The Prevent policy was introduced in 2003 as part of the UK counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST) with the aim of preventing the radicalisation of people to terrorism. In 2015, it was given a statutory footing in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act and it became a legal duty for Higher Education Institutions among others. Since then, Higher Education Institutions have been working to ensure their compliance with the legal duty. This article reflects on the implementation of the Prevent duty in one university. It is informed by an engagement with the Prevent group in the university which was created to implement the Prevent duty. The article argues that academic expertise had little impact in shaping the implementation of the Prevent duty at the university because the epistemic stance of counter-terrorism side lines expertise and evidence so that it can maintain its coherence and integrity. Specifically, the impact of academic expertise was limited because critically oriented academic expertise complicates a straightforward implementation of the legal duty, a state-centric orientation in the Prevent group constrained the horizon of discussion, and a crisis of knowledge at the heart of counter-terrorism replaces expertise and evidence with ideology.
AistropeT (2016) The Muslim paranoia narrative in counter-radicalisation policy. Critical Studies on Terrorism9(2): 182–204.
2.
BarkerE (1984) The Making of a Moonie: Brainwashing or Choice?Oxford: Blackwell.
3.
BazianH (2016) Muslim intellectuals and America’s imperial project. Daily Sabah, 8September.
4.
BeckfordJ (2003) Social Theory and Religion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5.
BlackwoodLHopkinsNReicherS (2016) From theorising radicalisation to surveillance practices: Muslims in the cross hairs of scrutiny. Political Psychology37(5): 597–612.
6.
BolerMZemblyasM (2003) Chapter 5: discomforting truths the emotional terrain of understanding difference. In: TrifonasPP (ed.) Pedagogies of Difference: Rethinking Education for Social Change. New York: Routledge, 107–130.
7.
BurnettJWhyteD (2005) Embedded expertise and the new terrorism. Journal for Crime Conflict and Media1(4): 1–18.
8.
ChrisafisA (2016) Human rights groups vow to challenge burkini ban on Cannes beaches. The Guardian, 12August.
9.
ChrisafisAFarrerM (2016) Sarkozy calls burkinis a ‘provocation’ that supports radical Islam. The Guardian, 25August.
10.
CohenAK (1955) Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang. New York: Free Press.
11.
CrenshawM (1981) The causes of terrorism. Comparative Politics13(4): 379–399.
12.
CroneM (2016) Radicalization revisited: violence, politics and the skills of the body. International Affairs92(3): 587–604.
13.
DaviesL (2016) Security, extremism and education: safeguarding or surveillance?British Journal of Educational Studies64(1): 1–19.
14.
DlaminiN (2002) From the other side of the desk: notes on teaching about race when racialized. Race Ethnicity and Education5(1): 51–66.
15.
DoddV (2006) Universities focal points for radical Islamists, says minister. The Guardian, 18November.
16.
DurodieB (2016) Securitising education to prevent terrorism or losing direction?British Journal of Educational Studies64(1): 21–35.
EspositoJL (1999) The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?, 3rd edn.New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press.
19.
GearonL (2013) The counter-terrorist classroom: religion, education and security. Religious Education108(2): 129–147.
20.
GhatakSPrinsBC (2016) The homegrown threat: state strength, grievance, and domestic terrorism. International Interactions43: 214–247.
21.
GillbornD (2008) Racism and Education: Coincidence or Conspiracy?London; New York: Routledge.
22.
GirouxH (2014) Neoliberalism’s War on Higher Education. Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books.
23.
Githens-MazerJ (2012) The rhetoric and reality: radicalization and political discourse. International Political Science Review33: 5556–5567.
24.
Githens-MazerJLambertR (2010) Why conventional wisdom on radicalisation fails: the persistence of a failed discourse. International Affairs86(4): 889–901.
Great Britain Department for Education and Skills (2006) Promoting Good Campus Relations: Working with Staff and Students to Build Community Cohesion and Tackle Violent Extremism in the Name of Islam at Universities and Colleges. London: The Stationery Office.
28.
HermanESO’SullivanG (1989) The ‘Terrorism’ Industry. The Experts & Institutions That Shape Our View of Terror. New York: Pantheon Books.
29.
Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) (2016) Updated Framework for the Monitoring of the Prevent Duty in Higher Education in England. London; Bristol: HEFCE.
30.
HM Government (2011) Prevent Strategy. London: The Stationery Office.
31.
HM Government (2015) Prevent Duty Guidance: For England and Wales. London: The Stationery Office.
32.
JacksonR (2015) The epistemological crisis of counterterrorism. Critical Studies on Terrorism8(1): 33–54.
33.
JacksonR (2016) To be or not to be policy relevant? Power, emancipation and resistance in CTS research. Critical Studies on Terrorism9(1): 120–125.
34.
KundnaniA (2009) Spooked!: How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism. London: Institute of Race Relations.
35.
KundnaniA (2014) The Muslims Are Coming: Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror. London; New York: Verso Books.
36.
LeonardoZ (2009) Race, Whiteness, and Education. New York; Oxford: Routledge.
37.
McLarenP (1998) Life in Schools: An Introduction to Critical Pedagogy in the Foundations of Education. New York: Longman.
38.
MartinT (2014) Governing an unknowable future: the politics of Britain’s Prevent policy. Critical Studies on Terrorism7(1): 62–78.
MillerDMillsT (2009) The terror experts and the mainstream media: the expert nexus and its dominance in the news media. Critical Studies on Terrorism2(3): 414–437.
41.
MillerDMillsT (2010) Counterinsurgency and terror expertise: the integration of social scientists into the war effort. Cambridge Review of International Affairs23(2): 203–221.
42.
MuellerJ (2006) Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them. New York: Free Press.
43.
MunsonH (2003) Islam, nationalism and resentment of foreign domination. Middle East Policy10(2): 40–53.
44.
O’DonnellA (2016) Securitisation, counterterrorism and the silencing of dissent: the educational implications of prevent. British Journal of Educational Studies64(1): 53–76.
45.
O’TooleTDeHanasDNModoodT (2012) Balancing tolerance, security & Muslim engagement in the UK-impact of Prevent. Critical Studies on Terrorism5(3): 373–389.
PriceS (2011) Worst Case Scenario? Governance, Mediation and the Security Regime. London; New York: Zed Books.
52.
RichardsA (2010) The problem with ‘radicalization’: the remit of ‘Prevent’ and the need to refocus on terrorism in the UK. International Affairs87: 143–152.
53.
RossJI (2009) The primacy of grievance as a structural cause of oppositional political terrorism: comparing Al-Fatah, FARC, and PIRA. In: CanterD (ed.) The Faces of Terrorism: Multidisciplinary Perspectives. New York: John Wiley & Sons, pp. 75–95.
54.
SaeedTJohnsonD (2016) Intelligence, global terrorism, and higher education: neutralising threats or alienating allies?. British Journal of Educational Studies64(1): 37–51.
55.
SedgwickM (2010) The concept of radicalization as a source of confusion. Terrorism and Political Violence22(4): 479–494.
56.
SilkeA (1998) Cheshire-cat logic: the recurring theme of terrorist abnormality in psychological research. Psychology, Crime & Law4(1): 51–69.
57.
SuskindR (2006) The One Per Cent Doctrine. New York: Simon & Schuster.
58.
TorosH (2016) Dialogue, praxis and the state: a response to Richard Jackson. Critical Studies on Terrorism9(1): 126–130.
