2024; Maynard, 2014).

On a societal level, theories can have massive effects, for example by justifying and thus perpetuating systems of power, as racial theory did for slavery. Parsons (2016) identifies four ways in which ideas can influence policy: (1) By being the ideas of the powerful, (2) By empowering actors, (3) By forming coalitions and (4) By shaping institutions. Once ideas are institutionalised, they spread not only by influencing policy, but also in many other ways that can be summarised under the heading of socialisation. As Saurugger (2013) notes, ‘[s]ocialization occurs when norms, worldviews, collective understandings are internalized and subsequently codified by a group of actors’. But there must be other ways in which ideational change occurs for new ideas to rise to the level of institutionalisation. Swinkels (2020) describes the process of ideational change as ‘layered’: new ideas first develop in individuals’ cognition and are shared through discourse, but socialisation and other external factors, such as crises or other events, also play a role. As for how ideas spread through discourse, ideally, we would expect ideas to stand on their own, for the best argument to prevail. Realistically, however, we have to assume that other mechanisms are also at play. For one thing, we know that political judgements are strongly influenced by group loyalties (see Achen and Bartels, 2016: 272; Lepoutre, 2021). We can reasonably expect the same to be true, at least to some extent, for moral judgements. For all claims, be they descriptive or normative, or their respective justifications, I assume that at least two things help them to spread: reach and credibility.

Today it is easier than ever to have an audience, and the more people you can reach, the more people you can persuade. It is plausible to expect this effect to be amplified by a high level of credibility. Marketing experts have long recognised that social media influencers are effective partners in persuading people to buy certain products, not only because of their reach, but also because of their perceived credibility (see Nafees et al., 2021). And while expertise and trustworthiness play a role in the perception of credibility, attractiveness and number of followers are also relevant factors (Weismueller et al., 2020).

In a healthy democracy with open discourse, I assume, the misuse of theoretical concepts can often be exposed and thus rendered harmless. But in the current situation, sometimes described as an epistemic crisis (see, e.g. Benkler et al., 2018; Sullivan et al., 2020), public discourse is increasingly fragmented, in part due to the effects of epistemic bubbles and echo chambers (see Nguyen, 2020). Fragmented discourse leads to group-based dogmatism and affective polarisation, meaning that in-group claims are less critically evaluated than out-group claims, and people from outside the group are disliked and distrusted (Lepoutre, 2021). What happens in groups that have closed themselves off from open discourse has also been described as tribal epistemology:

Information is evaluated based not on conformity to common standards of evidence or correspondence to a common understanding of the world, but on whether it supports the tribe’s values and goals and is vouchsafed by tribal leaders. ‘Good for our side’ and ‘true’ begin to blur into one. (Roberts, 2017)

This state of affairs, where information and theories are not independently checked for plausibility but where epistemically unsound, social reasons are decisive for epistemic evaluation, is a breeding ground for misinformation, and thus also for the misuse of philosophical theory.

These are all rather theoretical considerations. More research would be needed to see, first, how widespread the misuse of philosophical theory is, and second, what form it takes, that is, are theories that qualify as DURC more prone to misuse than perfectly coherent ones? Third, it would be very interesting to look more closely at the conditions for harmful misuse of philosophy: Are they the same as for misinformation in general?

Practical consequences for researchers and institutions

Measures that have been proposed and implemented to regulate DURC include legislative measures as well as self-regulatory measures such as not publishing, restricting access to data or not conducting research at all (see, e.g. Ehni, 2008; Evans et al., 2022; Salloch, 2018). These measures are, at least in part, severe and need to be well justified. Especially in the case of philosophical research, academic freedom seems to be closely related to issues of freedom of speech, which makes measures to restrict it all the more serious. Two observations make me doubt that at least legislative measures for philosophical DURC can be justified: First, as we have seen, the potential for misuse goes beyond those theories that qualify as DURC. Because of the lack of theoretical and empirical research on the subject, we do not know the extent to which philosophy is being misused today, or has been misused in the past, nor do we know what characteristics of a theory make it more or less likely to be misused. This also means that we do not know whether DURC really is more likely to be misused than other research in philosophy. My own reflections on the characteristics of dual-use research in philosophy are merely a theoretical starting point. Second, in all cases of misuse of philosophy, the potential for harm depends largely on social circumstances. The circumstances I have described as conducive to the successful misuse of philosophy are the same as those that generally foster misinformation and are a problem for a democratic society. Therefore, rather than restricting academic freedom, efforts should be made to address these circumstances. Possible measures to achieve this are many and varied and cannot be exhaustively addressed here, but they must at least include the restructuring of current forms of communication with the aim of creating spaces for healthy civic dialogue and improved education in deliberative practices. ³ For other actions, such as cancelling invitations to speak, rejecting a manuscript for publication or self-censorship, it is not clear whether they count as restrictions on academic freedom. What’s more, they can often be justified by a lack of quality in the research. As we have seen in Section ‘Examples of philosophical research that qualify as dual-use research or DURC’, the characteristics of dual-use research in philosophy are largely congruent with deficiencies in satisfying general standards of philosophical theory. In light of this, the protests against academics that both Peter Singer and Kathleen Stock have bemoaned (Adams, 2021; Singer, 2011) must perhaps be seen as an exercise of freedom of expression instead of a restriction of theirs.

However, I think there are things that researchers can do that are good in any case, and as a side effect may reduce the risks of misuse. First, we can try to be aware of the potential for misuse when we develop our theories. We can ask ourselves whether our arguments are as conclusive as they can be, and whether there is room for misinterpretation. Where it isn’t possible to make our arguments absolutely conclusive, we can emphasise what we want our argument to show and distance ourselves from possible misinterpretations or alternative conclusions. It is a good thing that Peter Singer emphasises the aim of his argument, making it harder for potential misusers to misinterpret it voluntarily. However, it would still have been better to make sure that the theory itself only allows for the right interpretation. Where we are making normative or conceptual claims about particularly vulnerable groups of people, such as those suffering from illness, disability or marginalisation, we may need to be particularly rigorous in our research, because the impact of misuse of these claims may be more severe for those who can’t defend themselves as effectively.

Perhaps more importantly, however, we have seen that potentially harmful misuse of philosophy takes place in the public or semi-public sphere. One way in which I think we can prevent the misuse of philosophy in the public sphere is by not leaving public philosophy to those who we do not think can do it justice. Perhaps the best way to prevent the distortion of philosophical concepts and arguments in public discourse is to counter it with a more accurate and useful account of them. Researchers can also act as role models in discussions, demonstrating best practices for fair and productive discourse, such as critiquing the strongest version of an opponent’s argument, considering a variety of viewpoints and striving for consensus.

On the part of institutions, this means that they need to encourage and support the communication of philosophy, as well as science communication in general. Universities should encourage scholars to publicise their research, and spending time on such activities should not be a disadvantage in the academic job market. Public funding should be made available to researchers who wish to engage in public philosophy.

Conclusion and desiderata

The aim of this article was to explore the potential of applying the concept of dual-use to philosophical research. The motivation was twofold: First, with the expansion of the discourse to fields outside the life sciences, the question arose as to whether the risk of dual-use research is also present in the humanities, and whether the concept could even theoretically be applied to non-empirical fields of research. Secondly, the fact that the discourse on dual-use research is usually framed as a dilemma between security and academic freedom, and that philosophy has its share of controversies on the topic of academic freedom, makes it seem natural to ask whether the concept of dual-use can play a role in justifying restrictions on academic freedom.

I have shown that the concept of dual-use can indeed be applied to philosophical research, if one understands philosophical research in the sense that a theory has the purpose of defending a particular answer to a question as well as furthering the general purposes of philosophy. Then the misuse of philosophical research is the use of a theory or concept or argument for a purpose that is both bad (by some external standard) and different from the intended purpose, or the use of philosophical methods for purposes that are contrary to the purposes of philosophy. Philosophical research is dual-use research if misuse is possible, which is the case for many theories, as in science. It is dual-use research of concern when the theory can be misused without or only minor modification, which is the case when a theory is not entirely conclusive and leaves room for interpretation.

However, a crucial difference between the misuse of philosophical research and that of typical dual-use research is that philosophical research does not facilitate action in the way that scientific research often does. It primarily helps to justify action. Thus, the potential for harmful misuse of philosophical research is greatest at the societal level, where it depends on a number of conditions. Since societal conditions are crucial for the harmful misuse of philosophy, and since there is no evidence that dual-use research is indeed more prone to misuse in the case of philosophy, typical measures that have been discussed for managing the risk of dual-use research do not apply in the case of philosophy. The current state of research does not suggest that the risk of harmful misuse of philosophy is an adequate reason to restrict academic freedom beyond measures that can also be justified by standards of research quality. Rather, researchers should be aware of the potential for misuse, make their arguments as conclusive as possible, and, where appropriate, emphasise the aim of the theory. To prevent harmful misuse in the public sphere, scholars could also engage in public philosophy and give an accurate and conclusive account of their research. Institutions should support this.

For future research, it would be interesting to look more closely at cases of misuse of philosophical theory: How common is the misuse of philosophical theory? What forms does it take? Are dual-use theories more prone to misuse than perfectly coherent ones? In addition, theoretical and empirical research on the conditions for harmful misuse of philosophy could further help to assess the risk of harmful misuse of philosophy.